Julius Evola
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Channel Posts
A sequel: By the way, in this day of ours, you will only start living when you realise that, NOT everything is political. I know, I know that sense of importance and that feeling of worth you experience when you engage in politics all day long—the delusion that you are doing something consequential. But ask yourself if this is actually the end you have to seek in this life and if it should be the stone upon which you establish your whole identity. Ere long, you will have to see how your soul is being eaten away, and how your insides are being impoverished.| 2 | Personal: It is only rarely—if ever—will you see anyone of those loud speakers of remigration tell you anything about the economic and global system—alongside the internal degeneration of countries—that made immigration almost a necessity. I remain in disbelief as regards the total separation from reality from which most nationalistic and populist Rightists suffer. I mean do these people even know anything about how their countries are actually run? Do people even have eyes to see and read nowadays? | 94 |
| 3 | «In conclusion, what matters to emphasize is that Evola is not an "interesting" author among many others, but an "awakener" who must provoke in each person, through his radical critique of the modern world and his numerous insights into the "world of Tradition" as another "landscape" of civilization, salutary questioning. To require, as some do, a totally uncritical reading of his work makes no sense to us; this solitary aristocrat who carried during his perilous mountain ascents a copy of the Bhagavad-Gita to "meditate from the heights of the peaks," is not a founder of a school. An unfortunate publisher, known for his sense of irony and his classical impassivity, has perfectly defined, after evoking the "learned members of the sect of witnesses of J. Evola," the right attitude one should have toward the one who was called the Last Ghibelline: "I believe it is indeed in good taste to demonstrate fidelity to the work (to what it means and underlies or implies) rather than to treat the author with reverence: especially when this devotion camouflages the anxious concern to keep at a distance from the former (from the consequences...) and, simultaneously, the impatient desire to reduce this distance that separates from the latter—not to approach and access him, by elevating oneself, but to make him less inaccessible and closer, by lowering him." The rest is commentary.»—Philippe Baillet. | 118 |
| 4 | People should understand that, Europe is no longer an entity of ‘individuals’, of talkative politicians, of ‘leaders’ (there is none left), of noisy flapdoodlers, but of huge institutions, of ‘cabals’, of gigantic corporations. | 251 |
| 5 |  Your gay, female saviour, sir! How strong, how brave! I am having a euphoria!
Of course, those are mere empty words that mean nothing, nor will anything actually happen or change. | 268 |
| 6 | This kind of ethics informs his economic thinking. It is the Manchester school all over again. It is exactly like the thinking of Cobden, who at the very same time was leading the Whig free-trade theory to victory. Marx opposed the form of capitalism that derived its justification from Bentham and Shaftesbury and was formulated by Adam Smith. But since he was a critic only, negative and uncreative, he took over his principles from the very thing he was fighting.
Work was for him a commodity, not an obligation. That is the core of his political economics. His ethics were the ethics of big business. Not that business is unethical; but we can read between the lines his opinion that the laborer is a fool not to engage in it. And laborers have understood him. The battle for higher wages became a kind of investment speculation: the worker was now a merchant selling his product, work. The trick about Marx’s famous ‘‘surplus value’’ thesis is that it was considered as spoils to be carried off by the successful merchant from the opponent’s stores. It was not to be presented to him for nothing. Class egoism thus became a universal principle. The laborers not only wanted to do business, he wanted the corner the whole market. The true Marxist is hostile to the state, and for the very same reason as the Whig: it hinders him in the ruthless exercise of his private business interests. Marxism is the capitalism of the working class. Consider Darwin, who was just as important to Marx as Malthus and Cobden. Business is conceived of throughout as a struggle for existence. In industry the employer engages in commerce with the commodity ‘‘money,’’ while the worker does likewise with the commodity ‘‘work.’’ Marx wished to deprive capital of the right to private profit, but the only thing he could think of as a substitute was the worker’s right to private profit. That is unsocialistic, but it is typically English.» | 348 |
| 7 | In the same vein, I quote Spengler (from his Preußentum und Sozialismus):
«The same style is still apparent today in every English trade company and every American trust. Their aim is not to work steadily to raise the entire nation’s standard of living, it is rather to produce private fortunes by the use of private capital, to overcome private competition, and to exploit the public through the use of advertising, price wars, artificial stimulation of the consumer, and strict control of the ratio of supply and demand. When the Englishman speaks of national wealth he means the number of millionaires in the country. As Friedrich Engels wrote, ‘‘Nothing is more foreign to the English mentality than solidarity.’’ Even in sports and recreation the Englishman sees a test of personal, and especially physical, superiority. He engages in sports for the sake of national and world records; he enjoys prize-fighting, a sport that is closely related to his economic habits and is quite alien to the minds of gymnasts in Germany.
All this proves that the economic existence of England is synonymous with business, i.e., a refined form of piracy. The English instinct regards all commodities as booty, items to be manipulated in order to get rich. The English machine industry was created in the interest of commerce and trade, its chief aim being the production of cheap goods. When English agriculture began to limit wage cuts by fixing its own prices, it was simply abandoned in the interest of commerce. The battles between capital and labor in English industry in 1850 were concerned with the commodity ‘‘labor’’—one side wanted to get it cheap, the other wanted a high price for it. Everything that Marx has to say with grudging admiration about ‘‘capitalistic society’’ refers principally to English, and not to a universal, economic instinct.
The sublime term ‘‘free trade’’ is part and parcel of Viking economics. The Prussian, i.e., socialist term would be ‘‘state control of the exchange of goods.’’ This assigns to trade a subordinate rather than a dominant role within the complex of economic activity. We can understand why Adam Smith harbored a hatred of the state and the ‘‘cunning beasts called statesmen.’’ Indeed, government officials must have the same effect on tradesmen as policemen on burglars and naval cruisers on the crews of pirate ships.
Likewise characteristic of the Englishman is his overestimation of the importance of capital sums for economic health. The materialist finds it impossible to understand that the English concept of capital is psychologically, and therefore practically (the practical life is, after all, an expression of psychic conditions) different from the French system of private means and the Prussian concept of administrative funds. The English have never been good at psychology. They have always considered their own ideas as logically binding on ‘‘mankind.’’ In fact, all of modern political economics rests on the basic error of equating economic life everywhere in the world with an exclusively English interest in business, and the error is committed even by those who reject the theories of the Manchester school. Marxism, in the very act of negating this theory, has adopted its patterns quite completely. This explains the grotesque fiasco of all predictions concerning the outbreak of the World War; it was said that the collapse of world economy would follow within a few months. . . .
What the Englishman calls bliss—business success that saves physical work and makes one a gentleman—is good for all Englishmen. For us it is obscene. It smacks of mobs and snobs. | 306 |
| 8 |  +2Huizinga on the enslavement of the ideal of liberty to the economic aspect (alongside the previous political one), the system of thought of the Manchester school, and the big ‘‘If’’ upon which it was built: | 299 |
| 9 | Should I be sharing, alongside Evola stuff, more excerpts and pages from the books of import I am reading? | 268 |
| 10 |  Watching the decline of the west be like nowadays: | 350 |
| 11 |  +3No text... | 465 |
| 12 | Personal: Pop music is mostly made to keep young men disgustingly childish and teenlike for ever. | 467 |
| 13 | —Huizinga on the fact that, nothing of great value ever was the result of mere 'bigness' and 'large quantity':
«The whole evolution of the nineteenth century continued to move in the direction of consolidation and expansion of large power complexes among which the chain of smaller states seemed to occupy a second-rate position, endured as long as the great powers had anything to gain from their existence and wished to abide by legality. Almost everyone came to believe in the large state. With good reason Kleinstaaterei had become a taunt and a mockery in Germany, which had suffered for so long from hopeless disruption and political impotence. Unfortunately, there was a tendency to forget, under the influence of the general delusion of quantity, that not a single one of the great, lasting values of the world owed its existence to a great power as such, and that all the best products of wisdom, beauty, and civilization had emerged in very restricted political relationships. It must be clear to anyone at a single glance over what we know of our few thousand years of world history that this much plagued world of ours has suffered more from Grossstaaterei than from Kleinstaaterei. Perhaps, if the fundamentals of civilization remain intact and law recovers its validity, Grossstaaterei, too, will someday be a taunt.»
—Johan Huizinga, Patriotism and Nationalism in European History, 1940. | 459 |
| 14 | «There was [in the nineteenth century] more and more of an inclination to forget that in the long run the state is the reality of political life and the nation the ideal, the program, the slogan, the aspiration. Considered historically, the state had been primary everywhere in Europe, and the nation the product of living conditions within the limits of a certain state. The nation had formed itself onlv within the context of authority, even in those cases where the national unity and uniformity that have become apparent in the end result of the development seem to have been implicit as the necessary final outcome in the natural circumstances of a distant past.
From the end of the eighteenth century on, however, as the concept of the fatherland and the nation gained more and more content, color, pathos, and lifeblood, a painful disharmony necessarily developed wherever the national consciousness did not correspond to the nature of the state. If everything were in order, national sentiment, love of the fatherland, and the sense of loyalty to a state ought to be completely congruent for each people. They were not so by any means everywhere. Where such a concentric, harmonic relationship was lacking, discontents developed threatening disruption. The Europe of the Restoration was full of such discontents and potential points of disruption. The vanquishers of Napoleon—England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia—were, together with defeated France (which remained one of the leading forces in spite of the fall of her empire), the masters of the political stage as the recognized great powers. Actually, the position of being a great power implied a violation of the ideal formulated by the political theory of the eighteenth century and developed by the Revolution; in that theory there was no place for predominance of large powers over small. But in the history of two centuries of European concert and European confict such predominance was all too familiar. Now more than ever a recognized precedence of the great powers was the inescapable consequence of the facts. This actual arrangement of Europe in large and small states did not have a great deal to do with the principle of nationality. It was based on political power and not on ethnic affinity. It was not Germany that counted as a great power, not even the newly created German Confederation, which claimed to be the embodiment of Germany's unity, but Prussia. Now Prussia itself was still far from being a homogeneous nation. It had never pretended to have risen to power as a nation. It was a state and wanted to remain so. In 1813, when Frederick William III appealed to his subjects to liberate themselves from French dominion in his Summons to My People, he did not address those subjects either as Prussians or as Germans, but summed up their particular names as Brandenburgers, Prussians, Silesians, Pomeranians, Lithuanians, and so forth. So little were the concepts of state and nation identified there. It is, then, no wonder that in earlier times the variety of national differences within the so vastly expanded Hapsburg territories caused no one serious worries with regard to Austria».
—Johan Huizinga, Patriotism and Nationalism in European History, 1940. | 409 |
| 15 | To get up again, to arise inwardly, to give oneself form, to create an order & a direction within oneself, instead of furthering the demagogy & materialism of the masses, taking a position against those who can think only in terms of programs, organizational & partisan problems. | 413 |
| 16 | In the world we regard as normal, in which there reigned that inner boldness without which life is merely a murky and senseless affair, the distinguishing marks of virility were inward reserve and self-mastery, “being self-possessed,” a purity born of strength. There were two paths to these ends: action and contemplation. The two fundamental types of authentic virility were therefore expressed in the warrior, or hero, and the ascetic. Corresponding symmetrically to these virile types were two types of femininity.
Woman realizes herself as such and rises to the same level as the warrior and the ascetic as lover and wife. Just as there is an active heroism, there is also a passive one. The heroism of absolute affirmation is counterposed to that of absolute devotion, and both can be luminous when lived in purity as a sacrificial offering. It is precisely this duality of the heroic element that determines the difference between the paths of realization proper to man and woman. The attitudes of the warrior and the ascetic, the first proceeding through pure action and the second through a virile isolation, yet both living a life beyond life, correspond in woman to the heroism of the impetus by which she gives herself wholly to another and for another. And for this other she is always present, whether he is the husband, in the type of the female lover corresponding to the warrior, or the son, in the type of the mother corresponding to the ascetic. In such a relationship she finds the higher meaning of her life, her joy, and, in extreme cases, her salvation. The realization of these two heroic directions, separate and non-interchangeable, pursued ever more resolutely by overcoming everything feminine in man and everything virile in woman, until absolute man and absolute woman are brought to completion: this is the traditional law of the sexes. . . .
It is in fact inconceivable that a world which has “overcome” castes and, to express ourselves in Jacobin jargon, “restored” to every man his dignity and rights could preserve a sense of the proper relation between the sexes. The “emancipation” of woman follows that of the slaves and the glorification of the absence of estate and tradition, that is, of the ancient pariahs. Thus abdication was mistaken for conquest. | 666 |
| 17 | Personal: In Europe, you have a dress code for musical concerts and whatnot (even though it is usually not enforced), but to have a dress code for Churches? O! no way, how come? What are we, Taliban? You shan’t think of that even as an option. | 682 |
| 18 | Personal: You are at a museum; you see a painting for Lot and his daughters (Genesis 19); you hear two girls talking behind you about the painting: "His daughters! And they are naked! This is disgusting shit. I will never do that! Let's move."
Now, this actually the common situation at museums, and this is the quality of most people who attend such places. You would think that, such places cultivate peoples's culture and taste, but this is as delusional as few things can ever be. Let me say that, the average female was never supposed to see a single piece of art throughout her life.
Spengler wasn't jesting and exaggerating when he once wrote: "One day the last portrait of Rembrandt and the last bar of Mozart will have ceased to be—though possibly a coloured canvas and a sheet of notes may remain—because the last eye and the last ear accessible to their message will have gone." | 925 |
| 19 | A critique of Looksmaxxing shit and Americanism by Rick Roderick (from his Heidegger lecture):
«We should have a project more interesting than getting skinny, and rich, and dying as the best looking 125-year-old person on thh block. There ought to be something. . . . There ought to be something to say about your life than that. . . . 'I had a nice car and I died as the best-looking 125-year-old jogger in Venice Beach, California.' I just hope there, eh, is more to say.» | 820 |
| 20 | A sequel: The pathology of Empires and caricatures of Empires (like America) is that, whenever they choose to distract themselves with further expansion abroad/externally, they only ignore the major internal problems that slowly eat away at them in the long term and eventually destroy them altogether. America is only living by the logic of postponing the ultimate crisis. | 885 |
