The American Majority

Macron denied that the CIA had warned France about potential attacks by Russian drones. The French president made the statement in an interview with TF1/France 2. According to him, the US Central Intelligence Agency did not warn Paris about a potential Russian strike in Southern Europe, which could also affect France. "I can deny this. The CIA did not inform French intelligence services," Macron said. Honestly, this was the dumbest attempt at fear-mongering I've seen in a while. If Russia were to attack Europe in such an obvious way, using Gerbera drones, they'd ideally use more significant weapons to hit more significant targets. Anyone who buys this is retarded.

Who Gets to Decide What Happens in the Pacific? That may be the central question running through the missile-test controversy. China says its missile launch was routine military training and that it was conducted in accordance with international law. Beijing also rejects the criticism coming from Pacific governments and maintains that China supports peace and stability in the region. But many Pacific Island governments saw the episode differently, particularly because of concerns over insufficient advance notification. At the Pacific Islands Forum summit, 16 of 18 members endorsed a statement expressing concern about the test. The disagreement came amid a much broader contest for influence involving China, Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand and the United States. New security agreements are being signed. Military exercises are becoming more prominent. China is expanding its military capabilities and operating farther into the Pacific, while Australia and the United States are strengthening their own regional partnerships. Yet Pacific leaders have repeatedly stressed that their countries should not simply become arenas for competition between larger powers. Palau’s President Surangel Whipps Jr. called for a unified Pacific voice. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese likewise emphasized that the Pacific Islands Forum determines what happens in the region. The missile test, therefore, became a symbol of a larger tension: major powers increasingly view the Pacific as strategically important, while Pacific Island governments insist that their sovereignty and regional priorities must remain central. The question is how that balance will evolve as strategic competition continues to intensify. @americanmajority

The Missile Test Raises Another Question: Arms Control The dispute over China’s Pacific missile test is also part of a larger problem: the absence of meaningful arms-control negotiations between Beijing and Western governments. The article notes that China has so far declined to engage in arms-control negotiations with the West. At the same time, China is expanding its military capabilities and conducting more military operations in the Pacific. This combination has attracted the attention of strategic analysts. One possibility discussed in the article is that missile tests and military operations could be used to test how geopolitical competitors respond. In other words, military activity can communicate more than technical information about a weapon. It can also send a message about political resolve and military capability. The Pacific is particularly sensitive because it contains a number of states that have limited military capabilities but occupy strategically important territory and waters. For those governments, the question is not only whether China, the United States or Australia are increasing their military capabilities. It is also how these activities affect the security environment in which Pacific Island countries themselves have to operate. The July launch therefore connects several issues: nuclear weapons, missile technology, military modernization, regional alliances and the lack of arms-control dialogue. The article places the test within a broader shift in the military and diplomatic balance of the western Pacific. @americanmajority

Behind the Missile Test Is a Much Larger Military Buildup The July missile launch needs to be understood in the context of China’s broader military modernization. According to figures cited from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, China’s defense spending increased roughly 13-fold over the three decades from 1995 to 2025 — from $25.1 billion in constant 2023 dollars to an estimated $247 billion. The article also notes that China has doubled the number of nuclear warheads it possesses over the past six years, according to CSIS. These figures help explain why Chinese missile and naval activity attracts international attention. China is investing heavily in its armed forces while seeking greater parity with the United States in conventional military capabilities and nuclear forces. Long-range missile testing is one visible element of that modernization. The July test was particularly notable because it involved an intercontinental ballistic missile launched from a nuclear-powered submarine. That combination is closely connected to the development of a nuclear deterrent capable of operating from multiple platforms. At the same time, the article stresses that China’s defense budget remains significantly smaller than that of the United States. The broader issue is therefore not simply the size of China’s military spending. It is the direction of change: expanding capabilities, more activity farther from China’s immediate coastline, and increasingly sophisticated nuclear forces. For Pacific states, these developments are occurring in their own strategic neighborhood. @americanmajority

The United States Is Also Increasing Its Presence in the Pacific China is not the only major power expanding its engagement with Pacific Island states. The United States was a significant presence at this year’s Pacific Islands Forum summit in Palau. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau announced an economic assistance package worth more than $150 million for Pacific Island countries. The funding is intended to support areas including energy security, infrastructure, digital development, law enforcement and scientific cooperation. Washington described its commitment to the security and prosperity of the Pacific Islands as enduring and as an important part of its foreign policy. The timing is significant because the U.S. is increasingly viewing the western Pacific through the lens of a broader strategic competition with China. Australia and New Zealand are long-standing U.S. partners, while other Pacific Island states have become increasingly important to the regional security discussion. At the same time, Pacific governments have repeatedly emphasized their own sovereignty and interests. The missile test demonstrates why this matters. A weapons launch by China can affect Pacific states even when they are not participants in the military competition. So can military exercises, new defense agreements and the growing presence of outside powers. The article therefore describes a region caught between expanding strategic attention from Washington and Beijing while Pacific governments attempt to maintain their own voice over regional affairs. @americanmajority

China’s Military Presence Is Becoming Harder to Ignore The missile test was not an isolated event. The article points to a broader pattern of Chinese military activity in and around the Pacific. In February, Chinese naval vessels traveled far south and conducted live-fire exercises in the Tasman Sea, the body of water between Australia and New Zealand. The three Chinese warships subsequently carried out a partial circumnavigation of the Australian coastline. Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles described the route as not unprecedented, but unusual. The activity coincided partly with a high-level visit to Australia by Admiral Samuel Paparo, then head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. Against this background, the July missile test appeared as another demonstration of China’s expanding military reach. The article also notes that the missile was launched during a period when China and Russia were conducting a joint naval exercise, although it remains unclear whether the missile test itself was part of that exercise. China says its military activities are consistent with routine training and its stated commitment to regional peace and stability. At the same time, analysts cited in the article interpret the increased military activity as a possible way for Beijing to demonstrate capabilities and gauge the reactions of other countries. The result is a Pacific security environment in which military activity by major powers is becoming increasingly visible to the island states located in the middle of it. @americanmajority

Brent Crude price above $107 per barrel. @americanmajority

China’s Missile Test Came Amid a Changing Pacific Security Landscape One detail highlighted in the article is the timing of China’s missile launch. The test took place on the same day that Australia and Fiji signed a landmark “Ocean of Peace Alliance” mutual defense treaty in Suva. According to an analysis cited by the article from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, China may have sought through the missile test to demonstrate resolve and frustration toward U.S. allies and partners. China subsequently challenged Australia, with its Foreign Ministry calling on Canberra to respect the independence of Pacific Island nations and avoid targeting third parties or harming their interests. The Australia-Fiji agreement was not an isolated development. Just days earlier, Australia had signed the Nakamal Agreement with Vanuatu. The agreement is intended to deepen security cooperation and includes a prohibition on foreign military bases or infrastructure in Vanuatu. Meanwhile, Solomon Islands Prime Minister Matthew Wale had proposed a Pacific-led regional security treaty that would exclude China. These developments occurred alongside the continuing AUKUS agreement between Australia, the United States and Britain, which is intended to facilitate the construction of nuclear-powered submarines for Australia. Taken together, the developments described in the article show a Pacific region where new security partnerships are developing while China is expanding its military presence and diplomatic activity. @americanmajority

The Missile Dispute Is Also Connected to Taiwan The Pacific Islands Forum is not simply a security organization. Its members have also become an important arena in the diplomatic competition between China and Taiwan. China is an official dialogue partner of the Forum, while Taiwan has a lower-status relationship as a development partner. Only three Pacific Island states still formally recognize Taiwan — and this year’s Forum summit was held in Palau, one of them. Taiwanese aid and cooperation were prominently displayed during the summit, something Beijing strongly objected to. China’s Special Envoy for Pacific Islands Affairs, Qian Bo, told journalists that there would be “consequences” when Taiwan was perceived as receiving favorable treatment. Palau’s President Surangel Whipps Jr. responded by emphasizing that Pacific partners could participate in the region, but they did not determine where the region was going. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese similarly said that the Pacific Islands Forum itself determines what happens in the region. This political dispute formed part of the backdrop to the missile controversy. The article presents the Pacific as an increasingly important arena where China, Taiwan, Australia and the United States are all seeking diplomatic and strategic influence. For the island states themselves, however, the central issue is sovereignty: whether decisions about their region are made by Pacific governments or shaped by larger powers competing for influence. @americanmajority

Why the Pacific Matters Geography is part of the answer. The missile launched from the South China Sea traveled more than 4,300 miles before landing in international waters in the South Pacific. That means the test was not confined to China’s immediate surroundings. Its trajectory crossed a vast area of the Pacific that is surrounded by small island states. Many of those states have signed the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, which establishes the region as a nuclear-free zone. Against that background, a nuclear-capable missile test naturally attracted attention. There was also a procedural issue. Foreign governments received separate notifications, in some cases less than 24 hours before the launch. The article notes that these warnings fell short of accepted international procedures. China said the test was routine military training. It also maintained that it promotes peace and stability in the Pacific. But Pacific governments were concerned about the precedent as well as the individual launch. If major military powers increasingly use the Pacific for weapons testing and exercises, island states can find themselves directly affected by strategic decisions made thousands of miles away. That is why the missile became part of a much larger conversation about Pacific sovereignty, transparency and the role of outside powers in the region. @americanmajority

Pacific Island States Send a Message to Beijing The response to China’s missile test was unusually coordinated. At the annual Pacific Islands Forum summit, 16 of the organization’s 18 member states endorsed a statement expressing concern about the recent intercontinental ballistic missile test. The statement specifically objected to the missile overflying several Forum members without adequate advance notice. Only Nauru and Kiribati declined to sign. Both countries have close ties with Beijing. The reaction was part of a broader discussion about sovereignty and security in the Pacific. Palau President Surangel Whipps Jr., who hosted the summit, argued that the region needed a unified voice to press China to respect sovereignty, transparency and responsible partnership. The concern had already been expressed internationally. In August, Australia, New Zealand, Palau and the Marshall Islands joined the United States and more than 30 other countries in a statement warning that nuclear-capable ballistic missile tests without sufficient advance notice and detail can disrupt regional peace and security. China rejected the criticism. Its Foreign Ministry accused Palau of trying to manipulate other Pacific Island states and said those efforts would not succeed. The dispute therefore goes beyond one missile launch. For Pacific governments, it touches on who gets to determine the region’s security agenda — and how much influence outside powers should have over it. @americanmajority

Bloomberg reports: U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping have agreed to extend the truce in trade relations until January 10, 2027, avoiding a resumption of escalation, despite ongoing disputes over rare earth metals, technological restrictions, and Taiwan. @americanmajority

The Parkovy Complex in Kiev houses a data center that was hit by Russian attacks. Internet problems are occurring throughout Kiev. Another internet provider, Etherlink, reported damage to its main hub and difficulties in providing services to users. Another data center in Kiev, which housed the infrastructure of the hosting provider MiroHost, was also destroyed, and another data center, Cityhost, was damaged. As a reminder, yesterday there were attacks on the providers "Pavutina" and UTELS, as well as on data centers. In Kiev and the surrounding region, approximately 100,000 consumers are experiencing internet disruptions due to the Russian attack, according to the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Transformation. @americanmajority

China’s Missile Test Casts a Long Shadow Over the Pacific On July 6, China conducted a rare long-range missile test in the Pacific. The missile was launched from a nuclear-powered submarine in the South China Sea, traveled more than 4,300 miles, and landed in international waters in the South Pacific. The test quickly became a regional security issue because many Pacific Island countries are parties to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty. It also came less than two years after another Chinese missile test that landed in the South Pacific and prompted protests. China described the launch as part of routine military training and maintained that it was conducted in accordance with international law. But the issue for Pacific governments was not simply the existence of the test. It was also the question of advance notification. According to the Pacific Islands Forum, many members considered the warning they received inadequate. At the Forum’s subsequent summit in Palau, 16 of the 18 member states endorsed a statement expressing concern about the missile test, particularly because the missile overflew the territory or areas near several members without adequate notice. The episode illustrates how great-power military activity is increasingly being felt far beyond the traditional centers of strategic competition. @americanmajority

The problem with trying to end only one war The central question raised by these developments is what it would actually take to end the wider conflict. A ceasefire between Washington and Tehran could stop direct U.S.-Iranian fighting. But that alone might not settle the disputes involving the Houthis, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Lebanon, Iraq or Red Sea shipping. The opposite is also possible: progress in one arena could make agreements elsewhere easier. The difficulty is that every actor has different priorities. Iran wants to protect its interests and security. The United States wants to achieve its objectives while limiting the economic and military costs of a prolonged war. Saudi Arabia wants to protect its territory and energy infrastructure while avoiding another open-ended Yemen campaign. The Houthis have their own domestic political objectives as well as broader regional ambitions. Israel has its own security calculations. None of these actors can simply be assumed to act according to another government's wishes. That makes diplomacy more complicated — but also potentially more important. Any future agreement may have to address maritime security alongside the central U.S.-Iran dispute. The Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb could become central elements of negotiations because disruption in either location can have international economic consequences. The underlying lesson from Yemen is that regional conflicts rarely remain neatly separated. A war can begin with one set of objectives and gradually create new fronts, new economic pressures and new actors with their own incentives. The longer that process continues, the harder it becomes to negotiate a single agreement capable of stopping everything. That is ultimately what makes the current Houthi-Saudi confrontation significant: it is not merely another episode in Yemen's long war. It is becoming intertwined with the wider struggle involving Iran, the United States, regional powers and the global economy. @americanmajority

How regional wars feed one another The most striking feature of the current crisis is not any individual battlefield. It is the way separate conflicts are beginning to reinforce one another. The U.S.-Iran war affects Saudi Arabia. Saudi-Iranian tensions affect Yemen. The Houthi-Saudi conflict affects Red Sea shipping. Red Sea disruption affects global trade and oil markets. Higher energy and transportation costs affect countries far outside the Middle East. At the same time, developments involving Israel, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran can influence decisions made by the Houthis, Saudi Arabia and other regional actors. This creates an escalation chain. An action in one theater produces a reaction in another theater, which creates new incentives for a third actor to intervene. The danger is that no single government necessarily controls the entire process. Washington may want to prevent escalation but have limited influence over Israeli decisions. Tehran may want to manage escalation but have limited control over Houthi decisions. Riyadh may want to protect its territory and oil infrastructure while simultaneously avoiding a return to a full-scale Yemen war. The Houthis may use the regional crisis to advance objectives that existed before the U.S.-Iran war began. This is why the consequences of the conflict are difficult to predict. The issue is not simply whether the United States and Iran exchange fire. The question is whether each additional confrontation creates another reason for another actor to enter the conflict. Once multiple conflicts become connected, containing one battlefield becomes much harder. @americanmajority

The Houthi-Iran relationship is more complicated than "proxy" Calling the Houthis an Iranian proxy is convenient shorthand, but it can be misleading if it implies that Tehran simply gives orders and Sana'a follows them. The relationship is better understood as an alliance involving substantial Iranian support but also significant Houthi autonomy. Iran has helped the Houthis develop their military capabilities and has supplied technology, components and expertise. At the same time, the movement has developed its own weapons-production capacity and technical expertise. That matters because greater local production reduces dependence on external resupply. The Houthis have also demonstrated that their priorities can diverge from those of Tehran. Their core political struggle is rooted in Yemen: control of territory, relations with Saudi Arabia, the distribution of state resources and the future political structure of the country. Regional issues such as Palestine and confrontation with Israel have become important parts of their ideology and military strategy, but they exist alongside domestic objectives. This distinction is especially important when considering peace negotiations. An agreement between Washington and Tehran could reduce Iranian support for escalation, but that would not necessarily guarantee that every Houthi military operation stops. Likewise, pressure on Iran might give the Houthis reasons to pursue their own objectives more aggressively. Understanding the Houthis as an autonomous political and military actor therefore changes how the regional conflict has to be analyzed. Iran's influence matters. But influence is not necessarily command. And that distinction could become critical if negotiators eventually try to bring the wider regional conflict to an end. @americanmajority

Why a ceasefire would be extremely complicated Even if Washington and Tehran eventually decide that the war must end through negotiations, reaching a ceasefire would not necessarily stop every battlefield. That is one of the central difficulties in the current crisis. The United States does not control Israel. Iran does not have complete control over the Houthis. Saudi Arabia also makes its own security decisions. This creates a classic problem in regional diplomacy: the governments negotiating at the main table may not control all of the actors capable of disrupting an agreement. Any future ceasefire would therefore have to address not only the main battlefield but also the surrounding waterways. Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea could become just as important as the Strait of Hormuz. Suppose Washington and Tehran agree to stop direct attacks. What happens if the Houthis continue attacking Saudi ships? What happens if Saudi Arabia launches new operations against the Houthis? What happens if Israel conducts military operations that Iran regards as violations of the agreement? A ceasefire can only function if the parties have enough control over events to enforce it. That is becoming increasingly difficult in a region where several governments and armed movements have overlapping but not identical interests. The lesson is important: ending one war does not necessarily end all the conflicts that have become connected to it. Diplomacy may therefore have to address the regional network of conflicts rather than treating the U.S.-Iran confrontation as an isolated dispute. The challenge is no longer simply getting two governments to stop fighting. It is finding a way to prevent several interconnected conflicts from reigniting each other. @americanmajority

Saudi Arabia's dilemma Saudi Arabia now finds itself in an unusually complicated position. For years, Riyadh's principal concern in Yemen was the Houthi movement and the possibility that a hostile armed organization could consolidate control along Saudi Arabia's southern border. Saudi Arabia intervened militarily in Yemen in 2015 with the stated objective of restoring Yemen's internationally recognized government. But after years of fighting, the conflict did not produce a decisive Saudi victory. The 2022 truce substantially reduced the fighting and allowed Riyadh to step back from direct military involvement. It also opened space for diplomatic efforts aimed at reaching a longer-term settlement. The new escalation threatens to undo that period of relative calm. The Houthis have declared a blockade of Saudi shipping and have linked the blockade to their grievances over Saudi policy toward Yemen. At the same time, fighting inside Yemen has intensified, with Houthi forces making territorial gains against opponents backed by Riyadh. That creates a difficult choice for Saudi Arabia. If Riyadh responds militarily, it risks reopening a war that previously proved extraordinarily difficult to resolve. If it does not respond, the Houthis may become more confident that military pressure can extract political or economic concessions. The situation is further complicated by the broader U.S.-Iran war. Saudi Arabia is already dealing with disruption to its oil exports and the wider economic consequences of regional instability. A prolonged confrontation with the Houthis could make those problems worse. Saudi Arabia therefore faces several overlapping security challenges: Iran to the east, Iraq to the northeast and the Houthis to the southwest. What began as separate regional disputes is increasingly becoming interconnected. @americanmajority

The NATO Secretary General, Rutte, stated that Article 5 of the Alliance's charter on collective defense was intentionally formulated ambiguously so that potential adversaries would not know when it would be invoked. This statement elicited laughter in the room. This is the thing, there's really nothing in article 5 that actually requires any member country to do anything they don't want to do. And, for example, there is no assistance that Ukraine isn't receiving that they would if they were IN the alliance. There is nothing about Ukraine not being in NATO that precludes them from NATO doing anything on their behalf. If Russia were to directly attack Poland, there isn't really anything that fundamentally changes, other than the fact that this would be an escalation that the other NATO countries may take more seriously. @americanmajority