The American Majority

The problem with trying to end only one war The central question raised by these developments is what it would actually take to end the wider conflict. A ceasefire between Washington and Tehran could stop direct U.S.-Iranian fighting. But that alone might not settle the disputes involving the Houthis, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Lebanon, Iraq or Red Sea shipping. The opposite is also possible: progress in one arena could make agreements elsewhere easier. The difficulty is that every actor has different priorities. Iran wants to protect its interests and security. The United States wants to achieve its objectives while limiting the economic and military costs of a prolonged war. Saudi Arabia wants to protect its territory and energy infrastructure while avoiding another open-ended Yemen campaign. The Houthis have their own domestic political objectives as well as broader regional ambitions. Israel has its own security calculations. None of these actors can simply be assumed to act according to another government's wishes. That makes diplomacy more complicated — but also potentially more important. Any future agreement may have to address maritime security alongside the central U.S.-Iran dispute. The Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb could become central elements of negotiations because disruption in either location can have international economic consequences. The underlying lesson from Yemen is that regional conflicts rarely remain neatly separated. A war can begin with one set of objectives and gradually create new fronts, new economic pressures and new actors with their own incentives. The longer that process continues, the harder it becomes to negotiate a single agreement capable of stopping everything. That is ultimately what makes the current Houthi-Saudi confrontation significant: it is not merely another episode in Yemen's long war. It is becoming intertwined with the wider struggle involving Iran, the United States, regional powers and the global economy. @americanmajority

How regional wars feed one another The most striking feature of the current crisis is not any individual battlefield. It is the way separate conflicts are beginning to reinforce one another. The U.S.-Iran war affects Saudi Arabia. Saudi-Iranian tensions affect Yemen. The Houthi-Saudi conflict affects Red Sea shipping. Red Sea disruption affects global trade and oil markets. Higher energy and transportation costs affect countries far outside the Middle East. At the same time, developments involving Israel, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran can influence decisions made by the Houthis, Saudi Arabia and other regional actors. This creates an escalation chain. An action in one theater produces a reaction in another theater, which creates new incentives for a third actor to intervene. The danger is that no single government necessarily controls the entire process. Washington may want to prevent escalation but have limited influence over Israeli decisions. Tehran may want to manage escalation but have limited control over Houthi decisions. Riyadh may want to protect its territory and oil infrastructure while simultaneously avoiding a return to a full-scale Yemen war. The Houthis may use the regional crisis to advance objectives that existed before the U.S.-Iran war began. This is why the consequences of the conflict are difficult to predict. The issue is not simply whether the United States and Iran exchange fire. The question is whether each additional confrontation creates another reason for another actor to enter the conflict. Once multiple conflicts become connected, containing one battlefield becomes much harder. @americanmajority

The Houthi-Iran relationship is more complicated than "proxy" Calling the Houthis an Iranian proxy is convenient shorthand, but it can be misleading if it implies that Tehran simply gives orders and Sana'a follows them. The relationship is better understood as an alliance involving substantial Iranian support but also significant Houthi autonomy. Iran has helped the Houthis develop their military capabilities and has supplied technology, components and expertise. At the same time, the movement has developed its own weapons-production capacity and technical expertise. That matters because greater local production reduces dependence on external resupply. The Houthis have also demonstrated that their priorities can diverge from those of Tehran. Their core political struggle is rooted in Yemen: control of territory, relations with Saudi Arabia, the distribution of state resources and the future political structure of the country. Regional issues such as Palestine and confrontation with Israel have become important parts of their ideology and military strategy, but they exist alongside domestic objectives. This distinction is especially important when considering peace negotiations. An agreement between Washington and Tehran could reduce Iranian support for escalation, but that would not necessarily guarantee that every Houthi military operation stops. Likewise, pressure on Iran might give the Houthis reasons to pursue their own objectives more aggressively. Understanding the Houthis as an autonomous political and military actor therefore changes how the regional conflict has to be analyzed. Iran's influence matters. But influence is not necessarily command. And that distinction could become critical if negotiators eventually try to bring the wider regional conflict to an end. @americanmajority

Why a ceasefire would be extremely complicated Even if Washington and Tehran eventually decide that the war must end through negotiations, reaching a ceasefire would not necessarily stop every battlefield. That is one of the central difficulties in the current crisis. The United States does not control Israel. Iran does not have complete control over the Houthis. Saudi Arabia also makes its own security decisions. This creates a classic problem in regional diplomacy: the governments negotiating at the main table may not control all of the actors capable of disrupting an agreement. Any future ceasefire would therefore have to address not only the main battlefield but also the surrounding waterways. Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea could become just as important as the Strait of Hormuz. Suppose Washington and Tehran agree to stop direct attacks. What happens if the Houthis continue attacking Saudi ships? What happens if Saudi Arabia launches new operations against the Houthis? What happens if Israel conducts military operations that Iran regards as violations of the agreement? A ceasefire can only function if the parties have enough control over events to enforce it. That is becoming increasingly difficult in a region where several governments and armed movements have overlapping but not identical interests. The lesson is important: ending one war does not necessarily end all the conflicts that have become connected to it. Diplomacy may therefore have to address the regional network of conflicts rather than treating the U.S.-Iran confrontation as an isolated dispute. The challenge is no longer simply getting two governments to stop fighting. It is finding a way to prevent several interconnected conflicts from reigniting each other. @americanmajority

Saudi Arabia's dilemma Saudi Arabia now finds itself in an unusually complicated position. For years, Riyadh's principal concern in Yemen was the Houthi movement and the possibility that a hostile armed organization could consolidate control along Saudi Arabia's southern border. Saudi Arabia intervened militarily in Yemen in 2015 with the stated objective of restoring Yemen's internationally recognized government. But after years of fighting, the conflict did not produce a decisive Saudi victory. The 2022 truce substantially reduced the fighting and allowed Riyadh to step back from direct military involvement. It also opened space for diplomatic efforts aimed at reaching a longer-term settlement. The new escalation threatens to undo that period of relative calm. The Houthis have declared a blockade of Saudi shipping and have linked the blockade to their grievances over Saudi policy toward Yemen. At the same time, fighting inside Yemen has intensified, with Houthi forces making territorial gains against opponents backed by Riyadh. That creates a difficult choice for Saudi Arabia. If Riyadh responds militarily, it risks reopening a war that previously proved extraordinarily difficult to resolve. If it does not respond, the Houthis may become more confident that military pressure can extract political or economic concessions. The situation is further complicated by the broader U.S.-Iran war. Saudi Arabia is already dealing with disruption to its oil exports and the wider economic consequences of regional instability. A prolonged confrontation with the Houthis could make those problems worse. Saudi Arabia therefore faces several overlapping security challenges: Iran to the east, Iraq to the northeast and the Houthis to the southwest. What began as separate regional disputes is increasingly becoming interconnected. @americanmajority

The NATO Secretary General, Rutte, stated that Article 5 of the Alliance's charter on collective defense was intentionally formulated ambiguously so that potential adversaries would not know when it would be invoked. This statement elicited laughter in the room. This is the thing, there's really nothing in article 5 that actually requires any member country to do anything they don't want to do. And, for example, there is no assistance that Ukraine isn't receiving that they would if they were IN the alliance. There is nothing about Ukraine not being in NATO that precludes them from NATO doing anything on their behalf. If Russia were to directly attack Poland, there isn't really anything that fundamentally changes, other than the fact that this would be an escalation that the other NATO countries may take more seriously. @americanmajority

The oil-price connection One of the most important aspects of the Houthi conflict is the potential connection to global oil prices. The mechanism is relatively straightforward. If the conflict disrupts oil exports or makes transportation more expensive, crude prices rise. Higher crude prices can feed into gasoline and diesel prices, transportation costs and eventually broader inflation. For countries with large fuel-consuming economies, that creates domestic economic pressure. The United States is therefore affected even if no fighting takes place on American territory. Iran faces a different calculation. Iran is already suffering severe economic and physical costs from the war. But the stakes for Tehran are fundamentally existential for the regime itself, whereas the United States does not face an equivalent question of regime survival. That creates what can be described as an endurance contest: each side attempts to withstand the costs of the conflict long enough to force the other side to change its position. The Houthi campaign potentially adds another layer to that contest. If Saudi oil exports become more difficult, if shipping through the Red Sea is disrupted and if global oil prices remain elevated, the economic effects can eventually reach consumers in the United States and elsewhere. There is an important distinction, however. Higher oil prices do not automatically determine the outcome of a war. Their impact depends on the duration of disruptions, alternative supply sources, inventories, demand and government policy. The broader point is that modern wars are not contained by geography. A missile launched from Yemen can ultimately influence a fuel price in a completely different country. @americanmajority

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a narrow waterway between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, but its strategic importance is enormous. It connects the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea. Ships traveling between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal normally pass through this region. That means instability around Bab el-Mandeb can affect trade between Asia, Europe and the Middle East. The Houthis have already demonstrated this during the Gaza war. Attacks on commercial shipping caused major companies to avoid the Red Sea and instead send vessels around the southern tip of Africa. That alternative route adds thousands of kilometers to some journeys. The economic consequences therefore do not depend solely on whether a missile actually strikes a commercial vessel. Shipping companies have to consider the probability of an attack, the cost of insurance, the availability of naval protection and the financial consequences of delaying deliveries. The broader Suez Canal–Red Sea–Bab el-Mandeb system is a major artery for international commerce. That makes the current confrontation particularly important. The Houthis say their current blockade is directed against Saudi shipping. But shipping companies may not always be able to determine which vessels will be considered legitimate targets. During previous Houthi campaigns, the movement's definition of an Israeli-linked vessel could be broader than simply a ship flying an Israeli flag. The result is uncertainty. And uncertainty is itself economically significant. If enough commercial operators decide that the Red Sea is too risky, traffic can decline even without a formal closure. That is why a conflict taking place in Yemen can quickly become a problem for businesses, consumers and governments far beyond the Middle East. @americanmajority

Saudi Arabia is facing a difficult strategic problem because several vulnerabilities are converging at once. The kingdom's traditional oil-export routes have been disrupted by the wider regional war. At the same time, the Houthis are threatening Saudi maritime traffic from Yemen. One important alternative route is the East-West pipeline, which carries Saudi oil across the kingdom toward the Red Sea. That route has become particularly valuable because shipping oil through the Strait of Hormuz has become more difficult during the U.S.-Iran conflict. But an alternative route is only useful if the surrounding waters are secure. The Houthis' position along the Red Sea and near the Bab el-Mandeb therefore creates another potential obstacle for Saudi oil exports. The article reports that Saudi oil exports had already fallen sharply during the wider conflict, reaching around 3.2 million barrels per day — a 13-year low. It also notes that the East-West pipeline had previously carried roughly 4 million barrels per day and had reportedly been upgraded toward a capacity of 7 million barrels per day. That makes the pipeline strategically important. But if Saudi tankers still have to pass through waters threatened by Houthi attacks, Riyadh cannot simply solve the problem by moving oil from one pipeline to another. Saudi Arabia could potentially send more oil northward, toward the Mediterranean, but that is geographically inconvenient because many of its major customers are in Asia. The result is a problem that goes far beyond Yemen's borders. A conflict involving Houthi attacks, Saudi retaliation and disruptions to Saudi energy infrastructure can affect global energy markets even if relatively few ships are actually hit. The mere perception that a major route is dangerous can be enough to change shipping patterns, insurance costs and oil prices. @americanmajority

The Houthis are often described simply as an Iranian proxy. But that description can obscure how much independent political and military power the movement has developed. The movement, formally known as Ansar Allah, seized Yemen's capital, Sana'a, in 2014. After years of war, it became the dominant authority across much of northern Yemen, an area containing a large share of the country's population. Its main domestic opponent is Yemen's internationally recognized government, which has relied heavily on Saudi support and whose leadership has frequently operated from outside the capital. Saudi Arabia intervened militarily in Yemen in 2015, leading a coalition that sought to reverse the Houthi takeover. The war produced enormous humanitarian consequences and eventually resulted in a truce in 2022 that dramatically reduced large-scale fighting. That truce did not resolve the underlying political dispute. The Houthis retained control of Sana'a and large parts of northern Yemen, while the internationally recognized government remained dependent on external backing. The relationship with Iran is real and important. Tehran has provided the Houthis with various forms of support, including weapons, technical assistance and political backing. But that does not necessarily mean Tehran controls every Houthi decision. The Houthis have their own domestic interests, political calculations and confrontation with Saudi Arabia. If Washington negotiates with Tehran, it cannot automatically assume that an agreement with Iran will make Houthi military activity disappear. The Houthis may be aligned with Iran on major regional issues while simultaneously pursuing objectives that are specifically Yemeni. In other words, the region's armed groups cannot always be understood as pieces moved by a single outside power. @americanmajority

The Polish President, Karol Nawrocki, stated that a permanent U.S. military base, if established in Poland, would be called "Fort Trump." "Once the work is completed by the American administration and both governments, I believe that President Trump himself may be able to attend the opening of 'Fort Trump'," Nawrocki said in an interview with Bloomberg. He expressed confidence that the U.S. decision to establish the base is only a matter of time, and he expressed hope that the construction would be completed before the end of Trump's presidential term in 2029. -RIA Novosti Sycophant of the year award... @americanmajority

The U.S.-Iran war is increasingly becoming something larger than a confrontation between two states. One of the most important developments is taking place thousands of kilometers from the Persian Gulf: in Yemen, where the Houthi movement has resumed attacks on shipping and is once again confronting Saudi Arabia. The significance goes beyond Yemen itself. The conflict is already being fought through several interconnected arenas: Iran and the United States, Israel and Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, and various armed groups operating in Iraq. Each has its own history and objectives, but the different conflicts are now interacting with one another. That makes escalation much harder to control. The Houthis are particularly important because they sit beside the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world's major maritime chokepoints. The narrow passage connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and is part of the route linking the Indian Ocean with the Suez Canal and European markets. Previous Houthi attacks on shipping demonstrated that relatively limited military capabilities can have consequences far beyond Yemen. Shipping companies can reroute vessels, insurers can raise premiums, and governments can be forced to spend resources protecting commercial traffic. The current situation is different, however. The Houthis' immediate confrontation is increasingly focused on Saudi Arabia, while the wider context is the U.S.-Iran war. That creates a critical question: if fighting in Yemen intensifies, is it still a separate conflict — or has Yemen effectively become another front in the wider regional war? The answer matters because the Houthi-Saudi confrontation could alter the economic and diplomatic calculations surrounding the Iran war itself. @americanmajority

The Prime Minister of Greenland, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, after signing an agreement with the United States on the Arctic, stated that it will take time to restore trust in the United States. "We need to take steps to restore trust. For us, this will take time," Nielsen said in response to a question about whether trust in the United States could be restored. -RIA Novosti It's like "restoring trust" with an abusive spouse who just slapped you while you're doing the dishes after their meal... @americanmajority

This isn't sci-fi, AI is already killing people In a recent hearing, lawmakers were told that the US military is deploying this technology to target adversaries, with civilians in the crosshairs. Palantir CEO Alex Karp proclaimed on a panel in 2024 that “technology should be able to reduce drastically the amount of collateral damage, civilian deaths.” Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt and former Deputy Director of the CIA David Cohen agreed. Proponents of artificial intelligence use in the military have long made some version of this argument — that the military’s adoption of AI will lead to a reduction in civilian harm. @americanmajority

Ukraine war spreads to Arctic as nuclear tensions escalate ...On September 9, Ukrainian drones struck two gas processing plants in the Yamalo-Nenets region, located about 1,900 miles from the Ukrainian border. This is Ukraine’s deepest strike on Russia since the war began. Arctic energy infrastructure in the Yamal region produces around 80% of Russia's natural gas. Russian military analysts believe the Ukrainian drones were launched from Sumy, northern Ukraine, and reached all the way into Yamal with the help of Starlink. Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces announced, “Until today, this was considered an absolutely safe rear.” @americanmajority

Given the Chance, Ukrainians Would Give Zelensky the Boot There was a time, not very long ago, when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was lionized around the world and spectacularly popular at home. But, if elections were held today, he would struggle to finish in the top three. Zelensky came to power in a landslide victory in 2019. His term, constitutionally limited to five years, has now stretched to over seven years because of the war. Although it is true that 57 percent of Ukrainians say they do not want to hold elections during the war, it is simply not true that it is unconstitutional to hold presidential elections until the fighting stops... Yea, it's just a grave shame that the only people who can or ever will "give him the boot" are the various imperial managers. The opinions of Ukrainians are worth less than nothing. @americanmajority

How Saudi Arabia's anti-Houthi strategy crashed and burned Eleven years after intervening in Yemen's war, Riyadh may be forced to negotiate with Ansar Allah on the group's terms. For a decade, Saudi Arabia’s Yemen policy has rested on the assumption that time, money and coercive force, patiently and strategically applied, would eventually produce enough leverage to subdue the Houthis, or at least force them into a settlement on Riyadh’s terms. Over the last two weeks, that assumption has been tested more severely than at any point since 2015, when Saudi Arabia initially launched its military intervention to roll back Houthi control of the Yemeni capital Sanaa. It has not held... Interesting article. @americanmajority

Trump unleashes his latest verbal bowel movement to the UN. He, thinking himself God-Emperor of humanity, claims he will end the war in Ukraine and "make a deal" with Iran or "send them to Hell." Big talk from someone who has been making these claims for years now... @americanmajority

An F-16 has crashed in the area of the American Spangdahlem Air Base in western Germany; one person was injured, Bild reports. It reportedly came down on a golf course near the base. @americanmajority