متاح الآن! بحث تيليغرام 2025 — أهم رؤى العام 
Hudson War Mapping - Reporting on the Ukraine War
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| التاريخ | نمو المشتركين | الإشارات | القنوات | |
| 01 يوليو | +7 |
منشورات القناة
| 2 | the very latest the front collapses is june-july 2025. it’s a lot closer to over than people think. remember ukraine badly needs another big aid package and is almost out of men | 342 |
| 3 | I want to get something off my chest, so to speak.
I sometimes feel the best way to admit that you were wrong without dwelling on it is to have a laugh at yourself.
Me, being naive and misunderstanding attrition, predicted in 2024 that the frontline would collapse in early 2025. 🤦
Obviously, i’m a lot more educated now than i was, and i can look back and say to myself, what evidence was there to even remotely support such a prediction.
Just wanted to get it off my chest. I’m far from perfect. | 345 |
| 4 | Km^2 figures DO provide insight into tactical battlefield momentum, which has certainly slowed significantly for Russia. | 6 137 |
| 5 | You'll have your monthly frontline changes report tomorrow.
But in short, the numbers aren't very good for Russia.
Of course, km² don't matter much in a war of attrition. Russia could be losing territory every month and still technically be winning by dealing more attrition.
They still have the advantage in almost every sector of this war, except for maybe mid-range drone strikes, and are therefore dealing a lot more attrition to Ukraine than Ukraine is to Russia.
But these figures are the result of successful Ukrainian adaptations, and a biproduct of the increased fluidity of the frontline, which can't even really be considered a conventional line of contact anymore. | 257 |
| 6 | I know i speak frequently about the collapse of the front and speculation of when it will happen.
I’ve gathered a few of my thoughts on what will be key indicators or markers of an approaching collapse.
These could occur in any order, early next year or late 2028. It is too difficult to tell at this stage.
1. A drop in mobilisation age by Ukraine, perhaps to 23 or 21. This would be a clear and obvious sign that Ukraine’s adaptations which have freed up manpower have passed their point of effectiveness.
6-12 months to collapse?
2. Localised Ukrainian counterattacks similar to what we see in Lyman direction and Velika Novosilka direction suddenly stop. This will show a significant degradation in Ukrainian adaptations, and indicate an extremely critical manpower situation where no assault units can be freed up.
Possibly 2-3 months to collapse.
2. Vehicle attrition sharply spikes in Russia’s favour. This will indicate that Ukraine no longer has the manpower to adequately protect their armoured vehicles. Contrarily, Russian vehicle losses should sharply drop as Ukraine runs out of drone operators.
Possibly 1-2 months to collapse.
3. A huge plummet in interception rates of Russian missiles, as Ukraine desperately drags AD operators to the front.
Possibly 2-3 weeks to collapse.
4. Sudden, large Russian incursions across the international border from Kharkiv to Chernihiv oblasts, acting as a launchpad for Russian armoured spearheads at the point of collapse. This will happen when Ukraine drags border guards to the front.
≈1 week to collapse?
5. Zelenskyy, Syrsky and other Ukrainian leadership flee to Lviv or to the west, and mass evacuations are carried out for every civilian east of the Dnipro river. This is a critical sign that Ukraine considers the situation lost and collapse as imminent
<1 week to collapse?
6. Russia possibly launches a huge missile attack on bridges across the river, to pin remnants of the AFU on the east bank. This would indicate that Russia expects the final push to come imminently.
≈72 hours to collapse
7. Finally, large Russian breakthroughs of extreme depth commence along the entire length of the front, and mappers (such as myself) declare the collapse underway
=At the point of collapse.
Keep in mind, this is all speculation, and i have gotten predictions wrong before. These are, however, helpful general signs you and i will notice and look out for to determine when the front may collapse | 1 072 |
| 7 |  Dnepropetrovsk-Donetsk oblast, Velyka Novosilka direction. Ukrainian forces retook Ivanivka and Zelenyy Hay. | 829 |
| 8 | This isn’t really a huge deal. Only 2 aircraft, and the Su-30s are rarely used by Russia.
Good propaganda for Ukraine though | 925 |
| 9 | I’ve received confirmation of the Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian tactical aviation.
At least two Su-30 and/or MiG-29K aircraft were hit by FPV drones, probably launched by a larger mother drone. It is not known if they were damaged or destroyed. I can’t specify the targeted airbase yet.
A video of the strikes will be released soon. | 392 |
| 10 | Ukrainian channels are claiming that multiple Russian tactical aircraft have been hit by drones at an unspecified airbase.
We will see if this turns out to be true. | 407 |
| 11 | Explosions in Kuwait | 927 |
| 12 | Sirens are sounding in Bahrain due to the threat of an Iranian missile and drone attack. | 467 |
| 13 | According to my info, 1 Iranian ballistic missile impacted the U.S. Ali Al Salem Airbase in Kuwait. | 521 |
| 14 | New explosions in Bahrain. | 943 |
| 15 |  Air defence activity seen over Bahrain a short time ago. | 553 |
| 16 | Repeated explosions in Kuwait can be heard, sirens are sounding. | 919 |
| 17 | Explosions and AD in Kuwait. | 913 |
| 18 | Theoretically, Ukraine should have enough Patriot PAC-2/3 interceptors for 2 more medium-sized Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile attacks on Kyiv. This is why they are able to achieve a much higher interception rate than usual tonight and two days ago.
Then, they will have to wait for another delivery to replenish their stockpiles. | 572 |
| 19 | Quiet in Bahrain for now | 994 |
| 20 | Further explosions in Bahrain. | 2 546 |
