اکنون در دسترس! پژوهش تلگرام ۲۰۲۵ — مهمترین بینشهای سال 
#STRATDELA
رفتن به کانال در Telegram
A project on all things strategic and nuclear (as seen from Moscow) by Dmitry Stefanovich. Also on Substack, with (ir)regular newsletters: https://1dkv.substack.com/ stratdela.ru
نمایش بیشتر959
مشترکین
اطلاعاتی وجود ندارد24 ساعت
-27 روز
+330 روز
در حال بارگیری داده...
کانالهای مشابه
ابر برچسبها
اشارات ورودی و خروجی
---
---
---
---
---
---
جذب مشترکین
ژوئن '26
ژوئن '26
+3
در 1 کانالها
مه '26
+16
در 11 کانالها
Get PRO
آوریل '26
+21
در 13 کانالها
Get PRO
مارس '26
+35
در 14 کانالها
Get PRO
فوریه '26
+14
در 8 کانالها
Get PRO
ژانویه '26
+13
در 6 کانالها
Get PRO
دسامبر '25
+37
در 24 کانالها
Get PRO
نوامبر '25
+12
در 4 کانالها
Get PRO
اکتبر '25
+33
در 13 کانالها
Get PRO
سپتامبر '25
+40
در 25 کانالها
Get PRO
اوت '25
+16
در 6 کانالها
Get PRO
ژوئیه '25
+21
در 13 کانالها
Get PRO
ژوئن '25
+20
در 7 کانالها
Get PRO
مه '25
+206
در 22 کانالها
Get PRO
آوریل '25
+57
در 6 کانالها
Get PRO
مارس '25
+42
در 6 کانالها
Get PRO
فوریه '25
+41
در 10 کانالها
Get PRO
ژانویه '25
+18
در 11 کانالها
Get PRO
دسامبر '24
+27
در 9 کانالها
Get PRO
نوامبر '24
+23
در 31 کانالها
Get PRO
اکتبر '24
+19
در 5 کانالها
Get PRO
سپتامبر '24
+60
در 20 کانالها
Get PRO
اوت '24
+42
در 7 کانالها
Get PRO
ژوئیه '24
+108
در 4 کانالها
Get PRO
ژوئن '24
+51
در 15 کانالها
Get PRO
مه '24
+44
در 16 کانالها
Get PRO
آوریل '24
+7
در 2 کانالها
Get PRO
مارس '24
+64
در 12 کانالها
Get PRO
فوریه '24
+32
در 25 کانالها
Get PRO
ژانویه '24
+13
در 5 کانالها
Get PRO
دسامبر '23
+47
در 12 کانالها
Get PRO
نوامبر '23
+31
در 2 کانالها
Get PRO
اکتبر '23
+313
در 3 کانالها
| تاریخ | رشد مشترکین | اشارات | کانالها | |
| 19 ژوئن | 0 | |||
| 18 ژوئن | 0 | |||
| 17 ژوئن | 0 | |||
| 16 ژوئن | 0 | |||
| 15 ژوئن | 0 | |||
| 14 ژوئن | 0 | |||
| 13 ژوئن | 0 | |||
| 12 ژوئن | 0 | |||
| 11 ژوئن | 0 | |||
| 10 ژوئن | +1 | |||
| 09 ژوئن | +1 | |||
| 08 ژوئن | 0 | |||
| 07 ژوئن | 0 | |||
| 06 ژوئن | +1 | |||
| 05 ژوئن | 0 | |||
| 04 ژوئن | 0 | |||
| 03 ژوئن | 0 | |||
| 02 ژوئن | 0 | |||
| 01 ژوئن | 0 |
پستهای کانال
The German business of MBDA hopes to perform initial trials of the €110 million ($127.7 million) Hypersonic Radar and Optical signature collecting GLIde Vehicle (Hyroglive) hypersonic target demonstrator as soon as 2027. Scaled versions potentially likely would make their first flights using Bayern-Chemie’s Red Kite solid-fuel motor, which MBDA has identified as the potential propulsion for a sounding rocket during initial test flights. The missile company presented a model of a potential HGV at the Berlin ILA Air Show here. ... MBDA Germany is exploring the use of a hypersonic missile capable of penetrating an adversary’s defenses and holding strategic sites at risk, a capability that European nations currently lack. This could eventually form part of a conventional deterrent fielded through the European Long-range Strike Approach (ELSA) initiative.https://aviationweek.com/defense/missile-defense-weapons/european-hgv-demonstrator-inform-conventional-deterrent-efforts
| 2 | Six European countries that have embarked on a joint effort to meet critical deep strike capability gaps have formalized their plans to embark on eight project initiatives covering suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), airborne early warning and various missile initiatives.
The June 18 agreement between Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Sweden and the UK around the so-called European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) builds on about two years of work. The countries are now ready to deepen their cooperation after agreeing to common requirements and ways forward in several areas that they refer to as clusters, they said in a joint statement.
Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine and that country’s efforts to repel its assailant highlighted to European countries the need to be able to hold targets at risk at extended range.
“Several clusters have now reached a level of maturity which will allow them to continue as standalone ‘ELSA Implementation Groups (EIG),’” the countries said.
The eight EIGs will cover work in airborne early warning, long-range SEAD, air-launched long-range strike, and European multi-missile launcher systems, as well as ground-launched, long-range strike systems with ranges of 300-500 km (186-310 mi.), 500-2,000 km, and above 2,000 km, in addition to low-cost, long-range strike effectors of more than 500-km range.
Each group will have a lead nation to develop and buy the systems.
https://aviationweek.com/defense/missile-defense-weapons/european-deep-strike-push-gets-clarity-eight-project-strands | 50 |
| 3 | Strategic Review 2025 is finally published, English version included: https://t.me/imemo_ran/2670 | 79 |
| 4 | The NPG Allies reaffirmed their enduring commitment to sharing the responsibilities, RISKS, and burdens of collective defence by investing in the resources, capabilities, and forces required to deliver NATO's nuclear mission and demonstrate Alliance unity and resolve.
https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2026/06/18/2026-nuclear-planning-group-statement | 86 |
| 5 |  🇷🇺 On 17 June, on the margins of the 66th session of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, Head of the Special Monitoring Service of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation Victor Korshak met with Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission Robert Floyd
🤝 During the constructive discussion, the parties outlined practical steps aimed at further expanding bilateral cooperation | 92 |
| 6 |  🆑 PIR Press News
A nuclear umbrella is not synonymous with extended nuclear deterrence but rather constitutes one of its elements. It does not necessarily imply the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of an ally and is not limited exclusively to protection against nuclear threats. First and foremost, it refers to a system of military-political and doctrinal guarantees provided by a nuclear-weapon state to its ally. Amid the growing role of the nuclear factor in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, the practice of nuclear umbrellas will not disappear but will transform: the United States will strengthen its system of extended deterrence; France will further specify the European dimension of its nuclear guarantees; and Russia will develop the nuclear dimension of the Union State with Belarus. – Mr. Ilya Subbotin, PIR Center intern and student of the MA Program International Security, implemented jointly by MGIMO University and PIR Center.
🔥 PIR Center is pleased to announce the publication of its new report (in Russian), “It’s Going to Rain: Peculiarities & Prospects of Nuclear Umbrellas,” prepared by PIR Center intern Mr. Ilya Subbotin. The report is published as part of PIR Center Reports series (№50) and represents a comprehensive study of the practice of “nuclear umbrellas” – nuclear guarantees provided by nuclear-weapon states to their military-political allies. The purpose of the research is to identify the specific features of the practice of nuclear umbrellas at the present stage and to assess its prospects in the foreseeable future.
🔎 The report is based on the author’s research paper presented at PIR Center and MGIMO University seminar “It’s Going to Rain: Peculiarities & Prospects of Nuclear Umbrellas.” The scientific advisor of the research paper was Dr. Vladimir Orlov, PIR Center Founding Director and Professor at MGIMO University.
🍀 In the course of the research, the author summarized academic discussions on the essence of the concept of a “nuclear umbrella,” examined the history of the formation and evolution of nuclear umbrellas up to the early 2020s, and conducted a comprehensive analysis of contemporary nuclear umbrellas and the latest trends in their development. The report focuses on U.S. nuclear guarantees to Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and NATO allies; the prospects for the Europeanization of nuclear deterrence; Russian guarantees within the framework of the CSTO and the Union State; and the question of whether new states may emerge under “nuclear umbrellas.”
👉 Read more
Ⓜ Follow us on Telegram | Our website
#pir_press #NuclearUmbrellas | 106 |
| 7 | Extended Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific in an Era of Great-Power Competition | 128 |
| 8 | Breaking: B-52 Stratofortress Bomber Crashed at Edwards AFB
Images posted online show a massive plume of black smoke rising from Edwards Air Force Base, before the base confirmed an ongoing B-52H Stratofortress mishap.
Story: https://theaviationist.com/2026/06/15/b-52-crashed-at-edwards-afb/ | 122 |
| 9 | France Begins Work on ASN4G Hypersonic Nuclear Missile
The new ASN4G hypersonic missile would replace the ASMPA-R currently carried by the Rafale, strengthening France’s nuclear deterrent.
Story: https://theaviationist.com/2026/06/13/france-asn4g-hypersonic-nuclear-missile/ | 117 |
| 10 | After New START: Why new formats of strategic arms control need a common view - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
https://thebulletin.org/2026/06/after-new-start-why-new-formats-of-strategic-arms-control-need-a-common-view/ | 165 |
| 11 | Нужна ли русскоязычная версия рассылки СТРАТДЕЛА? | 137 |
| 12 |  https://open.substack.com/pub/1dkv/p/stratdela-43 | 172 |
| 13 | But as the above analysis demonstrates, these interception metrics were created under circumstances that are unique to the Iranian threat. Applying them to East Asia risks overlooking this essential context—and, crucially, underestimating China’s ability to degrade missile defenses by systematically targeting the infrastructure that enables them and exploiting the resulting gaps with air and sea forces.
It also risks overlooking the critical U.S. vulnerabilities that the war has exposed. Rather than being deterred, it is possible that Chinese President Xi Jinping may conclude that his country’s conventional forces, properly utilized, would have a good chance of defeating the United States in the field and on the oceans.
https://archive.li/BXvrw | 161 |
| 14 | As the space domain becomes increasingly contested, international agreements ensure coalition interoperability, accelerate capability delivery and strengthen deterrence.
https://www.ssc.spaceforce.mil/Newsroom/Article-Display/Article/4515643/advancing-space-superiority-through-international-cooperative-agreements | 125 |
| 15 | Operational and Developmental Test Pilots Fly Together on B-21 Raider
An operational test pilot recently flew the B-21 Raider stealth bomber with a developmental test pilot, marking a key step in the program’s combined DT/OT approach and highlighting the urgency of the test campaign.
Story: https://theaviationist.com/2026/06/12/operational-test-pilot-b-21-raider/ | 134 |
| 16 | I have some really bad news for the respected authors: Russia will hardlyengageu in this discussion as long as US "theater range" nuclear weapons are present at the selected theaters at all. | 145 |
| 17 | Key for credible U.S. extended deterrence now is the accelerated deployment of the proposed SLCM-N system, rapid development of an air-launched nuclear standoff weapon for U.S. and NATO F35 dual-capable aircraft and possibly developing and deploying a nuclear warhead for U.S. medium-range ground-launched systems.
...
...until and unless we deploy systems that deny Moscow’s strategy of nuclear coercion, Russia will not engage in a serious discussion of curbing and reducing theater and tactical range nuclear systems.
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/05/26/trumps_nuclear_review_1184598.html | 159 |
| 18 |  Russia and Belarus started second stage of the non-strategic nuclear forces exercise today, per Dmitry Polyanskiy, Russian Permanent Representative to the OSCE.
https://osce.mid.ru/en/official/news/dmitry_polyanskiy_on_the_ongoing_attempts_by_osce_participating_states_to_undermine_efforts_to_find_11062026/ | 135 |
| 19 |  🆑 PIR Press News
🔥 PIR Center and MGIMO hosted a seminar on “Outcomes of the 11th NPT Review Conference: A Meeting with the Head of the Russian Delegation, Ambassador-at-Large Andrey Belousov”. During the discussion, the participants addressed the primary contradictions among the NPT Member States, disagreements surrounding the adoption of the final document, the Iranian and Israeli nuclear programs within the Middle East dossier, and the actions of the western nuclear triad.
👤 Amb. Andrey Belousov addressed the event as the keynote speaker. Dr. Dmitry Stefanovich, Research Fellow at the Sector of Military Economy and Innovation of the Center for International Security at IMEMO RAS and member of the PIR Center Advisory Board, and Ms. Alexandra Zubenko, Deputy Director of the PIR Center, delivered expert commentaries.
The NPT is the definitive international instrument underpinning global security, which Russia steadfastly advocates for and strives to strengthen. – the Head of the Russian Delegation, Ambassador-at-Large Andrey Belousov said.
👉 Read more
Ⓜ Follow us on Telegram | Our website
#pir_press #NPT | 139 |
| 20 | 🇷🇺 Statement by the delegation of the Russian Federation on the agenda item 7 of the IAEA Board of Governors
📍Vienna, June 11, 2026
💬 We are grateful to the Permanent Mission of China for its consistent efforts, despite resistance from certain countries, to advance within the IAEA an intergovernmental discussion on the AUKUS plans involving the transfer by the United Kingdom and the United States of highly enriched uranium to Australia for use in the nuclear propulsion systems of submarines
It is difficult to deny that, within the framework of AUKUS, we are witnessing the gradual military integration of Australia by the United States and the United Kingdom. Open-source information indicates that Australia is investing substantial resources in the modernization of HMAS Stirling, which is reportedly intended to serve as the principal hub for the AUKUS partners’ submarine fleet in the Asia-Pacific region. U.S. nuclear-powered submarines regularly call at the facility for maintenance, and British submarines have now begun doing so as well. Open-source reports of 30 May further indicated that the U.S. Navy had established a new support facility within the HMAS Stirling complex. The deployment of a significant contingent of U.S. military personnel is also envisaged. In essence, under the AUKUS umbrella, Australia is expected to host a concentration of offensive deterrence assets. All of this raises serious questions regarding Canberra’s commitment to both the letter and the spirit of the Treaty of Rarotonga establishing the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
We do not dispute that any State Party to the NPT has the right to pursue a naval nuclear propulsion programme, as well as enrichment and reprocessing activities. Nothing in the Treaty prohibits such activities. Nevertheless, through their non-transparent approach to engagement with the Agency’s Secretariat, the AUKUS countries have created a highly troubling precedent. As a result, a critically important discussion on the development of safeguards arrangements pursuant to provisions of comprehensive safeguards agreements that have never previously been implemented is effectively taking place outside the purview of the Agency’s policymaking organs
In this context, we note that we have yet to receive any clarification from the Republic of Korea regarding its own naval nuclear propulsion programme. The IAEA Secretariat has likewise remained silent on this matter. At the same time, on 26 May, the President and the Minister of National Defense of the Republic of Korea made a number of statements indicating that a nuclear-powered submarine, to be constructed with U.S. assistance, is expected to be launched by the mid-2030s. These statements also contained rather specific operational characteristics of the future submarine
It appears that we are experiencing déjà vu: the situation is unfolding almost exactly as it did in the case of AUKUS. We would not be surprised if we were soon told that a “feasibility study” is underway and that this would be used to justify the prolonged silence surrounding the project. However, we expect confirmation that the Republic of Korea has complied with its obligations under the modified Code 3.1 of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and has submitted the required initial notifications to the Agency’s Secretariat regarding the decision to construct a nuclear-powered submarine. Even this step is already overdue, particularly since, as we understand it, the Secretariat has already begun considering possible safeguards approaches for nuclear material intended for future South Korean submarines
We also bear in mind that the Republic of Korea participates in extended deterrence arrangements with the United States and falls under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Seoul plays a significant role in planning involving U.S. strategic nuclear forces, and we are currently witnessing a further deepening of this cooperation
🔗 Read in full | 127 |
