#STRATDELA

The Secretary of the Navy now has until April 1, 2025, to produce a study that addresses the following five points: “Examine a crewed variant of the LUSV that can serve as a pathfinder for the unmanned version while adding near-term missile-launching capacity, including a discussion of any need for waivers of survivability or other requirements, given the non-crewed original design of the LUSV.” “Examine other foreign, commercial, or U.S. Government ship designs that are mature and could be adapted with minimal modifications to produce a crewed small surface combatant.” “Examine existing Navy ships (including amphibious and support ships) or commercial-type hulls that could be quickly modified into missile-firing ships through the addition of VLS, bolt-on, or containerized missile launchers.” “Evaluate the time to field each platform, as well as the platform’s producibility within current supply chain and industrial base constraints.” “Provide cost estimates and manpower impacts for each platform.” https://www.twz.com/sea/navy-to-explore-arming-other-ships-with-missiles-amid-constellation-frigate-woes

Great overview of DPRK news from you know who. https://thebulletin.org/premium/2024-07/north-korean-nuclear-weapons-2024/

Issue 27 is live, go check it out: https://open.substack.com/pub/1dkv/p/stratdela-issue-27

Also, stay tuned for new STRATDELA issues this week. Subscribe if you haven't yet, and don't forget that there is a standalone website for this project: stratdela.ru

Some thoughts on how current INF-range weapons crisis is different from the 1980s. 1) At that time the confrontation took place between two major adversaries and blocs led by those. China was a factor, but more of a factor for Moscow, and the dynamics there were different, with, as far as I understand, more focus on battlefield nuclear weapons, not longer-range capabilities. 2) Geography for US and Soviet deployments and the involvement of allies was very different, as well as the fact that almost all of the discussion had been focused on nuclear-tipped missiles. Probably this is the reason why now there is much less opposition from the US allies. Also, both Russia (although the media overplays the saber-rattling narrative) and China are publicly and officially less vocal in painting non-nuclear longer-range missiles as possible targets for nuclear strikes. 3) For Moscow back in the Soviet era disarmament and especially nuclear disarmament was a very important political and diplomatic priority. It can be debated how sincere were the people in Kremlin back in the day, but it is clear that the current Russian leadership has no interest in further nuclear and especially non-nuclear disarmament at the moment, curbing the arms race and the ill-fated moratorium are the most ambitious goals possible in this domain. 4) China also has zero interest to do anything with their INF-range weapons, not to mention other countries with these capabilities, both in Europe and in Asia. 5) Moreover, as it has been clear for most people in the field, for the countries that retained and/or developed INF-range weapons while the INF Treaty was still alive such weapons were perceived and played a role rather different from what was the idea behind Pershings, Gryphons, Pioners and Reliefs back in the day. Not that missions behind ours and yours INF-weapons were very well-thought, but anyway, this was (from my perspective) a main reason why the 2007 initiative to multilateralize INF Treaty was doomed to fail. 6) Current US thinking about such non-nuclear long-range ground-based weapons suggests that they are actually for warfighting, augmenting sea- and air-based capabilities. On every theater, and all allies and partners should get some. 7) So the bottom line is that I hardly see any good way out. We are likely to see more horizontal an vertical proliferation of weapons in question, and corresponding escalation risks.

“With the old stands, it took over an hour to get ready just to work on an engine,” Vickers said. “With the Engine Pod Stand, we are ready to go in five minutes.”

https://www.airandspaceforces.com/air-force-b-52-maintenance-stand/

Some thoughts on possible Russian responses to the Western INF-range weapons deployment in Europe that I've prepared for this TWZ piece. Russia might demonstrate some of the previously announced INF-range weapons: "true" land-based Kalibr cruise missile* and something called "land-based intermediate-range hypersonic missile system", which might be a derivative of Tsirkon sea-launched hypersonic missile or an upgraded Iskander-M aeroballistic missile. It remains to be seen what might be the production and deployment tempo, as well as the areas for such deployment, with both NATO-focused Leningrad military district or traditional training unit for new weapons at Kapustin Yar at Southern military district possible. However, given the current Russian thinking that all the decisions are made in Washington, more focus on CONUS is possible, with previously announced and partially demonstrated patrols of sea-based hypersonic missile carriers near US coasts or even new rendition of far-eastern deployment of something like "heavy intermediate" closer to "light intercontinental" ballistic missile. We all remember shelved Rubezh project, which can re-surface as new "Pioner" without formally going beyond New START limits. Although the former will probably be less of a concern in 2026, not that it is a good thing. Another variable is a possible development and deployment of INF-range weapons by European (and Asian) allies and partners of the US. Looks like those are quite eager to join the party. What to do with all this dynamics arms control wise (which will eventually make a comeback, if we survive long enough) will be a challenge of its own. The scale of production of such weapons might be quite limited initially, but if the current trends continue we might end up in a full-fledged arms race with very dangerous weapons. *it was specifically announced by senior leadership back in 2019 that one of the responses to the US withdrawal would be "grounding" of Kalibr. 9M729 is understood as something else, longer than 9M728, but with a bigger warhead, not more fuel.

WASHINGTON, July 11 (Reuters) - France, Germany, Italy and Poland on Thursday kicked off an initiative to develop ground-launched cruise missiles with a range beyond 500 kilometres to fill a gap in European arsenals that they say has been exposed by Russia's war in Ukraine. The countries' defence ministers signed a letter of intent to this effect on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Washington. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/france-germany-italy-poland-agree-jointly-develop-long-range-cruise-missiles-2024-07-11/

NATO’s deterrence and defence posture is based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities, complemented by space and cyber capabilities. We will employ military and non-military tools in a proportionate, coherent and integrated way to deter all threats to our security and respond in the manner, timing, and in the domain of our choosing.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm

Remembered this for @russiancouncil from 2018... Looks like some of my ideas were not that far from reality:

One useful step towards resolving the crisis would be to identify the specific conditions under which Russia could resume the development and deployment of medium- and shorter-range missiles. Such a decision would be particularly logical to be linked with the possibility of the United States and/or NATO deploying medium- and shorter-range offensive weapons in Europe. Other developments that would radically change the balance of forces to the detriment of Russia are also possible. At the same time, linking this specific problem to a broad range of conditions does not appear to be the proper way to go. Furthermore, it would seem that now is the time to stage a public demonstration, for experts and media, of the 9M729 ground-based cruise missile, and clarify information about its design and capabilities, while not revealing information that could reduce the country’s deterrence and strike potential [7]. This would help Russia strengthen its narrative with regard to the absence of INF Treaty violations on its part, while assuming an active position on preserving the treaty’s achievements.

Not that it helped to save the INF Treaty...