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It is now 2015. The Witr issue flares up yet again after this same ex-student, a graduate, assumes the role of a Mustafti and submits a question to Korangi on the issue. A few months later, the answer from Korangi is issued, boasting the stamps of both Rafi and Taqi Usmani. The answer is then shared by the same person within the same emailing group, with no further comment.
In response, believing the Mustafti had shared it approvingly, Mohamed-Umer Esmail (d. 1441 AH), also an ex-student and a graduate of Korangi (and Dewsbury), remarks:
Jazak Allah khairan for providing the fatwa. It made my night! I remember this issue being discussed and debated at DUK in 1998 and some of the Scholars whose signature I see on this fatwa had differed strongly on this issue. This goes to show how open our Akabir are in terms of changing their opinion when needed or when strong evidence is presented. I recall being labeled too liberal when I once said that Hanafis can pray Witr behind an Imam of another mazhab as long as he prays Witr according one of the acceptable ways. My opinion was based on the opinion of most of the Scholars who signed this fatwa though at the time there was no documented detailed fatwa on the issue. So basically when a younger scholar says something based on his ijtihad or in this case hearing from the Akabir, it is too liberal, but when it comes from our Akabir, we accept it or at least most of us:). Jazak Allah khairan again for sending this fatwa.A few days later, the Mustafti replies:
Assalamu 'alaykum Ml. Umer sahib, My pleasure. I must inform you that there is a strong and impressive counter-argument being posted to our asatidha kiram at DU Karachi soon (hopefully, this week).Hang on a second. Was initial Istifta not supposed to be a sincere question to the Mufits of Korangi? It seems that had he got the preconceived answer he wanted, he would have shouted it from the hilltops. But he got the opposite and was now working on a refutation. Not only that, it seems his purpose of sharing the Korangi Fatwa was to elicit points of refutation from other participants in the group! And against one own’s teachers no less! Not that disagreeing with one’s teachers is bad. It seemed the Mustafti had trhown his toys out of the pram, having asked the question only to get the answer he wanted. What was surprising was that, knowing he was the Mustafti in the initial Istifta and now 'acknowledging' he was party to a refutation against the very answer offered to him, that nobody reading this pointed this out. Esmail’s email is followed up by Ibn Shabbir, who in 2016 wrote an expanded list of Hanafi scholars who approved praying Witr behind a non-Hanafi. It is published on his website. (Years later, Bilal Mahmudi reproduced a refutation on Ibn Shabbir - an unconvincing one for the same reasons that not praying behind the Imam of another Madhhab is discredited.) Eventually, this Mustafti conspires with Zameelur Rahman no less to produce a refutation against his own teachers, and allows its release into the public domain! Fast forward to May 2017, and this Mustafti, who has been obsessed and mentally occupied with this petit issue for the best part of four years, shares both the Korangi Fatwa and its refutation. For good measure, he digs up and shares a Fatwa from Khayrul Madaris in Multan stretching all the way back to August 1996, stating Witr behind a Shafi'i Imam is disallowed - it a flawed edict that is essentially based on yesterday's research that might have impressed people 20 years ago but is actually worthless. The end. Korangi, a prestigious Darul Ifta seminary in the world, was subjected to the duplicitous shenanigans of one of its ex-students - a total bigot who wants to bite their heads off over this petit Witr issue. Is this the mannerism of a supposed Mufti of Islamic law? Did being a card-carrying TS fanatic stop this individual from such douchebaggery? Well it's not the first time he's behaved in an appalling manner. (continues)
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The end. Korangi, a prestigious Darul Ifta seminary in the world, was subjected to the duplicitous shenanigans of one of its ex-students - a total bigot who wants to bite their heads off over this petit Witr issue. Is this the mannerism of a supposed Mufti of Islamic law? Did being a card-carrying TS fanatic stop this individual from such douchebaggery? Well it's not the first time he's behaved in an appalling manner.
(continues)
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It is now 2015. The Witr issue flares up yet again after this same ex-student, a graduate, assumes the role of a Mustafti and submits a question to Korangi on the issue. A few months later, the answer from Korangi is issued, boasting the stamps of both Rafi and Taqi Usmani. The answer is then shared by the same person within the same emailing group, with no further comment.
In response, believing the Mustafti had shared it approvingly, Mohamed-Umer Esmail (d. 1441 AH), also an ex-student and a graduate of Korangi (and Dewsbury), remarks:
Jazak Allah khairan for providing the fatwa. It made my night! I remember this issue being discussed and debated at DUK in 1998 and some of the Scholars whose signature I see on this fatwa had differed strongly on this issue. This goes to show how open our Akabir are in terms of changing their opinion when needed or when strong evidence is presented. I recall being labeled too liberal when I once said that Hanafis can pray Witr behind an Imam of another mazhab as long as he prays Witr according one of the acceptable ways. My opinion was based on the opinion of most of the Scholars who signed this fatwa though at the time there was no documented detailed fatwa on the issue. So basically when a younger scholar says something based on his ijtihad or in this case hearing from the Akabir, it is too liberal, but when it comes from our Akabir, we accept it or at least most of us:). Jazak Allah khairan again for sending this fatwa.A few days later, the Mustafti replies:
Assalamu 'alaykum Ml. Umer sahib, My pleasure. I must inform you that there is a strong and impressive counter-argument being posted to our asatidha kiram at DU Karachi soon (hopefully, this week).Hang on a second. Was initial Istifta not supposed to be a sincere question to the Mufits of Korangi? It seems that had he got the preconceived answer he wanted, he would have shouted it from the hilltops. But he got the opposite and was now working on a refutation. Not only that, it seems his purpose of sharing the Korangi Fatwa was to elicit points of refutation from other participants in the group! And against one own’s teachers no less! Not that disagreeing with one’s teachers is bad. It seemed the Mustafti had trhown his toys out of the pram, having asked the question only to get the answer he wanted. What was surprising was that, knowing he was the Mustafti in the initial Istifta and now 'acknowledging' he was party to a refutation against the answer offered to him, that nobody reading this at the time pointed out why he was working on a refutation against the answer he himself sought from Korangi. After all, he already knew their opinion beforehand via YouTube. Also, there was no indication in the Istifta he already had his own view. Esmail’s email is followed up by Ibn Shabbir, who in 2016 wrote an expanded list of Hanafi scholars who approved praying Witr behind a non-Hanafi. It is published on his website. (Years later, Bilal Mahmudi reproduced a refutation on Ibn Shabbir - an unconvincing one for the same reasons that not praying behind the Imam of another Madhhab is discredited.) Eventually, this Mustafti conspires with Zameelur Rahman no less to produce a refutation against his own teachers, and allows its release into the public domain! Fast forward to May 2017, and this Mustafti, who has been obsessed and mentally occupied with this petit issue for the best part of four years, shares both the Korangi Fatwa and its refutation. For good measure, he digs up and shares a Fatwa from Khayrul Madaris in Multan stretching all the way back to August 1996, stating Witr behind a Shafi'i Imam is disallowed - it a flawed edict that is essentially based on yesterday's research that might have impressed people 20 years ago but is actually worthless.
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Being trained to adhere to the Mu’tamad of a single school in Ifta doesn’t render a person shielded from abjectly falling into desire and predilection in other ways. Corruption in Ifta and among Muftis is as old as the hills. Molvis’ use and abuse of Darul Iftas across the world is rife, contrary to what some would believe that they are just one-off stories or a few bad apples. Ibn 'l-Qayyim and others highlight numerous horror stories in Fatwa. In the Ottoman period, you have Hanafis, even Hanbalis, passing Fatwa that fratricide is permitted in order to preserve political stability; one Hanbali scholar - the famous Mar'i al-Karmi (d. 1033 AH) - went as far to listed fratricide to be from the virtues of the Ottoman rulers!
But it’s not just Muftis. You’ll find many Mustaftis ask leading questions - and the gullible Mufti walks right into the trap. Mustaftis are known to offer half truths to present their rivals in the worst possible manner in the question (Ahmad Raza Khan, “Alahazrat”, comes to mind here, but it’s not only him). They will try to get an answer that settles scores with another party. Typically, they present questions with a neutral tone and/or a hypothetical framing, but will readily apply it to a real person once the answer is returned.
Sometimes, a Molvi submitting a loaded or leading question will even turn around and refute the Darul Ifta when he does not get the answer he wants. Following hawa (desire) is shouted from the hilltops by these lot when it comes to adhering to a school, but this shouty preaching rarely extends to the above scenarios that they perpetrate, because apparently, they can't ever possibly follow desire given that they consider themselves to be the vanguards of the faith. In reality, these nutjobs perpetrate a far worse form of Ittiba' 'l-Hawa than those who do not strictly adhere to a school. There are even instances that, when these fanatical Molvis did not receive the fatwa they desired, they conspired to refute the Darul Ifta, of which they were ex-students.
The year is 2013. The month is January. It is a digital circle - an emaling group - of a bunch of young Muftis and Molvis in the West. It has been brought to the attention of one British graduate and ex-student of Darul Ulum Korangi that Muhammad Rafi Usmani (d. 1444 AH) observes Witr in the Haramayn behind the non-Hanafi Imam. He expresses surprise and wants to probe this further, as this goes against his personal convictions of disallowance. He is presented with an audio of Rafi Usmani stating he prays behind the Haramayn Imams. The issue dies down for a couple of years. The aforementioned clip is left buried to gather dust, as evidenced by its low view count. But this ex-student could not let go and started to think of ways to establish the Hujjah on his own teachers...
(continues)
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Essentially, what we have now are three reasons why a Mufti ought to adhere to a specific school:
1. Because of Qiyas on Qada
2. Because that is the terms dictated to a Mufti employed by these Awqaf
3. Because of preventative measures against potential chaos in
All three are debatable. Let's start with the third point, that not adhering to the Mashhur/Mu’tamad of a school can potentially lead to mass chaos in Ifta. On this argument, Hatim al-Awni responds to it the best:
إن فوضى الإفتاء لا يمنع منها الإلزام بمعتمدات المذاهب، وإنما يمنع منها عدم الخروج عن الإجماع الحقيقي، وعدم الخروج من مجموع أقاويل السلف فيما يدخل في الإجماع المركب بشرطه المعتبر (الذي بينته في كتابي: اختلاف المفتين)، بإيجاب أن يكون للمفتي إمام معتبر بالاتفاق قد سبقه إلى قوله
هذا هو ما يضبط الفتوى وينجيها من الفوضى، وليس الإلزام بما لا تستطيعون الاستدلال على وجوب التزامه
وما مثل الملزمين بمعتمدات المذاهب السابق ذكرهم إلا كطبيب وجد مريضا بالسكر فحماه من السكر وكل ما يرفع السكر في دمه، ومنعه أيضا من أغذية أخرى لا علاقة لها بمرضه بحجة أنها قد تفتح شهيته للسكر، ومنعه أيضا من النشاط الحركي بحجة أنه يتطلب طاقة تجعله يتطلب السكر. فكان تضييقه هذا سببا في عدم التزام المريض بالحمية الصحيحة، وسببا في تفاقم المرض، فضلا عن كونه تضييقا غير علمي
فإذا كان دافع المتمذهبين هو حماية الدين والفقه من فوضى اللامذهبيين ومن دعاوى الاجتهاد عند أدعياء السلفية المعاصرة، وليس دافعهم التعصب المذهبي: فعليهم أن يلتزموا بالحمية الكافية للمرض، دون غلو غير علمي لا يحقق الهدف، بل ينكسه
On the second point, then that was dealt with in the Awqaf issue, and that it is contentious for Awqaf to even have these stipulations. But even if the link between Awqaf and Ifta is considered valid, that does not work for a Mufti who is not employed by a Madhhab-based Waqf, which is the case for almost all Muftis in today's world.
To the first point, then that is a straightforward analogy (Qiyas) on Qada. As discussed before, the mandate to to adhere to a school can be imposed by:
• the Chief Justice (in the case of a Qadi), or
• the terms of the Waqf where he is serving (in the case of a Mufti serving in that (Waqf), or
• by the Head of Government/State/Governor (in the case of both Qadi and Mufti).
But even this is a contentious point, as was dealt with in the previous series of posts dealing with Qada and Awqaf. The analogy (Qiyas) of Ifta (Maqis) on Qada/Awqaf (Maqis Alayh) is only as good as the arguments in favour of adherence in the Maqis Alayh, which themselves are highly disputed. Such a contentious basis of adherence to a school in Ifta can in no way impose a universal obligation of Taqlid Shakhsi - especially not in relation to personal practice.
Furthermore, the link between Muqallid Mufti (one passing fatwa by way of “parroting” his school's position) working as a Mufti and him operating in his personal practice is tenuous. In fact, the reverse is as applicable: just as he's allowed to act on a non-Mu'tamad view in his personal practice, he should be allowed to pass fatwa according to that view as well. Ibn Hajar al-Haytami (d. 974 AH) entertains this discussion in his al-Fatawa al-Kubra al-Fiqhiyyah, although he disagrees with it as he was a strong proponent of adhering to the official position of the school in both Qada and Ifta (not in personal practice). Haytami added that even when a judge is appointed without any restrictive conditions attached to his judgeship, he would still have to stick to a school if that is the prevailing urf (custom) in judicial society, as per the rule: والمعروف عرفا كالمشروط شرطا. He then extended this rule in Qada to Ifta, stating that it is implicitly understood that a Mufti ought to adhere to a school in the process of Ifta.
(continues)
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It can be safely inferred that the job of Ifta was never as "official" as a job as a Qadi. This is why the Ottomans allowed Muftis from all schools, but for judges only Hanafi ones were appointed in the Ottoman heartlands. Judges have adjudicatory jurisdiction that Muftis do not. But many scholars said they are similar in that one is representative of the school according to which he professes to pass rulings. So Ifta is linked to Qada.
Ifta is also closely linked to the Awqaf issue: many scholars would dare not to venture away from his designated school lest they be deprived of their jobs, or be grassed up for being too experimental with their opinions. As a result, de facto, Ifta switched from being an issue that was the sole dominion of Mujtahids to one where a scholar of a specific Madhhab may only pass fatwa according to that Madhhab. The flexibility that early scholars had to offer an alternative ruling was curtailed to a great extent.
Again, this was hotly contested by multiple scholars, both in theory and in practice. Subki (d. 756 AH) for example went against the Shafi’i School, as M. Taha Karan (d. 1442 AH) expertly analysed in his article: https://www.ilmgate.org/answering-an-allegation-against-imam-as-subki/
But this article deserves qualification. Subki, being who he was, could perhaps get away with what another scholar could not, as was previously mentioned vis-a-vis Mizzi (d. 742 AH) and Jaunpuri (d. 1438 AH). Stories of scholars working in these Awqaf being grassed up for straying from the Madhhab are not hard to find. In fact, in this very same article, the suggestion is that Bulqini (d. 805 AH) was at the level of Mujtahid - as was Subki - but did not exercise it to the degree that he could have. Also, as Ala’i (d. 761 AH) suggested, going against the Madhhab was tolerated in issues that weren’t considered to be hallmarks of the Madhhab. Ala’i too was discussed in earlier posts.
Qadis and Muftis having similar duties was well understood across the scholarly landscape. Regarding the imposition of a single Madhhab on a Mufti in Ifta as a continuation of the Qada ruling he proffered, Ibn 'l-Qayyim (d. 751 AH) said in al-I’lam:
وطرد هذا أن المفتي متى شرط عليه ألا يفتي إلا بمذهب معين بطل الشرط
Back to the theme of the Madhhab-based Awqaf and the want to preserve one’s job, Muhammad al-Hajwi (d. 1376 AH), a Maliki scholar from Fez, in his eyeopening al-Fikr al-Sami Fi Tarikh ‘l-Fiqh al-Islami, states:
هناك بالمشرق أوقاف خاصة بالشافعية، وأخرى بالحنفية مثلا، ومدارس لا ينال التدريس بها إلا من كان مقلدا لأحد المذاهب الأربعة، ووظائف كذلك من قضاء وفتوى، فكان هذا العمل مما أوجب بقاء العلماء مقلدين، ولو بلغوا درجة الاجتهاد.
In a nutshell, again, the imposition of adherence to a school in the context of Ifta developed as a result of a combination of socio-religious factors pertaining to the Awqaf, Qada, and institutional authority. It did not have much to do with any Shar'i evidence. In no way should anybody be inferring from this “adherence to a school in Ifta” phenomenon that Taqlid Shakhsi upon the Ummah is an obligation in personal practice. Indeed, many scholars who did make adherence obligatory in Ifta never extended that obligation to personal practice. Ibn Hajar al-Haytami is a prime example of that.
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On Ifta: Contextualising the obligation upon Muftis to adhere to the school’s correct position, and incorrect inference from it that Taqlid Shakhsi is mandatory upon all individuals
This is the next series of posts on faulty inferences for the obligation of Taqlid Shakhsi. I will index this and all previous posts at the end of these series. There are still at least three/four more rounds to go after this series.
We have previously discussed the institutions of Qada, Awqaf, and the Mihrabs as pitfalls for the Taqlid Shakhsi fanatic who erroneously infers from them that adherence to a school is an obligation. In similar fashion, the institution of Ifta is also prone to such an incorrect inference.
Many quotes have already been mentioned supporting the idea that, in Qada and Ifta, a Qadi and a Mufti must adhere to the school’s mainstream positions. It was also made clear though that those same scholars explicitly said that this obligation did not extend to their personal practice, let alone the practice of the clueless layman.
I have been hard-pressed to find anyone who made it mandatory upon the layman Muqallid to adhere to a school’s Mufta Bihi/Mu’tamad positions, or that he must ask the Mufti for precisely that. The minority of scholars that do state it is an obligation either mention he should try to choose the best available Madhhab, after which they have no obligation to ask for the Mu’tamad views of a scholar in that school; or they mention that he should adhere to a school for precaution, but even this camp did not make it the responsibility of the layman to seek out the ‘official’ position of the school.
To the contrary and in opposition to this minority, there are considerable quotes - literally in their hundreds - that support the notion that a layman is at liberty to ask any scholar, as the obligation of Taqlid Shakhsi elicits obligations that the Shariah never imposed on the layman, namely: knowledge of what a Madhhab is, knowledge of who the scholars of his Madhhab are so he refers only to them, and knowledge of scholars from other Madhhabs so he avoids them. Framed as such, it is virtually impossible to argue that adherence to a school a de jure obligation on the layman. A sample of this was discussed when even the battle-hardened Hanafi Fuqaha discussed a Hanafi seeking fatwa from a Hanbali Mufti in Kitab ‘l-Sawm: https://t.me/KnowledgeRevival/16567.
Ibn ‘l-Rif’ah (d. 710 AH) of the Shafi’is says with regards to a layman potentially being completely unaware of any school, let alone its machinations:
قال في الحلية: كان الشيخ أبو نصر يعلل ذلك بأن الزوج عقد النكاح على رأي من التزم مذهبه فيه، فأوجب عليه حكم اعتقاده، وهو وقوع الطلاق، وهذا فيه نظر فإن الزوج قد لا يعرف مذهبا
(Abu Nasr here probably refers to Ibn ‘l-Sabbagh (d. 477 AH), the teacher of the author of حلية العلماء aka Abu Bakr al-Qaffal al-Shashi (d. 507 AH), though this is a grey area as Ibn ‘l-Sabbagh in his al-Shamil explicitly said that divorce cannot occur in a Wali-less marriage; it is possible that Ibn ‘l-Sabbagh changed his view later on in life, or that this is another Abu Nasr altogether.)
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Nicholas Kristof became a columnist for The Times Opinion desk in 2001 and has won two Pulitzer Prizes.
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He now keeps a blown-up print of the settlers’ photo of him on the wall of his office. To try to make sense of what I found, I called up Ehud Olmert, who was prime minister from 2006 to 2009. Olmert told me he didn’t know much about sexual violence against Palestinians but was not surprised by the accounts I had heard. “Do I believe it happens?” he asked. “Definitely.” “There are war crimes committed every day in the territories,” he added. So we return to the point I noted at the beginning of this column: Supporters of Israel were right in 2023 that whatever our views about the Middle East, we should be able to repudiate rape. “Where the hell are you?” Netanyahu asked the international community then, demanding that it condemn sexual violence committed by what the Israeli government has called the “Hamas rapist regime.” Hamas has indeed brutally violated human rights. Israeli officials should look to their own violations as well — in particular at what a 49-page United Nations report last year called Israel’s “systematically” subjecting Palestinians to “sexualized torture” committed with at least “an implicit encouragement by the top civilian and military leadership.” Think of it this way: The horrific abuse inflicted on Israeli women on Oct. 7 now happens to Palestinians day after day. It persists because of silence, indifference and the failure of American and Israeli officials alike to answer Netanyahu’s query: Where the hell are you?
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A Gaza journalist shared with me his account of the abuse he suffered after he was detained in 2024. “No one escaped sexual assaults,” he said. “Not all were raped, I would say, but everyone went through humiliating, filthy sexual assaults.” On one occasion, he said, the guards zip-tied his testicles and penis for hours while beating his genitals. For days afterward, he said, he urinated blood. On one occasion, he said, he was held down, stripped naked, and as he was blindfolded and handcuffed, a dog was summoned. With encouragement from a handler in Hebrew, he said, the dog mounted him. “They were using cameras to take photos, and I heard their laughs and giggles,” he said. He tried to dislodge the dog, he said, but it penetrated him. Other Palestinian prisoners and human rights monitors have also cited reports of police dogs being coached to rape prisoners. The journalist said that when he was released, an Israeli official warned him: “If you want to stay alive when you return, do not speak to the media.” So why was he willing to speak? “There are moments when remembering feels unbearable,” he said. “My heart felt it might stop while talking to you about it just now. But I remember there are people still in there. So I speak up.” Multiple accounts indicate that sexual violence has been directed even at Palestinian children, who are typically imprisoned for throwing stones. I located and interviewed three boys who had been detained, and all described being sexually abused. One, a shy boy in a Hilfiger shirt who was 15 years old at the time of his arrest, declined to say whether he had also witnessed actual rapes. But he said threats were routine: “They’d say, ‘Do this or we’ll put this stick up your butt.’” The other boys told very similar stories of sexual violence as part of beatings and noted that the threats of rape were directed not only at them but also at their mothers and siblings. Israeli settlers are not an official arm of the state in the same way that the prison system is, but the Israel Defense Forces increasingly protect settlers as they attack Palestinian villagers and use sexual violence to drive Palestinians to flee. “Sexualized violence is used to pressure communities” to leave their land, according to a new report by the West Bank Protection Consortium, a coalition of international aid groups led by the Norwegian Refugee Council. The consortium surveyed Palestinian farmers and found that more than 70 percent of households that had been displaced reported that threats to women and children, particularly of sexual violence, were the decisive reason for leaving. “Sexual violence,” said Allegra Pacheco of the coalition, “is one of the mechanisms driving people from their land.” In a remote Jordan Valley hamlet of Bedouin farmers, I met a 29-year-old farmer, Suhaib Abualkebash, who recounted how a gang of about 20 settlers rampaged through the homes of his family, beating adults and children alike, stealing jewelry and 400 sheep — and also cut off his clothes with a hunting knife and then tightly zip-tied his penis and yanked. “I was afraid they would cut off my penis,” Abualkebash told me. “I thought this was the end for me.” Some may wonder whether Palestinians fabricated accusations of sexual assaults to defame Israel. To me that seems far-fetched, because none of those I interviewed sought me out or knew who else I was speaking to, and they were reluctant to speak. Yet there is some evidence that Israel’s sexual abuse has become so frequent that norms are changing and Palestinian victims are becoming a bit more willing to speak out. “For six months I couldn’t speak about it, even to my family,” said Mohammad Matar, a Palestinian official who told me that settlers stripped him, beat him and poked him with a stick in the buttocks while talking about raping him. During the attack, the assailants posted a photograph on social media of him blindfolded and stripped to his underpants. With time, Matar decided to speak out to try to break the stigma.
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That sent a powerful message throughout the police force: Those who assault detainees may be punished. And that’s the message that must be sent throughout the Israeli security forces. If the Trump administration insisted on a resumption of Red Cross visits to prisoners, if the U.S. ambassador visited rape survivors with cameras in tow, if we conditioned arms transfers on an end to sexual assault, we could send a moral and practical message that sexual violence is unacceptable no matter the identity of the victim. For starters, the ambassador could ensure that those Palestinians who dared to speak for this article are not brutalized again for their courage. How does this kind of violence happen? Decades of covering conflict has taught me that a combination of dehumanization and impunity can propel people into a Hobbesian state of nature. I’ve encountered this drift toward savagery in killing fields from Congo to Sudan to Myanmar, and I think it also roughly explains how American soldiers came to sexually abuse prisoners at Abu Ghraib in Iraq. The blunt reality is that when there are no consequences, we humans are capable of immense depravity toward those we are taught to scorn as subhuman. Itamar Ben-Gvir, Israel’s national security minister, called detainees “scum” and “Nazis” and boasted of making prison conditions harsher for Palestinians. When such attitudes prevail, sexual abuse can become one more tool to inflict pain and humiliation on Palestinians. Ben-Gvir declined, through a spokeswoman, to comment on sexual assaults by security services. B’Tselem, an Israeli human rights organization, documented “a grave pattern of sexual violence” toward Palestinians. It cited the account of a Gaza prisoner, Tamer Qarmut, who said he had been raped with a stick. Torture, B’Tselem said, “has become an accepted norm.” A former Israeli officer in a prison infirmary described in testimony to the Israeli group Breaking the Silence what that kind of acceptance means in practice: “You see normal, pretty ordinary people reaching a point where they abuse people for their own amusement, not even for an interrogation or anything. For fun, to have something to tell the guys, or revenge.” Most of the rape and other sexual violence has been directed at men, if only because Palestinian prisoners are more than 90 percent male. But I spoke to one Palestinian woman who was arrested at the age of 23 after the Hamas attack in October 2023. She said that the soldiers who arrested her threatened to rape her, her mother and her young niece. Her prison ordeal began with a strip-search conducted by female guards, “but then a male soldier came in, when I was completely naked,” she added. For the next few days, she said, she was repeatedly stripped naked, beaten and searched by teams of male and female guards alike. The pattern was always the same: Several guards, men and women together, would come to her cell, forcibly strip her naked, handcuff her hands behind her back and bend her forward at the waist, sometimes forcing her head into the toilet. In this position, she would be beaten and groped all over, she said. “They had their hands all over my body,” she said. “To be honest, I don’t know if they raped me,” she said, because she sometimes lost consciousness from the beatings. The aim of the abuse was twofold, she thinks: to crush her spirit and also to let Israeli men molest a naked Palestinian woman with impunity. “I’d be stripped and beaten several times a day,” she said. “It was as if they were introducing me to everyone who worked there. At the beginning of each shift, they would bring the guys to strip me.” When she was about to be released from prison, she said, she was called into a room with six officials and given a stern warning never to give interviews. “They threatened that if I spoke up, they would rape me, kill me and kill my father,” she said. Not surprisingly, she declined to be named in this article. Some of the worst sexual abuse appears to have been directed at prisoners from Gaza.
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Another reason, Palestinian survivors told me, is that Arab society discourages discussing the topic for fear of hurting the morale of prisoners’ families and undermining the Palestinian narrative of defiant and heroic detainees. Conservative social norms also inhibit discussion: Two victims told me that a prisoner who acknowledges being raped would harm the ability of his sisters and daughters to find husbands. One farmer initially agreed to let me use his name in this article. Released early this year after months in administrative detention — with no charges filed — he related what he said happened one day last year: A half-dozen guards immobilized him by holding his arms and legs while pulling down his pants and underwear and inserting a metal baton into his anus. The rapists were laughing and cheering, he said. Several hours later, he said, he fainted and was taken to the prison clinic. After he woke up, he said, he was raped once more, again with the metal baton. “I was bleeding,” he recalled. “I broke down completely. I was crying.” After being returned to his cell, he said, he asked a guard for pen and paper to write a complaint about the assaults. The request was denied. And that evening, a group of guards came to the cell. “Who is the one who wants to file a complaint?” one guard jeered, he said, and another guard pointed him out. “The beating started immediately,” he recalled. And then they raped him with the baton for a third time that day, he said. He recalled one saying, “Now you have even more to put in your complaint.” A few days after I interviewed him, the farmer called to say that he didn’t want his name used after all. He had just been visited by Shin Bet and warned not to cause trouble, and he also feared that his family would react badly to the attention. “Rampant sexual abuse of Palestinian prisoners is a thing; it’s been normalized,” said Sari Bashi, an Israeli American human rights lawyer who is the executive director of the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel. “I don’t see evidence that it has been ordered. But there’s persistent evidence that the authorities know it’s happening and are not stopping it.” Another Israeli lawyer, Ben Marmarelli, told me that based on the experiences of the Palestinian detainees he has represented, rape of Palestinian prisoners with objects “is going on across the board.” Bashi said her organization has filed hundreds of complaints detailing horrific abuse against Palestinian detainees — and not in a single case did these lead to charges filed. Impunity, she said, creates a “green light” for abusers. One Palestinian prisoner from Gaza reportedly was hospitalized in July 2024 with a tear in his rectum, cracked ribs and a punctured lung. Investigators obtained a prison video purportedly showing the abuse. The authorities detained nine reservist soldiers — but Israel’s right-wingers erupted in outrage, with a mob of furious protesters, including politicians, breaking into the prison to show support for the guards. The last charges against the soldiers were dropped in March, and last month the military approved the soldiers’ return to duty. Netanyahu hailed the dropping of charges as the end of a “blood libel.” “The State of Israel must hunt down its enemies — not its heroic fighters,” he said. Bashi described the outcome this way: “I would say that dropping the charges — that’s giving permission to rape.” That prisoner, who afterward reportedly required a stoma bag to collect his waste, was returned to Gaza, and an acquaintance of his said that he spent months in a hospital recovering from his internal injuries. The acquaintance said that the former prisoner declined to be interviewed. Prosecutions and public attention can curb such violence. In 1997, police officers in New York City raped a Haitian immigrant, Abner Louima, with a stick so brutally that he required hospitalization and surgeries. New Yorkers were outraged, Mayor Rudy Giuliani visited Louima in the hospital and police officers were prosecuted in a landmark case.
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I became interested in reporting on sexual assaults against Palestinian prisoners after Issa Amro, a nonviolent activist sometimes called “the Palestinian Gandhi,” told me when I previously visited that he had been sexually assaulted by Israeli soldiers and that he believed this was common but underreported because of shame. By one count, Israel has detained 20,000 people in the West Bank alone since the Oct. 7 attacks, and more than 9,000 Palestinians were still being held as of this month. Many have not been charged but were detained under ill-defined security grounds, and since 2023, most have been denied visits from the Red Cross and lawyers. “Israeli forces systematically employ rape and sexual torture to humiliate Palestinian female detainees,” the Euro-Med report said. It cited a 42-year-old woman who said she had been shackled naked to a metal table as Israeli soldiers forcibly had sex with her over two days while other soldiers filmed the attacks. Afterward, she said, she was shown photos of her being raped and told they would be published if she did not cooperate with Israeli intelligence. It’s impossible to know how common sexual assaults against Palestinians are. My reporting for this article is based on conversations with 14 men and women who said they had been sexually assaulted by Israeli settlers or members of the security forces. I also spoke to family members, investigators, officials and others. I found these victims by asking around among lawyers, human rights groups, aid workers and ordinary Palestinians themselves. In many cases it was possible to corroborate the victims’ stories in part by talking to witnesses or, more commonly, to those whom the victims had confided in, such as family members, lawyers and social workers; in other cases it was not possible, perhaps because shame left people reluctant to acknowledge abuse even to loved ones. Save the Children commissioned a survey last year of children ages 12 to 17 who had been in Israeli detention; more than half reported witnessing or experiencing sexual violence. Save the Children said that the true figure was probably higher because stigma left some unwilling to acknowledge what had happened to them. The Committee to Protect Journalists, a respected American organization, surveyed 59 Palestinian journalists who had been released by Israeli authorities after the Oct. 7 attacks. Three percent said they had been raped, and 29 percent said they had endured other forms of sexual violence. The Israeli government rejects suggestions that it sexually abuses Palestinians, just as Hamas denied raping Israeli women. Israel welcomed a United Nations report documenting sexual assaults against Israeli women by Palestinians but rejected the report’s call to investigate Israeli assaults against Palestinians. Netanyahu has denounced “baseless accusations of sexual violence” made against Israel. Israel’s Ministry of National Security declined to comment for this article. The prison service “categorically rejects the allegations” of sexual abuse, said a spokesman who declined to be named, adding that complaints are “examined by the competent authorities.” The spokesman declined to say whether any prison staff member had ever been fired or prosecuted for sexual assaults. The Palestinians I interviewed recounted various kinds of abuse beyond rape. Many reported that they often had their genitals yanked or were beaten on the testicles. Hand-held metal detectors were used to probe between men’s naked legs and then smashed into their private parts; some men had to have their testicles amputated by doctors after beatings, according to the Euro-Med monitor. One reason these abuses don’t receive more attention is threats by Israeli authorities, who periodically warn prisoners on release to keep quiet, according to Palestinians who have been freed.
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The Silence That Meets the Rape of Palestinians Male and female Palestinians describe brutal sexual abuse at the hands of Israel’s prison guards, soldiers, settlers and interrogators. By Nicholas Kristof Opinion Columnist, reporting from the West Bank May 11, 2026 It’s a simple proposition: Whatever our views of the Middle East conflict, we should be able to unite in condemning rape. Supporters of Israel made that point after the brutal sexual assaults against Israeli women during the Hamas-led attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. Donald Trump, Joe Biden, Benjamin Netanyahu and many U.S. senators, including Marco Rubio, condemned that sexual violence, and Netanyahu rightly called on “all civilized leaders” to “speak up.” And yet in wrenching interviews, Palestinians have recounted to me a pattern of widespread Israeli sexual violence against men, women and even children — by soldiers, settlers, interrogators in the Shin Bet internal security agency and, above all, prison guards. There is no evidence that Israeli leaders order rapes. But in recent years they have built a security apparatus where sexual violence has become, as a United Nations report put it last year, one of Israel’s “standard operating procedures” and “a major element in the ill treatment of Palestinians.” A report out last month, from the Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, a Geneva-based advocacy group often critical of Israel, concludes that Israel employs “systematic sexual violence” that is “widely practiced as part of an organized state policy.” What does this standard operating procedure look like? Sami al-Sai, 46, a freelance journalist, says that as he was being taken to a prison cell after his detention in 2024, a group of guards threw him to the ground. “They were all hitting me, and one stepped on my head and neck,” he said. “Someone pulled my pants down. They pulled down my boxers.” And then one of the guards pulled out a rubber baton used to beat prisoners. “They were trying to force it into my rectum, and I was bracing myself to prevent it, but I couldn’t,” he said, speaking with increasing anxiety. “It was so painful.” The guards were laughing at him, he said. “Then I heard someone say, ‘Give me the carrots,’” he recalled, adding that they then used a carrot. “It was extremely painful,” he said. “I was praying for death.” Al-Sai was blindfolded, he said, and heard someone say in Hebrew, which he understands, “don’t take photos.” That suggested to him that someone had pulled out a camera. One of the guards was a woman who, he said, grabbed him by the penis and testicles, and joked, “these are mine,” and then squeezed until he screamed from pain. The guards left him handcuffed on the ground, and he smelled cigarette smoke. “I realized it was their smoking break,” he said. After he was dumped into his cell, he concluded that the spot where he had been raped had been used before, for he found other people’s vomit, blood and broken teeth crushed into his skin. Al-Sai said that he had been asked to become an informant for Israeli intelligence, and he believes that the purpose of his arrest and imprisonment under the administrative detention system was to pressure him to agree. Because he prided himself on his journalistic professionalism, he said, he refused. I’ve had a career covering war, genocide and atrocities including rape, sometimes in places where the scale of sexual violence is far greater than anything committed by either Hamas militants or Israeli guards or settlers. In the Tigray conflict in Ethiopia a few years ago, 100,000 women may have been raped. Mass rape is now unfolding in Sudan. Yet our American tax dollars subsidize the Israeli security establishment, so this is sexual violence in which the United States is complicit.
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Repost from Islamic Knowledge
❗️ The History & Fiqh of Waqf with a Study of Kitab al-Waqf from Al-Mabsut - ONLINE
Register here: https://forms.gle/ntSV9q3WsDKQDjBe9
Course Instructor: Shaykh Dr. Haroon Sidat
Start date: 3rd June 2026
Timing: Every Wednesday 8:00 pm to 9:00 pm UK time
Duration: 3 months
Course Outline:
Nearly half of all real property in Muslim lands by the 16th century was waqf. It is without doubt the oldest organized form of charity in the world and was the engine that allowed Islamic societies to function before the advent of colonialism. Waqf was the lifeblood of Muslim civilization as it supported relief to the poor, education for the masses, services for travelers, construction and maintenance of mosques, schools, colleges, hostels and medical facilities which were all freely accessible to everyone.
In our new incredible 3-month online course, Shaykh Haroon will be journeying through the entire history of waqf from the first waqf in Islam of ‘Uthman radiyallahu ‘anhu until the awqaf systems in the Mughal and Ottoman world and beyond. Along with the history, we’ll be learning the theory by reading through Kitab al-Waqf from Al-Mabsut of Imam al-Sarakhsi rahimahullah (d. ca 483 AH) with a detailed understanding of how waqf itself works in classical Islam.
The history of Waqf is the history of Islam itself. It was amongst the first institutions destroyed by the colonialists. Everyone needs to be aware of waqf and how it works.
This course is not just a must for students, but even solicitors, accountants, law students and consultants!
Course Fee: £80 one-time payment or £45 over 2 months or £32 over 3 months
✅ Recordings Provided
✅ Open to brothers and sisters
Register here: https://forms.gle/ntSV9q3WsDKQDjBe9
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Repost from The East Wind
Some quick thoughts on this: this is a difficult claim to believe. There are some factors pointing to it being questionable, though it must be admitted that they do not conclusively disprove the claim either. Some of those reasons are:
1. It is already difficult to establish the attribution of works like this when the source is so much later than the author's demise, even though Ibn al-Nadim is quite reliable generally. Attribution aside, any claim or assumption regarding the contents of the work deduced from that title is even more questionable.
2. Titles are not always transmitted so meticulously. We see very often that some titles are confused for titles of works by other authors (though this does not seem to be the case here, to be fair); other titles are sometimes discovered to be paraphrased expressions or alternative wordings of the original title; sometimes a title gives the impression of the work being a standalone work despite it being a chapter of a larger work that is actually available to us, etc. It needs deeper reading than sufficing with a title mentioned in a work, even though it is a work that carries weight, like the Fihrist.
3. This claim can possible carry some anachronistic assumptions. Al-Shafi'i is commonly known to have authored "the first work in usul al-fiqh", but why is that?
Al-Shafi'i's "usuli" books like al-Risalah, Ibtal al-Istihsan, Jima' al-'Ilm, Ikhtilaf al-Hadith, Ahkam al-Quran, were conceived in the face of heightened tensions between the Ahl al-Ra'y and the Ahl al-Hadith (as well as al-Shafi'i's personal issues with some elements of Hijazi fiqh).
This backdrop was the impetus to codify a manifesto (at the behest of Ibn Mahdi, as narrated) of sorts that could lay the foundation for an objective hermeneutic criterion that could ground these various approaches in a controlled and delineated operating system, especially in a framework that would allow for the Ahl al-Hadith to engage with their interlocutors on equal footing. Agree with the details mentioned here or disagree, the fact is that the milieu of al-Shafi'i contained driving factors that made him feel that this was a need that he needed to fulfill.
Compare that to our case: what would have been the scholarly and/or social pressures pushing Muhammad to write a book on usul?
4. We should be careful to avoid reading early language with terminologies that become cemented later on. "Usul" in early parlance can denote chapters of fiqh (purity, prayer, fasting, etc), and this may be one way to understand the quote from Ibn al-Nadim. Granted, this may be met with skepticism since Ibn al-Nadim starts his list of Muhammad's works with:
ولمحمد من الكتب في الأصول كتاب الصلاة كتاب الزكاة كتاب المناسكHe then enumerates the various works he is aware of on various chapters of fiqh, mentioning as part of that list "Usul al-Fiqh", juxtaposed with works like Hajj, Rahn, etc, as well as comprehensive works like the two Jami's and the Hujjah. One can argue that this suggests that the "Usul al-Fiqh" mentioned is different than these works in its content. In any case, the argument presented above was simple: this text bears various possibilities and is not conclusive enough to make any emphatic claims. This title could very well be a work on some usuli concepts, but we don't seem have anything that tips the scales. The possibilities are endless. To illustrate: part of that list is "Kitab al-Istihsan". One may assume that this is a work on the usuli concept of istihsan (as some contemporary researchers seem to have understood) but it is actually just the chapter of hadhr and ibahah from Muhammad's al-Asl/al-Mabsut, titled "Kitab al-Istihsan". Another work on the list is "Ijthad al-Ra'y". One may think this is on the idea of juristic reasoning, but it could just be a chapter on various cases in fiqh where one needs to use their discernment (taharri), many of which are in al-Asl; for example, see the "Bab al-Shahadah fi al-Din" in al-Asl, 2:243.
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* **Qaraẓah** is explicitly attested by ضبط statements from classical scholars. * **Qurẓah** appears to be a later/common transliteration convention in some modern works and databases. So your correction was justified.
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ChatGPT versus Mulla Ali al-Qari
Is it Qurzah or Qarazah?
The correct vocalisation here is most commonly: > **Qurẓah** (قُرْظَة) So: Qurẓah ibn Kaʿb al-Anṣārī not **Qarazah**. ### Why? The name is spelled: > قرظة with: * **ḍammah** on the ق → **Qu** * sukūn on the ر * ظ → ẓ * final tāʾ marbūṭah → “ah” Hence: > **Qurẓah** ### Common transliteration variants You may also see: * Qurza * Qurzah * Korzah (less academic) * Qurdhah (older transliteration systems) But “Qarazah” would normally correspond to a different vowel pattern: > قَرَظَة which is not the standard reading of this Companion’s name in the biographical sources. The same Companion appears in hadith and rijāl works as: > قرظة بن كعب read as: > **Qurẓah ibn Kaʿb**. What about this? ( وعن عامر بن سعد قال : دخلت على قرظة ) بفتح القاف والراء والظاء معجمة ( ابن كعب ) أنصاري خزرجي مرقاة المفاتيح شرح مشكاة المصابيح الملا علي القاري - نور الدين علي بن سلطان محمد القاري
Excellent observation. This is precisely why some people end up reading it as **Qaraẓah**. The passage says: > **بفتح القاف والراء** meaning: > “with fatḥah on the qāf and the rāʾ.” So Mulla Ali al-Qari is explicitly telling the reader the name is pronounced: > **Qaraẓah ibn Kaʿb** > (قَرَظَة) not **Qurẓah**. So now you’ve uncovered an actual variation among scholars/readers. ## What’s going on? Both pronunciations are found in the literature: * **Qurẓah** (قُرْظَة) * **Qaraẓah** (قَرَظَة) The difference comes from: * manuscript transmission, * oral reading traditions, * how scholars ضبط (vocalised) names. ### In your quotation The wording is unambiguous: > بفتح القاف والراء This explicitly rejects: * ḍammah on qāf (**Qu**), * sukūn on rāʾ, and affirms: * fatḥah on qāf (**Qa**), * fatḥah on rāʾ (**ra**). Hence: > **Qa-ra-ẓa(h)** --- ## Which is more common? In many modern hadith editions and biographical works, you’ll see: > **Qurẓah ibn Kaʿb** But a number of classical scholars vocalised it: > **Qaraẓah ibn Kaʿb** Your citation is valuable because works like *Mirqāt al-Mafātīḥ* often include pronunciation guidance precisely to resolve ambiguities in names. --- ## Which should you use? If you are: * following the explicit ضبط in this text → use **Qaraẓah** * following many contemporary hadith editions → you’ll often encounter **Qurẓah** Because your source explicitly states the vowels, the academically careful thing when citing *this specific text* is: > **Qaraẓah ibn Kaʿb al-Anṣārī**.Where did you get Qurzah from? What's your reference?
I got “Qurẓah” from the fact that many modern editions and databases simply print the name unvocalised as: > قرظة and then standard modern transliteration practices often default it to **Qurẓah**. But after your quotation from *Mirqāt al-Mafātīḥ*, I checked further, and your evidence is stronger because it contains an explicit ضبط (vocalisation instruction), whereas the sources I relied on mostly just gave the bare consonantal spelling. That distinction matters. For example, sources like: * [Asad al-Ghābah](https://ar.wikisource.org/wiki/%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A9_%28%D8%B7._%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9%29/%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%81_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%81/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%81_%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1/%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%B8%D8%A9?utm_source=chatgpt.com) * [Tarājim database](https://tarajm.com/people/81938?utm_source=chatgpt.com) write only: > قرظة بن كعب without vowel marks. So reading it as “Qurẓah” was an inference from common modern usage, not from an explicit classical vocalisation. By contrast, your citation from *Mirqāt* explicitly says: > **بفتح القاف والراء** which decisively indicates: > قَرَظَة = Qaraẓah I also found lexicographical material explicitly supporting the fatḥah reading, e.g.: > “قَرَظَةُ بنُ كعب...” ([arabiclexicon.hawramani.com][1]) So the more defensible scholarly answer is:
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5. On Sibt Ibn 'l-Jawzi himself, Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728 AH) said he was a bit of a shady character. Minhaj 'l-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah states:
هذا الرجل يذكر في مصنفاته أنواعا من الغث والسمين، ويحتج في أغراضه بأحاديث كثيرة ضعيفة وموضوعة، وكان يصنف بحسب مقاصد الناس: يصنف للشيعة ما يناسبهم ليعوضوه بذلك، ويصنف على مذهب أبي حنيفة لبعض الملوك لينال بذلك أغراضه، فكانت طريقته طريقة الواعظ الذي قيل له: ما مذهبك؟ قال: في أي مدينة؟ ولهذا يوجد في بعض كتبه ثلب الخلفاء الراشدين وغيرهم من الصحابة رضوان الله عليهم لأجل مداهنة من قصد بذلك من الشيعة، ويوجد في بعضها تعظيم الخلفاء الراشدين وغيرهم.
We get to see a flavour of that in his work الانتصار والترجيح للمذهب الصحيح on the very first page, where he speaks about the virtues of the Hanafi School, backed up by the Hanafi-oriented Ayyubid Kurdish emir of Damascus, Al-Mu'azzam Isa (d. 624 AH):
لما سارت الركبان فى البلدان، وأسمعَتْ القاصى والدان باظهار التمسك والتنسك بمذهب أبي حنيفة النعمان رضى الله عنه، من المولى الملك العادل العالم المؤيد المظفر المنصور الملك المعظم شرف الدنيا والدين غياث الإسلام والمسلمين ناصر أمير المؤمنين أبي موسى عيسى ابن المولى الملك العادل المجاهد المرابط المؤيد المظفر المنصور سيف الدنيا والدین أبي بكر محمد بن أيوب شاذي خليل أمير المؤمنين أعز الله أنصارهما وضاعف اقتدارهما وملّكهما نواصي العباد وأقاصي البلاد بمحمد وآله، جرأنى ذلك على أن ألفت له كتابا، وبوبته أبوابا وسميته الانتصار والترجيح للمذهب الصحيح
It seems that he wrote this in order to curry favour with him.
Note that in Jerusalem, Emir Mu'azzam Isa set up the al-Madrasah al-Mu'azzamiyyah, also known as al-Madrasah al-Hanafiyyah, which was a Waqf for the Hanafis. A lot of it has been lost due to the Zionist occupation. Here is an article on it.
اکنون در دسترس! پژوهش تلگرام ۲۰۲۵ — مهمترین بینشهای سال 
