Quantus tremor est futurus - Actaeon Journal
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"Nietzsche felt the catastrophe in its scope; he could not yet assign it in detail to the figures. There is no longer anything to be hoped for from the warrior as estate or caste; he fell with the other two estates, the priest and the peasant."
~ Jünger
The Übermensch and the Anarch as two figures of man beyond the estates, but also part of their fall.
Democratic man finds himself in the position of Socrates, only without hemlock.
Defeat no longer has meaning. The sporting quality of loss, failure as a principle, the regimen of leaders losing their heads year by year with less at stake – all signs that only the death of the species would suffice for democratic man.
But even then he would only create a language in order to sell each word – one by one with increased price.
We would like to speak of the vanquished, but even this seems dangerous.
I often reference ideas with little explanation, but the nemesis of history is essential to us, and it is a central aspect of nationalism and the Counter-Enlightenment. To risk oversimplification, it is our struggle with fate which most concerns us in history. We ask, what is our struggle with fate? As a nation forms a state this question takes on greater significance.
"Nemesis-Adrastea, the daughter of Jupiter, the astute observer, the strict avenger, the fairest, and the highly revered." For the Greeks she was a guardian, for us she is an unknown and heavy judger of man. The man of history believes he has greater powers to "unconceal" his own fate, he overcomes Nemesis herself in his designs. And perhaps this is where universal history is at war with myth.
You can read Herder's Nemesis of History in the collection On World History.
Communism – The rationalisation of the nemesis of history.
A shallow cult of youth is the norm today. Any youth movement is likely to act as part of the norm, rather than offer a response. The death of subcultures should have been a lesson here.
Nietzsche's death-war succumbs to the "little virtues".
This would be the ultimate victory of 'woke', and conservatives are the leading proponents of its policies.
To stop illegal immigration only to greatly increase 'legal immigration' amounts to the inclusion of the illegal within the legal. That is, it acts to legitimize the criminal concept of total immigration and proscribe the concept of a national people.
Much of the Carmina Burana is a warning against slave morality, and also the will to power which is a counterpart.
Regarding migration, one of the dangers is that what is happening in Texas will be repeated throughout the West. Entire nations are already treated as sanctuary cities, if moratoriums are declared it is likely that migration levels will simply be shifted to other nations.
The only concern for governments is functionalism, migration will be 'resolved' as a minor crisis, it even serves as a catalyst for economic transition.
A characteristic of writing today is the economisation of the metaphor. A sort of sloganeering determines the style, whether through marketing, propaganda, or public relations techniques. What is important is that the idea is easily digested and can be absorbed by popular opinion, it becomes a mere reference to what the mass ought to do, how it could be improved. As a whole: pulp criticism.
One can only imagine the effect on dissident thought.
"Bürgerkrieg ist Bürgerkrieg."
The apparent conditions of war may change, but these conditions become weapons along with the increase in destructive power. What is specific to modern war is that everything is drawn into the conflict, even the appearance of anti-war forces can be maintained through new weapons.
Our response to "climate change" should have followed Goethe's theory of weather rather than counter-left economic speculation.
If, as Carl Schmitt says, legality becomes a weapon of civil war then responsibility must be taken on the ground of law. This cannot only be a question of increasing legality, which, as we are seeing today, would only increase civil war pressures.
State power must stand for order in the old dynastic sense. Decentralizing powers must also be reintroduced as necessary for the protection of these states.
Both Left and Right have adopted a form of occasionalism: the Left with its illusory efforts to overcome the political, and the Right with its analysis of this illusion as the political.
With WWI the Left faced a crisis on two fronts: fear of the international war, which must be total, and a return to class war in a limited sense. There is then passive support for the discriminating concept of war, and against a particular figure of the political who is the cause of this war. Another aspect is that total and permanent war wears down all other forces, the class war had to be equal to world-ordering power.
L'art pour l'art in warfare means fighting on two fronts, it is the oldest law, and the Left abandoned it.
Regarding the Conservative Revolution and the Marxist Reaction we should consider not only the interpretations of events but their direction. War played a central role for many, it was not only a concept or aesthetic. But for Walter Benjamin this was his central point of attack.
"The most rabidly decadent origins of this new theory of war are emblazoned on their foreheads: it is nothing other than an uninhibited translation of the principles of I'art pour l'art to war itself."
He goes on to describe the various authors as unrefined, mediocre, disgraceful, a mockery of the real front-line soldiers. And he does so while quoting lines that, with slight alterations, could be taken up as anti-war positions.
This is where we see a great mistake, these men become responsible for the new theory of war. It is not war itself that is a world-historical power, but war as a spatial result of a theory. 'War is decay, as a result of fascism.'
Here the soldiers are criminalised.
Benjamin engages in his own l'art pour l'art, he views war from the other side of the line, from the point of criminalisation and he new norm of war after the end of European public law.
That is, he sees war not from the historical event, nor even marxist ideology, but as a negative result of fascism. They become its center, or at least its greatest force.
This despite quoting Friedrich Georg Jünger who outlines the problem of the new line of war and machines.
The law of war has been turned on its head, the Unknown Soldier has become its form, he replaces the partisan.
