Resurgam_Eng

About different and interesting news 🇳🇱 Netherlands. Do you remember the right-wing populists led by Wilders (PVV party) won in the Netherlands? Back then, everyone was worried about aid for Ukraine. Then, for comfort, I gave an explanation of the contexts and a fundamental forecast of what would happen next. ➡️ The forecast was based on the fact that it would be challenging for Wilders to form a coalition based on the current results. So: ⏩ Rutte's government will continue (https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/regering) to fulfill its duties for the time being; ⏩ Wilders, to come to an agreement with Rutte's party (VVD), will be forced to give up both certain positions in the government and certain ideas (including not supporting Ukraine); ⏩ important long-term events, such as the start of negotiations on Ukraine's accession to the EU, a financial aid package of 50 billion for four years, a military aid package of 20 billion euros, the first transfers of F-16 aircraft will probably take place under the Rutte government and its corresponding support for the international arena. ➡️ As of now, Wilders cannot form a coalition; negotiations are ongoing; they resumed yesterday but, then the BBB farmers' party is "offended," then Rutte's party refuses to cooperate until specific points are fixed or excluded in the potential coalition agreement. ➡️ And also, even though Rutte's government is limited in its powers (it has the right only to technical/current performance of duties), due to some instruments, the support of Ukraine from the Netherlands for 2024 was still increased from 2 billion euros to 2.5 billion. ➡️ Therefore, the final development of events will be as follows: either Wilders will make most of the concessions to form a coalition, including Rutte's party, then with a high probability the support of Ukraine will be secured in the coalition agreement. Or, in the final case, there will be re-elections (but no one wants this yet). But the February 1 summit will likely occur under Rutte's administration. 🇪🇺🤝🇺🇦 Manfred Weber and Ukraine Manfred Weber, head of the European People's Party in the European Parliament, arrived in Kyiv. This party has the most significant representation and often gives the main votes for pro-Ukrainian decisions. The visit is intriguing and important. ➡️ The visit is interesting against the background of another upcoming visit. We are talking about the visit of the head of EU diplomacy, Borrell, to Kyiv, which is to take place at the beginning of February. Then, the European diplomat intends to discuss the allocation of 5 to 7 billion euros through the European Peace Fund to purchase weapons for Ukraine in 2024. We talk about those 20 billion military support for four years. Earlier, I explained this project and called it "Borrell's plan." Ukraine is under consideration to receive 50 billion in financial aid for four years and 20 billion euros ("Borrell plan") of military aid, also for four years, from the EU. For Borrell to implement his plan (the rules for using the European Peace Fund must be changed) is essential approval at the EU summit (February 1) and a vote in the European Parliament. It is likely that on February 1, the focus will be mainly on the allocated EUR 50 billion, and the mechanism for the allocation of EUR 20 billion will be finalized before the March meeting and perhaps even before February, but in any case, these visits are good signs. 🇺🇸 Caucuses (voting) in New Hampshire The New Hampshire caucuses will be held today. There is only one option for Haley to stay in the game for the full - at least a win in this state—all hope for "independent voters" and better weather than in Iowa. Resurgam ➰ Join

🇭🇺 🇸🇰 Transcarpathian pilgrimage: urban analytics and physiognostics. What is it for Ukraine? ➡️ On Wednesday, Slovak Prime Minister R. Fico will visit Uzhhorod to meet with Ukrainian Prime Minister Shmyhal. On January 29, the head of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Szijjarto, will come to Uzhhorod to meet with Kuleba. The meeting will take place two days before the extraordinary EU summit, where the key topic will be an attempt to adopt a medium-term support program for Ukraine for 50 billion euros. Let's start with Hungary 🇭🇺. Last month, it was actively under the information banner "deprive Hungary of the right to vote in the EU." Although we know that in this regard, Hungary is supported by a colleague from the pro-Moscow club Fico, I would not be sure about this support for several reasons: ▶️ First, there is already practice from the last summit. To avoid confrontation with other EU leaders, Fico dumped his "colleague" Orban and voted "for" the start of negotiations on Ukraine's accession to the EU. ▶️ Secondly, Slovakia is currently in an economic crisis. In Fico's case, going the way of Hungary and having the European Commission freeze funding programs is thoughtless. ▶️ Thirdly. Despite harsh pro-Moscow statements (including calls to Ukraine to hand over territory, the uselessness of supplying Ukraine with weapons, etc.), Fico did not terminate "defense contracts" with Ukraine but instead supported them. Why? These are much-needed funds for Slovakia. ▶️Fourthly, Fico now has constant mass protests against his government, and the spark may cause events similar to the Serbian ones. ▶️Fifthly, the actual reform of the EU. It will not happen in a week or a month, but the European Commission will present its outlines by March this year. Do you think the "friends of Orban" will be forgotten after the reform? If Slovakia becomes highly problematic to Brussels, not in words but in deed? The process of depriving Hungary of the right to vote is currently being implemented (so far) not so much to deprive Hungary of the vote but to use this argument for negotiating purposes and as a method of putting pressure on Orbán. A week ago, an article was published on Politico that the EU is not going to make too many concessions to Budapest because it has enough mechanisms not to succumb to the pressure of Hungary in full. The EU has a "B" plan for bypassing Hungary's veto for 50 billion euros and a separate plan for 20 billion euros of purely military purchases for Ukraine. I explained the differences and confusion in the programs earlier. After this article and several others, Szijjarto suddenly planned a visit to Ukraine. Also, after the official confirmation of these two visits, Orban and Fico actively started pouring out pro-Moscow statements like "a losing war," "give up the territory," "we will block everything," etc. But in reality, these two "actors" are playing on the pro-Moscow audience with their statements and, of course, "for Putin's ears," distracting him from the very fact of the visit, on the one hand, and the negotiating signals between these two and the EU, on the other. The 50 billion will probably be transferred to February/March (the key reason is the German national budget and the need to legally prepare plan "B" as a tool that deprives Orbán of negotiating dominance). ➡️ The summit on February 1 will be difficult in all respects. On the eve, there will be many provocative statements aimed at distraction, but the combination of factors and my experience observing the processes suggests that the result should be positive for Ukraine; the only question is what exactly will be the support variations. The visits to Ukraine are a bargaining process because Orban and Fico need to "sell" as many victories and exchanges as possible in the domestic market. Resurgam ➰ Join

Removal of DeSantis: causes, consequences, and developments. ➡️ The governor of Florida, Ron DeSantis, suspends his presidential bid and endorses Trump. A person who, a little more than a year ago, did everything to try to make DeSantis lose the gubernatorial election and, during this campaign, poured so much dirt that any yellow press could not imagine. But as they say, boots fit DeSantis (not everyone will understand this meme, but you can always google it). Why did DeSantis drop out? ▶️ 1. Strategy. DeSantis' main campaign strategy is Trumpism without Trump. In the end, it turned out that DeSantis, from an alternative to Trump, became a pale copy of him. In recent months, DeSantis had two strategic hopes: ⏩ the first is to get a good result in Iowa, where absolutely all forces were thrown; ⏩ the second is to wait for the court's decision. The hope of the second kept DeSantis in the race despite his downward trend in the rating. ➡️ But Trump pressured the Senate by blackmail with an agreement on the border and Ukraine, so they had to sign up to protect the ex-president. Overall, that factor, along with a combination of others (like the makeup of the Supreme Court), is likely to keep Trump in the race, and DeSantis understood that. ▶️ 2. Rating. It's one thing to score an acceptable 20% in Iowa, but another to score 5-7% a week later and not even pass New Hampshire. Demonstrating such a disaster is simply unprofitable for DeSantis with a future perspective. ▶️ 3. Positions. No one knows what DeSantis bargained for himself because it was one thing just to drop out but another to support Trump. What are the consequences for Hayley? ⏩ Negative. Having DeSantis in the race but in a weak position benefits Haley because his rhetoric largely alienated the anti-Trump electorate. He likely took more votes away from Trump than competing with Haley. Trump's team is concentrating everything on New Hampshire (Ramaswamy, Scott, DeSantis) because Haley's defeat in this state can already more than guarantee an early victory for Trump if all factors are considered. ➡️ Positive. There are only two left, Trump and Haley. And now the vote will not be "for" Trump or DeSantis or Haley, but "for" or "against" Trump. Protest voting should never be underestimated. In many states, "independent voters" who do not belong to either the Republicans or the Democrats can participate in the primaries. Independent voters mostly do not fall into republican sociology. More than 60% of independent voters do not support Trump. Haley's task is to ensure that independent voters come, and she will mathematically win more among the choice of "two. " From the technological point of view of the election, Trump's team is working perfectly. Systematically, it destroys opponents' structures with their weight until they end—removal of opponents when they are most critical for Haley. ➡️ I want to note Trump's game with the position of vice president. For over a week, Trump has demonstrated with all his fiber that it will be Elise Stefanik. In terms of information, the move was very well thought out: to offer Haley the position of vice president through the yellow press and manual twitterarmy to spread rumors that Haley would agree, thereby alienating % of the anti-Trump electorate from her. Wait for Haley's answer "no," and in this version, it reduces the likely flow of votes from Desantis to Haley, removes DeSantis, and, as the icing on the cake, demonstrates as much as possible that the vice president will be Elise Stefanik, who nullifies Haley's advantage in several aspects (for example, women's votes), Stefanyk is very similar to Haley in terms of style. Stefanyk's role is to duplicate Haley's, only in a pro-Trump way and in a pro-Trump team. ➡️ So the situation for Haley is critical, to be honest. However, the final evaluations can be given only after the voting in New Hampshire. Resurgam ➰ Join

🇹🇼 Taiwan's leading media fall into prostration after Trump's interview ➡️ Taiwan news: "Former US President Donald Trump has hinted that the US will not defend Taiwan from China if he wins the election. In an interview with Fox News, he suggested (and gave the reason) that this relates to Taiwan's semiconductor industry. " ➡️ So the "Trump economy" looks like this: If one of the allies is thriving and competitive in some field, then there are two approaches. ⏩ "A" is to stifle economically, impose non-market tariffs (wage a direct trade war), and close markets. ⏩ "B" — to give Taiwan to China, so it would be profitable for the world to move technological production to America against the security risks of locating this industry in China. ❔ And competing for the global chip market, as I understand it, is not an option for Trump? It is an interesting approach for a "republican". We are waiting for statements: the Japanese and Germans took the car market from the Americans, the Ukrainians took the honey market from the American farmers, and the Dutch merchant fleet is sailing in the internal "Atlantic sea" of the USA. UPD. I watched the video again; this is Trump's statement from 5 months ago. But the fact of the the message is there. 💬 The question is not that "Trump does not want Americans to die for Taiwan" or that "Trump wants to return the chips to the USA." The issue is that the US has been exploiting its leadership status for decades, receiving "Western political coalition support" in the economic interests of the US in exchange for maintaining a security balance. Think of it as a sort of "check-in" balance. ❗️ The content of international law and the international security system is not that "when it is scary, difficult or not profitable for you, then you can ignore the responsibilities and escape"—just the opposite, it's the time for uniting. US obligations regarding the security of Taiwan are far from written in "memorandums." The defense of Taiwan is fixed ⤵️ ▶️ It is an element in the US national defense strategy; ▶️ After 1979, US-Taiwan relations are governed by the "Taiwan Relations Act". The Act states: "The United States shall provide Taiwan with such defense products and defense services as are necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain an adequate self-defense capability." It also states that the US will maintain the ability (presence in the region) to counter any use of force or other coercion that could endanger Taiwan's security or social or economic system." And the main thing. The treaty guarantees that no president can unilaterally change the policy of US support for Taiwan. ➡️ If Trump wants to unilaterally "change" the US policy towards Taiwan, this violates international law, treaties, obligations, national security protocols, etc. ➡️ If Trump is ready to implement it, then Trump will put the USA on the same level as Moscow or Iran as a violator of international law, principles, and values. ➡️ Then, quite legally and morally, the USA should be deprived of its "privileged position" in the Western security and economic system and international political plans. ➡️ Europe, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan should start guaranteeing national security independently and create additional defense alliances outside the presence of the USA. Perhaps with the expansion of the nuclear reserve and the potential of such an alliance, also outside the USA, as an element of deterrence against Moscow, China, and North Korea and as a factor of excluding the USA from the Western security process as an unreliable partner. But there is hope that the Pentagon will not allow to destroy the security strategy of the "containment belts" of the USA, which are an element not only of security but also of the economic well-being of the USA. Resurgam ➰ Join

Brief notes/observations on strategic moves to provide aid to Ukraine. ▶️ Help from the USA Yesterday, there was a joint meeting in the White House of Biden, Sullivan, key Senate representatives, individual members of Congress of the House of Representatives, Speaker Johnson, and others. And now the question is who to believe? Statements by senators, including Republicans, that the bill has a consensus and will be put up for a vote within a week, or another tweet by Speaker Johnson? ➡️ Yesterday, I explained that Johnson will play an "adequate negotiator" for the Senate and a devoted Trumpist for the conservative-radical wing in the House of Representatives. Now, he plays for the public to keep the balance and bargains more while there is an opportunity so that he will be asked less later. But when the bipartisan bill is voted on in the Senate, Johnson is unlikely to be able to ignore it. Now, there will be political games that will be an emotional swing for Ukraine. The best method in such circumstances is not to take everything at face value and wait. ▶️ The actions of Cameron and the Prime Minister of Estonia can be a strategic key to stable support for Ukraine In the post "Cameron's return to the screens of British politics: should Ukraine be stressed?" I shared my thoughts on why Cameron's arrival is positive news for Ukraine despite concerns over the former prime minister's past. The efforts of the head of the Foreign Ministry of Great Britain are aimed at forming a tough position in Europe regarding Moscow and Putin. The fundamental thesis is "victory of Ukraine," not "failure to achieve Putin's goals." The head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain recently provided a vector of movement to the allies for victory🗣: "We are ready to support Ukraine in 2024, 2025, 2026, and beyond. This is the challenge of our generation. If you add up the GDP of the coalition countries, we exceed Moscow 25 to 1. For Ukraine, increasing the production of weapons may not be a problem. Yesterday, Minister Cameron compared Putin to Hitler and emphasized: "We have got not to appease Putin. We have got to stand up to the evil that his invasion represents. " ➡️ In fact, Cameron's statements are very similar to the initiative of the Prime Minister of Estonia, Kaja Kallas, who for a month has been promoting the idea that each allied country should record at least 0.25% of its GDP to support Ukraine (this is for long-term support programs for Ukraine, which have to be adopted by each NATO country by the decision at the last summit). This is what Estonia has done recently. And now, this issue will probably be raised by Estonia at the Ramstein meeting. In Estonia, they calculated that 0.25% of the GDP of the "coalition" countries is a stable $131 billion for Ukraine per year. These funds will be politically stable and financially guaranteed, unlike Moscow's ability to maintain the appropriate level of the military budget for a long time. Estonia needs a political heavyweight like Great Britain and Cameron to implement this initiative. ➡️ If cooperation does not happen naturally between Estonia and Great Britain, then this cooperation should be ensured "artificially" by Ukrainian diplomacy. The circumstances are promising and can positively promote the idea of 0.25% in Europe. Resurgam ➰ Join

About 300 billion frozen assets. Plan "Belgium" by Ocean's 13 friends The USA, through the G-7, actively promotes the issue of transferring Moscow's confiscated assets to Ukraine. And it's generally positive news when an ally of this magnitude pushes for the right decision (in any case). ➡️ Everything would be fine, but only 5.6 billion out of 300 billion Moscow assets are frozen in the USA. Most of this capital (over 200 billion) is concentrated in Europe. Only in Belgium alone 🇧🇪 on Euroclear bank accounts 192 billion, which in 2023 generated EUR 3 billion of net profit (for nine months) that remains and settles in the Euroclear/Belgium system itself. Another approximately 8 billion frozen assets are in Switzerland, 3.8 billion in Germany, etc. I will immediately note that Belgium opposed the transfer of assets, at least until the moment when "others will do it." Who wants to withdraw almost 200 billion euros from their banking system... What is the potential plan? ▶️ The first stage. Transfer of annual interest from Moscow assets. In October, during Zelenskyi's visit to Belgium, the President of Ukraine announced that Belgium would create a special fund for 1.7 billion euros per year, which will be filled with interest received from frozen assets (actually, the amount of interest received is not 1.7 billion, but more than 3 billion). But in reality, such a fund cannot function because there is no legislation for this within the EU and Belgium. Therefore, the first step is to draft a law from the EU. In the coming months, the European Commission plans to publish a draft law on the introduction of a tax on windfall income received from the frozen assets of Moscow. Belgium should not block this draft law because it has declared such an intention. ▶️ The second stage. Get the legitimacy of the move from international financial institutions. We are talking about the IMF and the World Bank. Partially implemented. The IMF stated that "the transfer of frozen assets to Moscow is the prerogative of the national governments where these assets are frozen." ▶️ The third stage. Approval of the step in the G-7. Belgium stated that the country's government will not agree to the transfer of frozen assets for the development of Ukraine until it is agreed and implemented by the G-7. With such a step, Belgium seems to "save face", but at the same time postpones the need for this decision for itself. ➡️ But there is a sure upbeat here: the US Congress introduced a draft law providing a legal basis for transferring confiscated assets to Ukraine. In December 2023, the G-7 announced they had found an international legal way to transfer confiscated assets to Ukraine. More precisely, US representatives in the G-7 stated that they would provide a ready-made mechanism for other G-7 participants. ▶️ The fourth stage. Precedents. When the first countries, especially the G-7, agree to transfer frozen assets, it is primarily about the USA. Then, it will create an international precedent that can be relied on and pressured on Belgium. Therefore, we summarize ⤵️ ➡️ 1. The USA wants to tip the ball over to Europe while it is in chaos internally. But the paradox is that without a precedent from the USA itself, the train does not move. Therefore, the ball is still in their court. ➡️ 2. The confiscation of 300 billion cannot be planned for 2024 because it is a process that takes not one month but maybe a year and perhaps even years, considering the "desire of Belgium" and "legal activity of Moscow." ➡️ 3. At the initial stage, so as not to cherish empty hopes in 2024 regarding the issue of 300 billion, it is worth approaching in two preparatory aspects. The first is the transfer of income from these frozen assets to Ukraine (for this, the EU must adopt a relevant decision). The second is to create some precedents for the actual transfer of assets (at least the transfer of those 5 billion frozen assets from the US, as one of the representatives of the G-7). Resurgam ➰ Join

About "Johnson" and help from the USA 🇺🇸 💬 Now the top topic is the news from Fox News, that Speaker Johnson will put the aid package for Ukraine to the vote, provided that almost all demands of the Republicans "on the border/HR2" are met. Against the background of general fatigue and emotionality, it is complicated to explain something. It is like someone trying to stop the ocean's waves, hoping you will not be washed away. ➡️ So. Can everything be wrong? Yes. And can there be specific contexts? Yes, it is possible, too. It is pretty challenging to separate something in the current information chaos. Still, let's analyze contexts. The news on Fox News notes that Johnson noted in a private conversation. The main thing is that a Republican reported this based on anonymity. I will not speak for the relationship to "anonymity" because, in this case, I admit that the conversation took place (later echoed with the news about the "telephone conference"), and most likely, Johnson himself wanted it to get into the media. And such information will be unique. But I want to focus on Johnson and his motives. A few days ago, Johnson was close to putting his resignation to a vote. Hot heads (Chip Roy) were cooled down a little by the Republicans themselves. Democrats have also signaled that they don't want to repeat the McCarthy mistake. I wrote earlier that the Republicans generally have a problem with the majority in the House of Representatives (they can't lose more than three votes on the ballot if the Democrats are complete). ➡️ Therefore, the speaker can be dismissed, but they are unlikely to accomplish the mission. But even so, Johnson understood the signals. How should Johnson behave in such circumstances? ⏩ On the one hand, there is a need to maintain adequate contact with party members in the Senate. With whom it is usually a terrible idea to quarrel both in the context of personal motives and the context of the party. ⏩ On the other hand, it is necessary to pretend and give signals as much as possible to avoid the risks of withdrawal and loss of trust from Trump, just in case. Therefore, Johnson and his cabinet may well leak such "anonymous" messages to the Republican Fox News for several reasons: ➡️ Bargain more from the Democrats so that there are fewer claims within the party to Johnson himself. ➡️ To demonstrate "firmness" as much as possible to refer to the decision "in the middle" as the work of the Republicans in the Senate. ➡️ Get guarantees from the Democrats that if the issue of his resignation is raised, they will not vote. Senate Republican leader McConnell has already thrown an "informational lifeline" to Speaker Johnson. McConnell noted that it is possible "only now" to make it possible the "Republican" decision across the border. Any attempt, even under Trump's presidency, will not have the necessary votes in the Senate (as it has been since 2011) because not just a majority needed, but 60 votes are required (now out of 100 votes: 51 for the Democrats, and 49 Republicans). According to McConnell, the failure of the agreements is unacceptable because the historic chance is only now. And when the bipartisan project in the Senate is ready, it will be difficult for Johnson to ignore it because it will directly affect the ratings of the Republican Party in a critical election year. ➡️ Can everything be wrong in the final case? Yes, it can. Has the process been delayed to the limit of "nowhere else"? Yes, it has. But don't mistake the result of the "process" for the "end result." And look at the contexts of why this or that comment came out. If Johnson wanted to "break the deal like that," he would have done it in a more direct way, not through an anonymous source or a closed conference call to get more approval from the MAGA (Trumpists). Resurgam ➰ Join

🇺🇦🤝🇹🇩 Ukraine and Romania partnership 💬Until February 24, 2021, relations between Ukraine and Romania were characterized by a lawsuit over the Snake Island, shipping disputes at the mouth of the Danube, and so on. But now, the state of relations between Ukraine and Romania is well defined by a recent event: ➡️ Unknown Romanian farmers blocked the Porubne-Siret checkpoint. In a few hours, the Prime Minister of Romania was already there talking with the protesters; in a few more hours, the checkpoint was unblocked. ➡️ In October, during Zelenskyi's visit to Romania, the president noted that relations with our neighbor are moving "to a strategic level." During the annual press conference, Zelensky had already thanked the President of Romania for considerable efforts to compensate for the losses due to blocking the border in the west. Blinken also noted the reliability of Romania as a partner and its contribution to the logistical support of Ukraine. So, as of now, Romania plays a vital role in road and rail logistics (including military) to Ukraine's ability to provide an independent transport corridor through the Black Sea. ⏩Of course, such drastic changes are not based purely on "volunteering" but not on "bare pragmatism" either. So: ▶️ First. What Poland lost, Romania gained. The Polish government allowed the blockade beyond any reasonable limits, which economically affected not only Ukraine but also Poland itself. Poland is not "unique" in problems with farmers, as Romania's president and prime minister also face protests from their farmers and transporters. These protests take place systematically but do not turn into a cause of chaos and destruction of interstate relations, thanks to the timely and adequate response of the government. There is a clear understanding of where the country's interest is "in general" and not for the "narrow group." And believe me, the presence of Moscow's special services in Romania is no less than in Poland. Thanks to its openness to Ukraine, Romania received funds from the USA and the EU to develop "southern logistics." Two days ago, the EU allocated 126 million euros to Romania for "expansion of logistics capacity," and earlier the Romanian government stated that the country would receive a total of 7 billion euros from the European Commission for the development of logistics, energy, and others. The government noted that it was possible to attract record investments thanks to the fact that a significant share of Ukraine's exports goes through Romania. For understanding, the government cited figures that Ukraine transported agricultural products with a total value of 38 billion euros through the "Romanian corridors." I am not taking Romania's earnings from the "customs" that Poland did not receive. ▶️ Second. The image of Romania. Bucharest demonstrated its adequacy as an international partner of the USA to the maximum extent. Bucharest has strengthened the security of the maritime corridor of Ukraine and is maximally demonstrating "reliability" and "predictability." In 2023, the USA allocated Romania $320 million for the reconstruction of 3 military bases. One of the reasons is that the USA sees Romania as a "reliable NATO partner." Poland also received the same "direct bonuses" from Ukraine's support, but only in 2022. ▶️ Third. Moldova. Ukraine, at a certain moment for Moldova (spring 2022), became a political locomotive in the EU and a security shield, which already in 2023, helped Moldova (a real prospect of European integration) to a greater extent jump off the hybrid influence of Moscow, which strengthens the regional positions Romania. Under no circumstances does Romania want the level of Moscow's influence on the politics of Moldova to resume, which was there before February 24. ❗️ The truth of international politics is worth looking at strategically more profoundly, as it was quickly realized in Romania. The partnership gives much more results to both parties than methods of dirty competition. Resurgam ➰ Join

About the beginning of the transition of Ukraine's aid to the "strategic dimension". A little about the Houthis and the nuances of the aid from Great Britain Recently (military) aid to Ukraine has been gradually changing from a "short-term" to a "medium-term" form. That means the possibility of expectations and forecasts for Ukraine further than a year has been established. ➡️ Such medium-term programs were adopted in Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, all Baltic countries, Canada, etc. It is positive in the context of stability and predictability, as well as volumes. For example, Germany adopted a program to support Ukraine until 2027 for 17 billion euros at 4.25 billion per year. Moreover in 2024, it expanded support from 4 billion to 8 billion. ➡️ The listed countries have recorded a needed "minimum" of support, and every current year, no one prevents this support from expanding as the Germans did. 🇪🇪 Estonia went even further, providing 1.2 billion euros of medium-term support until 2027. up to this amount, it recorded annual military support for Ukraine up to the size of its GDP. We are talking about 0.25% of the country's GDP until 2027. Estonia's economy is growing - support for Ukraine is growing. 🇱🇹 🇱🇻 Lithuania and Latvia have adopted large long-term support programs, considering the capabilities of these countries. Following Estonia, the presidents of Latvia and Lithuania noted 🗣: "It's time to change the priority and talk about supporting Ukraine until its complete victory over Moscow. ➡️ Operation against the Houthis ⛳️ The goal is that the USA does not like when it prevents the earning of petrodollars or harms world consumption. Still, when it was necessary to suppress the Yemeni Houthis together with Saudi Arabia in 2021, the Biden administration not only canceled the operation but also softened some sanctions against the quasi-government of the Houthis. The Houthis' actions now is the result from strategic mistakes of the past. Result of hits. The Houthis do not "produce weapons" but "collect them," and most often, they receive them from Iran in a finished form. So, if you want to stop the Houthis or Hezbollah destroy the military potential of Iran, and it is a "terrible" escalation. The result for the Houthis. — Without a ground operation, these strikes will not matter much. The result for the USA 🇺🇸 is also a no-go; most likely, the attacks on tankers and cargo ships will continue. Plus, relations with some Muslim countries will become even worse, and they will become closer to China. Result for Ukraine 🇺🇦. — It will not affect Iran's activities. It may even come close to lifting certain "taboos" in support of moscow. It will also not affect the volume of support for Ukraine from partners due to many factors. Therefore, to prove it today, Sunak will visit Kyiv with a one-year package of support. ➡️ About the annual support of Ukraine from Great Britain and distortion of information ➡️ It became known from the mass media that the Prime Minister of Great Britain will arrive in Kyiv to announce support to Ukraine for 2.5 billion pounds ($3 billion) for 2024/2025. I am sure there will be distortions: "This is for two years, not enough", "Britain reduced support," and so on. ⏭ Firstly, it is "military" support, not including financial and humanitarian aid, which Great Britain also provides. ⏭ Secondly, this support is not "for two years," but for one year." The current support program from Great Britain for 2.2 billion pounds is valid from March 2023 and ends in March 2024. ⏭ Thirdly, as you can already understand, the program of military support from Great Britain has not been "reduced"; actually, it has been increased from 2.2 billion pounds ($2.6 billion) to 2.5 billion pounds ($3 billion). The program will begin to operate after the old one is finished. That is, from March 2024 to March 2025. Be careful, and do not get manipulated. Resurgam ➰ Join

🇪🇨 About the situation in Ecuador ➡️ In October 2023, Ecuador elected a new president of the country, Daniel Noboa, who promised a "war on drug traffickers" and "gangs." During the presidential election, one of the leading candidates, Fernando Villavicencio, was shot by representatives of the drug mafia. Villavicencio also planned to start confronting the mafia. Daniel Noboa vowed to continue the fight against the slain Villavicencio's narco bands. Some gang members have been arrested for their involvement in Villavicencio's contract killings; among the main final suspects is a certain "Fito" from the "Los Choneros" gang, who has already been in custody since 2012. On January 8, this criminal (drug lord) managed to escape from the prison's heightened security. After that, the police raised all their efforts to search for him. In response, various drug gangs began to seize administrative buildings, take hostages of police officers, firefighters, and ordinary citizens, and shoot, cut, and burn them on camera, demanding that the president stop the operation and satisfy other points. Drug gangs want to demonstrate "power." The country's president, Daniel Noboa, introduced a state of emergency and used the army to suppress the gangs. ➡️ Ecuador. Noboa. Ukraine. An article was published on the channel in which Ecuador's position regarding Ukraine was detailed. In short, this position was "pro-Ukrainian" from the beginning, even before positive contacts with Chile, Argentina, and several other LA countries appeared. During the inauguration of Millay, the president of Ecuador met with Zelenskyi. Ecuador assured its pro-Ukrainian position. Also, Naboa has a good relationship with the president of Argentina, Millay. Argentina has already offered Noboa help if he wants. We are talking about the introduction of Argentine troops to suppress drug gangs that terrorize not only Ecuador. Chile-Argentina-Ecuador is the contour of the pro-Ukrainian triangle, which can represent the "global South" from South America and fundamentally oppose the pro-moscow duo on the continent of Brazil-Venezuela and others. ➡️Ecuador and moscow throwbacks. If you see that the Ecuadorian army "shot civilians," then know that this is the work of moscow propagandists. Now the moscow ‼️bastards are distorting the information field to complicate life in Ecuador ‼️: the bodies of civilians and policemen burned by drug gangs are called a "decision of the government" to sow hatred for the "holy merchants of happiness"; the introduction of an unusual provision - it is presented as "the creation of a police state"; attempts to arrest gang representatives - oppression of the opposition. There is only one reason for this position of moscow because earlier, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador noted: "moscow has unleashed a war against the entire civilized world." By the way, back in 2007, Ecuador recognized the Holodomor as a genocide of the Ukrainian people. ➡️ So moscow is now glorying, printing English-language distorted articles, creating new tg channels for the local plebs, which spread the executions of policemen and civilians of Ecuador (and they are happy that there is "worse than in Ukraine"), they throw in PSYOP, which is aimed at discrediting the authorities of Ecuador, who are now trying to protect its citizens. moscow is not just a member of the evil empire. It is evil. It is a tumor of humanity, with hatred and envy for the whole world. Examples of moscow informational trash are in the comments. 🫡 I remind you that the collection of 100 FPV drones for the 72nd OMBr "Black Zaporozhets," the 128th OGSHBr, the 10th OGSHBr "Edelweiss," and the 25th OSB for 100 FPV drones with the opportunity to win prizes is in progress. Among the prizes is a flag signed by Zaluzhny. The collection and raffle post is here ➡️ https://t.me/resurgammmm/1678 Resurgam ➰ Join

🚧 About the blockade of the "Polish border" by German farmers and how bad it is for Ukraine I explain from less to more significant: ▶️ First of all, the German services have increased the control of trucks coming from Poland - this is true. But Ukrainian truck drivers, who were previously forced to overcome queues on the Ukrainian-Polish border, are now standing in those queues on the Polish-German border. Usually, Ukrainian carriers do not go "to Poland" but in transit. ▶️ Secondly, German farmers protested and blocked "not the Polish border" but roads inside the country, which are important for Ukrainian transport. Trucks will have to make detours through other routes, which will be even more congested. All this will lead to increased logistics costs (due to queues, longer mileage, etc.). ▶️ Thirdly, any internal instability is bad. Germany is in 2nd place regarding the volume of support to Ukraine. But internal problems lead to less attention to "external issues." We have already experienced this practice in all its glory in the example of the USA or Poland. Ukraine is a foreign issue for the German government. Germany is trying to arrange final agreements on aid to Ukraine from the EU by the end of January (we are talking about 50 billion). I want to remind you that on February 1st, there will be an extraordinary EU summit at which the answer will be either "yes" or "no" to the end of March. The scale of the "crisis" is evidenced by the fact that only in the federal state of Thuringia they took out for a protest more than 1600 units agricultural machinery. ▶️ Fourthly, in Germany, there are two main logistics centers in Europe where aid to Ukraine is "collected" and arrives in packs. Hopefully, the protests will be short-term and will not affect military logistics. Protests in Poland, despite all promises, affected both military and volunteer logistics. ▶️ Fifthly, internal problems with logistics (if they are long-term) will have consequences for the pace of contract execution, including for Ukraine. For example, due to the protests, some productions, including one of the Volkswagen plants, have already been forced to stop. ▶️ Sixthly, the protests are already trying to "radicalize." Obviously, not without "external" participation, taking into account such "entrances" to moscow through friends as "Alternative for Germany" or the new party project of the "left" (Sarah Wagenknecht). Groups calling for the "overthrow of the government" have already begun to appear, and in German cities to put up "installations" with a traffic light and a gallows (the traffic light is a conventional symbol of the current coalition). Finance Minister Gabek also announced about the calls of "extremists." Let me remind you that in 2022 a group linked to moscow and accused of preparing a coup d'état was stopped. In total, more than 100 people were either detained or treated as suspects in this case. ❗️ And most importantly. The pro-moscow "Confederation" in Poland developed a "splendid" hybrid tool for moscow's actions in the EU. Together with useful fools, they showed how "it is possible with small forces" to create big problems. The scheme is simple: a little money, imagination, and a small number of "useful fools," but those who are the most toxic for the average level will do the job. This time, constructive arguments do not work. The country can lose much more money than a particular group would gain economic results. It does not matter for emotional hype because they play on specific population groups' emotional (political) dissatisfaction/preferences. That was the case in Poland; obviously, they will try to do the same in Germany. ⏩ In short, moscows have found their target audience. They want to shake EU from the inside. And there are enough small and medium-sized, but the most toxic pro-moscow groups scattered across Europe, which can act as a "catalyst" of such chaos. Resurgam ➰ Join

✈️ 🇯🇵 Visit of the head of the Japanese Foreign Ministry to Kyiv ➡️ Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa arrived in Kyiv. The visit is interesting for several reasons ⤵️ ⏩ At the end of December 2023, Japan transferred /provided credit guarantees for $2.2 billion to support Ukraine. Japan's aid, directly and indirectly, made it possible to increase the NBU's gold and foreign exchange reserves by 1.7 billion in December to ensure the country's macroeconomic stability and an average percentage of liquidity of the NBU's assets. ⏩ In 2023, Japan provided $3.6 billion in financial aid to Ukraine, the fourth largest support this year after the EU, the USA, and the IMF. What are the motivations of the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan? ➡️ Economy For 2024, Japan has approved an increase in the support program and its expansion in financial aid, recovery, and restructuring of the Ukrainian economy. The total amount of already announced projects is $4.5 billion, which the Prime Minister Kishida announced in December 2023. Some projects for 2024 are still being developed. Separately, Japan's credit guarantees increased the size of Ukraine's potential cooperation with the World Bank. ➡️ Restoration of industry Japan plans to transfer its production technologies. We are talking about biofuel. On February 19th, Japan will hold a Japanese-Ukrainian conference on the economic reconstruction of Ukraine. According to Japanese media, the event's purpose is an agreement between Ukraine and a Japanese technology supplier. In addition to production technology, Japan also plans to allocate the necessary equipment. The article states that Japan is considering the possibility of future exports of products produced in Ukraine to Europe, which will help Ukraine earn foreign currency. A representative of the Japanese government noted: "If the business works, it will become a promising export product (for Ukraine and Japan)." Europe's need for biofuels by the end of 2030 will increase approximately ten times following the European Green Deal ("decarbonization") and the entry before 2050 as a "climate neutral continent." ➡️ Military component The day before, the Japanese government created the conditions for the indirect export (re-export) to Ukraine of a portion of domestically produced weapons. We are primarily talking about missiles for Patriot systems and probably 155 mm ammunition manufactured under British licenses. 🗣 Earlier, Prime Minister Kishida stated that Japan will increase assistance to Ukraine in all areas because "What is happening in Ukraine today can happen in Asia tomorrow." ➡️ An article was published in the Western press that the USA may have problems supplying missiles to the Patriot systems because of the lack of an approved support program. I cannot deny or confirm this article (the sources are anonymous, as always). Still, the presence of a top diplomat of the largest foreign missile manufacturer to Patriot (Japan) can try to minimize these risks if they exist. At the beginning of 2023, I predicted that 2023-24 would see a significant uptick in Japan and South Korea (compared to 2022). Analyzing the events, I concluded: "For the next years (from 2023), Japan will provide financial and humanitarian support to Ukraine and military and technical support to South Korea." ➡️ I will conclude the post with a statement (March 2023) by Kurt Campbell, the White House coordinator in the Indo-Pacific region, that Japan (and South Korea) will present a plan to support Ukraine at the "most appropriate moment." * In the comments, I will drop some links to the main articles about Japan and some graphs👇 Resurgam ➰ Join

🛳 Exports from Black Sea ports set a new record ➡️ For the first time since the "grain corridor" ceased its activity, the independent export of agricultural products through the Black Sea ports through the Ukrainian corridor exceeded the volume indicators of the "grain corridor" times. ▶️ First, in December, Ukraine transported 4 million tons of agricultural products through the Black Sea ports through an independent corridor. For example, during the 11 months of operation of the "grain corridor" with the participation of Moscow, the largest indicator was 3.6 million tons of agricultural products. ▶️ Secondly, the independent corridor allowed Ukraine also to transport 2 million tons of non-agricultural products (mainly metallurgical), which was impossible to do in the days of the "grain corridor" and which will allow metallurgy, which is still somehow able to work in war conditions, to ensure the export of its products. ▶️ Thirdly, with the increase in the capacity of Black Sea ports, more expensive logistics transportation such as "road" or "railway" decreases. The decrease in "car" transportation is still dependent on the blockade of the borders, but to a greater extent, with the boost in the activity of the ports. ➡️ This is also a significant achievement won in 2023 because they tried to impose the "ammonia agreement" and the "SWIFT agreement" on Ukraine. The steadfast position of Ukraine, the timely managing of logistics across the Danube (which bought time for maritime operations with the withdrawal of the Moscow fleet), and well-thought-out political statements of "escalation" by the Ministry of Defense made it possible to achieve the result. Most of you and I defended the idea of "no agreements" because "Ukraine can do it ourselves," and as it turned out, Ukrainians are capable. Resurgam ➰ Join

A little about the interesting situation with the Republican majority in the House of Representatives ➡️ On January 21, Republican Bill Johnson will leave the House of Representatives a few months earlier than expected. He will serve as president of Youngstown State University. He is the third Republican to leave the House this year. Earlier, Republican George Santos was expelled from the House of Representatives due to a scandal, and Kevin McCarthy ended his career on December 31 (the ex-speaker never found his place in the House of Representatives). Over time, these positions "will be filled," but the new January and February votes will be held with a partial Republican majority in the House of Representatives. ⏩ That is, the composition of the Chamber will be as follows for a certain time: 219 Republicans and 213 Democrats. For decision-making in the House of Representatives (with an entire presence) 217 votes are needed. ➡️This means that Republicans cannot lose more than two votes in the House of Representatives if all 213 Democrats are in the chamber. And this is taking into account the fact that all 219 Republicans must be present in the hall. If, for some reason, several Republicans are not present in the hall due to "illness," "being late," "going out to drink coffee," or "locked in the toilet," the situation will be even more "interesting." ➡️ So the field for "absurd situations" in the January voting will be extremely large, taking into account the extreme groups of both Democrats and Republicans. I hope that if, at some point, the Democrats "do get a majority" for one day, they can use the idea of removing the speaker according to the rules that ex-speaker McCarthy adopted under the pressure of the Freedom Caucus. It isn't certain due to some reasons and interests, but I would not be surprised. P.S. The Hill calls the situation "walking on a blade" and notes that on February 13, the majority of Republicans may be reduced to 1 vote altogether, because there is a relatively strong possibility that Democrat Tom Suozzi may win in the district of excluded Republican Santos. Resurgam ➰ Join

About the expansion of BRICS (Brazil, russia, India, China, South Africa) ➡️ Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE officially joined this organization. Argentina withdrew its BRICS application. Indonesia declined the invitation. India has blocked Pakistan's entry. Nigeria, Thailand, Kazakhstan, Turkey ignored the invitation at this stage (from 2022): ⏩ What were the interests of the new members to join: 🇮🇷 Iran — there is nothing to comment on here. The interests of other countries are about the idea of "de-dollarization of trade" via the New Development Bank, which should implement common settlement currency "R5", but due to a number of reasons this idea will fail economically. So the "countries of the south" are fighting for the future possibilities, not of "success of the union", but of "failure". 🇪🇬 Lots of questions arise about Egypt's entry. In this post, I explained Egypt's "dollar" problems due to the poor policy of the local Central Bank and the populism of the government. By joining the BRICS, Egypt expects to "replace" the dollar deficit by receiving simple loans from China in order not to carry out unpopular reforms to receive funds from the IMF (its desire to receive "yuan" is related to the first point); reduction of the dollar deficit due to trade in other currencies that are used in BRICS. Plus, Egypt's defense depends on cooperation with moscow. 🇪🇹 Ethiopia — in the last 5-10 years, it has been called "little China" because of the amount of Chinese capital and loans it has received. The economy and strategic infrastructure are almost entirely bought up by Chinese capital, the security of which is ensured by Chinese PMCs. And Ethiopia is on the thin edge of civil war and, as in the case of Egypt, depends on the supply of Soviet weapons. Interests of 🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia and 🇦🇪 UAE are very clearly traced through their official comments regarding entry: "control of 44% of oil production" and targeting the largest buyers of oil with a total of "45% of the population" of the planet. ➡️ But their primary reason is to take advantage of the competition between India and China, to wait for the failure of the "yuanization" of the BRICS and to impose their currencies "as a compromise" for payments. Earlier, Saudi Arabia switched to oil payments not only in dollars (as was the case before) but also in other currencies, including yuan. Indian oil refining companies, on the "recommendation" of the government, stopped making payments for moscow oil in yuan and switched for payments in dirhams (UAE currency). At the same time, SA plans to impose payments in rials when resistance to the yuan from India and South Africa becomes even stronger to keep up with the UAE. SA also has a "security" interest in China's influence on Iran. 🇨🇳 China planned to "draw" Pakistan into BRICS to oppose India and reduce its position, but India has so far blocked the process concerning Pakistan (acted together with Brazil) ➡️ So what do we have? So most players want to wait for the "failure of yuanization" of the alliance to realize their interests. China and Moscow were planning BRICS as an "anti-Western union," but apart from Iran and redeemed Ethiopia, other players are not very interested in it. Influential players like India or SA attribute their success to the future failure of BRICS coordination. Western loyalty to India is increasing, and capital investments are diverted from China. In this way, India can resist the "Yuanization" and "Chinazation" of BRICS. Obviously, with the weakening of China, India intends to offer BRICS not as an "anti-Western political model or an extension of the expansion policy of the "yuan", which China and moscow are trying to transform BRICS into, but as an "economic model" similar to world practices, which will be more attractive to most BRICS players, including new ones. ➡️ And I bet that India will become a "kind of Hungary" for China and moscow, " which SA, South Africa, UAE, or Brazil will play along with situationally. Resurgam ➰ Join

*Continuation of part two, 2/2 ⏩ Therefore, in my layman's opinion, I would do the following: ➡️ Providing the availability of a technical reserve in case "something goes completely wrong." Suppose the world becomes "bad" for Ukraine on the political front. In that case, Ukraine should have a reserve for deterrence, and if it is "good," then Ukraine should have saved and accumulated resources for organizing a quick offensive (in terms of preparation time). ➡️ In 2024, Ukraine should wait for most USA order packages (orders from manufacturers). It is also worth waiting for the same Western planes (which will arrive in Ukraine at the same time and arrive during the year), air defense systems, etc. ➡️ Wait for the completion of the announced deployment of Western arms production from manufacturers from Germany, Great Britain, the USA, and Sweden, the main scale of which falls precisely in the second half of 2024. ➡️ Build (rebuild) defense lines to increase the loss ratio for the enemy and reinsurance in case of "what if." ➡️ Do not try to do something "from winter for spring" with insufficient forces to change balances. It is worth accumulating resources for the end of 2024/spring 2025. Having the means to launch an offensive at any convenient time for Ukraine already with an understanding of the "political schedules of partners for the end of 2024" and the corresponding risks. ➡️ It is worth waiting for the satisfactory production volumes of the EU and the USA, which will be released to the necessary peaks only in the second half of 2024. We are talking about producing 2 million ammunition (1 million each) and equipment. ➡️ In 2024, it is necessary to continue provoking the military-technical degradation of moscow's armaments (soviet warehouses are running out). For example, a significant share of the ammunition produced by moscow is not "produced", but "restored from soviet stocks". ➡️ In 2024, Ukraine should save and accumulate the number of personnel as much as possible until the level of technical degradation and deficits of the moscow army is acceptable for Ukraine (depletion of soviet stocks). The only thing with which there may not be a shortage in moscow is the "meat" resource. ➡️ Also, by the end of 2024, the economic consequences for moscow should intensify. It does not mean that "everything will end soon, russia will fall apart." But the budgets of moscow continue to degrade. Earlier, I wrote that 2024 is the peak financial opportunity, considering Moscow's gold and currency reserves + the aftereffect of peak energy prices in 2021-22. Therefore, based on many "political unknowns" and military-technical indicators, 2024 "must be preparatory" from a logical point of view. Even at the risk of going to "US elections." If the elections are "positive" for Ukraine, then at the end of 2024 - the beginning of 2025, Ukraine will have a saved resource for a quick (in terms of preparation) offensive. If it is negative, then Ukraine will have a resource for "restraint" and avoid "strategic defeat." ❗️ But if in 2024, Ukraine risks spending much more resources on the offensive than on the potential defense, and even if Ukraine succeeds, more is needed to push moscow strategically. The consequences may or may not have critical indicators considering international political factors. But does Ukraine have the luxury of such a risk? The leaders of Ukraine should understand the responsibility for the fact that the war can be lost. The expression "good always triumphs over evil" is good and motivating from an idealistic point of view, but real life is a bit more complicated. Resurgam ➰ Join

About political and military strategies for 2024 part one, ½ ➡️ You asked me several times to make a "weather forecast" for 2024, what will happen, etc. I do not have enough information to make it adequate, and I am not a military professional. Therefore, pay attention to this and do not judge harshly. I want to build my analysis based on political and military planning, and not purely military calculations, for which there are more professional people than me. ➡️ If you look at the war "deeply," there are two lines of thought: "to be in time for the US presidential election on November 15, 2024" or "to look deep into 2025". Since the volume of the text is limited, I will immediately answer what I am inclined to do. I tend to "look deep into 2025". Why? ⏩ Muscovites built defense lines. Therefore, at this moment, there is no need to rush: whether in 2024 or 2025 - it will be. ⏩ 2024 has many politically unknown critical components. And the question is not only about the elections in the USA. There are also the crucial June elections to the European Parliament, which can bring many unpleasant things. ⏩ Potentially, by 2027, the issue of financial (non-military) support will be resolved with the funds of the already accepted long-term support programs from the Scandinavian countries, Japan, and, in the future, from the EU. It is possible to keep the budget beyond 2024 + record gold and foreign exchange reserves. ⏩ Military support is already diversified: if in 2022, approximately 70-75% of military support came from the US, now this percentage is 45%. Germany is becoming more independent in determining "at what distance and how much to support Ukraine." Also, Germany and several other pro-Ukrainian countries provide long-term support for Ukraine, even to the point of substituting American support in the event of "crisis situations in the United States." Ukraine will not be left with zero funding even after the US elections, but the potential resources for an offensive may not be enough. ⏩ Even in 2025, it is worth looking through the elections in Germany and Great Britain that the "limits of possibilities to restrain the enemy" are not the US elections of 2024 but the year 2025 (German and British elections). What is the idea? ➡️ Do not try to accumulate strength and conduct one offensive per year quickly. It is worth considering in the long term the questions "What if Trump wins?", "What if he doesn't?", as well as "What if support increases dramatically in 2024?", "What if it doesn't?". The price of a mistake is too high, so Ukraine needs to have a resource for deterrence and offensive. That is, Ukraine cannot afford to tentatively conduct an offensive attempt in April-June 2024 (even if successful), and after November 2024 (the US elections and the exhaustion of the Armed forces of Ukraine) - suddenly have no resources for deterrence, protection of gains, and frontline support. And maybe I'm wrong, and the US system itself will correct the conditional Trump, and maybe "no," and perhaps it won't be Trump. It is possible that eurosceptics (such as Marine Le Pen, Robert Fico, Viktor Orbán, etc.) will be elected to the European Parliament in June, or maybe not, but these moments are of significant importance. Resurgam ➰ Join

💬 Ukrainian revenue strategy for 2024-2030 💰 To begin with, I would like my community not to make conclusions and comments until the moment of complete study of any subject of your assessment. This Strategy is over 300 pages long, so find an economist or thoroughly read the subject of your criticism/support. I will provide the political component of this Strategy and a specific set of information, which will help you form a coherent, non-politicized assessment. ➡️ What is this Strategy for? This Strategy was a recommendation of the IMF (primarily) and a little of the EU. ➡️ Instead, the Organization allowed to exceed the possible permissible borrowing for Ukraine (from quota). Ukraine has received/will receive funds amounting to 577% of its quota (the maximum allowable excess of 435% under medium-term programs). These are significant concessions. ➡️ The second component is recommendations from EU institutions regarding the budget and how Ukraine will emerge from the economic crisis. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Strategy is until 2030 (this is the year of Ukraine's projected accession to the EU), and most of the provisions begin to function only from 2026-27 (the approximate date of drafting the requirements of the treaty on Ukraine's accession to the EU). ➡️ Why was the government in a hurry to adopt this Strategy? The answer is to unblock programs from the IMF promptly and close the budget deficit. Plus, the factor of delaying aid from the US and the EU. And don't forget that on December 13, Ukraine entered the penultimate stage of European integration, "the beginning of accession negotiations," and Ukraine must accept certain norms, obligations, and moments. ➡️ Strategy, dates, and European integration. The Strategy includes part of the norms that will be the requirements for "bringing Ukrainian legislation into compliance with the EU norms" in the future. A relatively large proportion of tasks are stretched over time. Not all of them come into force on January 1, 2024. Most begin to act in a year, two or three. During this time, criticism of individual requirements may reach the necessary peak, which will provoke changes in Strategy. That is, before its actual implementation. Which requirements need to be changed and modernized is a matter for independent economists and businesses. ➡️ What mistake did the government make in developing the Strategy? ➡️ The main fundamental mistake is the lack of involvement of the public, business, and expert environment in strategy development. Such documents are not created "in offices" or during "closed consultations" with European colleagues. National contexts, the bearers of which are "Ukrainian business," "Ukrainian economists," etc., are an essential component in such documents. ➡️ Insufficient communication and the wrong approach to development provoke distrust of the document and rejection (even if there are reasonable requirements). The principle of public self-awareness in democratic societies is simple: what is done "without me" or the involvement of "people like me" is mainly done "not in my interests. " And now, this simple political principle has been violated. The government is experiencing a natural social consequence. ➡️ It cannot be the case that only one ("the state in the cabinets") creates rules for others (business). Inclusion of the parties (involvement) in the development of such decisions is the basis for ensuring quality provisions, operation of the Strategy, and, most importantly, trust in it. Trust, on a level with the rule of law, is the basis for the "acceptance" of the document by society and the honest implementation of its requirements — the implementation of the Strategy. Resurgam ➰ Join

Observations on night shelling: targets, terror and Moscow's fleet (part 2) 💰 The total cost of the missile attack on Moscow is estimated at $1.27 billion. It is more than the cost of the already underwater cruiser "Moskva." In a few hours... ⏩ For this billion, the enemy targeted such "military objects" as residential buildings, the private sector, a shopping center, a maternity hospital, a parking lot, and a warehouse. I advise you to pay attention to the fact that, in addition to the joy of geeks from killed civilians, local propagandists still cannot report "which real military objects they hit." Propagandist Romanov reported hitting the upper floors of the Kyiv under-construction building as "missile damage to the military structure." The Russian media representatives are waiting for instructions of how to blame Ukrainians for hitting a maternity hospital or a high-rise building. In certain cities, they tried to hit certain enterprises, but there is no confirmation they managed from official or unofficial channels. 💬 It is crucial that the enemy did not bring out the sea-based "Caliber." It was a coordinated mass attack, one of the largest during the war, and of course, these cannibals would have taken advantage of convenient launches in the direction of Odesa or central-western Ukraine from the Black Sea if they had had the opportunity. But one of the significant achievements of Ukrainian army in 2023 is the Black Sea navy of the enemy driven into Novorossiysk, which sits with its anchors tightened behind three barricades and is afraid to go to the Crimea region for "shifting" and "launch line." Caliber carriers went out to sea and simulated launches to divert attention but did not come close to the shores of Crimea (to the traditional launch points). ➡️ And finally. So far, according to unconfirmed data (⚠️so be careful with expectations), the enemy could lose (disappear from the radar) Tu-22 from strategic aviation. About 30 of these types of aircraft remained in working order. We are waiting for "objective control" from the community of russia. If, by some miracle, the Ukrainian could get Tu-22, these are promising prospects. I offer my condolences to the families of the victims and the people who suffered the disaster. The best way to honor these people is to find a collection of the money(from those you trust) and donate to the Armed Forces to destroy the danger. Resurgam ➰ Join

Observations on night shelling: targets, terror and Moscow's fleet (part 1) ➡️ The bastards carried out three waves of combined rocket launches from "Kinzhal" to S-300/400. It is the first mass attack since last winter. According to the data of the General Staff, 122 missiles (X-101, X-555, X-55, Kinzhalі) and 36 Shaheds attacked Ukraine overnight. Eighty-seven rockets and 27 Shaheds were shot down. 73% of targets were shot down. When evaluating the effectiveness of our air defense system, consider two key factors: ⏩ One-time load on air defense systems ⏩ The use of ballistic missiles of the S-300/S-400/Iskander-M type, which: • firstly, are difficult targets to shoot down; • secondly, they were deliberately used in the nearest cities from the launches to make a reaction impossible (Kharkiv/Zaporizhia). Looking at where and how the rockets flew, and most importantly from the reaction of the cannibals of the military, I made the following conclusions ⤵️ ➡️⛳️ The goal was not the energy infrastructure, which is more or less certainly covered up. Russians attacked with two intentions: to get certain production enterprises in certain cities, and the main idea was to commit the greatest possible illustrative terror. With rockets that quantitatively distracted our air defense, they intentionally hit on cities to inflict a greater "bloody" and "illustrative" effect if it is not possible to achieve a "military effect". Maybe I'm wrong, correct me. ➡️ One of the goals is simply an element of terror to hit at least something: a) to undermine the internal stability of Ukrainians against the background of inevitable psycho-emotional fatigue from the war; b) to sell the "picture" to the domestic consumer, "see how we defeat them," to divert attention from previous statements about Avdiyivka. Resurgam ➰ Join