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Resurgam (Latin for "I will rise again"). Ukrainian analytics. We prove that Ukraine will recover and rebuild after the war πΊπ¦β To support the channel: Buymeacoffe - https://www.buymeacoffee.com/Resurgam/membership Feedback βοΈ: @Resurgamm_bot
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Channel Posts
NATO Summit: Asia-Pacific Component for Ukraine πΊπ¦
In our last overview of the Asian region and Ukraine's prospects, we mentioned that it would be beneficial for Ukraine to "engage" in a series of events at the NATO summit dedicated to cooperation between this region and NATO and individual collaboration between countries of this region and the U.S. Let's see if this was successful.
Beijing issued threats on the day of NATO's meetings with Asia-Pacific partners.
β‘οΈ The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman π¨π³ stated π£: "Do not bring instability to the Asia-Pacific region after what happened in Europe," continuing with claims about "violations of Chinese borders," mandate expansion, exceeding defense zones, and fomenting regional confrontation.
It seems China was reacting nervously to the fact that one of NATO's top themes was the partnership with South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, which concluded with several documents and decisions on expanding the boundaries of strategic partnerships. China accused the U.S. of creating an "Asian NATO."
But what's most important: ‡οΈ
β© Ahead of the summit, Stoltenberg commented that the United States and NATO countries planned to discuss ways to build practical cooperation with South Korea to assist Ukraine during the summit sessions. As a result, it is crucial that Ukraine was included in the work of the "NATO and Asia-Pacific Four" group.
In the public domain, there were at least two episodes in which Ukrainian diplomacy had the opportunity to interact with South Korea, which is now a focal point of many of our expectationsβand not just ours.
βΆοΈ On a formal level, the Ukrainian delegation was included in the meeting of the Indo-Pacific Four partners, which is extremely important for building relations with countries in this region. Australia's most significant military aid package is evidence of this.
β‘οΈOn an informal level, Nikkei Asia reports that Zelensky had a dinner conversation with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, organized by the White House. The publication notes that the Ukrainian president likely raised the issue of military support from South Korea. How successful these events were and whether they will yield results is still unknown. Time will tell. We can affirm that a rapprochement process is underway with this critically important region for us.
β‘οΈ In his final speech, the South Korean President emphasized that solidarity among like-minded countries has become more important than ever. Allies now face interconnected challenges, such as the war in Ukraine and provocations from Pyongyang.
This part of the South Korean leader's speech resonates with the speech of the Japanese Prime Minister in the U.S. Congress π£: "Ukraine today could be East Asia tomorrow," the Japanese leader argued regarding providing support to Ukraine.
Regarding the practical aspect of decisions for Ukraine from the "Asian" sessions at the NATO summit, the public knows little so far π£: "NATO allies and Indo-Pacific partners will launch four new joint projects related to Ukraine, artificial intelligence, disinformation, and cybersecurity," according to the official statement. What exactly "a project related to Ukraine" means is still unknown. Hopefully, we will learn about it, not from a random guy on Discord, as happened last year.
P.S. Another interesting topic for thought, though beyond this post but in the context of these processes: the U.S. lifted its unofficial block on NATO airworthiness certification for South Korean aircraft. Essentially, Americans are allowing South Korea into the European aviation market, which the U.S. has fiercely protected from any "alternative interventions" that could compete with the F-35.
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| 2 | π«π· The Woman Who Twice Denied Macron
In our last update about France, we concluded that President E. Macron is waiting for the "New Popular Front" to fall apart.
π«π· Macron accepted Prime Minister Gabriel Attal's resignation, but until a new one is elected, the incumbent will continue to ensure the government's functioning.Β
β‘οΈ The electoral bloc "New People's Front" was supposed to nominate a prime ministerial candidate, but this issue has caused internal conflict. Macron is counting on this to sideline Jean-Luc MΓ©lenchon's party and MΓ©lenchon himself.
MΓ©lenchon, as a candidate for prime minister from the bloc, was rejected by RaphaΓ«l Glucksmann's Socialists. It appears that Glucksmann and his party, along with the Greens, will reject any candidate from MΓ©lenchon's LFI party, of which there have already been at least two others besides MΓ©lenchon himself.
Macron is waiting for a convenient prime minister because, after all, the composition of the parliament requires the candidate to be moderate and a compromise, which MΓ©lenchon cannot accept in his ambitions.
β‘οΈ It seems that the Socialists and the Greens have found such a candidate: Laurence Tubiana, a Green representative who is more of a public figure than a politician. Tubiana communicates freely with Socialists, Macronists, and Republicans and even has experience convincing Le Pen supporters.
π¬ MΓ©lenchon immediately tried to block any talk about Laurence Tubiana as she threatened his ambitions. However, the Socialists, Greens, Macron's group and some Republicans can vote for her as a compromise candidate, and that will be enough.
On the other hand, it seems that no one, apart from MΓ©lenchon himself, is going to vote for MΓ©lenchon's candidates. Therefore, his party declared that "negotiations for the prime minister have reached an impasse" and tried to shift everyone's attention to the election of the parliament speaker.
β But there is still a question of whether Laurence Tubiana will agree to become the prime minister. MΓ©lenchon accused her of a conspiracy with Macron, claiming Tubiana was under Macron's influence. Such conclusions were drawn because Macron offered Tubiana a ministerial portfolio twice, but she refused.
How Pro-Ukrainian is Laurence Tubiana? πΊπ¦
Tubiana has been involved in several initiatives for the reconstruction of Ukraine and condemns Moscow's actions. She is close to A. Baerbock, Germany's pro-Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Tubiana wrote several articles on Politico in support of Ukraine and has visited the country. Her "green" colleagues, along with the Socialists, pressured MΓ©lenchon to include in the pre-election program a commitment to expand support for Ukraine.
She is not just an excellent compromise option for France, but also a strong pro-Ukrainian choice that could significantly bolster France's support for Ukraine.
Can She Become Prime Minister Without MΓ©lenchon's Support?
β‘οΈ Remember what I said: MΓ©lenchon depends on Macron's votes, but Macron does not depend on MΓ©lenchon's.
Tubiana has the support of Glucksmann's Socialists (65 votes), the Greens (33 votes), and Macron's group (168 votes). Some smaller parties and some Republicans will probably also support Tubiana, and that will be enough.
This would mean the collapse of the "New People's Front" bloc.
Macron's Bet
βΆοΈ Against the backdrop of the speaker's election and the difficulties in agreeing on a prime minister candidate, the contradictions within the bloc will only intensify, leading to interesting events on July 20, when the Committees must be formed. This will result in scandals that will split the "New People's Front" by the end of the Olympics.
βΆοΈ After the Olympics, Macron eats his croissant and rides into the parliament on a white horse to stop the chaos, find a compromise, and "cut the Gordian knot" of contradictions as the head of the country.
βΆοΈ So, Macron gets a convenient Prime minister (perhaps not Tubiana), completely ignoring Le Pen and MΓ©lenchon.
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| 3 | On Orbanβs Actions and Potential Enemy Strategies
Timing and Strategic Objectives
β‘οΈ Orbanβs actions seem deliberately timed to coincide with Hungaryβs peak political influence (EU presidency) and Ukraineβs most sensitive period leading up to the NATO summit.
Provocative Events
βΆοΈ Orbanβs activities have aligned with provocative events before and during the NATO summit, likely organized by moscow. These include statements by Bulgariaβs acting prime minister, appeals from Western academia, letters from former ambassadors to moscow, and a general increase in bot activity and media manipulation.
βΆοΈ Additionally, there was a suggestion that Orban assured Xi Jinping of direct negotiations by the end of the year. This leak, occurring on the second day of the NATO summit, was highly distracting, especially for countries that are hesitant about continued military support for Ukraine.
Dual Objectives
Orbanβs activities seem to aim at two primary goals‡οΈ
βΆοΈ 1. Disrupting the NATO Summit: The aim is to undermine military support for Ukraine and political decisions that could influence the battlefield. For Orban to achieve his second objective, he needs the status quo to remain: Ukraine lacks the resources to counterattack while moscow continues its incremental advances.
βΆοΈ 2. Becoming a Mediator: Orban is positioning himself as a bridge between Trump (or Trumpβs circle), Putin, and Xi Jinping. Hungaryβs EU presidency is being used to enhance this intermediary role.
Hungaryβs Limited Independent Political Influence
Hungary lacks the independent political weight to implement peace initiatives of this scale. Still, it can act as an executor and communicator, leveraging its temporary political clout ( significance! ) during its EU presidency to advance obviously! βnon-Hungarian initiativesβ.
Indirect Indicators
Several indirect indicators support the thesis of Orbanβs deliberate actions:
β‘οΈ1. Hungary has hosted Chinaβs βpeaceβ envoy Li Hui twice, consistently supporting Chinaβs positions.
β‘οΈ 2. From 2023 to 2024, Hungary has increased Chinese investments in its banking and construction (infrastructure) sectors.
β‘οΈ 3. Before Hungaryβs presidency, Orban met with Xi Jinping (May), Trump, and Trumpβs circle (March) and had subsequent ( following ) phone conversations.
β‘οΈ 4. Orban plans to invite Trump to the EU summit, thereby legitimizing Trumpβs stance( position) on peace negotiations. However, this news should be cautiously interpreted, as it comes from an unreliable Hungarian source.
Coordinated Actions by Hungary, moscow, and China
π¨π³ The trioβs measures aim to freeze the war along the current frontlines. China has been expanding its βinvestment bribesβ and βcontract bribesβ to nominally neutral countries to increase its influence before strategically deploying them. Given Chinaβs and moscowβs political and financial resources, this appears to be moscowβs primary vector of action.
β‘οΈ Civilian Terror: This aims to emotionally drain the already exhausted populace.
Personally, I believe moscow is preparing systemic provocations in the Caucasus: overthrow Pashinyanβs government, election fraud in Georgia if necessary, and maximizing pressure on Ukraine through βpeacekeepingβ countries.
Impact on US Elections
βͺοΈ All these actions are being timed to coincide with the US elections, where regardless of the outcome, the country will plunge ( immerse ) into internal turmoil due to post-election chaos. This polarization will create a favorable environment for China to try to usurp ( take over ) the USβs international initiatives ( leading) entirely, including perspectives on the war. Meanwhile, moscow will pursue hybrid plans not only in Ukraine but also to regain lost influence.
Countermeasures
The only viable ( available) countermeasure is communicating these theses widely and cooperating maximally with the βEuropean core( leaders/countries)β in explaining these trends.
We must be aware that a period of post-election chaos in the US is inevitable, and our predictions ( analysis) must take it into account. | 134 |
| 4 | π Ouroboros: Alternative for Germany (AfD) Starts Open Fight with Orban's Group
π¬ While Viktor Orban has been flying worldwide, Alternative for Germany (AfD) has nearly completed forming its micro-group in the European Parliament. It has started luring potential members from Orban's "Patriots of Europe" group.
π Before the events described below, Le Pen's party and the Northern League distanced themselves from AfD. Orban ignored the possibility of inviting AfD first, preferring to bring in Le Pen's party.
β‘οΈ Guess what Orban offered Le Pen's party as a price for joining. Le Pen's party was given the position of head of Orban's group. The position would be held by Bardella, who won't become the Prime Minister of France, though he had already ordered a chair for the office. Orban's group is a rebranding of the ultra-right ID group, as out of 84 deputies, 64 are former ID members (Le Pen's group), including the leadership positions.
AfD has finally decided to compete for the ultra-right spectrum and is trying to snatch potential members from Orban. Orban was supposed to have 95 deputies, but now there are only 84 due to several reasons‡οΈ
βΆοΈ 1. The Polish "Confederation" π΅π±: The "Confederation" was in the final stages of negotiations to join Orban but postponed its decision. Overall, the "Confederation" has split. Four deputies want to join AfD, and only two want to join Orban's "Patriots."
βΆοΈ 2. The Slovak Republican Movement: Refused to join Orban and joined AfD instead (2 deputies).
βΆοΈ 3. The Bulgarian pro-Moscow party "Revival": Refused Orban and joined AfD (3 deputies).
Thus, while Orban is on tour, AfD is reducing Orban's chances of expanding his group, and it's not certain that later on, AfD won't pull some of the ultra-right members from Orban's group to their side.
β‘οΈ Orban's ambitions have completely split the right and ultra-right spectrum, preventing the creation of something unified or different but capable of cooperating.
β‘οΈ Orban's actions have prevented Meloni from becoming the sole queen of the right. The Hungarian prime minister has pulled potential members on whom Meloni was depending and with whom she was negotiating. Meloni's recent reaction to Orban was telling.
β© Orban didn't find common ground with AfD or politically hinder them from forming a group as an alternative ultra-right center. He would have needed to stay in Europe and negotiate with those AfD was luring rather than traveling worldwide. Now, the German admirers of putin are stretching the potential spectrum, though it would have been important for Orban to avoid this.
With such toxic relations, all three groupsβMeloni's right-wing and the two ultra-right groups of AfD and Orbanβare unlikely to cooperate in the European Parliament and achieve powerful positions at the "European Commissioner" level.
Thus, it turns out that Orban inadvertently did us a favor‡οΈ
β‘οΈ 1. He fragmented and inadvertently allowed the fragmentation of the ultra-right spectrum.
β‘οΈ 2. He cleansed Meloni's group of potential and existing admirers of putin by pulling them to his side.
β‘οΈ 3. He didn't keep all admirers of putin under one political roof, allowing the creation of two ultra-right groups that stretch participants and ultimately diminish each other's influence.
Such is the "Ouroboros with elements of a snake and viper fight."
P.S. There was already a conflict between Orban's group members, the "Northern League," and Le Pen's party at the first meeting regarding the vice-president position of the group. Le Pen's party refused to consider General Roberto Vannacci, Salvini's protΓ©gΓ©, as the group's deputy head. The French press described the Italian general: "Homophobe, racist, pro-Mussolini." Even the ultra-right Bardella has already distanced himself from such a deputy.
I believe that unity in Orban's group is just off the charts. π
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| 5 | A new confederation
π³πͺπ§π«π²π±NIAMEY: The military juntas of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger joined a new "confederation" on Saturday (July 6), signing a treaty during their first summit in Niamey. This comes after breaking ties with the existing West African bloc (ECOWAS).
β© The leaders of the three countries, who came to power through military coups in recent years and had close ties with the Wagner organization in the region, "decided to take another step towards greater integration among member states" and "adopted a treaty to create a confederation," according to a statement made at the end of Saturday's summit.
β‘οΈ The "Alliance of Sahel States," using the abbreviation AES, will unite approximately 72 million people.
β© In January, these three countries announced their departure from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), an organization they accused of lobbying for the interests of France, their former colonial ruler.
β‘οΈ All three countries have severed military and defense ties with France, seeking closer cooperation with moscow.
"Our people have irreversibly turned away from ECOWAS," said General Abdourahamane Tchiani, head of Niger's military junta, during the summit's opening.
All three countries expelled French troops, which previous governments had enlisted to combat jihadists, and instead turned to what they call their "sincere partners and best friends" β moscow, Turkey, and Iran.
π€· De-escalation is unpredictable; who would have thought it would turn out this way (sarcasm).
β‘οΈ Recall that the U.S. blocked ECOWAS's decision to launch a military operation against Niger's junta (although before American intervention, I was sure the operation would proceed), and Macron, on the eve of the coup in Niger, refused to heed intelligence reports and send special forces to the presidential palace of Niger's democratically elected president, who maintained close ties with Western countries, including France.
Now, the Americans are without military bases in the region, and the French are without uranium from Niger and many other benefits.
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| 6 |  +9A big post about Iran and other very important events has been written yesterday.
But I have no desire to post and discuss them today.
Especially when cynicism is spreading around the world much further than I even realize. The cynicism of certain media that I and my environment are trying to influence in many parts of the world right now.
I wanted to write an emotional post about it. I typed it on my phone. And then I stopped. I thought that everyone was already emotionally overwhelmed and been on the verge of exploding. And everyone understands everything. I deleted it. But then I pressed Ctrl+Z. I left it as a memento. But I still changed my mind about publishing it.
In the end, I decided that most of you want to punish the Muscovite evil more effectively than reading my emotional outbursts. Therefore, I am involving you in the process.
Individual attempts and narrowly instrumental methods have yielded results in some places, but in others they have proved powerless.
But you can try to help break through this wall. As we have already successfully done with Reuters last time.
It is possible to punish terrorists not only by donating to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (though this is also extremely important). Your activity is also important and effective at certain points.
Help me to explain to the editors of some media about the details and the horror of the terrorist attack. Explain the significance of the Okhmatdyt hospital in your appeals to the listed media. Demonstrate the bloodthirstiness of the attack - a demonstrative strike by terrorists. Send and show evidence of this bloodthirstiness. If, God forbid, one of your loved ones has been injured and you are morally ready to send a similar commentary-story - describe it. Let media leave their comfort zone. And, of course, the main thing is the health and safety of your loved ones.
Πsk the listed media for special reports and investigations of the strikes, as the same media did with Palestinian hospitals.
Terrorists can be punished by using different tools βby spreading information about their crimes and bringing the consequences closer. This is the first stage of punishment.
βΆοΈ 1. Contacts for inquiries and correction of materials in Reuters. Write here.
βΆοΈ 2. Contacts for inquiries and correction of materials in The Times. Write here.
βΆοΈ 3. Contacts for inquiries and correction of materials in The Washington Post. Write here.
βΆοΈ 4. Contacts for inquiries and corrections at ABC News. Write here.
I would like to thank the BBC, Bloomberg, CNN and The Guardian for their initial extensive coverage of the terrorist attack or, in other cases, their response to the appeal and for adding material about the importance of the Okhmatdyt hospital for children's medicine in Ukraine and describing the heinous crime committed.
I hope that other media outlets listed above will follow the example of more meaningful coverage of the event and avoid ambiguous interpretations in their news and publications after the massive appeals.
An act of terror against civilians - especially children - has no other interpretation, explanation or aspiration. The desire of the civilized world should be the same: to bring to justice those responsible for the crime, to deprive the tribe of terrorists of the opportunity to commit these crimes, and to maximize collective opportunities to prevent such acts. | 267 |
| 7 | ππΊ OrbΓ‘n is gaining "political weight." Is the process of consolidating pro-Moscow loyalist forces into one group a coincidence?
β‘οΈ OrbΓ‘n's group in the European Parliament could become the third-largest force, surpassing ECR (Meloni) and Renew. Despite his statements and visits, OrbΓ‘n's actions are clearly defined and potentially hostile to our country.
After being refused membership in both the EPP (Ursula von der Leyen) and the ECR, OrbΓ‘n formed a microgroup called "Patriots," which includes himself, the leader of Austria's far-right FPO, and former Czech Prime Minister BabiΕ‘ (ANO). All members show varying degrees of loyalty to Moscow.
β‘οΈ On July 5, the Spanish far-right party VOX decided to leave Meloni's group and join OrbΓ‘n's "Patriots."
But the main development lies ahead ‡οΈ
β‘οΈ It is likely that after the elections in France, especially if Le Pen does not achieve the expected results, she will unite with OrbΓ‘n.This is an important signal for those who believe Le Pen has changed her stance. Additionally, her statements about banning the use of French weapons to strike Moscow and refusing to supply missiles cannot be ignored.
π¬ An adviser to OrbΓ‘n announced that we will hear a lot about their group in the coming days, which is set to become the third-largest in the European Parliament and the main opposition. Politicians close to the negotiation process confirm that talks are nearing completion, and Le Pen is close to leaving her group ID to join OrbΓ‘n's group. This news is expected to become public next week.
β© If this happens, OrbΓ‘n's group will have 86 deputies, ECR (Meloni) will have 78, and Renew will have 76. Le Pen's exit from the ID group will effectively dissolve that group, benefiting OrbΓ‘n.
βΆοΈ I still wonder why Le Pen, the leader of her group, would join forces with OrbΓ‘n... The question remains open, but the answer seems obvious, especially after OrbΓ‘n's provocative visit to moscow, which was clearly intended to send a message to Europe.
OrbΓ‘n hopes that after Le Pen joins him and the ID group collapses, he will attract Italy's "Lega Nord" and eventually the Party for Freedom (PVV) led by Wilders from the Netherlands. This will be enough to form a pan-European group.
β‘οΈ This group should be formed before the EU summit and the votes for positions. It is held together by a range of individual interests, each of which OrbΓ‘n, as the leader of a presiding country or through this project, can help facilitate.
While this will not fundamentally change the balance of power in the EU, OrbΓ‘n gaining "weight" is not a good trend for worldwide interests. The consolidation of pro-moscow forces into a single group is also concerning. It was much better when they were scattered across different groups and effectively blocked.
Resurgam β° Join us | 168 |
| 8 | It's a contentious view, but it seems that Marine Le Pen's party lost its momentum before the second round of the French elections. Here's why:
β‘οΈ Although Le Pen is likely to secure the most seats in the first round, forming a majority will be challenging. Our previous analysis suggested that the winner would be the one able to quickly form alliances, with Macron better positioned than Le Pen.
Based on predictions from French analytical centers for the lower house composition after the first round‡οΈ
β’ Le Pen's party: 240-270 seats
β’ Left bloc: 180-200 seats
β’ Macron's bloc: 60-90 seats
β’ Republicans: 30-50 seats
β’ Others: 13-21 seats
A majority requires 289 seats. It was assumed Le Pen could form a coalition with the Republicans if needed. However, these forecasts didn't account for strategic withdrawals and cooperation between candidates in the districts.
βΆοΈ Macron's π«π· team successfully negotiated with the left bloc in most constituencies to withdraw third-party candidates, reducing competition. Consequently, in many districts, only Macron or left bloc candidates remain viable against Le Pen.
βΆοΈ In contrast, Le Pen's team failed to secure similar agreements with the Republicans. In some cases, Republicans even withdrew in favor of Macron's candidates.
I analyzed each district based on the following criteria:
β© Protected: Macron + Left votes > 60%
β© Inclined: Macron + Left votes 50-60%
β© Contested: Votes 40-50%
β© Losing: Votes < 40%
I also considered the gap in first-round results. If a Le Pen candidate's lead was less than 10% in a center-left district, it leaned towards Macron or the left bloc. Conversely, a significant lead in a right-leaning district counted for Le Pen.
According to my calculations, despite Le Pen's party winning 299 first places out of 577 in the first round, the second round should yield different results:
β’ Le Pen's party: 190-210 seats
β’ Left bloc: 175-190 seats
β’ Macron's bloc: 115-125 seats
β’ Republicans: 35-50 seats
β‘οΈ With 289 seats needed for a majority, Le Pen's party won't have enough seats to form a majority, even with the Republicans. Therefore, I predict the majority will likely belong to a coalition of Macron's bloc and the left bloc.
Let's see if this assessment holds true.
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| 9 | ππΊ Regarding Hungary's ultimatum ("OrbΓ‘n's points") for the accession of Ukraine πΊπ¦ to the EU
It's more reasonable to forget this ultimatum.
β‘οΈ At this stage, the opening of frameworks and clusters does not depend on OrbΓ‘n's will.
β‘οΈ At this stage of European integration, the only essentials are the European Commission's annual reports and relevant resolutions in the European Parliament regarding Ukraine's compliance with EU principles. This will be our central concern in the next 3β5 years.
βΆοΈ Hungary can influence nothing, even during its EU presidency. It can create minor obstacles, such as sending a report for "examination," But concerning global issues of European integration, not yet. The most immediate opportunity for us to get a block from Hungary is during the opening of the negotiation framework.
β’ June 21, 2024 β EU member states approved the negotiating framework for Ukraine and Moldova.
β’ On June 25, negotiations officially began.
β‘οΈ The stage where Hungary can block something is when "EU member states unanimously decide to sign the Agreement on Ukraine's accession to the EU."
It will take at least 3β5 years to reach this stage, during which it is not sure whether OrbΓ‘n will remain in power with the current trends or what this power will be.
β‘οΈ Of course, Orban can block the closure of clusters, but his "ultimatums" concern the third cluster (up to which years). The key to closing the cluster is the conclusion of the European Commission with technical approval in the European Council (where Orban abuses the right of veto). So, it will be years before it will be necessary to decide something and pay attention to "OrbΓ‘n's ultimatum."
And, even despite this, there is a plan "B": if "OrbΓ‘n's ultimatum" is still relevant years from now, then implement it (partially) so that Hungary agrees to close all the frameworks (negotiations) and ratifies the EU accession treaty, and then goes through the experience of Poland, Romania and the same Hungary. It is when another national law covers the "ultimately imposed condition" (not a pan-European requirement), or it was canceled when the state had already become a member of the EU. And that's all.
β‘οΈ Therefore, regarding European integration at this stage, perceive OrbΓ‘n as "white noise." At this stage, he practically cannot block anything (once again, he is talking about European integration), and these points are purely internal populism. If OrbΓ‘n wanted to achieve something with these ultimatums, he would do it BEFORE the opening of negotiations, where he could block this decision. And so we can do "long consultations with Hungary" so they somehow feel that we are about to make concessions, and then the fantasy of diplomacy...
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| 10 | π°π·What is the probability that military aid from South Korea will come to Ukraine?
Today, there is news from the government of South Korea π£: "The President will reconsider a country position/policy in regards to Military aid supply to UkraineΒ».
β‘οΈ South Korea is our partner from the Far East, and it provides support in financial and humanitarian fields. However, South Korea has a "block" regarding direct military aid. This block is within their security strategy and the law of their country. The law (Foreign Trade Act) prohibits the sale& provision of weapons to a country in active war or military conflict.
What has been changed?
putin's visit to North Korea and signing of contracts accordingly( all altogether) broke the status quo. Before, there was the informal (non-official) line: "moscow does not give "extra/ super military "technology to North Korea, in return South Korea limiting themselves to only financial and humanitarian assistance of Ukraine." Putin crossed this line by renewing military contacts/deals from ussr time.
So, will South Korea start delivering military weapons to Ukraine? πΊπ¦
π¬ In my opinion, blaming me for being a "traitor" is quite hard, considering that people say the opposite of me. However, I will say that the case of South Korea is a classic case of Β«Swiss syndromeΒ».
β‘οΈ In Switzerland, approximately (more or less) every 9 months, a Committee or the Minister of Defense initiates changes to the law/policy concerning reexports of the weapons in order to provide Ukraine with it( military aid).
β‘οΈ Even more, the Swiss defense departments not only want to support (help) Ukraine but also have a strong internal factor. While all countries with powerful Military Industries earn ( make ) money, the powerful Swiss Military Industry in 2023 year lost up to 25% of exports because of a refusal of a military supply to Ukraine, as stated in Reuters ( a link to the article). Even this internal motivation in Switzerland does not break the populist barrier that exists (hangs) in the Lower House of Parliament.
βοΈ The thing is that even though South Korea is a Presidential Republic and the President has wide authority/powers, South Korea needs to vote in Parliament to "cancel/correct" the Law. There will be no problems with putting for a vote; there will be no problems with passing the Committee. However, there will be a big problem with the voting itself at the end.
Moreover, after the Parliament election on 10 April 2024, The Government and the President of South Korea are in the minority. The Parliament majority is with the opposition "Democratic Party, "which was at least during 2023 against Ukraine Military support in any form.
"Military aid of the conflict zones does not align with our national interests, and this never should be done", announced the Party leader of the Democratic Party.
β‘οΈ That is why we should not have expected a direct military supply from South Korea to Ukraine, at least as of now, unfortunately.
βοΈ But "difficulty/ complexity "does not mean impossible.
The meaning of my post is to bring the idea/ thought: we don't have to get stuck and be obsessed with seeing Korean tanks or artillery directly in Ukraine; we have to use the moment and the opportunity in an available way. If we tried to "bring" Korean weapons to Ukraine directly, we would spend diplomatic &time resources, but we would bump into the wall of the Parliament voting as a result in the end.
β© While there is a "resonance" for South Koreans ( Military Contract between putin and kim chin in) we have to choose immediately the way that has a chance of the realization β "German roundabout".
German carousel (roundabout) is a German practice from the year 2022 when they supplied weapons to one country to make that country able to provide its weapons to Ukraine (not the newest, though). For this to happen, the government of South Korea does not need the Parliament's approval.
*the end of the post in the commentsπ
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| 11 | π¬ Moscow has already started a targeted disinformation campaign around Mark Rutteβs appointment . They actively began to throw in a first narrative βRutte is for negotiations (deals) with Putinβ.
This is the wayΒ in which moscowβs sources as well as some western /english sources ( with the reference to moscowβs ones), and bots reactivate last fake of Rutteβs saying at the Peace Summit in Switzerland:
βMany speakers here said , that Russia should be at this table , and me , I agree with this completely , β he emphasized. β Russia has to take a part in itβ.
Moscow PSYOP (Psychological operation) takes this phrase out of context‡οΈ
However the context following and in fact the statement was, that the moscow should be involved in the peace negotiations at βsome pointβΒ ( not necessarily the next summit) , Ρand, perhaps, he made intentionally the βridiculous peace proposalβ on June 14.
Moreover, after the Summit itself Rutte stated separately :
" moscow should not be involved into peace negotiations , until it adheres to international principles and the Charter of the United Nations adopted in 1945β.
Shortly, if moscow sends urgent PSYOP (Psychological operation ) as well as bots to public , it means thatΒ someone ( moscow) worries about Rutteβs appointment.
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| 12 | π°π· USA encourages South Korea to supply military aid to Ukraine: South Korean uncertainty for Putin
β‘οΈ It seems that the USA and South Korea have found a way to put Putin in strategic uncertainty and how the presidential vertical in South Korea can legitimize the transfer of weapons to Ukraine.
π Blinken's call to the Foreign Minister of South Korea recently occurred‡οΈ
βΆοΈ He started the conversation by condemning the agreement between North Korea and moscow. He reminded his South Korean colleagues that this is not the first time moscow has violated the norms for which South Korea has promised a "reply" since 2023.
βΆοΈ Blinken used a gentle reminder of the US role in South Korea's security. He especially focused on last year's defense agreement, which strengthened the US "nuclear shield" around South Korea (then it was in exchange for 300,000 munitions and a guarantee to deepen the "Ukrainian direction of support").
What did the South Koreans agree to do? π°π·
π£ "There are various options for the provision of weapons, and our position regarding the recent events between moscow and North Korea will depend on how moscow will approach the situation in the future," said the National Security Adviser to the President of South Korea.
This actually equates South Korea's potential support for Ukraine to the level of cooperation between moscow and North Korea, which puts moscow in a particular position of uncertainty.
How does it work?
You can watch how Putin and Kim Jong Un are almost hiding in nooks and crannies, but North Korea provides and will provide military support to moscow not for "good eyes" but in exchange for "something."
β‘οΈ South Korea constantly monitors this "something," what, and in what quantity moscow sends to North Korea. As soon as moscow gives North Korea its share of the deal, South Korea will "equivalently" transfer military aid to Ukraine πΊπ¦ (most likely through third countries).
β‘οΈ That is, moscow is put in the position that:
β’ or not to transfer anything to North Korea (which is impossible);
β’ or not to interact with North Korea because South Korea has the equivalent of a resource to cover it, which will eventually provoke a general blurring of "borders" and military support of Ukraine in South Korea's political system will become the norm, which, of course, moscow wants to avoid. In short, the German experience of "5000 helmets to the transfer of the Patriot" may occur.
The presidential vertical in South Korea by this decision:
β‘οΈ Shifted responsibility for further escalation to moscow (which is essential for South Korea in the international aspects of its region because the day before, moscow tried to shift responsibility to South Korea).
β‘οΈ Created a legitimizing basis within the country for legalizing future military interactions with Ukraine (responsibility for moscow).
β‘οΈ So South Korea adopted an interesting means of escaping moscow's blackmail, which played on the internal contradictions of the South's political community. Korea, and to the same extent, their blackmail against it (moscow).
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| 14 | π»π³ Battle for Hanoi: Vietnamese Erdoganism
π¬ The news of putin's upcoming visit to Vietnam is making waves across the internet. While the official agenda includes 'education' and 'strengthening of economic cooperation,' there are two undisclosed topics: 'military cooperation' and 'resolving payment issues worsened by new sanctions .'
Vietnam is a country of intriguing foreign policy dynamics. Despite my dedicated attention and time, I find it challenging to get its complex context: who aligns with whom, how, and where. Therefore, I will share my thoughts as a sequence of events instead of analysis:
βΆοΈ 1. Vietnam's communist leadership is not static regarding foreign policy. While it has historically leaned towards moscow, a faction within it advocates for closer ties with the US, particularly in light of the growing risks and competition with China.
βΆοΈ 2. In 2023, the USA pursued a targeted rapprochement policy with Vietnam: Blinken visited Vietnam in April 2023 and March 2024; in September 2023, Biden personally visited Vietnam (signed comprehensive partnership agreements); in October 2023, Sullivan visited Vietnam, and so on.
βΆοΈ 3. In 2023, Vietnam's trade relations with the USA recorded the Americans as the second largest trading partner of Vietnam (the first is China) and the absolute largest importer of Vietnamese products.
βΆοΈ 4. Surprisingly, US allies have also initiated to 'strengthen relations' with Vietnam. Australia has elevated its partnership to a 'strategic' level, the Philippines has signed a security agreement with Vietnam to curb China's illegal actions at sea, and Vietnam has signed some contracts with Japan.
βΆοΈ 5. On the eve of putin's visit, during the reception of ambassadors, Vietnamese President TΓ΄ LΓ’m said that his country wants to expand security and defense ties with the United States and deepen a comprehensive partnership.
But we also have the negative facts of Vietnam's actions:
β© 1. At the beginning of May, Vietnam postponed the meeting of the special envoy for the implementation of EU sanctions, David O'Sullivan. The EU ambassador was supposed to discuss the issue of sanctions with Vietnam. Still, Hanoi decided the meeting might be "inappropriate" against the backdrop of putin's visit and postponed it to July.
β© 2. Vietnam did not attend the summit in Switzerland π¨π, although the country sent different signals.
β© 3. Vietnam is a place of circumvention of sanctions, due to which recently some Vietnamese companies have received secondary sanctions.
putin's visit to Vietnam was received highly negatively in the US π£: "No country should provide putin with a platform to promote his aggressive war and allow him to normalize his evil deeds," said a representative of the US Embassy in Hanoi.
Why are there such contrasts in Vietnam?
β‘οΈ In 2023, Vietnam was rocked by several internal political scandals at the highest levels of the party leadership. This rough period coincided with the USA's active rapprochement with Vietnam. The official reason was the need to normalize powerful trade relations.
In March 2024, a political crisis in Vietnam led to Vo Van Thuong's dismissal as president after only a year in office. Instead, a high-ranking official from Vietnam's security service, To Lam, became president.
At that time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam actively cooperated with the United States and its allies. Instead, the "business elite of Vietnam" and their political representatives tried to maintain ties with moscow. Why? Because a large percentage of the gas production industry, and not only that, belongs to/depends on moscow companies.
As we see, Vietnam has two wings‡οΈ
β’ One that focuses on contacts with putin;
β’ Another that focuses on the US as the leading trading partner and a certain counterweight to China's influence.
We still need to find out which of these forces is more influential. But in the media, it seems that putin is already traveling with "Vietnamese tanks" - I would not believe it because Vietnam has its own collective Erdoganism. | 172 |
| 15 | Results of the Summit in Switzerland π¨π
β© Was the summit extremely successful? Not as initially planned.
β© Was it a failure? No, and not as moscow propaganda tries to portray him.
Positive aspects:
β‘οΈ The summit was a working one at this stage because at least if it caused such irritation in moscow and Beijing, it would put pressure on some pain points in the planning of these countries.
βΆοΈI would like to note one more thing: We should learn to take moscow's diplomacy adequately and move away from the prism of "Lavrov received the Order of the Horse in Africa." Unfortunately, moscow's foreign policy is robust, has significant resources, and can hinder Ukraine.
If all this is supported by China's diplomatic assistance, imagine the situation comparing resources and forces. Therefore, moscow's countermeasures should always be considered a factor, especially in those regions where Moscow's diplomacy continues the Soviet tradition.
The vital functional goals of the β³οΈsummit that were achieved:
βΆοΈ The international diplomatic field was not given to the Moscow-China "peace plan." The China-Moscow plan remains blocked while we gather 8 dozen countries under the text.
βΆοΈ Consolidated support for the West was recorded. The more or less monolithic rhetoric about Ukraine creates a favorable background that forces even countries such as Serbia and Hungary to sign the communique.
βΆοΈ The summit communique is not an international treaty but is an official document that can be used in various diplomatic tricks in the future.
βΆοΈ Filtered out friends, neutrals, and enemies. Even those countries that did not sign the final communiquΓ© but were present at the summit are potential workplaces for diplomacy.
βΆοΈ The text recorded moscow's recognition of aggression, although due to the caution of the text, it was done only once.
βΆοΈ The presence and signatures of Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Uruguay indicate that Ukraine is expanding its presence in the South American region.
βΉοΈ However, expectations regarding Africa were not met. Although there is movement, I consider the region underdeveloped diplomatically. I did not understand the absence of Morocco, Nigeria, and Egypt (which received several billions from the EU).
Negative aspects π
β© The summit recorded the actual bloc nature of the world: there is the Western world and its hostile camp. Most countries are in limbo, which will not allow in the near future, or perhaps at all, to create decisive diplomatic pressure on moscow. In general, none of the camps has a decisive diplomatic advantage. moscow and Beijing are able to block a significant percentage of inclination towards Ukraine by hybrid methods and various dependencies.
β© The communiquΓ© was very careful due to the increased need not to alienate the "neutral countries," some of which were represented at the summit.
β© moscow's absence from the next summit may decrease the number of participants. But for now, I think Ukraine is not ready to admit her to the summit at this stage, as this increases a whole set of critical risks.
β‘οΈ So, the first big summit fulfilled a certain set of goals, but the date of the second summit needs to be analyzed. I don't think it's worth rushing and holding it already in the fall because it can have unforeseen consequences for Ukraine. The second round should be organised when there are reasonable circumstances with SA, India, and South Africa or when there is a change in the battlefield. The admission of moscow to the second summit may be premature, a decision imposed on Ukraine for which it is not ready either diplomatically or militarily.
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| 16 | π¨π³π¨π³ China's revenge: Beijing ordered Ursula von der Leyen
β‘οΈ On June 21, Ursula's European group "European People's Party" will appear in court.
The plaintiff, a figure of significant influence (we will delve into his identity later), presents a compelling argument across 20 pages, challenging Ursula's eligibility for a second term. This legal battle takes on a whole new dimension when we consider the identity of the plaintiff.
Let's start with the base‡οΈ
β‘οΈ Somewhere around the middle of 2023, an oppositional attitude toward China began to grow in the European establishment actively. This eventually led to increased import duties on Chinese products, European support of American sanctions against certain Chinese companies, and, in general, tougher rhetoric towards China, fixation in the public space of unfriendly China's intentions, and generally its bad faith.
β© One of the most anti-Chinese politicians eventually became Ursula von der Leyen, whose office initiated most decisions against China.
π«π· Remember Macron's trip to Beijing in 2023? Then Ursula sat on his tail, and we jokingly said to control Macron (but there is a grain of truth in every joke), who was still inclined to the "strategic autonomy of Europe," a concept that spread China's hopes to split the West.
Macron and Ursula von der Leyen visited China on April 3-5, 2023. The Chinese were very unhappy with Ursula's rhetoric and tried their best to separate her from Macron. Although Macron partially succumbed to China's theses at the time, in the end,
Ursula and later her colleague Burbock minimized China's influence by correctly "correcting" Macron. There is an old post about it on the channel.
β‘οΈ Maybe it is a coincidence, but on April 21, 2023, one Belgian lobbying company raised the old Pfizergate scandal and filed a private lawsuit against Ursula regarding the impossibility of her holding the position of president of the European Commission. Debates regarding this claim are still ongoing.
β‘οΈ At the beginning of May 2024, Xi already flew to France. Still, the set of politicians from Europe was unchanged: Macron + Ursula von der Leyen and if Macron was more or less soft on Xi (good cop), then Ursula ruined the image by criticizing China the kind "Winnie the Pooh" who, in his characteristic manner, knows how to portray China, holding a knife behind his back.
Strangely enough, at the end of May, the same lobbying company (which also filed a lawsuit in 2023) filed a second lawsuit against Ursula and the EPP group, saying they cannot be the "majority" and Ursula hold office.
Well, what is this mysterious Belgian lobbying company?
β‘οΈ Belgian lobbying company CEBiz was founded by Belgian Frederic Baldan and Chinese Felix Hu.
Belgian Baldan is the plaintiff in two lawsuits against Ursula von der Leyen.
β³οΈ The purpose of this company's activity on its website is as follows: "To help clients achieve commercial goals and simplify trade between the EU and China." However, judging by the information on the website, "making life easier" affected only Chinese companies.
β‘οΈ The Chinese automobile and energy industries, two sectors heavily impacted by the EU's restrictions and additional duties, are the main clients of this lobbying company. This underscores the extent of China's influence and its efforts to protect its economic interests in Europe.
But these lobbyists have one more goalβthe legalization of the Chinese media field in Europe, or more precisely, the presentation of pro-China information from the party media in the Western media. Their goal is to build an "image of a good China."
After all, this is how tame lobbyists work, especially without hiding it.
β‘οΈ And we can conclude that China considers Ursula von der Leyen to be an inconvenient leader for itself and wants to "remove" her.
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| 17 | π¨π³ Why did China start acting more actively and openly now?
β³οΈ It is necessary to realize China's primary goals regarding the war. These goals changed with each stage of the war:
β‘οΈ 1. Initial stage.
China believed in moscow's ability to resolve the Ukraine issue in 2 to 3 weeks and, therefore, could well authorize (encourage) putin to take action. China needed a precedent for the military redistribution of spheres of influence and borders in the 21st century. Actual modulation of the situation so that in the future, Beijing can impose all this on the problem with Taiwan, avoiding the risks that moscow would face now. But the war dragged on.
β‘οΈ 2. Middle stage.
China saw its interest in continuing the war while the initiative was with moscow, and the storage resources of the US and allies were depleted in the war in Ukraine, which was not covered by any production for years. China used moscow's resources to equalize its "military potentials", and at the same time, with the same moscow resources, it tried to drive a wedge between European countries, between Europe and the USA, within the USA itself. The more polarized societies in Western democracies are, the better for China.
β‘οΈ 3. Counterattack.
China saw a threat in the Ukrainian counteroffensive, so it tried hard to "break the momentum" of its allies. That is why the "Chinese plan" actively appeared. China used its presence at the "peace summits" to demonstrate a "good bowl of rice" and give a false analytical vector to Western diplomacy that "China can be negotiated with."
β‘οΈ 4. Transition of the initiative to moscow.
Beijing saw its interest in continuing covert support for moscow in the context of six-month problems with the help of Ukraine as the "final stage". Pressing Kyiv to the ground and imposing a peace plan favorable to Beijing not only consolidates the interests of Putin and Xi but also strengthens the international role of China (especially for Europe) as a mediator.
β‘οΈ 5. Restoration of support to the West of Ukraine πΊπ¦ and "escalation."
In the end, Beijing could not drive the wedge it hoped for in relations in Europe and between the US and Europe. The West is gradually becoming militarized, which is disadvantageous to Beijing as part of its global goals around Taiwan.
Taiwanese, American, and Australian intelligence call 2027 the year of China's invasion of Taiwan. China does not need Europe and the United States to truly militarize by 2027 because of the need to support Ukraine. On the contrary, it is necessary to "relax" and not increase military spending and the expansion of the military industry. It is the strategic motive behind Beijing's actions now.
In addition‡οΈ
β’ There is a need to raise the stakes in the Europe-China trade war over electric cars and more.
β’ Cheap energy for China, paid for not by Beijing but by russian taxpayers. russians are already whining about this information: Even under the current gas pipeline, from 2025, China will receive gas at intra-moscow prices, which are subsidized.
β‘οΈ The main thing now is not to mistake China's "additional" components (gas, trade war) as China's strategic motives, which provokes the belief that "now we will find a solution in electric cars" and China will "leave moscow." China is the core of many processes related to putin's aggression. And it is necessary to abandon the idea of ββ"dealing with China" as if it were a neutral country. The classic of Chinese diplomacy is "a pleasant smile with a knife behind."
β‘οΈ Yes, to use China as it does to others. You can smile when it is beneficial, but remember the strategy and thoughts that China is a party to the conflict and far from being on our side.
π¬ The sooner we get rid of illusions and concentrate on those who are important and for whom diplomatic resources are not always enough:
β’ Argentina; β’ Chile; β’ Ecuador; β’ Sudan; β’ Egypt; β’ Morocco;
β’ maybe even South Africa, the Philippines, and Taiwan.
We will likely get the desired result, not a knife in the back.
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| 18 | How Europe financed an enemy agent network (moscow's) with millions of euros in the context of Francis Fukuyama's work "Liberalism and its discontents"
π¬The influence of this scientist on world political opinion is undoubted, so I used his last work as a basis. I want to add I didn't like Fukuyama because of his approach in his early works. He idealized his theory of the "end of history"
β‘οΈBut his late works became (in my subjective opinion) more moderate and fit into my ideological matrix of "right-wing liberalism." In his work, Fukuyama tries to answer the question, "Where did we go wrong?"
News‡οΈ
β‘οΈDanish publications and The Guardian received access to the internal documents after the information leak from the Moscow-based "PravFond." It became known that PravFond, which continues to function in Europe, was engaged in:
βΆοΈMillions of euros were used to support a dozen news portals and media, which, under the guise of "protecting the rights of innocent moscows," methodically promoted moscow's narratives.
βΆοΈCollected information, cooperated with intelligence, and carried out influence operations by demand of special services from moscow.
βΆοΈProtected and financed the interests of local agents.
In 40 documents received by the publication, it became known that "PravFond" implemented operations of influence in 48 countries of Europe and the world.
β‘οΈThe enormous paradox is that as an "international fund," this Fund received grants worth millions of euros from the national governments of European countries. The governments of European countries financed the organizational structure of moscow influence with the funds of their own taxpayers.
How did it happen? Because of "too much."
β‘οΈThere is a distortion of classical liberal ideas and neglect of simple logic. PravFond, created by Putin's directive a priori, had no right to function in Europe after February 24.
It is like an organization created under Hitler's order, would have functioned during World War II in London, and would have received funds from the British government to implement Goebbels' ideas. The story with PravFond is a confirmation of the "too much" and "distortion" of the concepts of human rights, tolerance, and patience, which ultimately lead to equating the aggressor with the victim because this is "Putin's war"
β‘οΈ"Excessiveness" and "toxicity" are the reasons that can be summarized from Fukuyama's book.
The extreme left-wing and the extreme right-wing have become fixated on the fight against zero-sum. In addition, "extreme progressivism" and "extreme conservatism" have directed ideals to religion and conspiracy theories. They generate hate for each other and the state as an institution. Far-left progressives consider the state an enemy that "restricts them" and prevents the advancement of their "utopian egalitarianism," and the far-right wings consider all power to be left-wing without objective distribution, which ultimately leads to the fact that the far-right pulls everything and everyone under its concept, and those who do not meet the "criteria" (even center-right) are considered enemies.
β© The war of extremes is plunging the Western world into a darkness of aggression, toxicity, and hatred, creating a crisis. The development of Europe was ensured by a balance, not by a struggle of extremes for "destruction," where objectively, each of the parties will not achieve "absolute victory."
β‘οΈ Fukuyama considers the beginning of the distortion of "economic neoliberalism" as "the point where they turned in the wrong direction." Economic neoliberalism arose as an utterly correct need in the 1970s and 1980s to "deregulate the regulated state," embodied in the policies of Thatcher, Reagan, and others. Still, in the end, it was distorted to the extent that the state was seen as "either the enemy" or only an instrument of "social corruption" citizens."
Fukuyama summarized his thoughts: "So restoring a sense of moderationβboth individual and collectiveβis the key to revival (rather than survival)."
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| 19 | Great Britain π¬π§ has started implementing the "Estonian initiative" and the "Stoltenberg plan" at the highest level.
In January, it became known that Estonia is promoting an initiative to allocate 0.25% of the country's GDP to Ukraine's military needs. I previously emphasized that Great Britain was also ready to promote this idea and gave some signals about it.
β‘οΈ It seems that Britain is already starting practical lobbying for this idea and is involving Germany and, probably, Poland in it. Countries that can potentially create a coalition of pressure on another trio: France, Spain, and Italy, which are not ready to set 0.25% of GDP in support for Ukraine, as Estonia and Latvia have already done.
β‘οΈ By the way, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia stated that this (0.25% from allies) would provide an opportunity to attract $137 billion annually to support Ukraine (this is from the USA). From the EU+GB β that's $55-60 billion annually.
π¬ Prime Minister Sunak, together with Defense Minister Grant Shapps, held a meeting with Donald Tusk and NATO Chairman Jens Stoltenberg. By the way, Sunak also announced an increase in the aid budget to Ukraine by $600 million from Great Britain. The key topic of the negotiations was "Ukraine." Immediately remember "Stoltenberg's plan for 100 billion euros for Ukraine."
Sunak also met with Scholz in Berlin. Here, the Chancellor of Germany and the Prime Minister of Great Britain made an interesting joint statement π£: "We call for a discussion between allies and partners to agree on the level of military aid to Ukraine concerning their economic power." It is an "Estonian initiative," which must be implemented in order for the "Stoltenberg initiative" to be implemented.
To better understand what I'm talking about, let's go back a couple of weeks‡οΈ
The "Stoltenberg Initiative" provides additional military financing for Ukraine for $109 billion for five years. That is, Stoltenberg needs to find an extra $22 billion annually. If the "Estonian initiative" is implemented, military aid to Ukraine will increase by approximately this amount. For example, from the EU plus Great Britain, it is $55-60 billion minus $24 billion (available military from national governments) minus $5.5 billion (available European Peace Fund) = $25.5-30 billion in addition.
β‘οΈ On April 4, the 75th anniversary of NATO, Stoltenberg presented the idea to the foreign ministers of the Alliance countries. According to the meeting's results, "the final agreement was not reached," but Stoltenberg outlined a "movement towards agreement."
Stoltenberg assured that he would find the money for the program, which will be agreed upon before the NATO summit on July 9-12 in Washington π£: "We are moving towards consensus, and the final decision will be made in Washington," Stoltenberg said regarding his initiative.
Stoltenberg and Sunak's strategy looks like this ‡οΈ
βΆοΈ To finally recruit to the "lobbying team" those countries that responded favorably to Stoltenberg's idea on April 4. The presence of Germans is not surprising because lately, the chancellor has been constantly making statements that certain European countries are underperforming the support, taking into account their economic capabilities.
βΆοΈ The "lobbying group" will convince those European countries that are still not ready to spend 0.25% of GDP on military support for Ukraine.
βΆοΈ Form a single European lobby for this idea and put collective pressure on the USA during the three-day NATO summit. Do something similar based on the example of experience (lobbying for aid to Ukraine in Congress).
βΆοΈ Approve the "Stoltenberg fund" within NATO, which will be implemented by Stoltenberg's successor, probably Rutte.
Also, during the Sunak/Sholz meeting, the two countries announced another interesting thing: "[...]In particular, we will cooperate to support Ukrainian helicopters, including armament, maintenance, and personnel training." Ukrainian in the sense of Western helicopters?
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| 20 | π³π± The Netherlands approved the budget revision and increased support to Ukraine by an ADDITIONAL 4.4 billion euros
β‘οΈ 4.4 billion euros will be additionally allocated for 2024-26 to the already planned support of Ukraine πΊπ¦. Four billion will go to military needs, and 400 million will go to humanitarian and financial needs.
It will have an approximate mathematical form if combined with other Dutch statements ‡οΈ
βΆοΈ In 2024, basic military support of 2 billion euros + 1 billion euros of additional military support (the amount is specified as a minimum), 148 million euros for financial and infrastructure support, and a contribution of 295 million to the European Peace Fund for the purchase of arms for Ukraine will total 3.44 billion euros.
βΆοΈ 2025 basic military supportΡ of 2 billion euros + 1 billion euros of additional military support. 252 million for financial and infrastructure. A total of 3.25 billion euros in 2025.
βΆοΈ In 2026, basic military support will be 2 billion euros β + 1 billion euros of additional military support. Financial and infrastructural support is unknown. Thus, the total will be 3 billion euros in 2026*.
β for 2026, there is still no official decision on the "basic" 2 billion. Still, with a high probability, the logic will be applied to this year approximately the same as 2024 and 2025 since "additional" funds have already been invested in "something." Just for 2026, it will become known in 2025.
As far as I understand, the last 1 billion euros remains a "reserve" and can be used for critical military needs during these three years (in equal shares of an additional 333 million) and in different proportions according to essential moments.
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