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Android Security & Malware

Android Security & Malware

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πŸ“ˆ Analytical overview of Telegram channel Android Security & Malware

Channel Android Security & Malware (@androidmalware) in the English language segment is an active participant. Currently, the community unites 43 914 subscribers, ranking 3 070 in the Technologies & Applications category and 723 in the USA region.

πŸ“Š Audience metrics and dynamics

Since its creation on Π½Π΅Π²Ρ–Π΄ΠΎΠΌΠΎ, the project has demonstrated rapid growth, gathering an audience of 43 914 subscribers.

According to the latest data from 18 June, 2026, the channel demonstrates stable activity. Although there has been a change in the number of participants by 192 over the last 30 days and by -1 over the last 24 hours, overall reach remains high.

  • Verification status: Not verified
  • Engagement rate (ER): The average audience engagement rate is 13.11%. Within the first 24 hours after publication, content typically collects 4.02% reactions from the total number of subscribers.
  • Post reach: On average, each post receives 5 757 views. Within the first day, a publication typically gains 1 764 views.
  • Reactions and interaction: The audience actively supports content: the average number of reactions per post is 12.
  • Thematic interests: Content is focused on key topics such as cve-2025, exploit, rat, trojan, bypass.

πŸ“ Description and content policy

The author describes the resource as a platform for expressing subjective opinions:
β€œMobile cybersecurity channel Links: https://linktr.ee/mobilehacker Contact: mobilehackerofficial@gmail.com”

Thanks to the high frequency of updates (latest data received on 19 June, 2026), the channel maintains relevance and a high level of publication reach. Analytics show that the audience actively interacts with content, making it an important point of influence in the Technologies & Applications category.

43 914
Subscribers
-124 hours
+827 days
+19230 days
Posts Archive
Brute forcing Android app's PIN using Frida to bypass bank's 2FA and get authorization token https://www.corellium.com/blog/frida-brute-forcing-pins-mobile-pentest

Massive Mobile Security Framework (MMSF) A mobile open-source framework that combines functionalities from frida, objection, drozer, reflutter and more for iOS and Android app analysis Info: https://securitycafe.ro/2023/09/18/mobile-pentesting-101-introducing-to-mmsf-massive-mobile-security-framework/ Download: https://github.com/St3v3nsS/MMSF

Android trojan masquerade as an Iranian online trading platform https://news.drweb.com/show/?i=14748&lng=en

Android App Pin Security Issue Allows Unauthorized Payments via Google Wallet even with enabled "Require device unlock for NFC" option (CVE-2023-35671) While in pinned mode, all other apps become temporarily inaccessible, except Google Wallet. PoC: https://github.com/MrTiz/CVE-2023-35671

From ERMAC to Hook: Investigating the technical differences between two Android malware variants https://research.nccgroup.com/2023/09/11/from-ermac-to-hook-investigating-the-technical-differences-between-two-android-malware-variants/

Useful tutorial on how to port Kali NetHunter (including custom Kernel) to unsupported "Essential Phone" https://odysee.com/@z2rec:1/how-i-ported-kali-nethunter-to-unsupported-device:c

New 0-click exploit chain discovered targeting iOS devices delivers Pegasus Spyware Exploit chain was capable of compromising iPhones (iOS 16.6) without any user interaction. The device is compromised just by receiving malicious image in iMessage (CVE-2023-41064, CVE-2023-41061). ➑️ Update your iOS devices https://citizenlab.ca/2023/09/blastpass-nso-group-iphone-zero-click-zero-day-exploit-captured-in-the-wild/

How to spoof iOS devices with Bluetooth pairing messages using Android https://www.mobile-hacker.com/2023/09/07/spoof-ios-devices-with-bluetooth-pairing-messages-using-android/

Android.Pandora trojans (ancestor of Linux Mirai trojan) compromise Android devices, either during firmware updates or when applications for viewing pirated video content are installed https://news.drweb.com/show/?i=14743&lng=en

Video explanation on a bug discovered in PayPal Business Android app how it was possible to steal authentication token to takeover victim account https://youtu.be/AoSvq9v8kvY?si=shOkn5aq_mXrhlu3

Account takeover using PIN brute-force BillPoint app didn't use brute-force PIN protection, which allowed attacker to gain unauthorized access to any user account simply by knowing their email https://medium.com/@hackedbyeldee/account-takeover-on-billpoint-co-mobile-app-9cc3aedd92b

Infamous Chisel: Detailed analysis of each component associated with Sandworm APT group designed to enable remote access and exfiltrate information from Android phones https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/infamous-chisel/NCSC-MAR-Infamous-Chisel.pdf

How to port custom build of Kali Nethunter to an unsupported phone (Xiaomi Poco X3 NFC) and compile custom Kernel with support for TP-LINK W722N V2/V3 (RTL8812AU drivers) https://r0ttenbeef.github.io/Port-Custom-Build-of-Kali-Nethunter-to-an-Unsupported-Phone-Walkthrough/

Bypassing Hardened Android Application available on the Play Store -Root Detection Check in Native Java code and in React Native file -Emulator Check -Frida Running Check -SSL Pinning Bypass https://notsosecure.com/bypassing-hardened-android-applications

Trojanized Signal and Telegram apps were discovered on Google Play and Galaxy Store Patched Signal is the first documented case of spying on a victim’s Signal communications by secretly autolinking the compromised device to attacker’s Signal device https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/badbazaar-espionage-tool-targets-android-users-trojanized-signal-telegram-apps/

Obfuscating Android Apps with Native Code The presentation explores writing Android applications in purely native code to obfuscate app flow-of-control Resources: https://github.com/LaurieWired/AndroidPurelyNative_Troopers23 Presentation: https://youtu.be/wayMcQQZV1U?si=UJ6m_6jogtzcnNBF

Mobile Malware Analysis Part 2 – MasterFred https://8ksec.io/mobile-malware-analysis-part-2-masterfred/

Technical Analysis of Multi-layered Obfuscation Techniques in AndroidManifest.xml Aimed at Evading Static Analysis https://www.liansecurity.com/#/main/news/H_NoQIoBE2npFSfF-iQ5/detail