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Android Security & Malware

Android Security & Malware

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📈 Análisis del canal de Telegram Android Security & Malware

El canal Android Security & Malware (@androidmalware) en el segmento lingüístico de Inglés es un actor destacado. Actualmente la comunidad reúne a 43 914 suscriptores, ocupando la posición 3 070 en la categoría Tecnologías y Aplicaciones y el puesto 723 en la región EEUU.

📊 Métricas de audiencia y dinámica

Desde su creación el невідомо, el proyecto ha mostrado un crecimiento acelerado, reuniendo a 43 914 suscriptores.

Según los últimos datos del 18 junio, 2026, el canal mantiene una actividad estable. En los últimos 30 días la variación de miembros fue de 192, y en las últimas 24 horas de -1, conservando un alto alcance.

  • Estado de verificación: No verificado
  • Tasa de interacción (ER): El promedio de interacción de la audiencia es 13.11%. Durante las primeras 24 horas tras publicar, el contenido suele obtener 4.02% de reacciones respecto al total de suscriptores.
  • Alcance de las publicaciones: Cada publicación recibe en promedio 5 757 visualizaciones. En el primer día suele acumular 1 764 visualizaciones.
  • Reacciones e interacción: La audiencia responde de forma activa: el promedio de reacciones por publicación es 12.
  • Intereses temáticos: El contenido se centra en temas clave como cve-2025, exploit, rat, trojan, bypass.

📝 Descripción y política de contenido

El autor describe el recurso como un espacio para expresar opiniones subjetivas:
Mobile cybersecurity channel Links: https://linktr.ee/mobilehacker Contact: mobilehackerofficial@gmail.com

Gracias a la alta frecuencia de actualizaciones (últimos datos recibidos el 19 junio, 2026), el canal mantiene la vigencia y un amplio alcance. La analítica demuestra que la audiencia interactúa activamente con el contenido, lo que lo convierte en un punto de referencia dentro de la categoría Tecnologías y Aplicaciones.

43 914
Suscriptores
-124 horas
+827 días
+19230 días
Archivo de publicaciones
Brute forcing Android app's PIN using Frida to bypass bank's 2FA and get authorization token https://www.corellium.com/blog/frida-brute-forcing-pins-mobile-pentest

Massive Mobile Security Framework (MMSF) A mobile open-source framework that combines functionalities from frida, objection, drozer, reflutter and more for iOS and Android app analysis Info: https://securitycafe.ro/2023/09/18/mobile-pentesting-101-introducing-to-mmsf-massive-mobile-security-framework/ Download: https://github.com/St3v3nsS/MMSF

Android trojan masquerade as an Iranian online trading platform https://news.drweb.com/show/?i=14748&lng=en

Android App Pin Security Issue Allows Unauthorized Payments via Google Wallet even with enabled "Require device unlock for NFC" option (CVE-2023-35671) While in pinned mode, all other apps become temporarily inaccessible, except Google Wallet. PoC: https://github.com/MrTiz/CVE-2023-35671

From ERMAC to Hook: Investigating the technical differences between two Android malware variants https://research.nccgroup.com/2023/09/11/from-ermac-to-hook-investigating-the-technical-differences-between-two-android-malware-variants/

Useful tutorial on how to port Kali NetHunter (including custom Kernel) to unsupported "Essential Phone" https://odysee.com/@z2rec:1/how-i-ported-kali-nethunter-to-unsupported-device:c

New 0-click exploit chain discovered targeting iOS devices delivers Pegasus Spyware Exploit chain was capable of compromising iPhones (iOS 16.6) without any user interaction. The device is compromised just by receiving malicious image in iMessage (CVE-2023-41064, CVE-2023-41061). ➡️ Update your iOS devices https://citizenlab.ca/2023/09/blastpass-nso-group-iphone-zero-click-zero-day-exploit-captured-in-the-wild/

How to spoof iOS devices with Bluetooth pairing messages using Android https://www.mobile-hacker.com/2023/09/07/spoof-ios-devices-with-bluetooth-pairing-messages-using-android/

Android.Pandora trojans (ancestor of Linux Mirai trojan) compromise Android devices, either during firmware updates or when applications for viewing pirated video content are installed https://news.drweb.com/show/?i=14743&lng=en

Video explanation on a bug discovered in PayPal Business Android app how it was possible to steal authentication token to takeover victim account https://youtu.be/AoSvq9v8kvY?si=shOkn5aq_mXrhlu3

Account takeover using PIN brute-force BillPoint app didn't use brute-force PIN protection, which allowed attacker to gain unauthorized access to any user account simply by knowing their email https://medium.com/@hackedbyeldee/account-takeover-on-billpoint-co-mobile-app-9cc3aedd92b

Infamous Chisel: Detailed analysis of each component associated with Sandworm APT group designed to enable remote access and exfiltrate information from Android phones https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/infamous-chisel/NCSC-MAR-Infamous-Chisel.pdf

How to port custom build of Kali Nethunter to an unsupported phone (Xiaomi Poco X3 NFC) and compile custom Kernel with support for TP-LINK W722N V2/V3 (RTL8812AU drivers) https://r0ttenbeef.github.io/Port-Custom-Build-of-Kali-Nethunter-to-an-Unsupported-Phone-Walkthrough/

Bypassing Hardened Android Application available on the Play Store -Root Detection Check in Native Java code and in React Native file -Emulator Check -Frida Running Check -SSL Pinning Bypass https://notsosecure.com/bypassing-hardened-android-applications

Trojanized Signal and Telegram apps were discovered on Google Play and Galaxy Store Patched Signal is the first documented case of spying on a victim’s Signal communications by secretly autolinking the compromised device to attacker’s Signal device https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/badbazaar-espionage-tool-targets-android-users-trojanized-signal-telegram-apps/

Obfuscating Android Apps with Native Code The presentation explores writing Android applications in purely native code to obfuscate app flow-of-control Resources: https://github.com/LaurieWired/AndroidPurelyNative_Troopers23 Presentation: https://youtu.be/wayMcQQZV1U?si=UJ6m_6jogtzcnNBF

Mobile Malware Analysis Part 2 – MasterFred https://8ksec.io/mobile-malware-analysis-part-2-masterfred/

Technical Analysis of Multi-layered Obfuscation Techniques in AndroidManifest.xml Aimed at Evading Static Analysis https://www.liansecurity.com/#/main/news/H_NoQIoBE2npFSfF-iQ5/detail

Android Security & Malware - Estadísticas y analítica del canal de Telegram @androidmalware