The NATO Summit on July 7-8, 2026, in Ankara took place against the backdrop of two wars: Russia's war against Ukraine, now in its fifth year, and the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran.
As leaders gathered for dinner at Erdoğan's presidential palace, the United States struck more than eighty targets in Iran and reimposed oil sanctions following attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. During those same days, Russia launched one of its largest aerial attacks on Ukraine: Kyiv and Kyiv region were struck by dozens of ballistic and cruise missiles, Zircon missiles, and hundreds of drones. In the span of a week, two such attacks killed more than seventy people.
The final declaration was agreed upon before the summit even opened - no one wanted to risk negotiations in President Trump's presence. The document reaffirms an "ironclad commitment" to Article 5, identifies Russia as a long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security, and establishes a new formula: "a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO."
Mark Rutte calls this "NATO 3.0" - an Alliance that is gradually assuming greater responsibility while remaining grounded on American involvement.
Ukraine was promised €70 billion in military support annually in 2026 and 2027. However, this figure looks convincing only at first glance. It is not a new aid package, but a combination of commitments already made, including the defense component of the EU loan (€28.3 billion in 2026) and bilateral programs by individual countries. The United States did not join this financial commitment. Ahead of the summit, Italy even proposed removing the reference to support through the end of 2027, arguing that a rigid timeline could complicate a political settlement; however, no consensus was reached on this change.
This is where Ankara's central contradiction became clear. The problem of European security today is defined less by political declarations than by resources.
According to CSIS estimates, the war with Iran cost the United States around 45% of its stockpile of critical Patriot interceptors and more than half of its THAAD stockpile. In just three days of fighting, more than 800 Patriot missiles were used - more than Ukraine has received since the start of the full-scale war. Replenishing these stockpiles will take between one and four years. For Ukraine, this is not an abstract problem concerning American arsenals, but a direct shortage of the missiles needed to intercept Russian ballistic missiles right now.
At the same time, the United States continues to reduce its military presence in Europe. Since October 2025, Washington has announced the withdrawal of between nine and thirteen thousand troops, and in the spring informed allies that it was reducing its contribution to the NATO Force Model - the system of forces assigned to the Alliance's defense plans. Some of the U.S. forces on which these plans relied are no longer part of them. This means that defense scenarios for the eastern flank will have to be revised before Europe has time to compensate for the loss of American capabilities.
Europe's response has been money. All 32 NATO members have already reached the minimum threshold of 2% of GDP, while some countries plan to reach 5% well ahead of the established deadline. Notably, the U.S. military budget for 2026 amounts to around 3.3% of GDP - below the level Washington demands of its allies.
Financial commitments are beginning to translate into production. NATO is launching a large-scale counter-drone defense program, procuring new airborne early warning and control aircraft and unmanned systems, while Lockheed Martin and Rheinmetall have agreed to localize ATACMS missile production in Germany - the first time American ballistic missiles will be manufactured outside the United States. This is a strategically important step that signals the gradual shift of defense production to Europe.