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APT

APT

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This channel discusses: — Offensive Security — RedTeam — Malware Research — OSINT — etc Disclaimer: t.me/APT_Notes/6 Chat Link: t.me/APT_Notes_PublicChat

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📈 Аналитический обзор Telegram-канала APT

Канал APT (@apt_notes) языкового сегмента Английский является активным участником. Сейчас сообщество объединяет 17 243 подписчиков, занимая 7 536 место в категории Технологии и приложения и 38 103 место в регионе Россия.

📊 Показатели аудитории и динамика

С момента создания невідомо проект демонстрирует стремительный рост, собрав аудиторию из 17 243 подписчиков.

Согласно последним данным от 31 октября, 2026, канал показывает стабильную активность. За последние 30 дней изменение числа участников составило 487, а за последние 24 часа — 13, при этом общий охват остаётся высоким.

  • Статус верификации: Не верифицирован
  • Уровень вовлечённости (ER): Средний показатель вовлечённости аудитории составляет 44.23%. В первые 24 часа после публикации контент обычно набирает N/A% реакций от общего числа подписчиков.
  • Охват публикаций: В среднем каждый пост получает 0 просмотров. В течение первых суток публикация набирает 0 просмотров.
  • Реакции и взаимодействия: Аудитория активно поддерживает контент: среднее количество реакций на один пост — 0.

📝 Описание и контентная политика

Автор описывает ресурс как площадку для выражения субъективного мнения:
“This channel discusses: — Offensive Security — RedTeam — Malware Research — OSINT — etc Disclaimer: t.me/APT_Notes/6 Chat Link: t.me/APT_Notes_PublicChat”

Благодаря высокой частоте обновлений (последние данные получены 01 ноября, 2026) канал поддерживает актуальность и высокий уровень охвата публикаций. Аналитика показывает, что аудитория активно взаимодействует с контентом, что делает его важной точкой влияния в категории Технологии и приложения.

17 243
Подписчики
+1324 часа
+1207 дней
+48730 дней
Архив постов
APT
17 240
Suspicious Named Pipe Events https://medium.com/falconforce/falconfriday-suspicious-named-pipe-events-0xff1b-fe475d7ebd8 #windows #pipe #events #blueteam #redteam

APT
17 240
AWS IAM explained for RedTeam & BlueTeam https://infosecwriteups.com/aws-iam-explained-for-red-and-blue-teams-2dda8b20fbf7 #aws #iam #redteam #blueteam

APT
17 240
Password Hash Cracking in AWS https://www.sans.org/blog/password-hash-cracking-amazon-web-services/ #aws #cuda #hashcat

APT
17 240
Bypass EDR with Microsoft Teams Copy payload into: %userprofile%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\ Then: %userprofile%\A
Bypass EDR with Microsoft Teams Copy payload into: %userprofile%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\ Then: %userprofile%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\Update.exe --processStart payload.exe --process-start-args "args" #edr #evasion #teams

APT
17 240
Domain Escalation — ShadowCoerce (MS-FSRVP) Coercing the domain controller machine account to authenticate to a host which is
Domain Escalation — ShadowCoerce (MS-FSRVP) Coercing the domain controller machine account to authenticate to a host which is under the control of a threat actor could lead to domain compromise. The most notable technique which involves coerced authentication is the PetitPotam attack which uses the Encrypting File System Remote Protocol (MS-EFSR). However, this is not the only protocol which could be utilized for domain escalation. Research: https://pentestlaboratories.com/2022/01/11/shadowcoerce/ PoC: https://github.com/ShutdownRepo/ShadowCoerce #ad #escalation #relay #redteam

APT
17 240
Log4jHorizon A proof of concept for VMWare Horizon instances and allows attackers to execute code as an unauthenticated user
Log4jHorizon A proof of concept for VMWare Horizon instances and allows attackers to execute code as an unauthenticated user using a single HTTP request. Research: https://www.sprocketsecurity.com/blog/crossing-the-log4j-horizon-a-vulnerability-with-no-return Exploit: https://github.com/puzzlepeaches/Log4jHorizon #log4j #vmware #horizon #rce

APT
17 240
Important Windows processes for Threat Hunting https://www.socinvestigation.com/important-windows-processes-for-threat-hunting/ #edr #detection #forensic #process

APT
17 240
Malicious PDF Generator Generate ten different malicious pdf files with phone-home functionality. Can be used with Burp Collaborator. https://github.com/pussycat0x/malicious-pdf #pdf #payload #burp #collaborator

APT
17 240
Deep Technical Analysis of an Office RCE Exploit https://billdemirkapi.me/unpacking-cve-2021-40444-microsoft-office-rce/ #off
Deep Technical Analysis of an Office RCE Exploit https://billdemirkapi.me/unpacking-cve-2021-40444-microsoft-office-rce/ #office #rce #cve_2021_40444

APT
17 240
Domain Domination With Windows Shortcuts This article on malicious shortcut files and how they can be leveraged to capture NTLM hashes quietly and dominate a network or domain. https://medium.com/cybersecpadawan/domain-domination-with-windows-shortcuts-6aab1d72b793 #shortcuts #lnk #abuse #windows

APT
17 240
EDR Parallel-asis through Analysis New method for enumerating Syscalls numbers using the Parallel loader Research: https://ww
EDR Parallel-asis through Analysis New method for enumerating Syscalls numbers using the Parallel loader Research: https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2022/01/edr-parallel-asis-through-analysis/ C++ Code Snipped: https://github.com/mdsecactivebreach/ParallelSyscalls C# Code Snipped: https://github.com/cube0x0/ParallelSyscalls #edr #evasion #parallel #csharp

APT
17 240
Optimizing Windows Function Resolving: A Case Study Into GetProcAddress https://phasetw0.com/windows-internals/optimizing_function_resolving/ #edr #evasion #winapi #getprocaddress

APT
17 240
RemoteNET This library lets you examine, create and interact with remote objects in other .NET processes. It's like System.Runtime.Remoting except the other app doesn't need to be compiled (or consent) to support it. Basically this library lets you mess with objects of any other .NET app without asking for permissions https://github.com/theXappy/RemoteNET #csharp #injection #pentest

APT
17 240
Process Injection via KernelCallBackTable Process injection via the KernelCallBackTable involves replacing original callback
Process Injection via KernelCallBackTable Process injection via the KernelCallBackTable involves replacing original callback function by custom payload so that whenever the function is invoked, payload will be triggered. In this case the fnCOPYDATA callback function has been used. C# Code Snippet: https://gist.github.com/sbasu7241/5dd8c278762c6305b4b2009d44d60c13 #edr #evasion #dll #injection #kernelcallbacktable

APT
17 240
Domain Persistence – AdminSDHolder https://pentestlab.blog/2022/01/04/domain-persistence-adminsdholder/ #ad #adminsdholder #redteam

APT
17 240
An ‘Attack Path’ Mapping Approach to CVEs 2021-42287 and 2021-42278 This post provides Splunk SPL queries for detecting the attacks described in Charlie’s blog, using only Windows Security Log events from a domain controller. Furthermore, this post only examines a subset of the Windows Event logging data source https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/an-attack-path-mapping-approach-to-cves-2021-42287-and-2021-42278 #ad #pac #s4u2self #research #escalation

APT
17 240
Bypass Defender AV static detection: If you name a malicious file *.log Defender doesn't scan it. UPD: DumpStack (by any file
Bypass Defender AV static detection: If you name a malicious file *.log Defender doesn't scan it. UPD: DumpStack (by any file number) can bypass MDE easily with no detection as mimikatz or eicar mode. The malicious file can be shown in the console but not identified as malicious. #defender #evasion #tricks

APT
17 240
Phishing With Spoofed Cloud Attachments This article looks at how you can abuse the cloud attachment feature on O365 to make
Phishing With Spoofed Cloud Attachments This article looks at how you can abuse the cloud attachment feature on O365 to make executables (or any other file types) appear as harmless attachments. https://mrd0x.com/phishing-o365-spoofed-cloud-attachments/ #phishing #O365 #abuse

APT
17 240
Undetected Azure AD Bruteforce Attack In late June 2021, Secureworks Counter Threat Unit researchers discovered a flaw in the
Undetected Azure AD Bruteforce Attack In late June 2021, Secureworks Counter Threat Unit researchers discovered a flaw in the protocol used by the Azure Active Directory Seamless Single Sign-On feature. This flaw allows threat actors to perform single-factor brute-force attacks against Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) without generating sign-in events in the targeted organization’s tenant. PoC: https://github.com/treebuilder/aad-sso-enum-brute-spray Research: https://www.secureworks.com/research/undetected-azure-active-directory-brute-force-attacks #sso #azure #ad #bruteforce #research