es
Feedback
APT

APT

Ir al canal en Telegram

This channel discusses: — Offensive Security — RedTeam — Malware Research — OSINT — etc Disclaimer: t.me/APT_Notes/6 Chat Link: t.me/APT_Notes_PublicChat

Mostrar más
Rusia40 343Tecnologías y Aplicaciones7 759

📈 Análisis del canal de Telegram APT

El canal APT (@apt_notes) en el segmento lingüístico de Inglés es un actor destacado. Actualmente la comunidad reúne a 16 259 suscriptores, ocupando la posición 7 759 en la categoría Tecnologías y Aplicaciones y el puesto 40 343 en la región Rusia.

📊 Métricas de audiencia y dinámica

Desde su creación el невідомо, el proyecto ha mostrado un crecimiento acelerado, reuniendo a 16 259 suscriptores.

Según los últimos datos del 31 agosto, 2026, el canal mantiene una actividad estable. En los últimos 30 días la variación de miembros fue de 546, y en las últimas 24 horas de 11, conservando un alto alcance.

  • Estado de verificación: No verificado
  • Tasa de interacción (ER): El promedio de interacción de la audiencia es 40.49%. Durante las primeras 24 horas tras publicar, el contenido suele obtener 18.06% de reacciones respecto al total de suscriptores.
  • Alcance de las publicaciones: Cada publicación recibe en promedio 6 579 visualizaciones. En el primer día suele acumular 2 934 visualizaciones.
  • Reacciones e interacción: La audiencia responde de forma activa: el promedio de reacciones por publicación es 26.

📝 Descripción y política de contenido

El autor describe el recurso como un espacio para expresar opiniones subjetivas:
“This channel discusses: — Offensive Security — RedTeam — Malware Research — OSINT — etc Disclaimer: t.me/APT_Notes/6 Chat Link: t.me/APT_Notes_PublicChat”

Gracias a la alta frecuencia de actualizaciones (últimos datos recibidos el 01 septiembre, 2026), el canal mantiene la vigencia y un amplio alcance. La analítica demuestra que la audiencia interactúa activamente con el contenido, lo que lo convierte en un punto de referencia dentro de la categoría Tecnologías y Aplicaciones.

16 259
Suscriptores
+1124 horas
+927 días
+54630 días
Archivo de publicaciones
APT
APT
16 267
Suspicious Named Pipe Events https://medium.com/falconforce/falconfriday-suspicious-named-pipe-events-0xff1b-fe475d7ebd8 #windows #pipe #events #blueteam #redteam

APT
APT
16 267
AWS IAM explained for RedTeam & BlueTeam https://infosecwriteups.com/aws-iam-explained-for-red-and-blue-teams-2dda8b20fbf7 #aws #iam #redteam #blueteam

APT
APT
16 267

APT
APT
16 267
Password Hash Cracking in AWS https://www.sans.org/blog/password-hash-cracking-amazon-web-services/ #aws #cuda #hashcat

APT
APT
16 267
Bypass EDR with Microsoft Teams Copy payload into: %userprofile%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\ Then: %userprofile%\A
Bypass EDR with Microsoft Teams Copy payload into: %userprofile%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\ Then: %userprofile%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\Update.exe --processStart payload.exe --process-start-args "args" #edr #evasion #teams

APT
APT
16 267
Domain Escalation — ShadowCoerce (MS-FSRVP) Coercing the domain controller machine account to authenticate to a host which is
Domain Escalation — ShadowCoerce (MS-FSRVP) Coercing the domain controller machine account to authenticate to a host which is under the control of a threat actor could lead to domain compromise. The most notable technique which involves coerced authentication is the PetitPotam attack which uses the Encrypting File System Remote Protocol (MS-EFSR). However, this is not the only protocol which could be utilized for domain escalation. Research: https://pentestlaboratories.com/2022/01/11/shadowcoerce/ PoC: https://github.com/ShutdownRepo/ShadowCoerce #ad #escalation #relay #redteam

APT
APT
16 267
Log4jHorizon A proof of concept for VMWare Horizon instances and allows attackers to execute code as an unauthenticated user
Log4jHorizon A proof of concept for VMWare Horizon instances and allows attackers to execute code as an unauthenticated user using a single HTTP request. Research: https://www.sprocketsecurity.com/blog/crossing-the-log4j-horizon-a-vulnerability-with-no-return Exploit: https://github.com/puzzlepeaches/Log4jHorizon #log4j #vmware #horizon #rce

APT
APT
16 267
Important Windows processes for Threat Hunting https://www.socinvestigation.com/important-windows-processes-for-threat-hunting/ #edr #detection #forensic #process

APT
APT
16 267
Malicious PDF Generator Generate ten different malicious pdf files with phone-home functionality. Can be used with Burp Collaborator. https://github.com/pussycat0x/malicious-pdf #pdf #payload #burp #collaborator

APT
APT
16 267
Deep Technical Analysis of an Office RCE Exploit https://billdemirkapi.me/unpacking-cve-2021-40444-microsoft-office-rce/ #off
Deep Technical Analysis of an Office RCE Exploit https://billdemirkapi.me/unpacking-cve-2021-40444-microsoft-office-rce/ #office #rce #cve_2021_40444

APT
APT
16 267
Domain Domination With Windows Shortcuts This article on malicious shortcut files and how they can be leveraged to capture NTLM hashes quietly and dominate a network or domain. https://medium.com/cybersecpadawan/domain-domination-with-windows-shortcuts-6aab1d72b793 #shortcuts #lnk #abuse #windows

APT
APT
16 267
EDR Parallel-asis through Analysis New method for enumerating Syscalls numbers using the Parallel loader Research: https://ww
EDR Parallel-asis through Analysis New method for enumerating Syscalls numbers using the Parallel loader Research: https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2022/01/edr-parallel-asis-through-analysis/ C++ Code Snipped: https://github.com/mdsecactivebreach/ParallelSyscalls C# Code Snipped: https://github.com/cube0x0/ParallelSyscalls #edr #evasion #parallel #csharp

APT
APT
16 267
Optimizing Windows Function Resolving: A Case Study Into GetProcAddress https://phasetw0.com/windows-internals/optimizing_function_resolving/ #edr #evasion #winapi #getprocaddress

APT
APT
16 267
RemoteNET This library lets you examine, create and interact with remote objects in other .NET processes. It's like System.Runtime.Remoting except the other app doesn't need to be compiled (or consent) to support it. Basically this library lets you mess with objects of any other .NET app without asking for permissions https://github.com/theXappy/RemoteNET #csharp #injection #pentest

APT
APT
16 267
Process Injection via KernelCallBackTable Process injection via the KernelCallBackTable involves replacing original callback
Process Injection via KernelCallBackTable Process injection via the KernelCallBackTable involves replacing original callback function by custom payload so that whenever the function is invoked, payload will be triggered. In this case the fnCOPYDATA callback function has been used. C# Code Snippet: https://gist.github.com/sbasu7241/5dd8c278762c6305b4b2009d44d60c13 #edr #evasion #dll #injection #kernelcallbacktable

APT
APT
16 267
Domain Persistence – AdminSDHolder https://pentestlab.blog/2022/01/04/domain-persistence-adminsdholder/ #ad #adminsdholder #redteam

APT
APT
16 267
An ‘Attack Path’ Mapping Approach to CVEs 2021-42287 and 2021-42278 This post provides Splunk SPL queries for detecting the attacks described in Charlie’s blog, using only Windows Security Log events from a domain controller. Furthermore, this post only examines a subset of the Windows Event logging data source https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/an-attack-path-mapping-approach-to-cves-2021-42287-and-2021-42278 #ad #pac #s4u2self #research #escalation

APT
APT
16 267
Bypass Defender AV static detection: If you name a malicious file *.log Defender doesn't scan it. UPD: DumpStack (by any file
Bypass Defender AV static detection: If you name a malicious file *.log Defender doesn't scan it. UPD: DumpStack (by any file number) can bypass MDE easily with no detection as mimikatz or eicar mode. The malicious file can be shown in the console but not identified as malicious. #defender #evasion #tricks

APT
APT
16 267
Phishing With Spoofed Cloud Attachments This article looks at how you can abuse the cloud attachment feature on O365 to make
Phishing With Spoofed Cloud Attachments This article looks at how you can abuse the cloud attachment feature on O365 to make executables (or any other file types) appear as harmless attachments. https://mrd0x.com/phishing-o365-spoofed-cloud-attachments/ #phishing #O365 #abuse

APT
APT
16 267
Undetected Azure AD Bruteforce Attack In late June 2021, Secureworks Counter Threat Unit researchers discovered a flaw in the
Undetected Azure AD Bruteforce Attack In late June 2021, Secureworks Counter Threat Unit researchers discovered a flaw in the protocol used by the Azure Active Directory Seamless Single Sign-On feature. This flaw allows threat actors to perform single-factor brute-force attacks against Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) without generating sign-in events in the targeted organization’s tenant. PoC: https://github.com/treebuilder/aad-sso-enum-brute-spray Research: https://www.secureworks.com/research/undetected-azure-active-directory-brute-force-attacks #sso #azure #ad #bruteforce #research