Election Data Analyzer

Election machines wireless communication (cont’d) Pro V&V did not test D-Suite5.5 against Section 7.7 of VVSG1.0 Wireless Communication due to an evaluation described in the VSTL Table 4.1.1. Table 4.1.1 is an evaluation of Non-Applicable Requirements. “No wireless technology is utilized in this system.” I think the word “utilized” is important to note. The VSTL does not say “exist”. In other words, it could say: “No wireless technology exists in this system.” But there is no claim of that…. My question to the VSTL would be, have you reviewed Mesa County reports 1, 2 and 3 in which they prove wireless technology does in fact “exist” and can be hacked? https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/28/VVSG.1.0_Volume_1.PDF https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/voting_system/files/Dominion_Voting_Systems_D-Suite_5.5_Test_Plan_Rev_C.pdf

Mark the 20th and 21st of August on your calendar and keep them open. There will be a ton happening those days around the release of the "Selection Code" movie, which stars the Lone Raccoon. I don't know if they agree but I am sticking with my story. I will be heavily involved in the live broadcasts on Frank Speech those days as will many other patriots. Start working on the people you know who are on the fence. This will be our last, best, and most successful opportunity to convince them. If you think you already know everything... with respect, you are wrong:-) This will be different than anything that came before. But we need eyes on. We need the court of public opinion to be fully in session. Duct taping people in chairs in front of the TV or monitor is acceptible.

Election machines wireless communication The latest standard being used by VSTL’s to test election machines is from 2005 VVSG 1.0. Chapter 7 concerns “Wireless Communications”. Wait, what? How much more obvious could it be folks? VVSG 1.0 does not say wireless communication is prohibited. It simply goes through a series a requirements that must be tested against to ensure any wireless communication is secure, simply put. Election fraud deniers, let’s stop pretending these machines cannot be hooked up to internet. The EAC standard says otherwise. The VSTL’s Test Plans use Chapter 7 as testing criteria. https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/28/VVSG.1.0_Volume_1.PDF

Election Machine “Change Management” In private industry we have something called change management or change control when it comes to deploying new IT software. The table quantifies the amount of “change” combined amongst all the election machine vendors that has occurred since 2017. Col 1 is the product name. Col 2 is the company. Col 3 is the number of instances where the EAC claims certified election machines are used in a jurisdiction, like a county or parish for each product. Col 4 are the number of engineering change orders “processed” by EAC per company since 2017. Col 5 is [col 3 x col 4] which would be the maximum # of deployments or “trusted builds”. Our election officials must have the capacity to manage the deployment of at most 57,087 updates since 2017. Does that inspire confidence in the election apparatus? https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/certified-voting-systems https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/engineering-change-orders

Those of you who work in private industry will understand this concept. Software vendors look to customers to define user requirements or user stories depending on your approach. It is not up to the vendor to define the user requirements. The customer understands their process better than the vendor. Who are the users w/r to elections? We are. But, we (s)elected people to represent us as the users in this case. So, it is up to the elected officials to define user requirements. But the elected officials not only don’t define user requirements, they don’t understand the actual election machine products they purchase. The election machine companies decide what the machines should do and hand it off to a test lab to verify it does what the machine companies thinks it needs to do. The elected officials just want a “certification” from someone telling them everything is OK. I can certify that through a test that a car does not have a steering wheel if the car manufacturer tells me is has auto-pilot. Does that make it a good idea?

Machine “Enhancements” From a voter perspective, I want to know why these things are a good idea? D-Suite does these things, but who get’s to decide we WANT to do these things? Modify a configuration file for ImageCast X (DRE VVPAT/DRE Reports Printer/BMD) Ability for the application to program the USB Flash Device with necessary resources used for setting up an ImageCast X voting device. Ability to add “strike through" text on ballots Ability for ICP/ICC tabulator platform to implement the straight party logic which takes into account multi-party affiliated voting box Ability to break-down results per precinct for consolidated ballots, when reviewing the contents of Results Files Refactoring of CVR Service to allow for improved performance and reliability during loading, adjudicating and publishing of results The existing CVR export can now be generated in Excel format Ability to remove provisional votes into a separate results batch in order to allow for adjudication of standard results in a batch Ability to choose whether the system automatically deletes any exported files when clearing all results in the database before the election starts to ensure a zero result state. The SOVC report has the ability to suppress the vote results from the report where there is low turnout in order to protect voter privacy. The threshold for suppressing the results is configurable. Adjudication Administrator can now perform tasks on a remote client machine, rather than the server When Continue is selected in the ballot load error dialog, new ballots with load errors are given a Quarantined status, with the note “Automatically Quarantined due to Load Error" Added option to force to ICC to overrun a preset number of ballots every time scanning stops mid-batch Ability to display and record votes for a choice which enables the voter to indicate they do not wish to cast a vote for any of the available choices Ability to limit the number of spoiled ballots

From a voter perspective, I want to know why these things are a good idea? D-Suite does these things, but who get’s to decide we WANT to do these things? Modify a configuration file for ImageCast X (DRE VVPAT/DRE Reports Printer/BMD) Ability for the application to program the USB Flash Device with necessary resources used for setting up an ImageCast X voting device. Ability to add “strike through" text on ballots Ability for ICP/ICC tabulator platform to implement the straight party logic which takes into account multi-party affiliated voting box Ability to break-down results per precinct for consolidated ballots, when reviewing the contents of Results Files Refactoring of CVR Service to allow for improved performance and reliability during loading, adjudicating and publishing of results The existing CVR export can now be generated in Excel format Ability to remove provisional votes into a separate results batch in order to allow for adjudication of standard results in a batch Ability to choose whether the system automatically deletes any exported files when clearing all results in the database before the election starts to ensure a zero result state. The SOVC report has the ability to suppress the vote results from the report where there is low turnout in order to protect voter privacy. The threshold for suppressing the results is configurable. Adjudication Administrator can now perform tasks on a remote client machine, rather than the server When Continue is selected in the ballot load error dialog, new ballots with load errors are given a Quarantined status, with the note “Automatically Quarantined due to Load Error" Added option to force to ICC to overrun a preset number of ballots every time scanning stops mid-batch Ability to display and record votes for a choice which enables the voter to indicate they do not wish to cast a vote for any of the available choices Ability to limit the number of spoiled ballots

Election Machine “Enhancements” Let me make this proposition. A test lab simply tests the software product against the latest set of specifications provided by the vendor. It is not Quality Assurance activity to verify that said changes are a “good” idea. Does “purging” sound like a good idea? It is now part of D-Suite 5.5 taken directly from the test plan. https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/voting_system/files/Dominion_Voting_Systems_D-Suite_5.5_Test_Plan_Rev_C.pdf Ability to bypass adjudication for early voting results. This ability allows an authorized user to choose to skip Adjudication of election results when importing Early Voting election results into the RTR application. This is accomplished by selecting the option to skip adjudication of these results during the results import process. When this option is selected the Early Voting results cannot be adjudicated as the adjudication process is skipped entirely. If the user later wishes to adjudicate the early voting results, the existing results which were not adjudicated must be purged from the database. The user can then import the early voting results from their original sources, choosing not to skip adjudication. At this point the Early Voting results can then be adjudicated.

Test Plan Election Machines Election officials: review this test plan and tell me you understand it as a pre-requisite to “certification”. https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/voting_system/files/Dominion_Voting_Systems_D-Suite_5.5_Test_Plan_Rev_C.pdf Heard of Automated Source Code Review? On page 41, the lab states that a automated source code review will be used. Why is that significant? An automated review relies on yet another software program. That auditing software can be programmed to look for whatever the person configuring it wants to look for. Who is certifying the automated auditing software? Who is doing a code review on THAT? Lastly, this test plan includes ~ 150 software and hardware elements. I would challenge any elected official to tell me they understand it. If they don’t understand it, whose responsibility is it then?

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EAC Election Machine Engineering Change Orders (ECO’s) Have you wondered how many times election machine companies have had to request EAC approval for an engineering change to their election systems since 2017? See the chart I have provided from data scraped from EAC. https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/engineering-change-orders I will be digging into the content of some of the more interesting change orders in coming days. There were only 13 changes processed by EAC between 2010-2016 so about ~ 2/year for all companies based on what is posted on the EAC site. Since 2017……. the ECO’s having streaming in at a rate of 23/year for a total of 139!! Wow, I wonder what all changes are being necessitated by? Maybe the wrong person won in 2016? Just a guess. We will find out soon enough.

For a reminder - here are the plots of total votes over time for the state of PA. We were all wondering why the vote counts went DOWN during the election.

I unveiled this last night. I talk about how bad the Edison data looks... this is a replay of rhe 2020 election in Chester County PA according to Edison/NYT. Turn your sound on :-)

EAC Certified Voting Machine Change Orders I will be digging into this treasure trove of information in the coming days and saying more about it. If you have the inclination, you can dig into it yourself. These are what looks to be 3+ years of election machine change orders processed by EAC. 3 of them were approved just this month in July 2022. https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/engineering-change-orders

Voting Machine EAC Change Order for a Monitor Here is an example of a EAC approved voting machine change order that is 3 weeks old. This vendor requested a swap out of one monitor type for another. https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eoc-documents/ECO%20Analysis%20Form%20100864.pdf Upon closer inspection, the new monitor is this model: https://www.dell.com/en-us/work/shop/dell-24-monitor-p2422h/apd/210-bbcc/monitors-monitor-accessories#techspecs_section Turns out, it has 4 USB ports and a variety of other ports. Do you think the hackers have figured out a way to infiltrate systems via a monitor port? If you said yes, you would be correct. https://thehackernews.com/2016/08/computer-monitor-hack.html The change impacts the Election Management System. Here is the statement form the “testing lab”. "It was determined that the new version will not adversely impact the certified systems; therefore, no testing is required.” I feel better now…LOL.

Decertification…for the machines Did you know there is a formal decertification process for EAC certified voting machines? Chapter 7 of the Voting System Test & Certification Program Manual defines the process. It can be initiated by a voter. https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/28/Certification%20Program%20Manual%20-%20OMB%203265-0004%20-%20Exp%207.31.2017.pdf Here is the EAC director’s information, Mr Jerome Lovato. https://www.eac.gov/eac-welcomes-new-testing-certification-director-jerome-lovato “Jerome: I am excited about the future of election technology in general. In regards to voting technology, the DARPA voting system (by Galois) and the recently announced ElectionGuard project (by Microsoft) are intriguing ventures that I look forward to learning more about.” This does not prohibit a state from using the machines but it certainly would not be a good thing for the machine companies from a PR perspective. Use the EAC decertification process to make your voices heard.

EAC Certified Voting Systems Did you know that only 1,916 of the 3,142 counties (61%) use EAC “certified” machines? https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/system-certification-process 7 different software products are used across these 1,916 counties (or equivalents). Within those 7 different software products, there are 39 versions of software being used in EAC certified counties. # of Software Versions for all Vendors Clear Ballot – 2 versions across 48 instances Dominion – 7 versions across 308 instances Microvote – 2 versions across 48 instances ES&S EVS – 14 versions across 1007 instances Unisys – 6 versions across 239 instances ES&S Unity – 1 version across 11 instances Hart – 8 versions across 255 instances Keep in mind that these are “certified” against standards from 2005 or 2002 (as listed in my prior post). Not to mention that there are 1,226 counties that are not EAC certified. Does this inspire confidence in our election apparatus?

Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 2.0 VVSG 1.0 was approved on 2005, VVSG1.1 was approved in 2015, VVSG 2.0 was approved in 2021. https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/voluntary-voting-system-guidelines Did you know that 72 of the 77 election machine types are “certified” by the testing labs against standards from 2005? The other 5 are certified against a standard from 2002. https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/certified-voting-systems Even the two machines being certified right now are using the 2005 standard. https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/voting-systems-under-test The fact that these machines can’t keep up with the latest standards is telling about how complicated they must be. As a point of reference, the version of windows released in 2005 was Windows XP, Bush was President, and Yahoo was as popular as Google as search engine. Get rid of the machines.