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Channel Posts
| 2 |  +1⁉️What FATF 🇪🇺 should see.
✍UN Designated Jaish-e-Mohammed Terrorists are being provided arms training in several districts of disputed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Flags of JeM are clearly visible in both videos.
✍ Jaish Commanders & Trainers in KPK are using cover of JUI-F to avoid sanctions regime of FATF. Maulana Fazlur Rehman who is heading JUI-F is also involved in these cover up. | 729 |
| 3 | That makes a possible return to HM significant. It is highly plausible that the ISI may again see utility in HM as a vehicle for rebuilding local recruitment and restoring a recognisably Kashmiri face to the militant ecosystem.
One recent indicator deserves attention. “Kashmir Conflict”, an account associated with propaganda supporting TRF, PAFF, ULC and KRA, recently circulated an audio message from Syed Salahuddin condemning remarks by US Ambassador to India Sergio Gor. Other chatter regarding attempts to revive HM has also been noticed.
None of this by itself confirms an operational revival. But after years of trying to replace HM’s local network with proxy brands that never achieved comparable grassroots traction, bringing Salahuddin and Hizbul Mujahideen back into the information space may not be accidental. | 796 |
| 4 | Is Hizbul Mujahideen trying to revive itself in J&K?
To understand why that may be happening, one first needs to understand why the ISI sidelined HM.
HM was once central to Pakistan’s terror ecosystem because of its grassroots network in Kashmir and its links with Jamaat-e-Islami, which provided an important base for local recruitment. But Syed Salahuddin was never considered as pliable as Hafiz Saeed or Masood Azhar. There was also a perception within the ISI that LeT and JeM cadres were better trained and more disciplined than HM’s locally recruited terrorists.
The relationship deteriorated further when the ISI reportedly threatened to choke HM’s finances and weapons supplies after the Salahuddin-led UJC failed to generate widespread protests and terror attacks in Kashmir post abrogation of Article 370. HM was receiving around PKR 3 crore per season from the ISI for operational expenses.
Salahuddin had publicly criticised the ISI on at least four occasions since 2012. The rift deepened after the killing of HM commander Riyaz Naikoo in 2020, when Salahuddin again criticised the ISI at gatherings in PoJK and Rawalpindi.
The ISI’s Kashmir desk subsequently began prioritising LeT, JeM and other Pakistan-based groups while keeping Salahuddin away from important meetings dealing with the post-Article 370 militancy strategy.
In February 2020, ISI officials reportedly met militant commanders at Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi’s residence. Salahuddin was not allowed to participate, while Al Badr chief Bakht Zameen was invited. Al Badr had largely disappeared from Kashmir by the mid-2000s but remained active around the Af-Pak theatre and developed links with the Haqqani network. The meeting reportedly discussed increasing infiltration into J&K and shifting jihadist cadres from Afghanistan towards Kashmir. Indian agencies later reported intercepting Pashto conversations at launch pads in PoJK.
The pressure on Salahuddin allegedly went further. On 25 May 2020, Islamabad’s Deputy Commissioner reported a cylinder blast in an abandoned vehicle in G-10/2, an area reportedly linked to Salahuddin’s residence. The incident was alleged to have been an ISI warning to Salahuddin over his public criticism of the agency.
But Pakistan was facing a larger problem.
Following the killing of Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind chief Zakir Musa, fatigue was increasingly visible among local terrorists while sections of the population were becoming disillusioned with both terrorism and Pakistan. The abrogation of Article 370 was preceded and followed by a massive security deployment, communication restrictions, the suspension of LoC trade, an NIA crackdown on hawala networks and separatist financing, and the MHA ban on Jamaat-e-Islami. Together, these measures significantly disrupted the ecosystem that had supported recruitment, financing and logistics.
Pakistan’s attempt to diplomatically isolate India after Article 370, including with support from Turkey and China, also failed to produce the expected outcome. Pakistan itself remained under FATF scrutiny, while local militant recruitment was declining sharply. With HM increasingly marginalised, the ISI was losing an organisation that historically provided it with an indigenous recruitment base inside Kashmir.
The response shifted towards new front organisations such as TRF, PAFF, KRA, ULC and Kashmir Tigers, alongside attempts to revive older names such as Al Badr and the Jammu and Kashmir Ghaznavi Force. The objective was seemingly twofold. Sustain terrorism through organisations carrying more local or secular-sounding identities, while creating another layer of deniability at a time when Pakistan was facing FATF pressure.
The Jammu theatre was subsequently activated, particularly through PAFF and Kashmir Tigers. But this strategy produced only limited success. Local recruitment continued to decline, terrorism became increasingly dependent on Pakistani terrorists, and these newer organisations failed to develop the kind of grassroots resonance that HM had once possessed. | 732 |
| 5 | 🚨 #UPDATE | Third Eye OSINT & Analysis:
✍️ Reports indicate that the Pakistan military has constructed a series of bunkers near the Combined Military Hospital (CMH) in Rawalpindi, Punjab (near by GHQ) reportedly stocked with up to 30 days of food, water and other essential provisions. The facilities are intended to protect family members of senior military officers in the event of a conflict with India.
✍️ At the same time, there has been reported heavy military transport activity involving China and Turkiye into Pakistan.
✍️ Taken together with the security challenges facing Pakistan’s establishment in Balochistan and PoJK.
✍️ One possibility is that Pakistan’s military establishment could again amplify the familiar “Indian threat” or false-flag narrative to divert domestic attention from internal political, economic and security pressures, including inflation and the continued detention of former PM Imran Khan. Similar narratives have emerged in the aftermath of the Pulwama (2019) and Pahalgam (2025) attacks.
✍️ If these indicators ultimately connect, India could once again be portrayed to the Pakistani public as the convenient external scapegoat, shifting attention away from mounting domestic challenges facing the military establishment and its political allies.
✍️ Another possibility cannot be ruled out: Pakistan could attempt another misadventure against India, whether through a deliberate provocation via its terror proxies. | 765 |
| 6 |  ⚡#PoJKUprising: A video circulating online shows a third-grade student, named Tulba from a school in Rawalakot, Pakistan-occupied Jammu & Kashmir (PoJK), appealing to the overseas community to support the region’s struggle for its rights.
✍️In the video, she questions the Pakistan military’s response to people demanding their rights, alleging that those who raise such demands are labelled as “terrorists” by the Pakistan military. | 771 |
| 7 |  📍Markaz al Qadsia, Lahore
⭐It is considered as pet project of LeT Chief Hafiz Saeed where he use to give sermon even after being imprisoned.
🗓23/08/2026: Senior Leadership of LeT gathered for their meeting and conference. | 918 |
| 8 | ⚠️ Turkey–Pakistan | Military Airlift Raises Questions:
✍A sustained movement of Turkish Air Force C-130 Hercules transport aircraft between Turkey and Pakistan has been observed between August 19 and August 21, with sorties linked to Pakistan’s Nur Khan airbase near Rawalpindi and Masroor airbase in Karachi.
✍According to intelligence inputs cited by media, the unusual frequency of these flights has raised questions over whether the aircraft were carrying military equipment, potentially including drones and associated systems. Sources have also suggested that an HQ-series air-defence system may have been involved.
✍Turkey has become an increasingly important defence partner for Pakistan, including cooperation involving unmanned aerial systems such as the Bayraktar TB2.
✍If confirmed, the latest airlift activity would underscore Pakistan’s accelerating effort to expand its UAV, loitering-munition and air-defence capabilities amid deeper military cooperation with Turkey and other partners.
🫵The key question now is what equipment was actually transferred and how significantly it could strengthen Pakistan’s unmanned warfare capabilities. | 1 041 |
| 9 |  ⁉#BalochistanMovement: Whoever calls Balochistan’s struggle “propaganda” should first feel the pain of those mothers and sisters whose husbands, brothers and sons never returned after being taken captive by the Pakistani military.
✍Forced disappearances, extrajudicial encounters in the name of security and the maligning of an entire public movement as “sponsored” or a “fitna” are a shame in the face of humanity.
✍Behind every missing person is a family waiting, grieving and demanding answers. Silencing their voices does not erase their suffering. | 872 |
| 10 | ⚠️ Pakistan-occupied Jammu Kashmir (PoJK) | Geelani Death Anniversary:
✍Kashmiri separatist organisations in Pakistan are preparing to observe the death anniversary of Hurriyat leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani on September 1.
✍According to reports, rallies, seminars and meetings are being planned across Islamabad, Pakistan-occupied Jammu & Kashmir (PoJK) and Karachi, with these locations expected to serve as key centres for the activities.
✍The planned programmes are likely to highlight Geelani’s loyality to Pakistan and the separatist movement’s position on Jammu & Kashmir, while also providing a platform for affiliated groups (PeHJK, JKSM, JKLC) to mobilise supporters and promote their narrative.
✍The scale and messaging of these events will be closely watched amid the continuing political and security sensitivities surrounding Kashmir. | 916 |
| 11 | ‼️ Balochistan | Allah Nazar Baloch
BLF chief Dr Allah Nazar Baloch has publicly called on India to support the Baloch independence movement, arguing that New Delhi should provide political, diplomatic and moral support and raise the issue at international forums.
In an interview with The Sunday Guardian, he rejected autonomy or a political settlement with Islamabad, saying full independence is the movement’s objective. He also suggested that attacks on foreign companies operating in Balochistan could increase as younger militants adopt new strategies.
The appeal is significant because it shows that elements of the Baloch insurgency are actively seeking external political and diplomatic backing to internationalise their struggle. At the same time, India has consistently rejected Pakistan’s allegations that it sponsors Baloch militant groups. Allah Nazar’s remarks should therefore be understood as a public appeal for Indian support, not evidence that such support currently exists.
The broader point, however, is difficult for Islamabad to dismiss: Pakistan’s own longstanding political and security policies in Balochistan have helped create the grievances and conditions that the insurgency now exploits. External actors may seek to capitalise on the conflict, but that does not erase the internal causes that allowed it to persist.
#Balochistan #BLF #Pakistan #India #Insurgency
https://sundayguardianlive.com/world/allah-nazar-baloch-seeks-indias-support-for-freedom-movement-267677/ | 960 |
| 12 |  +1✍ Funeral Video of Hamza Burhan 22/05/2026 comprasion with Al Badr Chief Bakht Zamin Khan last meeting on 22/04/2026. | 32 |
| 13 |  ✍It was claim that Al Badr Chief Bakht Zamin Khan was spotted in funeral of Hamza Burhan along with Hizbul Chief.
⭐Fact: Bakht Zamin Khan was last spotted in 22nd April 2026. Thereafter, due to internal rivalry between terrorist groups. He was shot dead by Unknown Gunmen in last week of April 2026. | 2 828 |
| 14 |  ❗Proof of Life of JeM Ops Commander Mufti Abdul Rauf Asghar.
🗓Date: 30 March 2026
📍Location: Markaz Usman O Ali, Bahawalpur
⭐Occasion: Funeral of Tahir Anwar, Elder Brother of JeM Chief Maulana Masood Azhar. | 1 045 |
| 15 |  ✍JeM Chief Masood Azhar & his elder brother Late Tahir Anwar picture at the age of 40 Year. They look similar. | 1 068 |
| 16 |  ❗Jaish-e-Mohammed 🇵🇰 Leaders clear picture. | 4 278 |
| 17 |  🚨🇵🇰 JeM Report: Masood Azhar’s absence reportedly reshuffles the group’s Bahawalpur command structure.
Operational control has reportedly shifted to his brothers, Talha Al-Saif and Mohinuddin Aurangzeb, alias Ammar Alvi.
Meanwhile, confirmed sources indicate that Rauf Asghar is very much ALIVE, contradicting earlier reports of his death.
Masood Azhar and Rauf Asghar are reportedly under protection in Nawabshah, Sindh, amid Azhar’s reported health issues.
Details: Wion news and Open source | 575 |
| 18 |  🚨 Pakistan | IIP
A new propaganda production from Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan (IIP), titled “Muslim-e-Khwabeeda Uth!” (“Awaken, O Sleeping Muslim”), has surfaced as Part 1 of a two-part series.
The video combines religious rhetoric with footage of armed fighters, weapons and military-style activity, framing an “Islamic Revolution” in Pakistan as its central theme.
This is consistent with IIP’s broader media strategy, which has increasingly mixed ideological messaging with material depicting militant activity. The group is also part of Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP), alongside Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group and Lashkar-e-Islam.
IIP has additionally been linked in open-source reporting to AQIS and al-Qaeda-associated networks, although the precise nature of those relationships remains contested and should not be overstated. | 1 047 |
| 19 |  ❗Failed Marshal Asim Munir has deployed 3X Companies of Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi for 6 Months.
⭐Bunker Boy & his henchman Mohsin Naqvi is really scared. | 1 263 |
| 20 |  📍An overseas group affiliated with the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) is organizing a protest today from 5:00 PM to 8:00 PM at Times Square, New York, USA against the two months of continuous repression by the Pakistani military in PoJK.
💣Ironically, Ghulam Nabi Fai, a ISI-linked lobbyist in the United States of America (USA), is behind this protest against the Pakistani military. | 3 686 |
