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We of course find this identical formulation also among the Platonist philosophers. The first exhortation of the Golden Verses of Pythagoras says: “First honor the immortal gods, as is established and ordained by the ancestral custom [nomos].” There exists a commentary on the Golden Verses attributed to Proclus and this is what the author has to say about this exhortation:
“The glorification of the gods is effected by true belief in them, and by doing good before them; the true belief about them is that they are good, and the givers of all things; that they do not cause evil; that they are not susceptible to change, because they are absolute, while change is a transition from something to something else, and that they are the knowers of things that truly are, with a knowledge uncontaminated by falsehood.
Doing good varies according to the doer and his position, and so for each different rank there are differences in sacrifices, incense, the use of pigs and wine, and festivals, and so on, and in this matter ancestral ruling is followed; this is what is meant by ‘ancestral custom’ [nomos]. The reason why the rulings of the ancestral customs differ is that they conform to the difference among the minds, beliefs and habitations of men: the ancestral custom of the Athenians was to sacrifice the pig and to make offerings of diluted wine, whereas the Egyptians refuse to sacrifice pigs. These are principles which were obtained from Hermes, who commanded man to abide by the customs of his fathers and ancestors, and to avoid alien practices. In accordance with the disposition of each nation of mankind and its ancestral rule, the usages established by the wise men regarding sacrifice, festivals and incense vary, and they trace back these principles to the gods. This is why if any nation transgresses against its own ancestral custom, it perishes.”
The essence of our tradition can be summed up as follows — to hold correct beliefs about the Gods and to worship them according to one's ancestral tradition. We find this formulation in some of the Stoic authors.
Epictetus, Enchiridion, c. 31:
“The most important aspect of piety toward the gods is certainly both to have correct beliefs about them, as beings that arrange the universe well and justly, and to set yourself to obey them and acquiesce in everything that happens and to follow it willingly, as something brought to completion by the best judgment. For in this way you will never blame the gods or accuse them of neglecting you. [...] it is always appropriate to make libations and sacrifices and give firstfruits according to the custom of one's forefathers, in a manner that is pure and neither slovenly nor careless, nor indeed cheaply nor beyond one's means.”
Chrysippus, Fragments:
“Those who have handed down to us reverence for the gods have done so in three ways: first of all in a physical form [physis], second in a mythical form [mythos], and third in a form that is manifested in norms [nomoi, ancestral customs]; the physical [or natural] form is given expression by philosophers, the mythical by poets, and that involving norms by the ritual practices of individual cities [poleis].”
The physical form, or physis essentially means "things that are" or more broadly "the nature of things" or even "nature of the cosmos." It was the object of study of the natural philosophers. The investigation of physis is on a par with myth and ritual traditions as one of the three modes of knowledge of the Gods. Therefore, we see that there is no real separation between the religious tradition and natural sciences, or sciences concerned with the nature of reality. The cosmos is a result of the activity of the Gods, therefore, its study can help us acquire knowledge about the Gods. The two other modes of knowledge of the Gods are the myths and the ancestral customs.
Stephen A. McNallen, founder of Asatru Folk Assembly, Asatru: A Native European Spirituality, c. 4, "Real, But Different":
"Although there are no polls on the subject, I suspect that most Asatruar today think of myth as metaphor. The ancient stories then become symbolic ways of voicing spiritual truths. This is done on a number of levels, like the layers of an onion.
On the surface, myths are entertaining tales that make a moral point or illustrate virtues like wisdom, sacrifice, bravery, or generosity. They tell us something about the nature of the Gods, and they give us guidance for living our lives.
But there is a deeper level. The myths are true in the sense of 'those things which never happened, but always are.'* The stories of the Gods become allegories and archetypes rather than history. Their meanings can be dissected through intuition and by comparison with related mythologies.
[...]
Even if the myths are metaphor, the Gods and Goddesses are still very real. But this doesn’t mean that Thor is actually a muscular, man-like figure with a red beard, any more than Jehovah is a fatherly figure in a white gown sitting on a golden throne, surrounded by clouds. The description of Thor in the myths gives us a way to relate to the being we call Thor, but it is not him.
* McNallen's note: This quote is attributed to Sallustius, a collaborator of Emperor Julian who wrote a text titled De diis et mundo. Julian vigorously defended Roman paganism against the attacks of Christianity."
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Cases against mythic literalism can be found directly in the Eddic material, i.e. the myths preserved therein and the poetic descriptions that are used to refer to the Gods. For example, in the Lokasęnna [The Flyting of Lock], s. 36, it is related that the God Nearth [Njörðr] has produced children with his sister and thus, if this myth is to be read literally, the God committed an evil act of incest. Yet, in Grímnismǫ́l [The Speeches of Grimner], s. 16, the God is described as "free of evil," "guileless" or "free of faults." The word in question is męinsvani, which is a compound of mein, meaning "evil, harm, fault (especially moral, not a physical injury)" and vanr which simply means "lacking, free of." A literalist reading of the myth makes it impossible to call the God "free of evil," but a non-literalist reading does make it possible to understand the true nature of divinity as free of evil, just as the wise and noble poet did. Moreover, it is quite likely that this same poetic description "free of evil" was used to refer to all the Gods, suggesting a common belief in the goodness of the Gods.
One of the most overlooked sources on the theology of the Germanic people is preserved in the Correspondence of St. Boniface. In particular, there's a letter from bishop Daniel of Winchester who advises Boniface on how to convert the Germanic people, which is dated to cca 723-724. Essentially, Daniel advises Boniface to convert the Germanic people by asking a series of quite novice questions. We will now quote and comment on some of the parts relevant to Germanic theology, insofar as we find them useful. On the Method of Converting The Heathen:
"[...] I am taking the liberty of making a few suggestions, in order to show you how, in my opinion, you may overcome with the least possible trouble the resistance of this barbarous people [continental Germanic tribes, most likely the Saxons]. [...] Do not begin by arguing with them about the genealogies of their false gods. Accept their statement that they were begotten by other gods through the intercourse of male and female and then you will be able to prove that, as these gods and goddesses did not exist before, and were born like men, they must be men and not gods."
Daniel here essentially attacks through the literalist reading of myths. He wants the Germanic people to admit that the Gods had a beginning, because this is what the myths say literally, and as soon as this is affirmed, he can put the status of the Gods into question, because what is divine has no beginning nor end, so how could these beings be Gods if they had a beginning? This is easily refuted by explaining that the myths are not to be read literally, but allegorically. Yet what this illustrates is the weakness of the literalist reading of myths, and that it was and can be weaponized by a religious adversary.
"Do they think the gods should be worshipped for the sake of temporal and transitory benefits or for eternal and future reward? If for temporal benefit let them say in what respect the heathens are better off than the Christians. What do the heathen gods gain from the sacrifices if they already possess everything?"
It is interesting that Daniel mentions the doctrine that the Gods already possess everything. And since he mentions it, it is likely that at least a part of the population must have held these beliefs. Of course, we find a parallel doctrine in the Platonic authors (cf. Sallust, On the Gods and the World, c. 15: "The divine itself is without needs, and the worship is paid for our own benefit.")
"This conclusion also must be drawn: If the gods are omnipotent, beneficent and just, they must reward their devotees and punish those who despise them. Why then, if they act thus in temporal affairs, do they spare the Christians who cast down their idols and turn away from their worship the inhabitants of practically the entire globe? And whilst the Christians are allowed to possess the countries that are rich in oil and wine and other commodities, why have they left to the heathens the frozen lands of the north, where the gods, banished from the rest of the world, are falsely supposed to dwell?"
Why would a Christian missionary try to persuade the Germanic people that their Gods aren't omnipotent, beneficent and just unless they really did hold these beliefs? Clearly, this belief must have been something quite universally held because it is one of the main concerns for Daniel. But what is especially interesting are the implications of the Germanic people holding these beliefs. If the Germanic people viewed the Gods as omnipotent, then they couldn't have understood the myths literally, but must have held these theological doctrines in parallel with a non-literalist reading of the myths.
You may ask, why would I as a person who follows the Germanic tradition care about any of these things we discussed above? Why would I care about ancient Greek reception of myths among the intellectual elite and nobility? Why would I care what any of these ancient Greek philosophers have to say about myths? We applaud all that ask such questions, and the reason is quite simple. There is no native Germanic treatise on the correct reception and interpretation of myths. When we look at myths, we look at a beautiful antique cabinet. We may admire its beauty from the outside, but unless we have a key, we can't access what other ancient beauties we’ve inherited inside. More importantly, if we don't know there's a key to unlock it, we may never know that it contains secrets hidden in it! The purpose of our earlier study was to show that other religiously related ancient Europeans practicing their ancestral traditions before us have noticed this very same thing. Therefore, our study is a substitute for the missing material in the Germanic tradition, and what is to be taken from it aren't the various particulars, but the essence of the method of mythic interpretation. Its purpose was to show that allegorical reading of myths was always a part of the Greek tradition and that it was inherited from its most ancient sources, and we firmly believe that it was also a part of the Germanic tradition. We do not give you everything handed down on a plate, but we merely want to show you that there exists a key from that beautiful cabinet, and we want to stir up that curiosity in you and let you find out on your own what's inside.
In Xenophon's Symposium we read a discussion on the value of Homeric poetry in education. The company agree that being able to recite Homer by heart is no worthy accomplishment in itself, because the rhapsodes, after all, can do as much, and this company is unanimous in viewing them as the most stupid of men because they do not know the hyponoia of each of the myths. Niceratus therefore is to be congratulated because he has paid a good deal of money to learn them. Xenophon, Symposium, III (5-6):
"[Callias:] So now, Niceratus, suppose you tell us on what knowledge you most pride yourself.
[Niceratus:] My father, in his pains to make me a good man, compelled me to learn the whole of Homer's poems, and it so happens that even now I can repeat the Iliad and the Odyssey by heart.
[Antisthenes:] You have not forgotten, perhaps, that besides yourself there is not a rhapsodist who does not know these epics?
[Niceratus:] Forgotten! Is it likely, considering I had to listen to them almost daily?
[Antisthenes:] And did you ever come across a sillier group of people than these same rhapsodes?
[Niceratus:] Not I, indeed. Don't ask me to defend their wits.
[Socrates:] It is plain, they do not know the underlying meanings [hyponoiai]. But you, Niceratus, have paid large sums of money to Anaximander, and Stesimbrotus, and many others, so that no single point in all that costly lore is lost upon you. [...]"
Stesimbrotus was one of the famous allegorical readers of Homer. Anaximander here is probably the Anaximander who at the end of the fifth century wrote Exegesis of Pythagorean Symbola and this work appears to have applied to Pythagorean sayings the same kind of allegorical explanation that had been used on Homer. It is clear that this instance in Xenophon reinforces our view of Socrates that we discussed above.
The company then turns to discuss the particulars of what they consider to be false in Homer. It is clear that the participants of the discussion consider many things Homer and Hesiod say to be false — e.g. the literal reading of the myth of the jar, because Zeus does not give bad things to mankind — but myths like the castration of Uranus shouldn't be told freely, whether they are true [in which case they are to be revealed in the mysteries] or not and whether they have an underlying meaning or not [en huponoiais, aneu hupnoion]. Why? Because the young do not understand allegories, and because what people learn when they are young is harder to disprove. Does this mean that Socrates rejects the traditional myths? Not quite. While Socrates appears to not believe in the literal reading of myths, e.g. in Euthyphro, 6a-d:
“I find it hard to accept things like that being said about the gods […] do you really believe these things [horrific actions of the gods told in myths] are true? […] do you believe that there really is war among the gods, and terrible enmities and battles, and other such things as are told by the poets […] ?”
He quotes and praises Homer, he calls him divine numerous times (e.g. Phaedo 95a: the "divine poet," Second Alcibiades 147c: the "divinest and wisest of poets," Ion 530c: "Homer above all, who’s the best poet and the most divine"). More importantly, numerous times, he discusses the hyponoia in Homer (e.g. Cratylus, Theaetetus, Symposium). Keeping in mind that the Republic is a thought-experiment about founding a city-state, these other instances in the Dialogues prove that the discussion in the Republic does not necessarily reflect Socrates' own ideas about these topics.
We have sufficiently proved that criticism of Homer and Hesiod goes hundreds of years back before Socrates and Plato, and this is likewise true for the allegorical reading of myths. We shall now devote our time to discuss some of Socrates' ideas regarding these topics. In the Republic, Book I, there's a discussion on what the education should look like in a hypothetical city-state, the participants talk about the purpose of the poets in their city-state and the purpose of myths. In 377d-379a, Socrates says in answer to Adeimantus asking what he means by major stories that should be supervised:
"[Socrates:] Those that Homer, Hesiod, and other poets tell us, for surely they composed false stories, told them to people, and are still telling them.
[Adeimantus:] Which stories do you mean, and what fault do you find in them?
[Socrates:] The fault one ought to find first and foremost, especially if the falsehood isn’t well told.
[Adeimantus:] For example?
[Socrates:] When a story gives a bad image of what the gods and heroes are like, the way a painter does whose picture is not at all like the things he’s trying to paint.
[Adeimantus:] You’re right to object to that. But what sort of thing in particular do you have in mind?
[Socrates:] First, telling the greatest falsehood about the most important things doesn’t make a fine story — I mean Hesiod telling us about how Uranus behaved, how Cronus punished him for it, and how he was in turn punished by his own son. But even if it were true, it should be passed over in silence, not told to foolish young people. And if, for some reason, it has to be told, only a very few people — pledged to secrecy and after sacrificing not just a pig but something great and scarce — should hear it, so that their number is kept as small as possible.
[Adeimantus:] Yes, such stories are hard to deal with.
[Socrates:] And they shouldn’t be told in our city, Adeimantus. Nor should a young person hear it said that in committing the worst crimes he’s doing nothing out of the ordinary, or that if he inflicts every kind of punishment on an unjust father, he’s only doing the same as the first and greatest of the gods. [...] we mustn’t allow any stories about gods warring, fighting, or plotting against one another, for they aren’t true. The battles of gods and giants, and all the various stories of the gods hating their families or friends, should neither be told nor even woven in embroideries. If we’re to persuade our people that no citizen has ever hated another and that it’s impious to do so, then that’s what should be told to children from the beginning by old men and women; and as these children grow older, poets should be compelled to tell them the same sort of thing. We won’t admit stories into our city — whether allegorical or not — about Hera being chained by her son, nor about Hephaestus being hurled from heaven by his father when he tried to help his mother, who was being beaten, nor about the battle of the gods in Homer. The young can’t distinguish what is allegorical from what isn’t, and the opinions they absorb at that age are hard to erase and apt to become unalterable. For these reasons, then, we should probably take the utmost care to insure that the first stories they hear about virtue are the best ones for them to hear.
[Adeimantus:] That’s reasonable. But if someone asked us what stories these are, what should we say?
[Socrates:] You and I, Adeimantus, aren’t poets, but we are founding a city. And it’s appropriate for the founders to know the patterns on which poets must base their stories and from which they mustn’t deviate. But we aren’t actually going to compose their poems for them."
Worth noting to us in our study is also the Derveni Papyrus. The Derveni Papyrus is one of the oldest surviving religious texts ever found on the European continent, and its discovery is nothing short of a miracle. It was discovered in 1962 and its content was pieced together from carbonized remains found in a tomb of a Greek nobleman. The text is a philosophical commentary on the mythology and poetry attributed to Orpheus. It is dated roughly to the 4th century BCE, but its content is dated to the late 5th century BCE. It is our earliest preserved specimen of extended allegorical interpretation. The text records one of the important words that is since used in the allegorical interpretation, and that is enigma (αἴνιγμα), literally "a riddle," but also "an obscure method of communication." We shall now take a look at some of its contents. In column VII, we read this striking information:
"[...] one cannot state the solution of the [enigmatic] words though they are spoken (i.e. not secret). This poem is strange and riddling to people, though [Orpheus] himself did not intend to say contentious riddles but rather great things in riddles [enigmas]. In fact he is speaking mystically, and from the very first word all the way to the last. [...] he is not legislating for the many [but addressing himself to those] who are pure in hearing ..."
Likewise, in col. XIII:
"[...] he [Orpheus] is speaking through the entire poem allegorically about real things [...]"
The elitist nature of the text is repeated yet again in the following passage. The ordinary people do not understand things, but one who knows the enigmas of the Orphic lore does understand. Moira here is a Greek word for Weird [Urðr]. Col. XVIII:
"The other people in their everyday talk say that 'Moira has spun for them' and that 'it will be as Moira has spun', speaking correctly but not understanding either what Moira is or what [is] spinning."
The Derveni Papyrus is thus an important window into the intellectual, philosophical and mystical discussions of the Greek noblemen in the 4th century BCE. It establishes allegory as a tool for interpretation of the mythic lore, clearly attributing its use to the more educated and philosophically-minded elite — those who are "pure in hearing."
An interesting case is that of Xenophanes (6th century BCE), a travelling religious teacher, a reciter of Homer, a poet, a philosopher and a religious revivalist. As a reciter of Homer, or a rhapsode, Xenophanes had an extensive knowledge of the Homeric poetry. And as a religious revivalist, Xenophanes also became a critic of Homer and Hesiod on a number of important points. Not explaining the apparent conflicts of the true nature of the Gods and the Homeric and Hesiodic myths as hyponoia, it appears he instead chose to explain these as misunderstandings on the poets' part, e.g. Fragment 11:
"Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the gods all sorts of things which are matters of reproach and censure among men: theft, adultery, and mutual deceit."
Xenophanes is traditionally held to think that these mythic actions of the Gods do not reflect the true nature of the Gods. Likewise, Xenophanes appears to believe that some of the various mythic beings are not real, as documented in Fragment 1 (20):
"He deals neither with the battles of Titans nor Giants
nor Centaurs, fictions of old,
nor furious conflicts – for there is no use in these.
But it is good always to hold the gods in high regard."
Xenophanes is especially critical of some of the popular opinions, that may be stemming from the popular reception of Homer and Hesiod, such as anthropomorphization of the Gods, in Fragment 14:
"But mortals suppose that gods are born,
wear their own clothes and have a voice and body."
He also notes this tendency in Fragment 15:
"But if horses or oxen or lions had hands
or could draw with their hands and accomplish such works as men,
horses would draw the figures of the gods as similar to horses, and the oxen as
similar to oxen,
and they would make the bodies
of the sort which each of them had."
And he also notices the ethnic aspect of the understanding of the Gods, in Fragment 16:
"Ethiopians say that their gods are snub-nosed and black;
Thracians that theirs are blue-eyed and red-haired."
And lastly, let us discuss an idea which many contemporary people appear to believe is quite recent, that is voiced by Xenophanes in Fragment 23:
"One god is greatest among gods and men,
not at all like mortals in body or in thought."
And while Xenophanes is criticized by contemporary people for this belief, its earliest record can be attributed to Homer, in Book VIII of the Iliad (18-27):
"Come, you gods, make this endeavour, that you all may learn this. Let down out of the sky a cord of gold; lay hold of it all you who are gods and all who are goddesses, yet not even so can you drag down Zeus from the sky to the ground, not Zeus the high lord of counsel, though you try until you grow weary. Yet whenever I might strongly be minded to pull you, I could drag you up, earth and all and sea and all with you, then fetch the golden rope about the horn of Olympos and make it fast, so that all once more should dangle in mid air. So much stronger am I than the gods, and stronger than mortals."
We will only see clearer formulations of this idea of an omnipotent being, transcending all the other powers in the world, that is identified with the Highest God, but one that was present even in the remotest of antiquity.
Criticizing Homer and Hesiod peaked with some of the pre-Socratic philosophers, namely with Heraclitus (6th-5th century BCE). Not only does Heraclitus criticize the traditional lore, he outright wants it trashed, as we read in Fragment 42 (Diogenes Laertius 9.1):
“[He used to affirm that] Homer ought by rights to be ejected from the lists and thrashed, and similarly Archilochus.”
The criticisim is also clear in Fragment 57 (Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies 9.10.2):
“For very many people Hesiod is (their) teacher. They are certain he knew a great number of things — he who continually failed to recognize (even) day and night (for what they are)! For they are one.”
But his criticism extends to all Greeks, namely in Fragment 56 (Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies 9.9.5):
“People are deceived, [he says], in the recognition of things that are obvious in much the same way Homer, who was wiser than all the Greeks, was deceived. For he was deceived by the words spoken to him by some boys killing lice: 'What we saw and caught we leave behind, while what we did not see or catch we take (away with us).”
And lastly in Fragment 40 (Diogenes Laertius 9.1):
“A lot of learning does not teach (a person the possession of) understanding; (could it do so,) it would have so taught Hesiod [...]”
Unfortunately, we do not know all the reasons why Heraclitus thought of the traditional lore this way — why he thought the Homeric works should be trashed, or why he thought Hesiod unwise. These criticisms of the divinely-inspired poets seem largely unwarranted. Most later currents, especially the Platonist and Stoic philosophical currents reject such notions.
We have shown before that allegorical myths existed already in the most archaic ancient Greek poetic sources. But we can likewise find most archaic ancient Greek commentators on these poetic sources who have engaged in allegorical reading of myths. Counted among these men is Theagenes of Rhegium (6th century BCE), and we only learn of his existence via later commentators and scholiasts, one such scholiast of the Iliad reads:
"In general, [Homer's] account of the gods tends to be worthless and unsuitable, for the myths he tells about the gods are inappropriate. To such charges as this, some reply on the basis of Homer's way of speaking, holding that everything is said by way of allegory and refers to the nature of the elements, as in the passage where the gods square off against one another. For they say that the dry battles with the wet, the hot with the cold, and the light with the heavy. Moreover, water extinguishes fire while fire evaporates water, so that there is an opposition between all the elements composing the universe, which may suffer destruction in part but remains eternal as a whole. In setting out these battles Homer gives fire the name Apollo, Helius, or Hephaestus, he calls water Poseidon or Scamander, the moon Artemis, the air Hera, and so on. In a similar way he sometimes gives names of the gods to human faculties: intelligence is Athena, folly is Ares, desire Aphrodite, speech Hermes, according to what is characteristic of each. Now this kind of defense is very old and goes back to Theagenes of Rhegium, who first wrote about Homer."
A good deal of caution is required in evaluating this information. The scholiast depends on intermediary sources now unknown, and it is these sources who may be responsible for the specific allegorical equivalencies listed and we shouldn't thus necessarily ascribe these to Theagenes. Moreover, it is well-known that the ancient Greeks had a tendency to ascribe things to a founding figure. It is scarcely credible that Theagenes could have invented mythic allegorical reading single-handedly and it becomes difficult to specify what he invented that was remarkable, given that allegories exist already in Homer and Hesiod. His fame may be due simply to the fact that he managed to leave an example of his interpretative practice in a written text, the one remembered as the first treatise on Homer. It is plausible there were many more such commentators whom we do not know because either their ideas or their writings haven't been preserved to us. Therefore, it is most likely that allegorical reading and commenting on myths already existed within the oral tradition of archaic ancient Greece.
Plato, Theaetetus, 180c, d:
“This problem now, we have inherited it, have we not, from the ancients? They used poetical forms which concealed from the majority of men their real meaning […]”
Let us now turn our focus on Hesiod, as there is plenty of genuine allegory in Hesiod.
In his Theogony (383) he explains Strength (Kratos) and Force (Bia) and "these have no house apart from Zeus nor any seat, nor any path except that on which the god leads them, but they are always seated next to deep-thundering Zeus."
The myth of Pandora is one elaborate allegory and contains a description of woman as a divinely manufactured evil, in the Theogony (70-100):
"(70) [...] the famous Lame One [Hephaestos] fabricated out of earth a likeness of a modest maiden, by the plans of Cronus' son; the goddess, bright-eyed Athena, gave her a girdle and ornaments; the goddesses Graces and queenly Persuasion placed golden jewelry all around on her body; the beautiful-haired Seasons crowned her all around with spring flowers; and Pallas Athena fitted the whole ornamentation to her body. Then into her breast the intermediary, the killer of Argus, set lies and guileful words and a thievish character, by the plans of deep-thundering Zeus; and the messenger of the gods placed a voice in her and named this woman Pandora (All-Gift), since all those who have their mansions on Olympus had given her a gift — a woe for men who live on bread.(83) When he had completed the sheer, intractable deception, the father sent the famous killer of Argus, the swift messenger of the gods [Hermes], to take her as a gift to Epimetheus [Afterthought]. And Epimetheus did not consider that Prometheus [Forethought] had told him never to accept a gift from Olympian Zeus, but to send it back again, lest something evil happen to mortals; it was only after he accepted her, when he already had the evil, that he understood.
(90) For previously the tribes of men used to live upon the earth entirely apart from evils, and without grievous toil and distressful diseases, which give death to men. But the woman removed the great lid from the storage jar with her hands and scattered all its contents abroad — she wrought baneful evils for human beings. Only Anticipation remained there in its unbreakable home under the mouth of the storage jar, and did not fly out; for before that could happen she closed the lid of the storage jar, by the plans of the aegis-holder, the cloud-gatherer, Zeus."
Zeus' marriages in the Theogony are also allegorical. One marriage is with Order and the children are the Seasons, Justice, Law, Peace, and the Fates (903). The second marriage, with Memory, brings forth the Muses (53).
One last allegory from the Theogony we shall mention — and this one is very special — is the myth of Aphrodite as the goddess born from the foam of the flesh of Ouranos, who is mutilated by Cronus (175). Behind the myth of the mutilation of Ouranos, which puts an end to his disordered fertility, and the myth of the birth of Aphrodite, there lies the idea of the fixity of species, of which the Platonic theory of ideas is only a refined translation (Paul Mazon, Hésiode, Théogonie, Les travaux et les jours, Le bouclier, 1947).
In reference to allegories found in myths, the archaic ancient Greeks used the word hyponoia (ὑπόνοια), which essentially means “an underlying meaning,” or literally an "undermeaning." It is especially used in reference to myths as the “the thought or idea that underlies a myth.” This word was later displaced by the word allegory (ἀλληγορία) which can be literally etymologically translated as "otherspeech" but is the elaborate form of allegory as we know it, and appears already in Plutarch (How to Study Poetry).
But can hyponoia and thus non-literal reading of the myths and poems be found in the most archaic ancient Greek sources? We shall now devote our time to discuss the uses of hyponoia in Homer.
A somewhat complicated yet remarkably effective hyponoia is contained in the description of Discord in Book IV of the Iliad (439):
"Ares drove these on, and the Achaians grey-eyed Athene, and Terror drove them, and Fear, and Discord whose wrath is relentless, she the sister and companion of murderous Ares, she who is only a little thing at the first, but thereafter grows until she strides on the earth with her head striking heaven. She then hurled down bitterness equally between both sides as she walked through the onslaught making men's pain heavier."
Here all is clear, Discord is a sister and companion to the Lord of War. Like him she is accompanied by Terror and Fear, springing from small causes, she suddenly expands and grows until she seems to fill the entire universe. In this passage the poet's intent is to convey a truth concerning Discord by means of significant action.
One of the most notable hyponoias is the myth of jars, put in the mouth of Achilles in Book XXIV of the Iliad (527):
"Such is the way the gods spun life for unfortunate mortals, that we live in unhappiness, but the gods themselves have no sorrows. There are two urns that stand on the door-sill of Zeus. They are unlike for the gifts they bestow: an urn of evils, an urn of blessings. If Zeus who delights in thunder mingles these and bestows them on man, he shifts, and moves now in evil, again in good fortune. But when Zeus bestows from the urn of sorrows, he makes a failure of man, and the evil hunger drives him over the shining earth, and he wanders respected neither of gods nor mortals."
Or, to expand the meaning of these lines, according to Achilles, Zeus reserves twice as many misfortunes for mankind as he does our blessings. Man can expect at best only a mixture of happiness and pain in life, and in fact may receive very little happiness at all. In this passage, accordingly, every requisite of allegory is present.
An even plainer case of hyponoia occurs in Book XIX of the Iliad (91), where the operation of Aite (Delusion), upon men is described as follows:
"Delusion is the elder daughter of Zeus, the accursed who deludes all; her feet are delicate and they step not on the firm earth, but she walks the air above men's heads and leads them astray. She has entangled others before me."
The fact that Delusion is the daughter of Zeus is expressive of her power. Her feet are delicate because men do not know when she steps upon their heads.
This is obviously not an extensive list of the use of hyponoia in Homer, but serves to illustrate, that Homer did engage in allegories. A literal reading of these passages completely misses their point, and thus proves that the ancient lore is not always to be read literally.
Plato, Ion, 534b-e:
“For of course poets tell us that they gather songs at honey-flowing springs, from glades and gardens of the Muses, and that they bear songs to us as bees carry honey, flying like bees. And what they say is true. For a poet is an airy thing, winged and holy, and he is not able to make poetry until he becomes inspired and goes out of his mind and his intellect is no longer in him. As long as a human being has his intellect in his possession, he will always lack the power to make poetry or sing prophecy. Therefore, because it’s not by mastery that they make poems or say many lovely things about their subjects (as you do about Homer) — but because it’s by a divine gift — each poet is able to compose beautifully only that for which the Muse has aroused him […] it’s not mastery that enables them to speak those verses, but a divine power, since if they knew how to speak beautifully on one type of poetry by mastering the subject, they could do so for all the others also. That’s why the god takes their intellect away from them when he uses them as his servants, as he does prophets and godly diviners, so that we who hear should know that they are not the ones who speak those verses that are of such high value, for their intellect is not in them: the god himself is the one who speaks, and he gives voice through them to us. […] the god is showing us, so that we should be in no doubt about it, that these beautiful poems are not human, not even from human beings, but are divine and from gods; that poets are nothing but representatives of the gods, possessed by whoever possesses them.”
Homer likewise introduces his Iliad with the following words "Sing, goddess, the anger of Peleus' son Achilleus and its devastation, which put pains thousandfold upon the Achaians" and he invokes the Muses elsewhere throughout the work, in order for them to relate information to him. In Book II of the Iliad, (484-485) he sings: "Tell me now, you Muses who have your homes on Olympos. For you, who are goddesses, are there, and you know all things, and we have heard only the rumour of it and know nothing." Or in Book XI of the Iliad, (215-220) he sings: "Tell me now, you Muses who have your homes on Olympos, who was the first to come forth and stand against Agamemnon of the very Trojans, or their renowned companions in battle."
He introduces the Odyssey with the same formula: "Tell me, Muse, of the man of many ways, who was driven far journeys, after he had sacked Troy's sacred citadel." The idea that the lore related by the poet comes from the Muses is also demonstrated in Book VIII of the Odyssey, (70) where Demodokos sings about Odysseus at Troy: "the Muse stirred the singer to sing the famous actions of men on that venture", earlier (60) we read about this poet to be an "excellent singer whom the Muse had loved greatly, and gave him both good and evil." This may suggest that the Muses could likewise put false and even evil things into the poet's mouth.
The same idea that is related by Hesiod, that the Muses are the originators of divine lore is present also in Homer. It is most likely that Hesiod was referring to the works of Homer as well when he said that the Muses can tell of true and false things. And as mentioned above, there may be references to the idea this same idea in Homer as well.
