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APT

APT

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This channel discusses: β€” Offensive Security β€” RedTeam β€” Malware Research β€” OSINT β€” etc Disclaimer: t.me/APT_Notes/6 Chat Link: t.me/APT_Notes_PublicChat

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πŸ“ˆ Analytical overview of Telegram channel APT

Channel APT (@apt_notes) in the English language segment is an active participant. Currently, the community unites 14 658 subscribers, ranking 8 841 in the Technologies & Applications category and 45 631 in the Russia region.

πŸ“Š Audience metrics and dynamics

Since its creation on Π½Π΅Π²Ρ–Π΄ΠΎΠΌΠΎ, the project has demonstrated rapid growth, gathering an audience of 14 658 subscribers.

According to the latest data from 12 June, 2026, the channel demonstrates stable activity. Although there has been a change in the number of participants by 406 over the last 30 days and by 7 over the last 24 hours, overall reach remains high.

  • Verification status: Not verified
  • Engagement rate (ER): The average audience engagement rate is 49.89%. Within the first 24 hours after publication, content typically collects N/A% reactions from the total number of subscribers.
  • Post reach: On average, each post receives 7 313 views. Within the first day, a publication typically gains 0 views.
  • Reactions and interaction: The audience actively supports content: the average number of reactions per post is 20.

πŸ“ Description and content policy

The author describes the resource as a platform for expressing subjective opinions:
β€œThis channel discusses: β€” Offensive Security β€” RedTeam β€” Malware Research β€” OSINT β€” etc Disclaimer: t.me/APT_Notes/6 Chat Link: t.me/APT_Notes_PublicChat”

Thanks to the high frequency of updates (latest data received on 13 June, 2026), the channel maintains relevance and a high level of publication reach. Analytics show that the audience actively interacts with content, making it an important point of influence in the Technologies & Applications category.

14 658
Subscribers
+724 hours
+1007 days
+40630 days
Posts Archive
APT
14 668
Wordlists Dictionaries of attack patterns and primitives for black-box application fault injection and resource discovery. https://github.com/fuzzdb-project/fuzzdb https://github.com/Karanxa/Bug-Bounty-Wordlists https://github.com/orwagodfather/WordList https://wordlists.assetnote.io/ #wordlist #fuzzing #bugbounty

APT
14 668
NTLM Relay This article is not meant to be a tutorial to be followed in order to carry out a successful attack, but it will allow the reader to understand in detail the technical details of this attack, its limitations, and can be a basis to start developing his own tools, or understand how current tools work. https://en.hackndo.com/ntlm-relay/ #ad #relay #ntlm #ntlmrelay

APT
14 668
KrbRelayUp Universal no-fix local privilege escalation in windows domain environments where LDAP signing is not enforced (the
KrbRelayUp Universal no-fix local privilege escalation in windows domain environments where LDAP signing is not enforced (the default settings) https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp #ad #privesc #kerberos #ldap #relay

APT
14 668
Repost from 1N73LL1G3NC3
Windows Event logs Cheat Sheet

APT
14 668
Abusing LNK "Features" for Initial Access and Persistence https://v3ded.github.io/redteam/abusing-lnk-features-for-initial-access-and-persistence #windows #lnk #persistence #redteam

APT
14 668
Invoke-SocksProxy The reverse proxy creates a tcp tunnel by initiating outbond SSL connections that can go through the system's proxy. The tunnel can then be used as a socks proxy on the remote host to pivot into the local host's network. https://github.com/p3nt4/Invoke-SocksProxy #powershell #socks #proxy #tools

APT
14 668
WSO2 RCE (CVE-2022-29464) Critical vulnerability on WSO2 discovered by Orange Tsai. the vulnerability is an unauthenticated unrestricted arbitrary file upload which which allows unauthenticated attackers to gain RCE on WSO2 servers via uploading malicious JSP files. Google Dorks:
inurl:"/carbon/admin/login.jsp"
inurl:"/authenticationendpoint/login.do"
inurl:"devportal/apis"
intitle:"API Publisher- Login"
intitle:"WSO2 Management Console"

https://github.com/hakivvi/CVE-2022-29464 #wso2 #rce #exploit

APT
14 668
KernelCallbackTable Injection KernelCallbackTable which could be abused to inject shellcode in a remote process. This method of process injection was used by FinFisher/FinSpy and Lazarus. https://captmeelo.com/redteam/maldev/2022/04/21/kernelcallbacktable-injection.html #edr #bypass #injection #cpp #maldev

APT
14 668
A blueprint for evading industry leading endpoint protection in 2022 In this post, I’d like to lay out a collection of techni
A blueprint for evading industry leading endpoint protection in 2022 In this post, I’d like to lay out a collection of techniques that together can be used to bypassed industry leading enterprise endpoint protection solutions. This is purely for educational purposes for (ethical) red teamers and alike, so I’ve decided not to publicly release the source code. The aim for this post is to be accessible to a wide audience in the security industry, but not to drill down to the nitty gritty details of every technique. Instead, I will refer to writeups of others that deep dive better than I can: https://vanmieghem.io/blueprint-for-evading-edr-in-2022/ #av #edr #evasion #research

APT
14 668
In-Process Patchless AMSI Bypass https://ethicalchaos.dev/2022/04/17/in-process-patchless-amsi-bypass/ #amsi #bypass #av #evasion

APT
14 668
Repost from 1N73LL1G3NC3
CVE-2022-29072 7-Zip 21.07 on Windows allows privilege escalation and command execution when a file with the .7z extension is dragged to the Help>Contents area (0-day) https://github.com/kagancapar/CVE-2022-29072

APT
14 668
ShadowMove Pivot Technique ShadowMove is a novel technique to hijack sockets from non-cooperative processes. It is described
ShadowMove Pivot Technique ShadowMove is a novel technique to hijack sockets from non-cooperative processes. It is described in the paper ShadowMove: A Stealthy Lateral Movement Strategy presented at USENIX β€˜20. This technique takes advantage of the fact that AFD (Ancillary Function Driver) file handles are treated as socket handles by Windows APIs, so it is possible to duplicate them with WSADuplicateSocket(). https://adepts.of0x.cc/shadowmove-hijack-socket/ #shadowmove #hijacking #socket #redteam

APT
14 668
Pass-the-Hash in 1C Enterprise To gain access to 1C Enterprise, you need a username and password. In case 1C works with LDAP
Pass-the-Hash in 1C Enterprise To gain access to 1C Enterprise, you need a username and password. In case 1C works with LDAP authentication and you only have the user's NTLM hash, you can use Rubeus to launch 1C using the Pass-the-Hash attack. Thus, you can access 1C Enterprise without having a password in the plaintext.
Invoke-Rubeus -Command "asktgt /user:i.ivanov /domain:APTNOTES.LOCAL /rc4:A87F3A337D73085C45F9416BE5787D86 /createnetonly:C:\1cestart.exe /show"

Bonus: If the compromised user has permissions to run "External data processors", you can get a reverse shell of the 1C server. https://github.com/KraudSecurity/1C-Exploit-Kit/tree/master/1C-Shell #1c #pth #rubeus #ad

APT
14 668
Red Teaming Toolkit A collection of open source and commercial tools that aid in red team operations. This post will help you
Red Teaming Toolkit A collection of open source and commercial tools that aid in red team operations. This post will help you during red team engagement. Contents β€” Reconnaissance β€” Weaponization β€” Delivery β€” Command and Control β€” Lateral Movement β€” Establish Foothold β€” Escalate Privileges β€” Data Exfiltration β€” Misc β€” References https://renatoborbolla.medium.com/red-teaming-adversary-simulation-toolkit-da89b20cb5ea #redteam #toolkit #powershell #c2

APT
14 668
Microsoft Sharepoint RCE (CVE-2022-22005) https://hnd3884.github.io/posts/cve-2022-22005-microsoft-sharepoint-RCE/ #sharepoint #rce #cve #research

APT
14 668
SID filter as security boundary between domains? Microsoft states that "the forest (not the domain) is the security boundary in an Active Directory implementation", meaning that Domain Admins of a child domain is essentially as privileged as Enterprise Admins in a root domain and will have administrative rights in all domains of the forest. Why? We guessed that the default trust between domains inside a forest enables any child domain to trick the root domain to treat child domain users as Enterprise Admins by abusing the SID history (ExtraSids) functionality – this attack/technique is known as "Access Token Manipulation: SID-History Injection" and is explained in a later part of this series. Kerberos authentication explained (Part 1) Known AD attacks - from child to parent (Part 2) SID filtering explained (Part 3) Bypass SID filtering research (Part 4) Golden GMSA trust attack - from child to parent (Part 5) Schema change trust attack - from child to parent (Part 6) Trust account attack - from trusting to trusted (Part 7) #ad #trust #kerberus #research

APT
14 668
Red Team Tips To get rid of Microsoft Defender "behaviour based" amsi detection in case of opening a https C2 channel, it can
Red Team Tips To get rid of Microsoft Defender "behaviour based" amsi detection in case of opening a https C2 channel, it can help, to play with the parameter UserAgent. For example, try a Windows Update User Agent. #redteam #tips #defender #bypass

APT
14 668
Critical Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilities in Windows RPC Runtime (CVE-2022-26809) https://www.akamai.com/blog/security/c
Critical Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilities in Windows RPC Runtime (CVE-2022-26809) https://www.akamai.com/blog/security/critical-remote-code-execution-vulnerabilities-windows-rpc-runtime #windows #rpc #rce #research