#STRATDELA

Weitreichende Raketen: Deutschland und Frankreich kooperieren | FAZ https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/unternehmen/weitreichende-raketen-deutschland-und-frankreich-kooperieren-accg-201024079.html

The Space Development Agency announced contracts worth $1.75 billion to build 36 satellites in support of the Pentagon’s Golden Dome missile defense shield. The satellites will be part of Tranche 3 of SDA’s missile defense, warning, and tracking layer, a constellation of satellites in low-Earth orbit. L3Harris and Sierra Space both received contracts to build 18 satellites each and deliver them in time for a potential launch in late 2028. ... The Space Force awarded initial contracts for Tranche 3 last December to Lockheed Martin, Rocket Lab, Northrop Grumman, and L3Harris for a total of 72 satellites. This additional batch of 32—which SDA calls Accelerated Missile Defense Tranche 3, or AMDT3—brings the total tranche to 104 spacecraft. ... SDA said in its statement that L3Harris’ satellite design will be based off the Hypersonic Ballistic Tracking and Space Sensor. L3Harris and Northrop Grumman each built one HBTSS prototype for the Missile Defense Agency, both of which launched as part of the first batch of SDA missile defense satellites. ... Sierra Space’s satellites will be missile warning/missile tracking spacecraft. The company said in a statement that the satellites will be based on its “Horizon” spacecraft. The company is already on contract to build 18 satellites for Tranche 2 of SDA’s tracking layer.

https://www.airandspaceforces.com/sda-awards-contracts-for-36-golden-dome-missile-tracking-satellites/

France and Poland held their first nuclear steering group meeting in Paris on Friday, 10th July.

https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2026/07/10/france-and-poland-held-their-first-nuclear-steering-group-meeting-in-paris

Ariane Group decided to share a glossary on missile technology. https://x.com/i/status/2076724145937588683

Joint Declaration on the Establishment of the Integrated Anti-Ballistic Missile Coalition Published 13 July 2026 A statement from the leaders of Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. We, the leaders of Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Kingdom recognizing the growing threat posed by ballistic missiles and the increasing importance of defence capabilities for the security of the European continent, announce today the initiation of the establishment of a purely defensive Anti-Ballistic Missile Coalition. We express our support for its Flagship Project to work at pace to develop an Anti-Ballistic capability. We believe that the protection of Europe requires a global solution of integrated missile defence architecture to deter and defeat future missile threats - developed through collective effort, technological openness, and trusted industrial cooperation. It will complement existing ballistic missile defence systems, including sovereign European solutions already acquired, or to be acquired by participating countries. By bringing together our defence industrial base, our research, and our operational experience, we aim to build a shared antiballistic missile capacity for Europe and support relevant contributory activities. We do this not against any people, but in defence of our own. We acknowledge the unique experience of Ukraine, gained in defence against Russia’s war of aggression. Through this Declaration, we aim to establish common operational requirements, joint technical working groups, clear governance mechanisms, and a roadmap towards the Coalition's first operational capabilities – in line with our respective constitutional arrangements and international obligations. We will seek to support joint research and development activities under the Flagship Project, including by exploring appropriate opportunities for funding and promote enhanced data and information exchange. The founding members of the Coalition are Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. The Coalition remains open to other nations that share its principles and objectives.

https://www.government.se/statements/2026/07/joint-declaration-on-the-establishment-of-the-integrated-anti-ballistic-missile-coalition/

Three-Dimensional Deterrence: Escalation Management and War Termination in a Two-Peer Nuclear Environment https://cgsr.llnl.gov/sites/cgsr/files/2026-06/Keay_3D_Deterrence_Final.pdf

The planned procurement would span JASSM Lots 27–33 and LRASM Lots 13–19, covering up to 11,200 missiles in multiple variants over the next five to seven years. The expansion would also increase sustainment capacity, missile repair infrastructure, software support, and production at Lockheed Martin’s two existing manufacturing facilities, with deliveries expected to begin 27 months after contract award. The contract covers all current and future variants of the LRASM and JASSM, including the new LRASM-ER and JASSM-XR — two new variants of the shared missile family that add some of Lockheed Martin’s newest anti-spoofing and survivability equipment.

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/07/lrasm-and-jassm-production-to-triple-under-new-us-air-force-contract/

Latest STRATDELA issue: https://open.substack.com/pub/1dkv/p/stratdela-44

This looks like a health human's Typhon by the way. https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2026-07-09/australia-achieves-landmark-prototype-missile-defence-live-fire

The Air Force has officially decided the B-21 Raider will fly with a two-pilot air crew—and some of those pilots will be former weapon system and combat systems officers. The Air Force is establishing a transition program for WSOs and CSOs to become pilots and take follow-on assignments flying the new bomber. ... WSOs will be drawn from the B-1, B-52, and F-15E communities, where they operate the planes’ weapon systems and assist pilots with situational awareness and defensive operations. The Air Force plans to retire its B-1s by the late 2030s, and has sought to retire more than half the F-15E fleet, although Congress has blocked that so far. The F-15EX will ultimately supplant the F-15E, and it also has a two-seat cockpit. But as designed, that plane can be operated by a pilot alone, and that remains the Air Force’s plan so far.

https://www.airandspaceforces.com/air-force-to-teach-weapon-system-officers-to-fly-b-21s/

Merz has once again stated that the US now definitely agreed to sell Tomahawk cruise missiles. According to rumours, a contract could be signed in August for both the missiles themselves and Typhon systems to launch them. Some thoughts on the matter. 1) To begin with, what matters is how many and which types of Tomahawks Germany will receive, and, most importantly, when. This story has been played out several times already; let’s see what happens next. 2) Proper long-range cruise missiles remain highly relevant. Yes, compared to overhyped "effectors", they are more expensive and more complicated to manufacture, and it is more difficult to carry out regular, large-scale strikes with them. However, their effectiveness is far greater, both in terms of overcoming air defence systems and in terms of accuracy, and their warheads are far more sophisticated. Moreover, the storage of modern cruise missiles is a far more straightforward and reliable process. 3) The main question is what will become of European systems. Despite all the talk of autonomy and the projects that have been launched (ELSA and so on), it would appear that Germany, for its part, is prepared to hand over its cash to anyone, even the US (there is also talk of Türkiye), just so long as it does not have to support the French defence industry. 4) Overall, a pan-European discussion is needed – one that includes Russian experts – regarding the role and place of long-range strike weapons in both deterrence and warfighting. It would appear that even amongst European countries there is no common understanding, and the actions being taken are largely reactive in nature. And these weapons are extremely dangerous in terms of escalation risks, given their high readiness even in peacetime and their ability to strike strategic targets. PS Typhom is quite smth in its own right; perhaps Pentagon simply wants to offload these ‘refrigerators’ somewhere once they’ve got something more decent for themselves.

NNSA announced today that it had completed “diamond stamping” of all canned subassemblies (CSA) for the B61-13 nuclear gravity bomb planned for the current Fiscal Year three months ahead of schedule at the Y-12 National Security Complex. ... The B61-13 will be certified for delivery by U.S. strategic bomber aircraft. Development of the bomb is part of a broader strategy between NNSA and the Department of War to develop new technical solutions for the defeat of hard and deeply buried targets.

https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-completes-critical-b61-13-bomb-components-ahead-schedule

NATO’s deterrence and defence rest on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities, complemented by space and cyber assets.  We are committed to maintaining our combat advantage.  We are investing in our ability to deploy, enable and sustain our armed forces and deliver our capability targets in all domains, including in deep precision strike, integrated air and missile defence, uncrewed systems, cutting edge technologies, and intelligence capabilities.  We are developing an interoperable transatlantic warfighting cloud and adopting powerful AI models.

https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2026/07/08/the-ankara-summit-declaration

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) says low availability of unnamed “legacy” aircraft has created hurdles for flight testing of the new AGM-181A Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) nuclear-armed cruise missile. The B-52 is the only platform known to be involved in this effort. The fleet of these bombers is highly in demand, underscored by heavy use in strikes on Iran earlier this year, and has also recently suffered a tragic loss. U.S. Air Force officials have previously highlighted how the relatively small number of B-52s in service and the heavy demands placed on them create challenges when it comes to modernizing the aircraft themselves.

https://www.twz.com/air/poor-b-52-readiness-creating-testing-challenges-for-new-agm-181a-nuclear-cruise-missile

Some personal thoughts on the latest PLAN SLBM test. Judging by the available photographs and the estimated trajectory and range of approximately 8,000 km based on NOTAMs, the JL-2 SLBM was launched. It is not the most modern design, and is clearly inferior to advanced US, Russian and French missiles, but it is definitely capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to enemy territory. Future JL-3 SLBM, a mock-up of which was displayed at the parade in Beijing last Autumn, has an even greater range. In fact, some experts still believe that this one was launched, but doubts remain. It is not entirely accurate to speak of synchronisation with the current Russian-Chinese naval exercise; rather, one event is taking place against the backdrop of the other. The Russian-Chinese ‘Maritime Interaction’ exercise was kicked-off after the SLBM test, and the exercise scenario does not resemble the SSBN deployment support or the delivery of a nuclear strike. That said, this coincidence nevertheless provides an opportunity to frankly discuss operational issues relating to strategic naval nuclear forces. China regularly conducts launches of ballistic missiles of various ranges and deployment types; however, unlike North Korea, it has the capability to use a so-called ‘internal launch route’ for such launches, as the country’s territory allows for the launch of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in a westerly direction towards desert regions. At the same time, it is clear that the actual potential ‘target’ lies in the opposite direction; consequently, given the growing tensions in Sino-American relations, more practically significant launch directions have been used with increasing frequency in recent years. Three points are worth noting separately. Firstly, initial warnings regarding the closure of airspace and maritime areas indicated plans to launch two SLBMs from different regions, but so far only one launch has been reported. Secondly, according to reports from countries in the region (Japan, New Zealand and others), China voluntarily issued launch notifications, albeit in a relatively short time before the actual launches took place. Consequently, there has been increased discussion regarding the advisability of multilateral notification regimes for long-range missile launches. Such an arrangement exists between Beijing and Moscow, albeit with certain exceptions (incidentally, they might well not have provided notification of the recent launch). Thirdly, given the development of the naval component of China’s nuclear forces, questions are arising regarding the validity of assumptions about the separate storage of warheads and delivery systems, particularly given the possible transition to permanent deterrent patrols by SSBNs. It is another matter that such patrols is a challenge for PLAN, but that is a separate issue.

Strategic Solidarity: A Proposal for Anglo-French Cooperation on Air-Launched Nuclear Systems | Geopolitics and Security Studies Center, GSSC (previously known as Eastern Europe Studies Centre, EESC) https://www.gssc.lt/en/publication/strategic-solidarity-a-proposal-for-anglo-french-cooperation-on-air-launched-nuclear-systems/

Russia will use its nuclear weapons only if its very existence is under threat, Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov said in an interview with the Swiss magazine Die Weltwoche. He reiterated that Russia’s nuclear doctrine clearly specifies when the use of nuclear weapons is permitted.

"It's very bold, it's very understandable, and it's very simple. If something endangers the idea of existence of the Russian state, then nuclear weapons will be used," Peskov said. "Otherwise, no. It's very important to understand that."

In other submarine news:

As an organic element of a submarine’s sensors, Iver4 900 is capable of performing the “dirty work” of high-risk missions like seabed mapping, forward intelligence gathering, and other classified missions that U.S. Navy submarines often complete during routine deployments. The Iver4 900, according to Gear, is being proven out in exercises with the U.S. Navy, iterating the design and its concept of operations through at-sea availabilities with Virginia-class submarines. The most important part of these exercises will inform how the AUV is used in real-world scenarios—leveraging its multi-mission and modular capabilities. ... The Iver4 900 has swappable payloads for sensors along the side of the AUV, in the nose, and in the tail, which are all removable and swappable for different configurations. This includes various types of ISR payloads, including sonar arrays, seabed mapping systems, minesweeping capabilities, and other, third party platforms that can be installed outside of L3Harris.

https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/sea-air-space-2026/2026/05/l3harris-delivering-clandestine-submarine-launched-auvs-to-the-u-s-navy/