CloudSec Wine

🔶 Well-architected best practices for software supply chain security Aligned with the AWS Well-Architected Security Pillar, the article recommends defending against npm supply chain attacks (e.g., Shai-Hulud) by using temporary credentials, least-privilege IAM, artifact signing via AWS Signer, centralized dependency management with CodeArtifact, continuous scanning via Amazon Inspector, and CloudTrail-based monitoring. https://aws.amazon.com/ru/blogs/security/well-architected-best-practices-for-software-supply-chain-security #aws

🤖 A Security Researcher’s Guide to Understanding Copilot Studio AI Agents A guide to understanding Copilot Studio AI agents, their deeper architecture on Entra ID and APIM, and key security risks. https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/copilot-studio-ai-agents-security-risks #AI

🤖 Comparing AI Application Security Testing Platforms Doyensec compared Aikido Attack AI Pentest and XBOW Lightspeed for web app vulnerability detection, evaluating true/false positives, configuration, report quality, cost, speed, and impact on tested applications. Full findings available as a PDF. #AI

🔴 Securing Your Gemini and Google API Keys Protect your Gemini API keys with this guide on API restrictions, secure storage in Secret Manager, and key hygiene to prevent hijacking and unauthorized use. https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/developers-practitioners/api-keys-are-open-secrets #gcp

🌩 When Background AI Agents Become a Security Boundary Problem Claude Code's background sessions, supervisor process, CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR override, scheduled tasks, and Markdown-based agent definitions can be chained post-foothold to deploy a persistent, nearly invisible C2 agent evading standard EDR binary-focused detection. https://www.originhq.com/research #ClaudeCode

🔶 Global S3: Another C2 Channel for AgentCore Code Interpreters AWS AgentCore Code Interpreters in Sandbox mode allow unrestricted global S3 access (including cross-account, public/presigned URLs), enabling a bidirectional C2 channel via S3 polling, demonstrated as a full reverse shell PoC. Mitigation: use VPC mode with S3 Gateway Endpoints and strict endpoint policies. https://sonraisecurity.com/blog/global-s3-another-c2-channel-for-agentcore-code-interpreters #aws

👩‍💻 The expendable extension name: Azure VMAccess naming chaos, password resets, and a detection gap The Sysdig Threat Research Team uncovered a detection gap in Azure VM password resets that allows attackers to evade name-based detections by assigning arbitrary VM extension names. Learn how the flaw works, why Microsoft's documented detection guidance failed during testing, and what defenders should monitor instead. https://www.sysdig.com/blog/the-expendable-extension-name-azure-vmaccess-naming-chaos-password-resets-and-a-detection-gap #azure

Аудитные логи в облаке — отдельная распределённая система со своими требованиями к надёжности и стоимости хранения, а не «таблица с событиями». Команда MWS Cloud Platform выложила подробный разбор архитектуры своего сервиса: от библиотеки, которую подключают сервисы облака, до хранилища на Apache Iceberg и движка StarRocks, с объяснением, почему выбрали именно такой набор технологий и где спрятаны неочевидные грабли. Полезно всем, кто разрабатывает ИБ-инструменты, работает с большим количеством событий или просто интересуется инструментами безопасности в облаке. Читать статью на Хабре #реклама

🔶 CISA Admin Leaked AWS GovCloud Keys on Github A Nightwing contractor's public GitHub repo ("Private-CISA"), active since November 2025, exposed plaintext AWS GovCloud admin keys, Firefox-saved passwords, kubeconfig, and Artifactory credentials for CISA internal systems, with GitHub's secret-scanning protections deliberately disabled. https://krebsonsecurity.com/2026/05/cisa-admin-leaked-aws-govcloud-keys-on-github #aws

🌩 Automating Security Operations with AI: Triaging Renovate PR A Claude Code Routine that triages every Renovate PR by risk, flags dead deps, and catches deprecated framework configs before I touch the diff. https://blog.marcolancini.it/2026/blog-automating-security-operations-with-ai-triage-renovate #ClaudeCode

🌩 Skill Issues: Compromising Claude Code with malicious skills & agents With the increasing usage of AI Coding agents, can coding agent skill files be exploited as an initial access mechanism, and how? This is part 1 of a 3 part series exploring the attack surface and defensive recommendations. https://labs.reversec.com/posts/2026/05/skill-issues-compromising-claude-code-with-malicious-skills-agents-part-1 #ClaudeCode

🌩 Claude Code MCP Token Theft: MitM Attack Explained Mitiga Labs shows how Claude Code MCP configuration can be hijacked through ~/.claude.json to steal OAuth tokens, persist through rotation, and hide in trusted SaaS activity. https://www.mitiga.io/blog/claude-code-mcp-token-theft-mitm #ClaudeCode

🔶 Authorization Bypass in Amazon Quick: Unauthorized AI Chat Agent Usage An authorization bypass in Amazon Quick's AI Chat Agents that allowed users to access and interact with AI agents despite explicit administrative restrictions. AWS responded by deploying a fix without notifying customers, classified the issue as “none,” and did not publish an advisory. https://www.fogsecurity.io/blog/authorization-bypass-in-amazon-quick-ai-agents #aws

🤖 AI Threat Readiness Framework Wiz proposes a 4-pillar AI Threat Readiness Framework: (1) reduce attack surface and AI-scan all exposures; (2) accelerate CVE patching and zero-day response; (3) perform deep AI-driven code analysis; (4) automate real-time threat detection and containment. https://www.wiz.io/blog/ai-threat-readiness-framework #AI

🔶 The AWS Bedrock API Keys Security Guide Part 2: Detection, Prevention, and Response The second part of a guide to AWS Bedrock API key security, this research builds off of the risks of AWS Bedrock API keys introduced in part one to cover detection, prevention, incident response, and migration to STS. https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/aws-bedrock-security-guide-api-keys-detection-response #aws

🤖 Skill Issues: How We Discovered Supply Chain Attack Vectors in an AI Agent Skills Marketplace Orca Security identified four supply chain attack primitives in an AI agent skills marketplace: unauthenticated install count inflation, non-deterministic security scanning, silent skill name override, and blind bulk updates. All enabling bait-and-switch, nested skill injection, and delayed weaponization attacks achieving real-world RCE. https://orca.security/resources/blog/ai-agent-skill-supply-chain-security #AI

20 мая в 12:00 (мск) пройдёт бесплатный вебинар «Автоматизация процессов безопасности в Kubernetes: опыт MWS Cloud Platform».  Руководитель направления облачной безопасности Алексей Федулаев расскажет:  - Какие есть подводные камни при переходе с ручных сканов  - Как покрыть тепловыми картами кластеры и отслеживать нарушения - Как находить аномалии в поведении пользователей  - И наконец, как это всё подружить с центром безопасности Вебинар будет полезен директорам по ИТ и ИБ, ИБ-специалистам и инженерам, работающим в облачных средах.  Регистрируйтесь, подключайтесь к прямому эфиру и задавайте вопросы в чате.  📆 20 мая в 12:00

🤖 The (In)security Landscape of AI-Powered GitHub Actions (Part 2/2) Wiz researchers analysed popular AI GitHub Actions (Anthropic, OpenAI, Google) and found: bot permission-check bypasses enabling untrusted external apps to trigger AI workflows, novel credential-file exfiltration vectors unrecognised by LLMs as sensitive, and widespread misconfigurations in repos with 200,000+ combined stars. https://www.wiz.io/blog/github-actions-security-ai-powered-actions-vulnerabilities #AI

🤖 LeakyLM: AI Assistants Are Leaking Your Conversations Research disclosing that ChatGPT, Claude, Grok, and Perplexity embed third-party trackers (Meta, Google, TikTok) that leak conversation URLs, email hashes, and user identifiers, often bypassing cookie consent. via client-side pixels and server-side forwarding. https://leakylm.github.io/ #AI