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Android Security & Malware

Android Security & Malware

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πŸ“ˆ Analytical overview of Telegram channel Android Security & Malware

Channel Android Security & Malware (@androidmalware) in the English language segment is an active participant. Currently, the community unites 43 896 subscribers, ranking 3 091 in the Technologies & Applications category and 725 in the USA region.

πŸ“Š Audience metrics and dynamics

Since its creation on Π½Π΅Π²Ρ–Π΄ΠΎΠΌΠΎ, the project has demonstrated rapid growth, gathering an audience of 43 896 subscribers.

According to the latest data from 15 June, 2026, the channel demonstrates stable activity. Although there has been a change in the number of participants by 181 over the last 30 days and by 19 over the last 24 hours, overall reach remains high.

  • Verification status: Not verified
  • Engagement rate (ER): The average audience engagement rate is 12.50%. Within the first 24 hours after publication, content typically collects 5.13% reactions from the total number of subscribers.
  • Post reach: On average, each post receives 5 485 views. Within the first day, a publication typically gains 2 250 views.
  • Reactions and interaction: The audience actively supports content: the average number of reactions per post is 12.
  • Thematic interests: Content is focused on key topics such as cve-2025, exploit, rat, trojan, bypass.

πŸ“ Description and content policy

The author describes the resource as a platform for expressing subjective opinions:
β€œMobile cybersecurity channel Links: https://linktr.ee/mobilehacker Contact: mobilehackerofficial@gmail.com”

Thanks to the high frequency of updates (latest data received on 16 June, 2026), the channel maintains relevance and a high level of publication reach. Analytics show that the audience actively interacts with content, making it an important point of influence in the Technologies & Applications category.

43 896
Subscribers
+1924 hours
+1077 days
+18130 days
Posts Archive
Exploiting the iOS Kernel by Spraying IOSurfaces https://youtu.be/Y-UI4dEFXFk?si=6UpFUyABAX7htCWn

Unpacking the BADBOX Botnet with Censys https://censys.com/unpacking-the-badbox-botnet/

Frida script to bypass root detection & SSL certificate pinning https://github.com/0xCD4/SSL-bypass

Mobile Indian Cyber Heist: FatBoyPanel And His Massive Data Breach https://www.zimperium.com/blog/mobile-indian-cyber-heist-fatboypanel-and-his-massive-data-breach/

SparkCat malware: OCR crypto stealers in Google Play and App Store https://securelist.com/sparkcat-stealer-in-app-store-and-google-play/115385/

Understanding WiFi Karma attacks or how and why devices can auto-reconnect to untrusted networks https://www.mobile-hacker.com/2025/02/05/hacking-on-the-go-wi-fi-karma-attacks-with-mobile-devices/

Android Tria stealer: malware that exfiltrates data and hijack accounts https://securelist.com/tria-stealer-collects-sms-data-from-android-devices/115295/

Analysis of TrickMo Android malware campaign targeting Poland https://www.sirt.pl/atak-na-uzytkownikow-androida-falszywa-aplikacja-olx/

Vulnerability of hotel room Android kiosk tablets It was possible to execute ADB commands, unlock bootloader and possibly escalate privileges to root. Pull kiosk apps for reverse engineering and obtain servers (pivot) or hardcoded secrets. As a result attacker could pose as another guest room terminal and control the air conditioning and lights, place orders, display bills, and eavesdrop on chats https://devblog.lac.co.jp/entry/20250124

USB Army Knife: Close Access Penetest Tool It is capable of: remote keystroke injection, VNC, USB network adapter, EvilAP, Marauder, record microphone, controlled over web interface with fancy LCD screen https://www.mobile-hacker.com/2025/01/24/usb-army-knife-the-ultimate-close-access-penetest-tool/

Analysis of Autel MaxiCharger Android app to reviewing the attack surface https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2025/1/15/reviewing-the-attack-surface-of-the-autel-maxicharger-part-two

Fully-remote (0-click) bug on the Samsung S24 if Google Messages is configured for RCS (the default configuration on this device), as the transcription service decodes incoming audio before a user interacts with the message for transcription purposes. Issue is fixed now. https://project-zero.issues.chromium.org/issues/368695689

FireScam: Android information stealing malware with spyware capabilities https://www.cyfirma.com/research/inside-firescam-an-information-stealer-with-spyware-capabilities/

How to install and run any firmware (Marauder, Bruce, Ghost ESP...) on ESP32 devices without using computer with M5Stick Launcher https://www.mobile-hacker.com/2024/12/29/run-firmware-anywhere-flexibility-of-m5stick-launcher/

Android instrumentation using Frida https://learnfrida.info/