2026 ISW: Institute for the Study of War
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The Institute for the Study of War advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. https://linktr.ee/understandingwar
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| Date | Subscriber Growth | Mentions | Channels | |
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| 01 September | +2 |
Channel Posts
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 7, 2026: Negotiations to secure the durable and lasting peace that US President Donald Trump has said he aims for cannot be based on Russian lies. They can only be based on the actual realities of the battlefield and the real trajectory of the war, which does not favor Russia.
To read the full update, tap the link in our bio and navigate to "Publications"
Other Key Takeaways:
The Ukrainian military demonstrated, and a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger acknowledged, the falsity of one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s more outrageous claims of fictitious Russian gains in Donetsk Oblast.
The pervasive culture of lying within the Russian armed forces paradoxically both damages Russian forces’ ability to fight effectively and supports exaggerated Kremlin claims that Putin weaponizes to enhance Russia’s negotiation position.
Negotiations to secure the durable and lasting peace that US President Donald Trump has said he aims for cannot be based on Russian lies. They can only be based on the actual realities of the battlefield and the real trajectory of the war, which does not favor Russia.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction and the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Russia launched 92 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure on the night of September 6 to 7.
| 2 |  +3No text... | 96 |
| 3 | Iran Update, September 7, 2026: The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) attempted to attack US naval forces on September 5, likely to try to degrade the United States’ resolve to continue enforcing its naval blockade on Iranian ports.
To read the full update, tap the link in our bio and navigate to "Publications"
Other Key Takeaways:
The IRGC may have also conducted the attack to deter US forces from facilitating the transit of commercial vessels through the strait amid indications that Iran may be facing constraints in its maritime surveillance, targeting, and mine-laying capabilities.
Iran’s planned restricted maritime zone appears to be a separate effort to deter commercial vessels from bypassing Iranian control of the strait and coerce the shipping industry to pressure the United States to lift its blockade.
Iran’s recent efforts to coerce the United States to lift its blockade may reflect growing regime concerns about the blockade’s impact on the Iranian economy. Iran has a growing incentive to find alternative ways to force the United States to end its blockade, including by raising the military costs of enforcement for the United States and increasing commercial costs for vessels that bypass Iranian control. | 90 |
| 4 |  No text... | 85 |
| 5 |  ISW is seeking a Russia Team Program Coordinator to provide administrative and operational support to our Russia Team. An ideal candidate will have a demonstrated interest in the war in Ukraine, a solutions-oriented attitude, and the will and ability to take initiative. Professional working proficiency in Russian, two or more years of professional experience in an operational role, and proficiency with Microsoft Office are additional requirements.
This role consists of supporting a number of routine and non-routine responsibilities across the team, including team scheduling and staffing responsibilities, support for knowledge management procedures, and ad hoc support for team leadership as needed.
Are you interested in supporting our Russia Team? Apply today by clicking the link in our bio and selecting "Jobs & Internships." | 110 |
| 6 | Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 6, 2026: Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated Russia’s unwillingness to make any meaningful compromises in the peace negotiations process to end the war in Ukraine. Putin is doubling down on the fictional battlefield situation that he defines as “reality” and insisting that his misrepresentation of the actual state of the war become the basis for any peace negotiations on Ukraine.
To read the full update, tap the link in our bio and navigate to "Publications."
Other Key Takeaways:
The lies and distortions of Russian military commanders at many levels are likely leading Putin to harden his perception that Russian forces can achieve his intended objectives in Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2026 and thus that he need not make any compromises in his aims.
Russia is failing to achieve its battlefield objectives in reality, however, and is specifically failing in its priority objective of seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2026.
Russian forces will not seize Donetsk Oblast until 2032 at their current rate of advance — if they can seize it at all.
ISW is not prepared to assess that Russian forces will be able to take the rest of Donetsk Oblast on any timeline, however.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with Witkoff and Kushner in Kyiv City on September 6 and agreed on fundamental principles for ending the war in Ukraine, including security and economic guarantees for post-war Ukraine.
Putin’s demands transcend Donbas, however, as both his 2024 speech (to which Russian officials constantly allude) and Russia’s military operations demonstrate.
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and the suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign in Rostov Oblast on the night of September 5 to 6. Russian forces launched 108 drones against Ukraine overnight.
Russian forces have achieved tactically-significant advances in the Hulyaipole direction in the past several months. | 122 |
| 7 |  +6No text... | 116 |
| 8 |  +3Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 5, 2026: The US delegation arrived in Moscow City on September 5 as Ukraine and Russia reached a temporary agreement to halt long-range strikes against Kyiv and Moscow cities for three days to facilitate the delegation's travel.
To read the full report, tap the link in bio and navigate to "Publications."
Other Key Takeaways:
Putin rejected a broader frontline ceasefire proposed by Ukraine during the US delegation’s visit.
Russian officials continue discussing efforts to strengthen Russian air defense systems in order to defend against Ukraine’s long-range strikes.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on September 5.
Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Iskander-M or KN-23 ballistic missiles and 167 drones against Ukraine overnight. | 147 |
| 9 | Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 4, 2026: Russian sources falsely and baselessly claimed that Russian forces encircled 2,000 Ukrainian forces northeast of Kharkiv City.
To read the full update, tap the link in our bio and navigate to "Publications."
Other Key Takeaways:
Russian forces attempted to assassinate Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) head Oleksandr Poklad with a Geran-type drone strike on September 4.
The Russian Geran drone platform adaptations are improving their ability to conduct successful high-precision strikes.
The Kremlin’s behavior indicates Russia’s unwillingness to guarantee the safety of the US delegation during their reported upcoming visit to Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin appears committed to his existing expensive and inefficient force generation mechanism through volunteer recruitment.
Russia’s expedited efforts to establish its Rassvet satellite constellation as a replacement for Starlink are facing significant challenges which may degrade the constellation’s lifespan.
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military, oil, and defense-industrial infrastructure on September 3 and 4. Russian forces launched one Kh-31P anti-radar missile and 121 drones against Ukraine overnight.
Ukrainian forces advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area. | 146 |
| 10 |  +4No text... | 122 |
| 11 | Iran Update, September 4, 2026: Recent Iranian attacks on US regional assets indicate that Iranian decision-makers — particularly the hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) faction that appears to be controlling decision-making — are dissatisfied with the current status of the war because Iran has not yet achieved its key objectives in the conflict, namely securing recognized control over the Strait of Hormuz. These decision-makers appear intent on trying to change the trajectory of the conflict through the use of military force.
To read the full update, tap the link in our bio and navigate to "Publications."
Other Key Takeaways:
Iran is facing several constraints that are limiting its ability to achieve its political objectives in the war. The operational constraints imposed by US strikes are temporary, and Iran will likely try to reconstitute its degraded capabilities and develop new capabilities to adapt to the constraints on its military campaign.
Iran’s ongoing cash flow crisis will likely limit Iran’s ability to overcome these constraints in the near term. Iran is facing a shortage of foreign currency reserves and access to US dollars, which has been exacerbated by intensifying US economic pressure.
Iran is constrained by its relationships with the Gulf states because it seeks to increase political and economic costs on the United States while, at least at this time, avoiding actions that could push the Gulf states to support a resumption of large-scale US operations against Iran. Iran has also faced consistent opposition from the Gulf states toward its efforts to control shipping in the strait. | 117 |
| 12 |  No text... | 100 |
| 13 |  China & Taiwan Update, September 4, 2026: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) National People's Congress passed a revision to the National Defense Mobilization Law on August 28 that would likely broaden the PRC's ability to requisition civilian assets for military purposes to include short-of-war engagements. The PRC could use this capability to significantly increase its military transport and sealift capacity during a Taiwan invasion scenario by using civilian vessels to carry out these operations.
To read the full report, tap the link in bio and navigate to "Publications."
Other Key Takeaway:
Unnamed US officials reported that the PRC is using state-owned conglomerate China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) vessels to collect maritime data with potential military relevance. COSCO maintains a global network of ships, ports, and shipping lanes, which could give the PRC extensive access to information relevant to future military operations. | 136 |
| 14 | Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 3, 2026: Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to use contradictory language about the possibility of achieving peace in Ukraine to obscure Moscow’s true objectives.
To read the full update, tap the link in our bio and navigate to "Publications."
Other Key Takeaways:
Putin continues to downplay the war’s mounting economic and demographic costs to ordinary Russians, portraying persistent economic challenges as indicators of Russia’s economic resilience and gradual stabilization.
Putin attempted to portray the Russian government as promptly responding to the Ukrainian drone threat while continuing to deflect responsibility for providing air defense onto private businesses.
Ukrainian forces conducted an unmanned surface vessel (USV) strike on the Port of Sochi demonstrating Ukraine’s ability to strike deeper into the Russian Black Sea coast and further restrict Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (BSF) operations.
Ukraine’s sustained strikes against BSF vessels demonstrate that Ukrainian USVs and other unmanned systems continue to pose a significant threat to Russian naval assets in the Black Sea, even after the Russian naval command withdrew several vessels from the BSF headquarters in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, to Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai.
Unknown actors reportedly attempted to assassinate Commander of the Russian 22nd Heavy Bomber Aviation Division (Long Range Aviation, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) Major General Nikolai Varpakhovich in Saratov Oblast on September 3.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk, Novopavlivka, and Oleksandrivka directions. Russian forces advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Russia launched 163 drones against Ukraine overnight. | 129 |
| 15 |  +4No text... | 121 |
| 16 | Iran Update, September 3, 2026: The Iranian Artesh conducted a missile and drone attack targeting US bases in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates on September 3, likely as part of the regime’s efforts to raise the costs of the US campaign against Iran. The latest Iranian strikes bear some similarity to a recent Iranian attack on Jordan that some Iranian military officials have claimed is reflective of a new Iranian targeting doctrine that reportedly includes preemptive strikes against US military assets in the region.
To read the full report, go to the link in bio and select "Publications."
Other Key Takeaways:
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced on September 3 that it cleared a major Hezbollah underground facility beneath the Ali al Taher Ridge in Nabatieh District after a months-long siege. Ali al Taher occupies advantageous terrain overlooking the Litani River and the neighboring Houla Valley, which enabled Hezbollah to target Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and civilian settlements in northern Israel.
ISW-CTP is considering three possible Iranian courses of action against Israel in response to the assault on Ali al Taher: a large-scale missile and drone attack, a limited and “symbolic” attack, and no military response. Iranian officials reportedly warned the United States in mid-August 2026 that Iran would respond to any offensive to seize the Ali al Taher facility with a “large-scale attack” on Israel, according to unspecified regional sources speaking to Reuters. All courses of action rely upon the assumption that the reporting about the Iranian warning is accurate. | 115 |
| 17 |  +1No text... | 109 |
| 18 | Russian Occupation Update, September 3, 2026: Russia continues the deportation of Ukrainian political prisoners in apparent violation of international law.
To read the full update, tap the link in bio and navigate to "Publications."
Other Key Takeaways:
Russian occupation officials used the beginning of the 2026-2027 schoolyear to showcase enrollment figures while continuing efforts to institutionalize pro-Russian curricula, military-patriotic education, and behavioral monitoring mechanisms throughout occupied Ukraine.
Early voting for the Russian State Duma elections has begun in occupied Ukraine as Russian occupation officials continue to set conditions to control electoral outcomes.
Russian and occupation courts continue to issue over decades-long sentences to residents of occupied areas accused of pro-Ukrainian activities.
The Donetsk Oblast occupation administration is trying to present occupied Donetsk Oblast as an attractive investment destination for Russians and foreigners.
Russian elites are using their ties to development projects in occupied Ukraine for self-enrichment.
Russian state atomic energy corporation Rosatom is denying recent international warnings about the situation at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to present itself as a responsible and capable operator.
Russian occupation administrations continue to rely on Russian patron regions for construction and development projects in occupied areas. | 119 |
| 19 |  No text... | 109 |
| 20 | Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 2, 2026: Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to exaggerate Russian forces’ battlefield performance to assert that Russian military victory in Ukraine is inevitable. These claims continue to be divorced from the battlefield reality on the ground, however.
To read the full report, go to the link in our bio, and select "Publications."
More Key Takeaways:
Putin insisted that Ukrainian defenses are collapsing across the frontline and that Russian forces are making rapid gains, contrary to all observable evidence from the battlefield.
Putin is likely aware that he appears detached from the current battlefield realities in Ukraine and has attempted to present himself as an informed leader.
Putin once again reiterated Russia’s continued unwillingness to freeze the current frontline or engage in any meaningful peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Mykhailo Drapatyi released a statement of priorities for the Ukrainian military that outlines the focus on unifying operational planning to contest Russia’s initiative and bolster Ukraine’s long-term defensive capabilities.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky dismissed Commander of Ukrainian Ground Forces Major General Gennady Shapovalov and appointed Brigadier General Svyatoslav Zaitsya as his replacement on September 2.
Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Security Service (SBU) elements engaged in a small arms firefight in Kyiv City on September 2.
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Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate- and long-range strike campaign against military assets and oil infrastructure in Russia.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and the Slovyansk direction, and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Russia launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, an unspecified number of S8000 Banderol-type loitering munitions, and 174 drones against Ukraine overnight. | 127 |
