Citrus Integrity Trick
前往频道在 Telegram
Moonlight shines the lake, unveiling a path for the brave to advance.🌙 Official Channel That Update TSupport Module.
显示更多📈 Telegram 频道 Citrus Integrity Trick 的分析概览
频道 Citrus Integrity Trick (@citraintegritytrick) 英语 语言赛道中的 是活跃参与者。目前社区聚集了 10 194 名订阅者，在 技术与应用 类别中位列第 11 929，并在 印度 地区排名第 36 853 位。
📊 受众指标与增长动态
自 невідомо 创建以来，项目保持高速增长，吸引了 10 194 名订阅者。
根据 01 十一月, 2026 的最新数据，频道保持稳定运转。过去 30 天订阅人数变化为 16，过去 24 小时变化为 -3，整体触达仍然可观。
- 认证状态： 未认证
- 互动率 (ER)： 平均受众互动率为 27.81%。内容发布后 24 小时内通常能获得 11.47% 的反应，占订阅者总量。
- 帖子覆盖： 每篇帖子平均可获得 2 835 次浏览，首日通常累积 1 169 次浏览。
- 互动与反馈： 受众积极参与，单帖平均反应数为 6。
- 主题关注点： 内容集中在 module, integrity, detection, detector, qualcomm 等核心主题上。
📝 描述与内容策略
作者将该频道定位为表达主观观点的平台：
“Moonlight shines the lake, unveiling a path for the brave to advance.🌙
Official Channel That Update TSupport Module.”
凭借高频更新（最新数据采集于 02 十一月, 2026），频道始终保持新鲜度与高覆盖。分析显示受众积极互动，使其成为 技术与应用 类别中的关键影响点。
10 194
订阅者
-324 小时
+27 天
+1630 天
正在加载数据
吸引订阅者
十一月 '2611月 '26
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| 日期 | 订阅者增长 | 提及 | 频道 | |
| 02 十一月 | +3 | |||
| 01 十一月 | +2 |
频道帖子
Tip.
1. https://t.me/CitraIntegrityTrick/1162
** PIF Inject by KOW, dont use Pixel 10 or later fingerprint.
2. https://t.me/CitraIntegrityTrick/1157
** TrickyStoreOSS by beakthoven
3. Get a keys :
** Tricky Addon Modules by KOW
OR
** Duck Toolbox for unique device RKP Keys. ( Its Private, so never share generated RKP to Public, else you may be banned forever by GOOGLE )
Did this help ? Let me see your reaction on this post. 🌹
| 2 | Integrity Status | 1 482 |
| 3 | Anyone already using this ?
https://github.com/Fronsipswu/qcom-band-menu | 2 277 |
| 4 | STRONG WITH? | 3 799 |
| 5 | STRONG WITH? | 1 |
| 6 | STRONG WITH ? | 3 582 |
| 7 | Happy Integrity? | 3 350 |
| 8 | Looks like this method wont last long for me ...
It does flag generated RKP Keys, with "NOT APPROVED".
Some of you might already seen this from the leaked Lenovo RKP.
Possibly because it send a "csr.cbor" with :
vb_state = orange
bootloader_state = unlocked
to RKP Server, they do respond your request but also flag it as "NOT APPROVED". | 3 340 |
| 9 | Tmpfs needed, tried LKM SUSFS but not enough. | 2 950 |
| 10 | ![Switch to KernelSU-Next LKM ( No SUSFS ). Stock fingerprint [ With TSupport ].](){kind=small} Switch to KernelSU-Next LKM ( No SUSFS ).
Stock fingerprint [ With TSupport ]. | 3 032 |
| 11 | Alright, this method tested on Qualcomm device.
So do guarantee it will work for MTK, and maybe not all Qualcomm device will work with the module. | 2 920 |
| 12 | Everything works [ STRONG ] for me.
RKP
CTS
RCS
GPAY | 2 806 |
| 13 | If its work, never share your RKP. | 2 615 |
| 14 | A new keybox technique is public, and Duck ToolBox already implements it
A new route to an attestation keybox has been published, and it differs from both routes people knew before. It does not extract the device's CDI_Leaf seed from the TEE for unlimited offline signing, and it does not rely on any external service. The core idea is to treat the device's KeyMint TA as a signing oracle: the real device runs the certificate request itself, and we only supply the software public key we want it to sign.
Concretely: the host generates a P-256 key pair and keeps the private half. The public half goes into the TA's CSR_V2 request (command 0x3122), and the trusted application signs it with the device's genuine DICE chain. That yields a completely legitimate CSR, which is then submitted through the normal fetchEekChain / signCertificates flow to Google in exchange for a certificate chain. Finally the private key and the chain are assembled into a keybox.xml that Tricky Store can load. Nothing is extracted, and the bootloader is never touched. The full walkthrough is at the Kanxue write-up linked below.
Duck ToolBox reduces that chain of steps to two commands. Start with rkp-device status, which checks the prerequisites: Android arm64, root, /dev/smcinvoke, the keymaster library, and a Qualcomm SoC. It names exactly what is missing instead of leaving you to guess. When the checks pass, provision --acknowledge-limitations produces keybox.xml, the CSR, the DER certificate chain, and the private key. The tool is strict about what it accepts: the issued leaf certificate must carry the public key it generated, the chain must be one complete leaf-to-root path with no stray certificate, and any failure is rejected before a single file is written. What it does write is checked against Tricky Store's own keybox validator, so the artifact is one the device will actually load.
The boundaries matter, so: it depends on Qualcomm's KeyMint vendor ABI and therefore works on some devices only; when the ABI does not match you get an explicit error saying the firmware may be incompatible rather than a silent failure. It issues RKP certificates only, with no test or software attestation keys. Beyond writing the artifacts it changes no device state. The keybox is tied to a key generated on the device, so it is valid there and nowhere else: keep the private key file. The prerequisite check is read-only and side-effect free, so running it first to see whether your phone qualifies is the sensible way to start.
And yes, it is completely free: no extra hardware, no account, no server. The underlying method comes from a research write-up on the Kanxue forum: https://bbs.kanxue.com/thread-293244.htm — the implementation is Duck ToolBox's, the credit for the method belongs to its author. If you run it on real hardware, your results are welcome; they help us describe the compatible range accurately. | 2 422 |
| 15 | New Keys Technique just leaked. | 2 937 |
| 16 |  没有文字... | 3 594 |
| 17 |  +1没有文字... | 2 841 |
| 18 |  +1没有文字... | 3 126 |
| 19 |  Necessary
... | 2 590 |
| 20 | Stock Fingerprint no longer valid for Integrity ( my device fingerprint banned ).
Only Pixel Canary/Beta Fingerprint works.
Just like the old day.
** New changes, Pixel 10/11 can't use Hardware Attestation key ( Old Keyboxes ).
This cause by the fingerprint already Device Initial SDK higher than 35. | 3 058 |
