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SUBJECT: Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM)

they've known since the 1970s that low doses of microwave radiation causes heart attacks and cancers.

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functions can allow weapons to strike military objectives more accurately and with less risk of collateral damage” or civilian casualties. Although the U.N. CCW is a consensus-based forum, the outcome of its discussions could hold implications for U.S. policy on lethal autonomous weapons.

Weapons review process. DODD 3000.09 requires that the software and hardware of covered semi-autonomous and autonomous weapon systems, be tested and evaluated to ensure they Function as anticipated in realistic operational environments against adaptive adversaries taking realistic and practicable countermeasures, [and] Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems https://crsreports.congress.gov complete engagements within a timeframe and geographic area, as well as other relevant environmental and operational constraints, consistent with commander and operator intentions. If unable to do so, the systems will terminate the engagement or obtain additional operator input before continuing the engagement. Systems must also be “sufficiently robust to minimize the probability and consequences of failures.” Any changes to the system’s operating state—for example, due to machine learning—would require the system to go through testing and evaluation again to ensure that it has retained its safety features and ability to operate as intended. The directive also notes that “the use of AI capabilities in autonomous or semi-autonomous systems will be consistent with the DOD AI Ethical Principles.” Senior-level review. In addition to the standard weapons review process, a secondary senior-level review is required for covered autonomous and semi-autonomous systems. This review requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]), the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), and the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]) to approve the system before formal development. USD(P), VCJCS, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD[A&S]) must then approve the system before fielding. In the event of “urgent military need,” this senior-level review may be waived by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. DODD 3000.09 additionally establishes the Autonomous Weapon System Working Group—composed of representatives of USD(P); USD(R&E); USD(A&S); DOD General Counsel; the Chief Digital and AI Officer; the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—to support and advise the senior-level review process. Congressional notification. Per Section 251 of the FY2024 NDAA (P.L. 118-31), the Secretary of Defense is to notify the defense committees of any changes to DODD 3000.09 within 30 days. The Secretary is directed to provide a description of the modification and an explanation of the reasons for the modification. International Discussions of LAWS Since 2014, the United States has participated in international discussions of LAWS, sometimes colloquially referred to as “killer robots,” under the auspices of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (U.N. CCW). In 2017, these discussions transitioned from an informal “meeting of experts” to a formal “Group of Governmental Experts” (GGE) tasked with examining the technological, military, ethical, and legal dimensions of LAWS. In 2018 and 2019, the GGE has considered proposals by states parties to issue political declarations about LAWS, as well as proposals to regulate them. In addition, approximately 30 countries and 165 nongovernmental organizations have called for a preemptive ban on LAWS due to ethical concerns, including concerns about operational risk, accountability for use, and compliance with the proportionality and distinction requirements of the law of war. The U.S. government does not currently support a ban on LAWS and has addressed ethical concerns about the systems in a March 2018 white paper, “Humanitarian Benefits of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons.” The paper notes that “automated target identification, tracking, selection, and engagement

CRS Products CRS Report R45178, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, by Kelley M. Sayler CRS Report R44466, Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: Issues for Congress, by Nathan J. Lucas CRS In Focus IF11294, International Discussions Concerning Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, by Kelley M. Sayler and Michael Moodie CRS Report R45392, U.S. Ground Forces Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI): Considerations for Congress, coordinated by Andrew Feickert Other Resources Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, “Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Updated May 8, 2017, https://www.esd.whs.mil/portals/54/documents/dd/issuances/ dodd/300009p.pdf. U.S. Government, “Humanitarian Benefits of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons,” March 28, 2018, https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/ (httpAssets)/7C177AE5BC10B588C125825F004B06BE/$file/C CW_GGE.1_2018_WP.4.pdf. U.S. Government, “Human-Machine Interaction in the Development, Deployment and Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems,” August 28, 2018, https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/ (httpAssets)/D1A2BA4B7B71D29FC12582F6004386EF/$file/2 018_GGE+LAWS_August_Working+Paper_US.pdf. United Nations Office at Geneva, “Background on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems in the CCW,” https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/ (httpPages)/8FA3C2562A60FF81C1257CE600393DF6?OpenD ocument. Defense Innovation Board, “AI Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use of Artificial Intelligence by the Department of Defense,” October 2019.

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