R.Politik

Some brief thoughts on the current state of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict: • Russia lacks the military resources to significantly expand its control over Ukraine and has to slow its offensive. It continues to rely on the gradual weakening of the Ukrainian state or a collapse at the front, while persistently targeting the country’s energy infrastructure. This strategy may continue without decisive success. • Regardless of the outcome of the U.S. election, it seems unlikely that the West will support Ukraine to a degree that could force Russia to retreat. From Moscow’s perspective, there are no actions that could decisively shift the situation in Ukraine’s favour. • There are no strong indications that meaningful peace talks regarding the nature of the conflict will happen soon. Ukraine is considering more flexible approaches, such as exchanging territory for peace, but Russia is betting on the fall of Kyiv. The West lacks a viable plan and the political will to develop one, while other states such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, or China do not have proposals that are acceptable to both Russia and Ukraine. • There is an increasing call within the international community for a ceasefire, though currently, no practical routes toward this goal are visible. A ceasefire would benefit Russia, but Putin currently does not perceive an urgent need for one. • Extraterritorial escalation is on the rise, involving Russia and the West and extending beyond the Ukrainian conflict. Both sides are progressively testing each other’s patience and tolerance levels.

Keith Kellogg and Fred Fleitz, two of Donald Trump advisers, elaborated a plan to stop the Russian war against Ukraine. The plan involves de facto freezing the conflict along the contact line and initiating direct talks between #Moscow and Kyiv. It proposes putting off NATO membership for Ukraine for an extended period while continuing to arm Ukraine "to ensure Russia makes no further advances." It also includes limited sanction relief and, if an agreement is reached, placing levies on Russian energy sales to fund Ukrainian reconstruction. What would the Russian reaction be had Trump won the office and agreed to go forward with this plan? There will be several problems with this plan, judging from Moscow's perspective: - Putin does not want to freeze the conflict, especially since he currently believes Russia has the upper hand and sees no reason to halt military pressure. Even if Russia cannot significantly advance on the battlefield, it can continue to target Ukraine's energy sector, further exhausting society. In Moscow's view, the threat of increased support for Ukraine will not significantly alter the existing situation or current threats. - The idea of putting off Ukraine’s NATO membership for an "extended period" has already been repeatedly rejected by Putin; at the beginning of the war, a proposal for a 25-year suspension was actively discussed. He insists that Russia needs "ironclad" guarantees and is more convinced now than in 2022 that he can secure them. I am very skeptical that this can change while Putin remains in office. - This plan overlooks the core issue of the conflict: Putin aims to dismantle the anti-Russia project in Ukraine. For him it's not about territory but about ensuring Ukraine becomes "friendly." I don't think it's achievable (which is why Putin's war is doomed), but it remains Putin's primary and most compelling motivation for the war. - The intention to continue arming Ukraine will be particularly unacceptable and is likely to be immediately rejected. - The proposal to finance Ukrainian reconstruction through Russian energy sales could only be taken seriously in the event of a Russian defeat—which seems unlikely—or a regime change. - The very approach of this plan, which suggests "dictating" terms to Russia (yes, and to Ukraine too), will be met with significant resentment. The Russian leadership is convinced that Russia cannot lose, regardless of the cost, and is ready to resort to nuclear escalation should it face a more substantial military threat. All this is not to say that the plan is inherently bad or good. Objectively, Moscow's reaction will likely be negative, even though the proposal may seem to benefit Russia and disadvantage Ukraine. The military costs for Russia are not substantial enough to make Putin reconsider his own "plan." However, the proposal has a specific feature that might appeal to Putin: it initiates a new geopolitical game where Moscow could have much more room to maneuver. The plan compels Ukraine to cease resistance—exactly what Putin currently desires. It mandates direct talks between Kyiv and Moscow, which, in Putin’s view, could weaken Ukraine domestically and might lead back to discussions akin to the Istanbul agreements of April 2022. The plan could be seen as a tactical opportunity, a starting point for a new geopolitical scenario in which an exhausted Ukraine would have to reassess its domestic political situation, becoming more susceptible to Russian influence and more pliable. Thus, the Kremlin might cautiously engage with this new strategy while remaining aware of the plan’s potential shortcomings. And finally, the elephant in the room: the plan itself underscores the significant potential for further escalation that may follow Trump’s election, as a failed peace plan could prove to be more dangerous than no plan at all.

Keith Kellogg and Fred Fleitz, two of Trump’s advisers, elaborated a plan to stop the Russian war against Ukraine. The plan involves de facto freezing the conflict along the contact line and initiating direct talks between Moscow and Kyiv. It proposes putting off NATO membership for Ukraine for an extended period while continuing to arm Ukraine "to ensure Russia makes no further advances." It also includes limited sanction relief and, if an agreement is reached, placing levies on Russian energy sales to fund Ukrainian reconstruction. What would the Russian reaction be had Trump won the office and agreed to go forward with this plan? There will be several problems with this plan from Moscow's perspective: ◽️Putin does not want to freeze the conflict, especially since he currently believes Russia has the upper hand and sees no reason to halt military pressure. Even if Russia cannot significantly advance on the battlefield, it can continue to target Ukraine's energy sector, further exhausting society. In Moscow's view, the threat of increased support for Ukraine will not significantly alter the existing situation or current threats. ◽️The idea to put off Ukraine’s NATO membership for an "extended period" has already been repeatedly rejected by Putin; at the beginning of the war, a proposal for a 25-year suspension was actively discussed. He insists that Russia needs "ironclad" guarantees and is more convinced now than in 2022 that he can secure them. I am very skeptical that this can change while Putin remains in office. This plan completely overlooks the core issue of the conflict: Putin aims to dismantle the anti-Russia project in Ukraine. For him it's not about territory but about ensuring Ukraine becomes "friendly." I don't think it's achievable (which is why Putin's war is doomed), but it remains Putin's primary and most compelling motivation for the war. ◽️The intention to continue arming Ukraine will be particularly aggravating and is likely to be immediately rejected. The proposal to finance Ukrainian reconstruction through Russian energy sales could only be taken seriously in the event of a Russian defeat—which seems unlikely—or a regime change. ◽️The very approach of this plan, which suggests "dictating" terms to Russia (yes, and Ukraine too), will be met with significant resentment. The plan is destined to fail because the Russian leadership is convinced that Russia cannot lose, regardless of the cost. All this is not to say that the plan is inherently bad or good. However, Moscow's reaction will likely be negative, even though the proposal may seem to benefit Moscow and disadvantage Ukraine. It diverges significantly from what Putin believes he can achieve and from his reasons for starting the war. In fact, the military costs for Russia are not substantial enough to make Putin reconsider his "plan." However, the plan has a specific feature that might appeal to Putin: it initiates a new geopolitical game where Moscow could have much more room to manoeuvre. The plan compels Ukraine to cease resistance—exactly what Putin currently desires. It mandates direct talks between Kyiv and Moscow, which, in Putin’s view, could weaken Ukraine domestically and might lead back to discussions akin to the Istanbul agreements of April 2022. The plan could be seen as a tactical opportunity, a starting point for a new geopolitical scenario in which an exhausted Ukraine would have to reassess its domestic political situation, becoming more susceptible to Russian influence and more pliable. Thus, the Kremlin might cautiously engage with this new strategy while remaining aware of the plan’s potential shortcomings. And finally the elephant in the room: the plan itself highlights the significant potential for further escalation that may follow Trump’s election.

Dear Friends, If you are new to R.Politik and have not yet signed up for our newsletters, we are pleased to offer you an exclusive opportunity to obtain our latest R.Politik Weekly Digest for free! In this edition, we cover four major topics: – Wildberries Deal: Who is behind one of the most intriguing mergers in recent years? – Beseda’s Replacement: The FSB’s overseer of foreign activities resigns. – Belousov’s New Deputies: Exploring the logic behind recent appointments. – Urazov’s Arrest: Is this a routine criminal case or an attack on Belousov? To access the digest, please register here. If you have any questions, please contact us at [email protected].

Dear Friends, If you are new to R.Politik and have not yet signed up for our newsletters, we are pleased to offer you an exclusive opportunity to obtain our latest R.Politik Weekly Digest for free! In this edition, we cover four major topics: – Putin’s “Peace Plan”: Why now and what are the real intentions? – Undesirable Entities: A harsher approach to undesirable organizations. – Belousov’s Meeting with Military Correspondents: The balancing acts of the new Defense Minister. – New Secretary of United Russia’s General Council: The significance of Vladimir Yakushev’s appointment. To access the digest, please register here. If you have any questions, please contact us at [email protected].

Vladimir Putin has proposed his “peace plan” to Ukraine, purportedly to halt the war. Here are several thoughts on this manoeuvre: 📌 This is not a peace plan but a series of maximalist demands directed at the West and Ukraine in exchange for ending hostilities. Moscow offers no concessions; there is no scope for compromise. 📌 The "plan" is timed to coincide with the Swiss conference starting tomorrow with the intention of devaluing it. One might wonder why Putin would focus so much on an event that is turning out to be less successful than anticipated and is, frankly, failing. Contrary to the popular belief that "Putin has time," he urgently needs to consolidate Russia's military advantage in Ukraine through a "peace process" to render this superiority irreversible, as Russia may lose its military advantage in the coming year. Thus, Moscow views the Swiss conference as an escalating action against Russia, an effort to solidify an anti-Russian stance globally, and the Kremlin is determined to thwart this. 📌The proposal itself essentially demands Ukraine’s capitulation: Putin offers to end the war if Ukraine relinquishes the four regions annexed in 2022 (within their administrative borders, representing significant territory currently beyond Russian control) and Crimea, assures its neutrality, and commits politically to prevent “nationalists” (read any anti-Russian forces) from gaining power. This arrangement excludes President Zelensky. 📌For a long time, Putin avoided explicitly stating these demands to maintain a semblance of flexibility. Now, the mere announcement of these demands complicates the potential for future negotiations. It is doubtful that anyone in Russia genuinely believes these demands will be met soon. However, if there is a significant reciprocal move from Ukraine, Putin may cease hostilities. As I have mentioned multiple times, Putin wants Ukraine to surrender without Russia having to exert significant military effort. 📌But Putin's immediate goal is to create conditions that would compel Zelensky to step down and draw Ukraine into "negotiations" that would destabilise the state, thereby coercing Kyiv to acquiesce to Russian demands in the future.This strategy would relieve Russia of the need to continue military action and reduce the necessity for the West to arm Ukraine. At the same time, the "proposal" is designed to sow discord in the West and appeal to those who desire immediate peace, encouraging support for the Russian “proposal." Once again, Putin needs Ukraine to cease resistance, which, in his view, would be a significant step toward a Russian "victory."

We are excited to share our latest edition of the R.Politik Bulletin, No. 10 (140). This issue delves into four critical topics that shape current geopolitical dynamics. In this edition: ◽️ Putin in China. We explore the potential for Putin to finalize the Power of Siberia-2 contract and consider alternative solutions being discussed. We also examine financial interactions between Chinese and Russian banks and their impact on bilateral relations. Additionally, we provide insights into Moscow’s perspective on Beijing’s peace efforts in the Ukraine conflict. ◽️ Arrests in the Ministry of Defence. Do recent developments indicate an anti-corruption campaign, or are they a purge aimed at weakening former Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu? We analyze each case and uncover the nature of the current prosecutions. ◽️ Confiscation as a Geopolitical Tool. Putin has introduced a new procedure to compensate for damages caused to Russia by the “unfriendly actions” of the United States. We explain how this mechanism is intended to work and discuss Moscow’s underlying tactics.

Dear Friends, We are eager to present our latest R.Politik Bulletin, No. 9 (139), issued after a short break. It covers all major personnel changes in the Russian government undertaken by Vladimir Putin in the last two weeks. In this EDITION: ◽️ Mishustin And The Cabinet. We explain why and how Mikhail Mishustin was reappointed and what the dynamics of his position are. ◽️ The Presidential Bloc. The most shocking changes concern the Defence Ministry, Security Council, and Presidential Administration. You will find out why Andrey Belousov has taken over Sergey Shoigu’s position, while the latter moves to the post of Security Council’s secretary. We also cover Nikolay Patrushev’s transfer to Putin’s administration among other changes. ◽️ Who's Who In The Cabinet. We outline major shifts in Mishustin’s Cabinet: who has gained influence and who has benefited from redistributed prerogatives; new ministers and the particularities of the reshaped Cabinet. ◽️ New Escalation. Putin's fifth term begins amid heightened international tensions. He has directed the General Staff to conduct military drills for non-strategic nuclear weapons. We are trying to answer the critical question: What will happen if Putin believes he cannot win the war, especially if Western forces enter Ukraine? We also invite you to explore our revamped website, which is now more secure and faster: https://rpolitik.com https://rpolitik.com/bulletin/9-2024/personnel-reshuffle-in-the-cabinet-presidential-administration-and-security-council-new-escalation-with-the-west-tactical-nuclear-weapons-drills

After Putin's recent meeting, three main points concerning his vision on the Crocus terrorist attack can be outlined: 1️⃣ Putin unequivocally believes radical Islamists executed the attack. 2️⃣ Putin does not believe that the attack was undertaken by genuine radical islamists due to its timing - during Ramadan. He is persuaded that there's a "client" orchestrating behind the scenes. 3️⃣ However, his wording is cautious and lack evidence: he mentions a "Kyiv trace" (not very convincing) and suspects the US of attempting to "cover up" Ukraine, but gives no specifics. He also says that the terrorist attack at Crocus "may be" (or may not be?) "a link in a series of attempts by those who have been at war with Russia since 2014 at the hands of the Kyiv regime." This is more of an accusation against the US. Finally, he says that "this terrorist attack fits quite logically into the acts of intimidation that Kyiv is carrying out." That is, it could indeed be Kyiv. In other words, Putin does not have evidence of involvement by either the US or Ukraine, but he is convinced that such a terrorist attack would be advantageous for them, which fuels his suspicions.

Yulia Navalnaya has declared her intention to pursue Alexei's cause, signaling a clear move towards an independent political role. This development raises numerous questions regarding her future prospects and the implications of her decision. It's challenging to assess Navalnaya's potential as a politician since we have yet to familiarize ourselves with her in this new capacity. However, I would like to point out several political challenges she might face: 1️⃣ Navalny's Shadow. The dilemma of being perceived merely as Alexei Navalny's widow, thereby constantly being measured against him, poses a significant question. Can she establish a distinct political identity separate from her husband, and more importantly, is it necessary to do so and to what extent? This issue is complex, with no straightforward answer. 2️⃣ Engaged by the West. For the Russian audience, a pro-Western stance is frequently perceived as synonymous with betrayal or allying with the enemy, particularly in the war context. The Kremlin's indirect accusations of Yulia Navalnaya being involved in her husband's murder add to the complexity of distancing herself from such a stigma, regardless of how insane it may seem. This perception of pro-Westernism is contentious even among Russia's liberal circles, which attribute the West's actions as provoking Putin into the conflict and now suspect the West of aiming to deliver a "strategic defeat" to Russia. 3️⃣ Russian Tikhanovskaya. Drawing parallels with Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, who emerged as a formidable challenger to Lukashenko but struggled to establish herself as a significant opposition figure in exile, illustrates another potential pitfall for Navalnaya. Despite possible recognition and respect from the international community, lacking substantial support within Russia could significantly curtail her effectiveness as a political figure. These hurdles do not mean that Navalnaya won't find success. Much will depend on her ability to present herself not just as the widow of a prominent politician but as a formidable, self-accomplished entity. Her success will hinge on her capacity to develop a unique political style, articulate her vision, and assemble a professional team that does not put off potential supporters. Only time will reveal the extent of her impact on the political landscape.