ᴛʜᴇ ɢʜᴏꜱᴛ ɪɴ ᴛʜᴇ ᴍᴀᴄʜɪɴᴇ

New Twitter: twitter.now

A startup in Virginia just launched a social network called Twitter and it has NOTHING to do with Elon Musk. The blue bird is back, tweets and retweets are back, and it costs $20 to get through the door.

#TGITM

Louis Michael Gaebler, 23, of Mandurah, Western Australia, was arrested in Perth in connection with the TeamPCP investigation. Reporting from Australian media said he was one of two West Australian men charged after a joint investigation involving the Australian Federal Police, Western Australia Police, and the FBI. TeamPCP has been linked in reporting to major supply-chain attacks that allegedly spread malicious code through open-source software and affected a large number of organizations worldwide. In this case, the important point is not a single technical failure, but the accumulation of public traces that allowed investigators to connect online identities, platform activity, and real-world records. For a cybersecurity audience, the lesson is straightforward. Attribution in cases like this usually comes from correlation rather than one dramatic breakthrough. Names, usernames, account histories, public profiles, and infrastructure references can all become part of the same investigative picture when they overlap consistently over time. The case also highlights how operational security failures tend to be cumulative. A handle, avatar, social profile, or business record may seem insignificant in isolation, but repeated across services it can create a durable identity trail. That trail becomes more valuable when it is preserved for years and can later be matched against other account activity or public records. Gaebler’s arrest in Perth therefore matters not only as a law-enforcement action, but as a reminder that long-term identity reuse can become an attribution risk. In modern cyber investigations, the strongest cases often do not come from one isolated clue. They come from multiple small clues that point to the same person. #TGITM @TheGhostITM

Two people linked to TeamPCP were reportedly arrested in Australia today. TeamPCP is believed to be behind a string of major supply-chain attacks that sent shockwaves through the cybersecurity community.

- Cross-platform alias persistence: Handles and identity fragments were reportedly retained across HackerOne, GitHub, Hugging Face, TikTok, Steam, and Telegram. - Infrastructure exposure: A domain reportedly associated with malicious command-and-control activity was publicly linked from developer-facing profiles. - Weak identity separation: A possible real name, initials, aliases, and related account data were sufficiently connected to enable further OSINT pivots. - Historical timeline overlap: Steam VAC-ban dates and account interactions reportedly aligned across multiple identities. - Visual-identity reuse: The same distinctive cat avatar reportedly appeared on Steam and Telegram accounts associated with the wider TeamPCP ecosystem. - Public-record exposure: A business reportedly operated under the name OPSEC EXPRESS created an additional real-world attribution surface. Corporate records are routinely useful when they can be correlated with online identifiers, financial activity, communications, or infrastructure evidence. Analytical Takeaway This case demonstrates that operational security fails cumulatively. An individual does not need to expose a home address, leave a real IP address in a server log, or publish a direct confession to become attributable. Small artifacts—an old Steam ban, a contact comment, a reused profile image, a domain on a public developer profile, or a social-media video—can persist for years and later become critical evidence. The central mistake was treating individual accounts as isolated identities. They were not isolated. The reported evidence indicates that each platform preserved a fragment of the same operational history. Once one fragment was linked to a real-world identity, the remaining artifacts could be examined as part of a single pattern. For cyber-intelligence teams, the lesson is equally practical: prioritize pivots that establish independent corroboration. A username is a lead, not a conclusion. Confidence grows when a handle is supported by shared infrastructure, time-based correlations, platform relationships, visual markers, and verifiable public records. #TGITM @TheGhostITM

Case Study: How Reused Digital Identity Exposed an Alleged TeamPCP Member By Yara Tabet (The Ghost In The Machine) Executive Assessment The reported arrest of Ruben Thomson in Western Australia illustrates a common failure in hacking OPSEC: identity reuse across platforms with radically different levels of visibility. The reported attribution was not built around a zero-day, a covert implant, or a single leaked identifier. It emerged from publicly accessible traces that, when correlated, connected a long-standing online persona to an alleged TeamPCP member. The core failure was poor compartmentalization. Handles, infrastructure references, historical account activity, profile imagery, and social-media content allegedly overlapped for years. Any one artifact would have been weak evidence. Together, they created an attribution chain that was difficult to dismiss. Scope and Attribution Caveat This assessment is based on publicly reported material and open-source observations. It does not independently establish guilt or validate all claims of group membership. The reference to Thomson’s reported arrest and alleged connection to TeamPCP should be read as an attribution assessment pending the outcome of judicial proceedings. Initial Identity Pivot The investigation reportedly began with the handle DeadCatx3, which was associated with a HackerOne profile connected to the name Ruben Thomson. The account was significant because it created an initial bridge between a real-world identity and an established online alias. Researchers then identified what appeared to be an associated Hugging Face account using initials consistent with the same name. That profile reportedly referenced masscan[.]cloud. The domain had been identified publicly as command-and-control infrastructure associated with the Mini Shai-Hulud npm worm activity. The same domain was also reportedly present on the DeadCatx3 GitHub profile. This overlap mattered because it was not merely a reused username. It connected a named identity, developer-platform profiles, and infrastructure allegedly tied to a malware campaign. The evidentiary value came from convergence: distinct services independently pointing toward the same operational ecosystem. Social-Media and Steam Correlation Once Ruben Thomson became a working lead, investigators and researchers reportedly pivoted through account-linked data and open-source records. This led to a TikTok account using the name yolosolo17. The account reportedly contained a single video, published in March 2017, showing a Steam profile named YolocrownZ. The footage showed that the account had received a VAC ban $$175$$ days earlier. This places the likely ban date at approximately September 13, 2016. Further Steam research reportedly identified an account called Ellis that had also received a VAC ban on September 13, 2016. Public Steam-profile interactions and comments reportedly established a relationship between the Ellis and YolocrownZ identities. This is a valuable example of timestamp-based correlation. A shared ban date does not identify a person on its own, but it becomes meaningful when aligned with connected accounts, relationships, alias reuse, and the wider attribution record. The Avatar Link The strongest and most memorable pivot was visual rather than technical. A distinctive cat avatar appeared on a Steam profile associated with the identity chain. The same image was reportedly reused by the PCPsh Telegram account linked publicly to TeamPCP. Reverse-image searches reportedly produced few or no unrelated uses of the image. This gave the avatar limited but useful attribution value. Profile pictures are generally weak indicators because they can be copied, but their value rises when they appear consistently across accounts that also share timelines, contacts, aliases, and operational context. The cat image did not prove identity. It corroborated an identity chain that was already supported by multiple independent sources. OPSEC Failures Identified

Proton is currently experiencing a major outage affecting Proton's services due to a cooling failure in their Frankfurt datacenter.

The Uwais al-Qarani Hacker Group claims responsibility for a cyberattack on Israel's power grid, targeting critical infrastructure and sending a message of resistance. #TGITM @TheGhostITM

THE FOREIGN HAND: ISRAEL’S ROLE IN U.S. SURVEILLANCE INFRASTRUCTURE Unit 8200 and Its American Footprint Unit 8200 is Israel’s elite signals-intelligence and cyber unit, often compared to the U.S. National Security Agency. Its role includes intercepting communications, conducting cyber operations, and gathering intelligence. Over decades, it has developed a reputation as one of the world’s most capable cyber-intelligence organizations. For people across the Arab world, especially Palestinians and Lebanese, this is not an abstract subject. Israel’s surveillance capabilities have been used in the region for military occupation, targeting, intelligence collection, and monitoring civilians. That history should matter when technologies and companies shaped by this ecosystem enter public institutions abroad. Unit 8200 is also known as a powerful pipeline into the technology industry. Many former members have gone on to found or work for prominent cybersecurity, software, and data companies. Israel’s technology sector has benefited heavily from skills, networks, and experience developed through military intelligence service. Some of those companies have expanded into the United States, where they may work with corporations, police departments, public agencies, and security institutions. Their products can involve sensitive information: license-plate records, location data, video feeds, emergency communications, biometric data, and other forms of digital surveillance. That raises legitimate questions—not about the ethnicity or nationality of individual engineers, but about accountability. Who owns the data? Where is it stored? Who can access it? What safeguards prevent misuse? And what public oversight exists when surveillance tools move between military, private-sector, and government environments? The case of NSO Group offers an important warning. Founded by former members of Israel’s military-intelligence ecosystem, NSO developed Pegasus spyware, a tool that has been linked to the targeting of journalists, activists, political opponents, and human-rights defenders in numerous countries. The company said its technology was intended to fight crime and terrorism, yet repeated investigations showed how easily powerful surveillance technology can be abused when oversight fails. The issue is larger than any one company. It is the wider military-to-tech pipeline: intelligence experience becomes commercial technology, commercial technology enters foreign markets, and public institutions adopt it in the name of safety. Once these systems are embedded, they can quietly expand beyond their original purpose. In the United States, automated license-plate readers, facial-recognition systems, border-surveillance platforms, and large-scale data-sharing networks have become increasingly common. These tools affect ordinary people every day, often with limited public debate and weak safeguards against misuse. From a Lebanese perspective, there is every reason to view this trend critically. Lebanon and the wider region have lived with the consequences of Israeli military power, intelligence operations, aerial surveillance, and cyber capabilities. When systems shaped by that security model are exported abroad, the public deserves to ask whether they bring the same assumptions: that mass monitoring is normal, that privacy is expendable, and that security institutions should operate without meaningful scrutiny. This is not an argument against cooperation between countries or against technology itself. It is an argument for transparency, democratic oversight, data sovereignty, and human rights. No foreign government, military-linked network, or private contractor should gain privileged access to the personal data of another population without clear safeguards and public accountability. @TheGhostITM

نشر وثائق عن تعاون شركة Novamill مع الصناعات العسكرية التابعة للاحتلال الإسرائيلي نشرت جبهة الإسناد السيبراني أجزاءً من وثائق داخلية لشركة Novamill Systems، بتبيّن تفاصيل تعاون الشركة في مجال القطع الصناعية والتكنولوجيا مع الصناعات العسكرية والفضائية التابعة للاحتلال الإسرائيلي. بتشمل الوثائق عقودًا، واتفاقيات تعاون، وتقارير فنية مرتبطة بشركات، منها Elbit Systems وRafael والصناعات الجوية الإسرائيلية (IAI). ومن بين الوثائق المنشورة مخططات هندسية، ومعلومات عن القطع، وتفاصيل عن أوجه التعاون التقني كمان. Documents Released on Novamill’s Cooperation with Israeli Military Industries The Cyber Isnaad Front has released portions of internal documents from Novamill Systems. The documents reportedly show details of the company’s cooperation in industrial components and technology with Israeli military and aerospace industries. The documents include contracts, cooperation agreements, and technical reports related to companies including Elbit Systems, Rafael, and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). The released materials also include engineering designs, information on components, and details of technical cooperation. #TGITM @TheGhostITM

نشر وثائق عن تعاون شركة Novamill مع الصناعات العسكرية التابعة للاحتلال الإسرائيلي نشرت جبهة الدعم السيبراني أجزاءً من وثائق داخلية لشركة Novamill Systems، بتبيّن تفاصيل تعاون الشركة في مجال القطع الصناعية والتكنولوجيا مع الصناعات العسكرية والفضائية التابعة للاحتلال الإسرائيلي. بتشمل الوثائق عقودًا، واتفاقيات تعاون، وتقارير فنية مرتبطة بشركات، منها Elbit Systems وRafael والصناعات الجوية الإسرائيلية (IAI). ومن بين الوثائق المنشورة مخططات هندسية، ومعلومات عن القطع، وتفاصيل عن أوجه التعاون التقني كمان. (Documents Released on Novamill’s Cooperation with Israeli Military Industries The Cyber Support Front has released portions of internal documents from Novamill Systems. The documents reportedly show details of the company’s cooperation in industrial components and technology with Israeli military and aerospace industries. The documents include contracts, cooperation agreements, and technical reports related to companies including Elbit Systems, Rafael, and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). The released materials also include engineering designs, information on components, and details of technical cooperation.) #TGITM @TheGhostITM

Cyberattack on Boston Scientific, a Medical Device Company Boston Scientific, a medical device company, has been targeted by a cyberattack that has disrupted its network and some operational systems globally. #TGITM

A large-scale DDoS attack has targeted the shared infrastructure of Norway's digital government services since Monday, causing disruptions to some public services.

From the refugee camps of Jordan rise voices no border can silence. Amani al-Jundi carries not only the dreams of her people, but the unbroken belief that Palestine will one day be free.

Yemeni Cyberattack on the Zionist Regime's Power Grid The hacking group "Uways al-Qarani" (أويس القرني) claimed in a statement that it carried out a cyber operation against the Zionist regime's electricity infrastructure. The group stated that in this operation, the power grid's industrial control systems were targeted, and a large solar power plant near Tel Aviv, comprising more than 5,000 solar panels, was taken offline. Hebrew-language media covered the news with concern, and in referencing this attack, warned about the vulnerability of the Zionist regime's critical infrastructure to cyberattacks. This attack shows that Yemen has extended its confrontation with the Zionist regime into cyberspace, targeting the regime's critical infrastructure. #CyberAttack #Yemen #ZionistRegime #Hacking #CyberWarfare #TGITM @TheGhostITM