Agency International
Закрытый канал
1 761
Подписчики
Нет данных24 часа
+57 дней
+230 дней
Загрузка данных...
Похожие каналы
Нет данных
Возникли проблемы? Пожалуйста, обновите страницу или обратитесь к нашему support-менеджеру .
Облако тегов
Входящие и исходящие упоминания
---
---
---
---
---
---
Привлечение подписчиков
июль '26
июль '26
+2
в 0 каналах
июнь '26
+49
в 0 каналах
Get PRO
май '26
+58
в 0 каналах
Get PRO
апрель '26
+48
в 0 каналах
Get PRO
март '26
+91
в 1 каналах
Get PRO
февраль '26
+84
в 2 каналах
Get PRO
январь '26
+123
в 0 каналах
Get PRO
декабрь '25
+97
в 1 каналах
Get PRO
ноябрь '25
+93
в 1 каналах
Get PRO
октябрь '25
+103
в 2 каналах
Get PRO
сентябрь '25
+202
в 7 каналах
Get PRO
август '25
+214
в 0 каналах
Get PRO
июль '25
+211
в 3 каналах
Get PRO
июнь '25
+221
в 4 каналах
Get PRO
май '25
+133
в 1 каналах
Get PRO
апрель '25
+97
в 1 каналах
Get PRO
март '25
+150
в 3 каналах
Get PRO
февраль '25
+298
в 4 каналах
| Дата | Привлечение подписчиков | Упоминания | Каналы | |
| 01 июля | +2 |
Посты канала
Agency International is for informational purposes only. We do not promote illegal activities.
Please donate monero (XMR) to keep this project alive:
864GxDryrYsfRbRw67qVuxEqpvFpDD29gUAz7ERphVtqgGT5rDK8NR6KPrbbvqpEHCHbnC9X3VpoqHimPQ7Lm9c85TdyCzE
| 2 | Data & Information
• Finagle's Five Laws of Information
• Types of Data
• Qualitative vs Quantitative Data
• Studies in Intelligence
Methods of Money Laundering
• Three Stages of the Money Laundering Cycle
• Structuring
• Microstructuring
• Casinos
• Online Casinos
• Real Estate
• Vehicle Sales
• Travel Agencies
• Legal Professionals
• Precious Metals & Fine Art
Red Flags & Indicators
• Indicators of Money Laundering Using Electronic Transfers of Funds
• Casino AML Behavioral Indicators
• Categories of Red Flags Using Legal Professionals
• Unusual Customer Behavior
• Unusual Customer Identification Circumstances
• Other Unusual Customer Activity
• Unusual Cash Transactions
• Unusual Noncash Deposits
• Unusual Activity for Virtual Currency
• Unusual Wire Transfer Transactions
• Additional Potential Indicators of Terrorist Financing (NZPFIU) | 276 |
| 3 | Data & Information
• Finagle's Five Laws of Information
• Types of Data
• Qualitative vs Quantitative Data
• Studies in Intelligence
Methods of Money Laundering
• Three Stages of the Money Laundering Cycle
• Structuring
• Microstructuring
• Casinos
• Online Casinos
• Real Estate
• Vehicle Sales
• Travel Agencies
• Legal Professionals
• Precious Metals & Fine Art
Red Flags & Indicators
• Indicators of Money Laundering Using Electronic Transfers of Funds
• Casino AML Behavioral Indicators
• Categories of Red Flags Using Legal Professionals
• Unusual Customer Behavior
• Unusual Customer Identification Circumstances
• Other Unusual Customer Activity
• Unusual Cash Transactions
• Unusual Noncash Deposits
• Unusual Activity for Virtual Currency
• Unusual Wire Transfer Transactions
• Additional Potential Indicators of Terrorist Financing (NZPFIU) | 1 |
| 4 | Firearm Drills & Qualifications
• Physical Fitness & Military Effectiveness
• Rifle Drills Exercises
• The El Presidente Drill
• Failure to Stop Drill (aka Mozambique Drill)
• The Dozier Drill
• FBI Pistol Qualification (Revised 2013)
• FBI Pistol Qualification (Revised 2019)
• FBI Pistol Qualification (Revised 2025)
• US Federal Air Marshal Pistol Qualification
• ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) Pistol Qualification
• Train As You Fight
• Facts of Police Close Quarter Shooting
• Gunsite 250 Pistol Course
• Gunsite 223 Carbine Course
Medical
• Basic Management Plan for Care Under Fire/Threat
• Tactical Combat Casualty Care
• Doc Spears | Combat Lifesaver (CLS)
Military & Warfare
• Adaptive Traits of Nonstate Groups
• STEMPLES+
• Green Beret 1960's Gabriel Demonstration
• The Covert Action Ladder
• 2002 Millennium Challenge
• Rules of Recon
• Defining Terrorism
• Types of Insurgencies
• David Galula's Four Laws of Counterinsurgency
• Counterinsurgency Strategies (Cold)
• Counterinsurgency Strategies (Hot)
Psychological Warfare
• Core Psychological Warfare Techniques: Mechanisms and Countermeasures
• Core Cognitive Biases Exploited in Influence Operations
• Cognitive Warfare vs Traditional PSYOP
• Jacque Ellul's Definition of Propaganda
• Considerations in Propaganda Production
• Contemporary Model for Russian Propaganda
• Divisions of Propaganda Analysis
• Using the DISARM Red Framework to develop information manipulation & influence tactics for widespread adoption
• Black, White, Grey Propaganda Defined
• Symbol Theory
• Symbolic Psychology
• Symbol Theory in Psychology
• Faith Conversion
• Key Indicators of Iatrogenic Influence | 231 |
| 5 | HUMINT
• Agent Recruitment Cycle
• Information to Assess
• Motivations
• Vulnerabilities
• Robert Cialdini's Six Principles of Influence
• Reciprocity
• Authority
• Scarcity
• Consistency
• Likeability
• Social Proof
• Social Penetration Theory
• Motivation Theories
• Personality Theories
• Cognition Theories
Counterintelligence
• Understanding Foreign Interference in 5 Steps
• The Critical Pathway: Behavioral Model of Insider Threat
• Insider Threat Psychological Pressures
• Detecting Deception
• Understanding Elicitation
• Elicitation Techniques
• Deflecting Elicitation
• Identifying Surveillance — TEDD
• Methods of Contact / Methods of Operation Matrix
• (((Saul Alinsky)))'s Rules for Radicals
• Agents Provocateurs
• Motivation Theories
• Personality Theories
• Cognition Theories
• FBI Informant Recruitment (2, 3)
• MICE Matrix (RICE)
• Benefits of Double Agent Operations
• Double Agent Red Flags
• Barium Meal
Deception / Counterdeception
• Deception Planning Methodology
• Misleading vs Ambiguity Increasing Deception
• Four Fundamental Principles of Deception
• Your OODA Loop
• Adversary OODA Loop
• How the Adversary Views Your OODA Loop
• Targeting a Decision Maker
• Targeting an Intelligence Service
• Targeting a Defined Group
• Rational Models
• Administrative Models
• Emotional Models
• The Thirty-Six Strategems
• Strategic Deception (Godson & Wirtz)
• Outcome Scenarios | 198 |
| 6 |  "We must develop effective espionage and counter espionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us."
Systems Thinking & Cognitive Training
• Dunning-Kruger Effect
• Dual Process Theory
• Watching vs Observing
• Critical Thinking
• Cognitive Biases & Heurstics
• Strategic Thinking Competencies
• Strategic Thinking Enablers
• Strategic Thinking Exercises
OPSEC
• Quick & Dirty OPSEC Guide
• The Forensic Evidence on Our Phones.mp3
• What Cell Companies Know About Us.mp3
• Mobile Device Threat Matrix
• Secure Messaging
• Cellebrite vs GrapheneOS Matrix
• Supply Chain Attack Mitigation
• Remove your credentials from data brokers
• Remove your credentials from breached data providers
• Traffic Analysis
• The CARVER Methodology
Law & Legal
• Never Talk to Law Enforcement
• How to Talk to Law Enforcement
• Omerta
Case Studies
• Black Hat 2013 | OPSEC Failures of Spies
• Black Hat 2017 | Ochko123 - How the Feds Caught Russian Mega-Carder Roman Seleznev
• DEF CON 22 | Dropping Docs on Darknets: How People Got Caught
• DEF CON 30 | Darknet OPSEC by a Veteran Darknet Vendor: Sam Bent
• RSA 2020 | When Cybercriminals with Good OpSec Attack
• Pompompurin
• IntelBroker | 233 |
| 7 |  We've lost ~15 subscribers in the last two days, almost all of them with Indian names or Indian profile pictures.
While we happily applaud the departure of Telegram's most obnoxious parasites, we simultaneously condemn in the harshest possible terms the arbitrary decision taken by the world's worst smelling government to censor its population of 1.5 billion monkeys from an entire portion of the internet and prevent the free flow of information.
Thank you for cleaning Telegram, IT Ministry of India, but we also hope you eat cow shit for being such censoring cunts. | 482 |
| 8 |  Core Cognitive Biases Exploited in Influence Operations | 576 |
| 9 |  Cognitive warfare is the strategic use of information, psychological manipulation, and digital technology to reshape how people think, not just what they think.
🌧 Traditional PSYOP aim to change what people believed about a specific situation.
☀️ Cognitive warfare targets the underlying cognitive architecture itself, the biases, emotional triggers, and mental shortcuts that govern how humans process any information, about anything, at any time.
❌ The goal isn't to win a single argument.
✔️ The goal is to degrade the opponent's capacity to reason clearly, trust institutions, and form coherent collective responses.
➡️ Technology is what made this leap possible.
Modern psychological warfare tactics now include computational propaganda, algorithmically targeted influence campaigns, and synthetic media—precision targeting through behavioral data, real-time feedback loops, platform algorithms that amplify outrage over accuracy, and AI-generated content at scale.
Tools that can reach millions of people simultaneously with content tailored to their individual psychological vulnerabilities. | 516 |
| 10 |  Core Psychological Warfare Techniques: Mechanisms and Countermeasures
Main technique categories:
• Propaganda and disinformation
• Fear and intimidation
• Deception and misdirection
• Cognitive exploitation
➡️ Each targets a different layer of the human mind.
💡 Together, they can erode social cohesion, paralyze decision-making, and turn a population against its own government without a single shot fired. | 450 |
| 11 |  Key Indicators of Iatrogenic Influence
Within information operations, there is potential for an operation to result in iatrogenic influence.
➡️ Iatrogenic influence is when information operations produce outcomes contrary to their intent.
Iatrogenic influence primarily occurs:
• When there is a lack of credibility within the target audience
• A lack of planning by disseminating forces
• Information fratricide contradicting other messaging
⚠️ Information fratricide occurs when different information-related capabilities inadvertently conflict, undermining each other's effectiveness.
An information campaign to counter adversary propaganda may inadvertently amplify adversary messages if it fails to anticipate how the target audience processes information, particularly among broad general audiences. | 576 |
| 12 | Finagle's Five Laws of Information
• Law I: The information you have is not what you want.
• Law II: The information you want is not what you need.
• Law III: The information you need is not what you can obtain.
• Law IV: The information you can obtain costs more than you want to pay.
• Law V: What you are willing to pay will get you exactly that information you already have. | 679 |
| 13 |  Friendly Reminder:
• Absorb the information
• Dissect and deconstruct
• Repurpose for your use (offense)
• Safeguard against it (defense) | 968 |
| 14 |  The expansion of the Islamic Faith-and-Empire provides a great deal of procedural information which cannot be neglected.
It has been said that men's faith should not be destroyed by violence, and that force alone is insufficient to change the minds of men.
In reality warfare by Mohammed's captains and successors demonstrated two principles of long-range psychological warfare which are still valid today:
1) A people can be converted from one faith to the other if given the choice between conversion and extermination, stubborn individuals being rooted out.
To effect the initial conversion, participation in the public ceremonies and formal language of the new faith must be required. Sustained counterintelligence must remain on the alert against backsliders, but formal acceptance will become genuine acceptance if all public media of expression are denied the vanquished faith.
2) If immediate wholesale conversion would require military operations that were too extensive or severe, the same result can be effected by toleration of the objectionable faith, combined with the issuance of genuine privileges to the new, preferred faith.
The conquered people are left in the private, humble enjoyment of their old beliefs and folkways; but all participation in public life, whether political, cultural or economic, is conditioned on acceptance of the new faith.
In this manner, all up-rising members of the society will move in a few generations over to the new faith in the process of becoming rich, powerful, or learned; what is left of the old faith will be a gutter superstition, possessing neither power nor majesty.
The former process is difficult and bloody, but quick; the latter is as sure as a steam-roller.
➡️ If people are put in a position of underprivilege and shame for their beliefs, and if the door is left open to voluntary conversion, so that anyone who wants to can come over to the winning side, the winning side will sooner or later convert almost everyone who is capable of making trouble.
• In the language of Vilfredo Pareto, this would probably be termed "capture of the rising elite"
• In the language of present-day Marxists, this would be described as "utilization of potential leadership cadres from historically superseded classes"
• In the language of practical politics, it means "cut in the smart boys from the opposition, so that they can't set up a racket of their own." | 791 |
| 15 |  Migration done, you can use the /export feature. If you find bugs/exploits please report them to @ContactAkulaBot and we will give you tokens. Performance test will be open in a few days (hopefully).
If you need tokens, please message @StrategicServices or contribute to the project by sending files to @ContactAkulaBot.
2.3 is a major step to get something useful running on akula.st akula.cx, besides the /export feature. We will send out a roadmap update once all the bugs are found. | 768 |
| 16 | 2.04 GB of structured data from LexisNexis AWS infrastructure
17 VPC databases, AWS Secrets Manager, and the Qualtrics survey platform
536 Redshift tables
430+ VPC database tables
Complete AWS Secrets Manager with 53 secrets
3.9 million database records
Approximately 400,000 cloud user profiles with real names, emails, phone numbers, and job functions — including 118 users with .gov email addresses: federal judges, DOJ attorneys, SEC staff, and federal court law clerks.
-Courtesy of Fulcrumsec | 1 040 |
| 17 | Although some of these may not make sense to the newfags reading this, for many of us, /board/ culture has been highly influential throughout the internet.
For all those who forgot, chose to ignore, or never knew to begin with:
Rules of the Internet
1. Do not talk about /b/
2. Do NOT talk about /b/
3. We are Anonymous
4. Anonymous is legion
5. Anonymous never forgives
6. Anonymous can be a horrible, senseless, uncaring monster
7. Anonymous is still able to deliver
8. There are no real rules about posting
9. There are no real rules about moderation either - enjoy your ban
10. If you enjoy any rival sites - DON'T
11. All your carefully picked arguments can easily be ignored
12. Anything you say can and will be used against you
13. Anything you say can be turned into something else - fixed
14. Do not argue with trolls - it means that they win
15. The harder you try the harder you will fail
16. If you fail in epic proportions, it may just become a winning failure
17. Every win fails eventually
18. Everything that can be labeled can be hated
19. The more you hate it the stronger it gets
20. Nothing is to be taken seriously
21. Original content is original only for a few seconds before getting old
22. Copypasta is made to ruin every last bit of originality
23. Copypasta is made to ruin every last bit of originality
24. Every repost it always a repost of a repost
25. Relation to the original topic decreases with every single post
26. Any topic can easily be turned into something totally unrelated
27. Always question a person's sexual prefrences without any real reason
28. Always question a person's gender - just incase it's really a man
29. In the internet all girls are men and all kids are undercover FBI agents
30. There are no girls on the internet
31. TITS or GTFO - the choice is yours
32. You must have pictures to prove your statements
33. Lurk more - it's never enough
34. There is porn of it, no exceptions
35. If no porn is found at the moment, it will be made
36. There will always be even more fucked up shit than what you just saw
37. You can not divide by zero (just because the calculator says so)
38. No real limits of any kind apply here - not even the sky
39. CAPSLOCK IS CRUISE CONTROL FOR COOL
40. EVEN WITH CRUISE CONTROL YOU STILL HAVE TO STEER
41. Desu isn't funny. Seriously guys. It's worse than Chuck Norris jokes.
42. Nothing is Sacred.
43. The more beautiful and pure a thing is - the more satisfying it is to corrupt it
44. Even one positive comment about Japanese things can make you a weaboo
45. When one sees a lion, one must get into the car.
46. There is always furry porn of it.
47. The pool is always closed. | 1 987 |
| 18 | Studies in Intelligence is a quarterly peer-reviewed academic journal on intelligence that is published by the Center for the Study of Intelligence, a group within the United States Central Intelligence Agency.
➡️ It contains both classified and unclassified articles on the methodology and history of the field of intelligence gathering.
*This upload contains all available PDF excerpts from 1992 — current. | 1 155 |
| 19 |  New core features for 2.3
— Exports up to 500.000 records (this might change)
— Over 120 billion records in total
— Transfer account ownership
➡️ Please keep sending files that you find on Telegram to @ContactAkulaBot
Things are moving really slow and I personally want to apologize for that. This is not a business for us, so we can only work on it after our jobs and personal responsibilities are handled.
— Frank
🔺🔺🔺
Official Links: akula.st / akula.cx | 1 029 |
| 20 |  +8Leaked Content Guidelines for Telegram Mod Stage II Clarifications.
These are the actual, official guidelines Telegram gives to their tranny janny volunteer force.
➡️ You can also apply for the very tedious, low paying mod jobs.
🙂 With enough work, it may pay off in other opportunities.
1) Use a Telegram account from a low income, third world country—They won't even consider you if you're not using a account with a phone # from an underdeveloped nation.
2) Go through the application process. Use: @jobs_bot (telegram.org/jobs)
3) Input false but plausible information—nothing actually gets verified.
4) ???????????
5) PROFIT!!!!1!! | 1 123 |
