اکنون در دسترس! پژوهش تلگرام ۲۰۲۵ — مهمترین بینشهای سال 
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پستهای کانال
Repost from IASExam-Congress
@shunyashashvata
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| 2 |  Article by Prof C Raja Mohan on India's changing relationship with west:
➡️India’s primary foreign policy challenge no longer lies in navigating between the "West and the Rest" (or choosing between BRICS and Western forums).
➡️Instead, its critical diplomatic imperative is navigating the rapid, volatile, and unexpected structural changes happening "within the West itself," driven primarily by a resurgent, unilateralist United States.
➡️The task of Indian diplomacy is to manage these changes with patience and calm.
➡️Restructuring the economy, modernising the defence industrial base, revitalising the technological ecosystem
Article link 🔗
https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/india-west-g7-modi-trump-macaron-carney-10742709/ | 293 |
| 3 | Article by Prof C Raja Mohan on US-Iran deal end the elusive quest for ‘New Middle East’:
➡️Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the United States and Iran represents an ambitious attempt to redefine relations locked in confrontation since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
➡️It signals that the old regional order has been deeply shaken and a "profound transition" is underway in Middle Eastern geopolitics.
➡️Unlike the 2015 JCPOA, which focused almost exclusively on Iran's nuclear program, this new MoU goes beyond the nuclear question. It attempts to build a wider framework for managing US-Iran tensions.
➡️The idea of a “new Middle East” has been an elusive one. The Oslo peace process in the 1990s, the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Arab Spring of 2011, and the Abraham Accords of 2020 were all presented as decisive turning points. Yet each produced outcomes very different from those originally envisaged
➡️A primary structural driver is the changing political consensus in Washington → growing fatigue with America's long military involvements, a widespread demand to end "forever wars," , questions of USA’s Israel’s Policy.
➡️New Delhi must strategically pivot "from a risk-averse policy to an active role in stabilising regional politics in the Middle East," acting independently as well as in coalition with partner nations.
Article link 🔗
https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/us-iran-mou-middle-east-geopolitics-10741229/ | 641 |
| 4 |  بدون متن... | 585 |
| 5 | Article by Prof Happymon Jacob on India’s Grand Strategy of Strategic Autonomy:
➡️A state's autonomy is fundamentally a function of its national power, not its political declarations.
➡️ Theorizing strategic autonomy without its material foundation is akin to "theorising nuclear deterrence without possessing nuclear weapons."
➡️India faces a unique structural paradox driven by its physical size and global ambitions:
->Ambition (continental landmass, two nuclear-armed adversaries, a maritime arc, and a billion-plus population) pushes India to claim strategic autonomy.
->Dependence (an extensive external dependence portfolio) prevents India from fully exercising it.
➡️The Middle East-Energy; a great China-Mfg; US - Tech and Capital; Russia - Defence+Oil ; and France and Israel (and increasingly the US) - high end military ware.
➡️Time has come to focus less on “strategic autonomy” and focus more on “strategic capacity”: the ability to produce, deploy, replace, and sustain in the critical domains of the country.
➡️True strategic autonomy is a product of strategic capacity.
Article link 🔗
https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/grand-strategy-the-material-limits-of-strategic-autonomy-101781514498686-amp.html | 912 |
| 6 | @iasexamcongress is running two courses for Mains 2026
CRUX (Current Affairs module) for Mains-2026 starts in full swing from tomorrow onwards.
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@Shunyashashvata | 708 |
| 7 |  Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be attending the G-7 summit next week in France:
➡️India’s engagement with the G7 has undergone a profound structural shift, transitioning from a "guest" (a peripheral participant) to a "strategic partner" (a pivotal player).
➡️A defining feature of India’s new vision towards Europe is the concept of the Indo-Mediterranean an emerging geostrategic framework connecting the Indian Ocean with Europe.
➡️ India, as G-20 chair, launched the India-Middle East Economic Corridor (IMEC)
➡️The Indo-Mediterranean vision could eventually give rise to an “Indo Atlantic” strategic space as a western counterpart to the Indo Pacific
➡️Unlike the Belt and Road Initiative by China, the Indo-Mediterranean vision has a role for every participating nation.
Article link 🔗
https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/india-g7-summit-indo-mediterranean-strategic-vision-10736777/lite/ | 1 399 |
| 8 | India and the Global South by Ambassador Ashok Sajjanhar | 1 541 |
| 9 | Article by Prof Harsh V Pant and Sayanthan Haldar on Challenges for India in IOR:
Indian Ocean region is fast emerging as a critical hotbed of geo-economic opportunities and geopolitical contention.
As a resident Indian Ocean power, India is a key player in the region, especially in shaping its maritime security architecture by emerging as a preferred security partner or first responder.
China’s actions in the Indo-Pacific present distinct and diverse maritime security challenges:
➡️ In the Pacific region , Confrontational behaviour with countries like Phillipines in South China Sea(Cartographic Aggression).
➡️ In Indian Ocean , more nuanced and and calibrated approach (China is not a littoral Power) --> fostering developmental partnerships, while deploying dual-use survey vessels to gather military intelligence.
➡️ Under OBOR Investing in infrastructure, offering financial assistance — often involving predatory lending ( String of Pearls to encircle India )
➡️ China also seeks to project its power as a lead through the China-Indian Ocean Forum.
India’s multifaceted strategy to respond to Beijing’s inroads in its strategic backyard is characterized by three key approaches:
▶️ Distinctly define the nature of New Delhi’s partnership with Indian Ocean littoral countries, emerging as a partner rather than a provider.
▶️ Foster regional cooperation through groupings like IORA, CSC etc.
▶️ Advance naval capabilities like hosting multinational Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region.
https://www.orfonline.org/research/rising-to-the-china-challenge | 1 938 |
| 10 |  Article by Prof Kanti Bajpai on India-US Relations:
The special relationship has withered because America has changed its view of India:
1.Europe (The Western Flank): The war in Ukraine demonstrated to the US that India would not act as a "diplomatic brake" on Russian adventurism.
2.The Energy-Rich Gulf: While India attempted a larger strategic role positioning itself as a security provider by deepening economic and defense ties, USA looked at Pakistan.
3.China/Asia : The US originally hoped India would play a large "balancing role" against Beijing.
America’s China challenge has also changed, It is less about Taiwan and Asia and more about economic and technological competition in commerce (the trade deficit), chips, computer software (AI), and critical minerals.
In the US view, India is not a crucial player.
The US-India special relationship is now cold-eyed transactionalism.
Article link 🔗
https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/us-india-special-relationship-trump-xi-modi-10730039/ | 1 990 |
| 11 |  Article by Prof Happymon Jacob on Reviving SAARC:
Reasons why New Delhi should take the lead in reviving SAARC:
➡️ China has steadily deepened its footprint across South Asia via ports, loans, power grids, and ships, reaching nearly every capital except New Delhi and Thimphu.
➡️ South Asia is among the least integrated regions in the world [5% in S Asia vs 25% in S-E Asia].
A South Asian free trade agreement exists on paper and goes largely unused. Activating it would lower costs for consumers, open markets for Indian firms, and benefit the eastern and northern borderlands most.
➡️ Minilateral forums that India enthusiastically embraced in place of SAARC are themselves under great strain[ QUAD , IMEC , I2U2 , INSTC , BRICS(becoming instrument for Beijing) ]
Revived SAARC will not change the region’s geopolitical context overnight, but it can keep the neighbourhood from drifting further towards China.
Finally, it allows New Delhi to put its region in order while the global order is breaking up. | 1 829 |
| 12 | https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/very-special-relationship-jaishankar-calls-for-decisive-shift-in-indianepal-ties-kathmandu-signals-reset-says-no-old-baggage/articleshow/131556145.cms | 1 739 |
| 13 | When the Taliban regained power in Afghanistan, Pakistani establishment saw it as creating 'a new bloc' — paving the way for the realisation of 'strategic depth': the idea that a friendly government in Kabul would provide security leverage against India. However, this vision of 'strategic depth' proved shortsighted.
The Taliban demonstrated a degree of autonomy that defied Pakistan's expectations, pursuing a more independent regional approach rather than aligning closely with Islamabad's strategic interests.
Afghanistan's re-engagement with India has added a layer of anxiety to Pakistani strategic and security thinking. New Delhi has opened channels of engagement with the Taliban, upgrading its technical mission to a diplomatic mission following Afghan Foreign Minister Muttaqi's visit
From Islamabad's perspective, the prospect of deepening Afghanistan-India ties raises the fear of strategic encirclement.
South Asia is witnessing new alignments, with divergences between old allies (the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan) and convergences between new partners (India and the Afghan Taliban).
India, meanwhile, must leverage its engagement with the Taliban and its soft-power diplomacy to secure guarantees for its development projects and to ensure that anti-India groups are not allowed to operate from Afghan soil.
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/from-strategic-depth-to-strategic-breakdown-the-new-afghan-pakistan-crisis | 1 571 |
| 14 |  Article by DK Joshi on Importance of Great Nicobar Project:
➡️A state that does not secure its frontiers, alliances and trade routes cannot secure its future[Kautilya].
➡️For much of the post-Independence period, India's "strategic imagination remained heavily continental," which shadowed its maritime destiny.
➡️The project can support trade and strengthen national security, reduce dependence on foreign transshipment hubs, enhance India's maritime reach and serve as a gateway to SE Asia and platform for wider Indo Pacific.
➡️Across the IOR, powerful countries are expanding their presence through ports, naval assets, surveillance systems and economic corridors. India’s answer must be strategic consolidation.
➡️The Indo-Pacific century demands that India think as a maritime power as much as a continental one.
Article link 🔗
https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/great-nicobar-task-pursuing-national-security-with-ecological-responsibility-10722919/ | 1 559 |
| 15 |  Article by Prof C Raja Mohan on Japan's Changing foreign policy and lessons for India:
➡️ Japan’s post-World War II posture deliberately defining itself as a "peaceful nation," is drawing to a close.
➡️ This shift is driven by growing Chinese assertiveness and America's ambivalence in Asia especially regarding the defence of Taiwan.
➡️ At the Recent Shangri-La Dialogue Japan's Defence Min unveiled three broad directions:
--> Stepping up national defence spending and military modernisation.
--> Increasing defence cooperation with friendly nations.
--> Lifting historic restrictions on the export of arms.
The most visible symbol of this change is Japan's export of Mogami-class frigates to Australia and growing Japan-Aus-NZ axis in Indo Pacific.
➡️ Delhi must also engage with Washington where beneficial, while simultaneously enhancing collaboration with other regional player.
There is a growing structural struggle for a new BOP in Asia in an era defined by Chinese power and American reorientation. | 1 465 |
| 16 | https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/05/29/quad-australia-india-japan-us-security-pacific-strategy-china/
➡️Since the return of the Trump administration, talk of putting the
Quad on the back burner has grown;
However, the recent Foreign Minister-level meeting shows that much of the group's pomp and pretense has been stripped away. What remains is a more narrowly focused, self-interested, and therefore more credible grouping.
➡️It has streamlined its work to four security-related efforts: maritime security, economic security, critical and emerging technology, and emergency assistance.
➡️Recent meeting yielded potentially important outcomes on maritime security, with the announcement of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration (IPMSC) and a new maritime common operating picture.
➡️The QUAD’s trajectory is inextricably linked to the bilateral ties between its member nations, particularly the deepening U.S.-India strategic partnership. | 1 635 |
| 17 | Article by Prof Harsh V Pant on India-US Relations:
➡️The India-US partnership today is driven not by sentimentality but by converging structural interests. Both countries recognise the challenge posed by China’s rise, both seek resilient supply chains, technological competitiveness, and a stable Indo-Pacific maritime order.
➡️Unlike many other strategic partnerships, India-US ties possess a substantial societal dimension that often cushions political disagreements.
➡️New Delhi values closer ties with Washington but remains unwilling to become part of any overt treaty-based engagement. For the US, India is indispensable but also frustratingly independent. This tension is unlikely to disappear.
https://www.orfonline.org/research/a-new-lexicon-of-indo-us-ties | 1 508 |
| 18 | Article on Recent QUAD Foreign ministers Summit:
The Indo-Pacific has emerged as the world’s strategic and geo-economic centre of gravity, hosting critical sea lanes that carry over 50% of global trade and energy flow.
➡️United States: Perceived as the pillar of its Indo-Pacific strategy and a networked security architecture that substantiates American primacy in Asia to balance China without direct military confrontation
➡️India: Seeks to balance China due to its shared border and security calculus, and is strongly opposed to China’s design of carving out a unipolar Asia.
➡️Australia: Driven by Beijing's intimidating posturing, forcing AUS to expand strategic outreach and security partnerships, even while remaining heavily dependent on China economically.
➡️Japan: Views the Quad as an essential security imperative in response to tensions in the South China Sea caused by Beijing’s apparently expansionist designs.
Despite a compelling rationale, the Quad continuously grapples with a foundational question: Is it a strategic force multiplier or merely a mechanism for consultative dialogue?
Beijing strongly opposes the grouping. Historically dismissed by Wang Yi as "sea foam" that would dissipate
The Quad lacks a NATO-like collective defence mechanism, and there is no binding treaty obligation linking the partners.
Quad Foreign Ministers' meeting on May 26 attempted to break fresh ground by focusing on tangible geo-economic areas:
1.The Fiji Port Project: Announcing the development of port infrastructure in Fiji as its first joint project
2.Unveiling initiatives for enhanced maritime surveillance coordination, an energy security framework, and cooperation on critical minerals to reduce dependence
Way forward: To achieve organisational depth, the Quad must transition toward a permanent institutional architecture, enhanced military interoperability, synergised technology partnerships, and strengthened maritime capacity building in the Indo-Pacific.
The real test of the Quad is not whether it transforms into an "Asian NATO," but whether four distinct democracies, with varying national interests, can sustain strategic cooperation in the era of great power competition.
Article link 🔗
https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/why-quad-lacks-momentum-takeaways-delhi-meet-10713094/ | 1 723 |
| 19 |  بدون متن... | 1 204 |
| 20 |  Sanjaya Baru argues India-US relationship moved from estrangement to engagement to restrained democracies, with Trump's transactionalism and weaponised trade hurting Indian strategic interests. | 1 471 |
