Slavyangrad Analytica ☭

Specially written/translated texts, genuine news, analysis, and insight in relation to the war in the Donbass and the wider global struggle against Empire and fascism. https://slavyangrad.org/ "Tout anticommuniste est un chien" J-P. Sartre

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ER - نسبت تعامل

در حال بارگیری داده...

⬆️⬆️⬆️⬆️⬆️ In relation to the four potential aims of the current operation outlined above: 1) The current troop commitment is nowhere near even coming close to what would be required to even partially encircle Kharkov, let alone to take the city (Ukraine's second largest). It is, of course, possible that more troops will be committed to the front at a later date; but the commitment needed to achieve this goal would be pushing 100k troops—a full third of the supposed figures achieved by the last mobilization in the RF. At the moment, at least, this looks highly unlikely. 2) The distance from Volchansk/Vovchansk to Kupyansk is 95km by the shortest road. After roughly a week of the new "offensive", RF troops have yet to fully liberate Volchansk. It appears they have also yet to take Lyptsi, a much smaller settlement. If they were to proceed at the same rate, it would take a very considerable amount of time before they could reach the rear of Kupyansk. It would also be necessary to maintain a very significant number of troops and materiel around Kharkov to protect the rear and to pin down Ukrainian reserves from attacking the flanks of any such thrust towards Kupyansk. 3) It is not possible to establish a cordon sanitaire that will protect Belgorod and its border regions simply by liberating and occupying a band of territory between the border and Kharkov. Ukraine has enough artillery and missiles that would still be able to reach Belgorod itself, not to mention its border regions. It may well be possible to reduce the frequency of such attacks by establishing this cordon sanitaire, but this says nothing about the potential intensity of those strikes, the last of which, for example, was one of the more severe. 4) In light of all the above, it does indeed seem most likely that the intention of this new front is as suggested in the post above. As a postscript, and in relation to what I've said here about the pace of operations and the possibility of advancing to the rear of Kupyansk: the Ukrainian assault on Rabotino has consistently been held up as a laughing stock among those on "our side". The amount of time and resources spent by the Ukrainian Army in taking and then holding this small settlement is indeed absurd, for extremely limited territorial and tactical gain. But it should also be noted by those on "our side" that the RF Armed Forces have spent almost as long (if not longer) and almost as much in resources on retaking/liberating Rabotino. And it would appear, from what the post above says, that the liberation of Rabotino has only now been secured due to the opening of a new front in another theatre. Besides, Rabotino has long since ceased to exist in any meaningful sense as a human settlement. There are lessons here for "our side" both in terms of the need for strategic campaigning in order to shift a largely stagnant front line, and in terms of "first cast out the beam out of thine own eye".

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So, the Northern Front is open. Russian troops have been advancing in the Kharkov region for several days. There are successes, populated areas have been liberated, the front line is moving forward. Of course, not with 10 divisions and not 250 km along the front, only 35-50 thousand and 50 km. But this is also very important and necessary. The offensive may have several goals: 1) To cover the flanks and take Kharkov; 2) To advance to the rear of the AFU grouping near Kupyansk and collapse the front there; 3) To create a cordon sanitaire, move the line of contact further away from Belgorod in order to reduce the opportunities for shelling of our territories; 4) To stretch the front line and divert reserves from other directions. So far option 4) looks the most likely. However—we don't know the strategic plan. The enemy also doesn’t know it. With the opening of the Northern Front, Russia completely seized the strategic initiative. We can attack wherever we want, and the enemy is forced to only react by transferring its limited reserves. Most likely as a result of the limited reserves of the AFU and the opening of a new front, our troops were able, for example, to take Rabotino. In other areas our situation also may improve. What’s also important and interesting: from what I know, we can conclude that in the Kharkov direction, our troops were able to achieve at least parity, and even—possibly—superiority in UAVs. And in modern conditions this is key to the success of the operation. https://t.me/germansadulaev/2418

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Герман Садулаев

Итак, северный фронт открыт. Российские войска уже несколько дней наступают в Харьковской области. Есть успехи, освобождены населённые пункты, линия фронта продвигается. Конечно, не 10 дивизий и не 250 км по фронту, а всего 35-50 тыс и 50 км. Но и это очень важно и нужно. Целей у наступления может быть несколько: 1) охватить с флангов и взять Харьков 2) зайти в тыл группировке ВФУ под Купянском и обрушить фронт там 3) создать "санитарную зону", отодвинуть ЛБС от Белгорода, с тем, чтобы уменьшить возможности для обстрела наших территорий 4) растянуть линию фронта и отвлечь резервы с других направлений. Пока вариант 4) выглядит самым вероятным. Но. Стратегического плана мы не знаем. И враг не знает. С открытием северного фронта Россия полностью овладела стратегической инициативой. Мы можем наступать где хотим, а враг вынужден только реагировать, перебрасывая ограниченные резервы. Вероятно, из-за ограниченности резервов у ВФУ и открытия нового фронта наши смогли, например, взять Работино. И на других участках…

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Join the Analytica discussion channel https://t.me/+JOxJHjnWV1w5MTdh

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Slavyangrad Analytica Discussion

The Discussion Forum for @SLGAnalytica "The world outside the Soviet Union is governed by madmen." Maksim Gorkiy

It would appear that either there is some kind of generalised "clean up" underway in the RF Ministry of Defence, or that personnel associated with a certain group or tendency or clique are being rooted out.

The detention of the Chief Personnel Officer of the Ministry of Defence, Lieutenant General Yuri Kuznetsov, has been confirmed. He was arrested on suspicion of bribery. Kuznetsov's home and work have already been searched. More than 100 million rubles, coins, currency, collectible watches and “luxury items” were seized. According to official information from the Investigative Committee, Kuznetsov received bribes from representatives of commercial structures in the period from 2021 to 2023. Rybar previously wrote that the lieutenant general’s case is connected with the fact that he was involved in protecting state secrets. Incidentally, Kuznetsov became the head of the Main Personnel Directorate in the Moscow Region only a year ago. Before that, he headed the 8th Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces for 13 years. This department is responsible for protecting state secrets.

https://t.me/YourNewsTalk/38274

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ВАШИ НОВОСТИ

Подтверждено задержание главного кадровика Минобороны генерал-лейтенанта Юрия Кузнецова. Он арестован по подозрению во взятке У Кузнецова дома и на работе уже провели обыски. Изъяли более 100 млн рублей, монеты, валюту, коллекционные часы и «предметы роскоши». По официальной информации от Следкома, Кузнецов получил взятку от представителей коммерческих структур в период с 2021 по 2023 год. «Рыбарь» ранее писал, что дело генерал-лейтенанта связано с тем, что он занимался защитой гостайны. Кстати, начальником Главного управления кадров в МО Кузнецов стал только год назад. А до этого он 13 лет руководил 8-м управлением Генштаба ВС РФ. Это управление как раз и занимается защитой гостайны.

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⬆️⬆️⬆️⬆️⬆️ Incidentally, the map shows quite clearly where the "first defensive line" is in the Kharkov direction, to which Ukrainian troops allegedly "retreated". It also shows quite clearly where the current fighting is taking place.

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Let's look at the relief map of the Kharkov direction. It is important to understand that the battles are still taking place in the ‘forefield’, or in the support zone of the defence line. We learned all this well on the Southern Front last summer: Rabotino, Vremyevka—this is entirely the ‘forefield’ of our defence line, the Surovikin line. Beyond it, we had either one main line of fortifications, as in the Vremyevka direction, or two, as in all the others. At the same time, our forefield was very powerful: filled with minefields, with several echelons of strongholds, and, as a result, for six months the enemy could not even approach the main defensive line. Ukraine, of course, has thinner resources, which is why their forefield is more frail (Ukrainian soldiers complain in telegram channels that though on paper there are minefields on the border, in fact there were none), and the main line of fortifications—all those dragon’s teeth and concrete dugouts—are not everywhere completed. So, if, beyond Volchansk, on satellite images, the line [3] is clearly visible, then sections [1, along the border of the Olkhovaya Balka forest] and [2] are in an unclear state. Do they even exist at all? The second question is the troops. The most powerful fortifications are nothing unless filled with infantry. While the fighting is going on in the forefield, the Ukrainian Armed Forces can manage to saturate the main lines with troops. But the problem is that they don’t have enough troops for everything, and they need to determine the direction of our main attack in order to direct their main forces and means against it—naturally, at the expense of other directions. Russia also has not yet deployed their main troops, and it is not a given that they even will deploy them here, and not somewhere in the Donbass or even towards Sumy. We have a classic competition between two general staffs, and the outcome of the campaign largely depends on who beats whom in this correspondence chess match. Russia holds the advantage inasmuch as it holds the strategic initiative. We believe that we will avail ourselves of it better than the Ukrainian Armed Forces did a year ago. https://t.me/vatfor/9322

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Ватфор | Автострадный think tank

Посмотрим на карту Харьковского направления с высотами. Важно понимать, что бои пока ведутся в предполье, или в полосе обеспечения линии обороны. Мы все это хорошо выучили по Южному фронту прошлым летом: Работино, Времеевка — это все предполье нашей обороны, линии Суровикина. Вслед за ним у нас шла либо одна основная полоса укреплений на Времеевском направлении, либо две — на всех остальных. При этом предполье у нас было очень могучим: насыщенным минными полями, с несколькими эшелонами опорных пунктов, и в итоге за полгода к главной линии обороны противник почти нигде даже не смог подойти. У Украины, понятное дело, ресурс пожиже, поэтому и предполье более хилое (укробойцы жалуются в телеграмах, что минные поля на границе по документам есть, а по факту их не оказалось), и основная линия укреплений, все эти зубья дракона и бетонные блиндажи, не везде готова. Так, если за Волчанском на спутниковых снимках вполне читается линия [3], то участки [1, по границе леса Ольховая балка] и [2] в непонятном состоянии, существуют ли они вообще? Второй вопрос — войска. Самые мощные укрепления — ничто без пехотного наполнения. Пока идут бои в предполье, ВСУ могут успеть насытить войсками основные линии. Но проблема в том, что войск на всё у них не хватает, и им нужно определять направление нашего главного удара, чтобы направить против него основные силы и средства — разумеется, за счет других направлений. Наши же тоже пока не ввели свои основные войска, и не факт, что введут они их здесь, а не где-нибудь на Донбассе или вовсе под Сумами. Имеем классическое соревнование двух генеральных штабов, и от того, кто кого переиграет в этой заочной партии, во многом зависит исход кампании. У нас — преимущество как у владеющих стратегической инициативой. Верим, что мы его реализуем лучше, чем ВСУ год назад.

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⚡️ New Minister of Defence The change at the head of the Defence Ministry is a significant event for modern Russia, which could herald the beginning of systemic changes in the army. We decided to ask the experts what tasks Andrei Beloüsov will have to solve in his new position and whether the course of the SMO will change under his leadership. 🔴 Sergey Poletaev, co-founder of the Vatfor | Freeway think tank:

Peskov explained exhaustively yesterday: [Beloüsov’s main task will be] the control and effective use of a huge financial flow (6.7% of GDP). Without such controls, our economy faces problems similar to those of the late eighties. That is, this is a preparation for a long confrontation at the current level of spending, which should become, if you like, the systemic background, and coexist with the full development of state and society. All colleagues who participate in the SMO on a voluntary basis expect that they will now be given KPIs [Key Performance Indicators –ed.] and be forced to write reports and presentations. Seriously, though, I expect a deep reform of the rear (after all, Shoigu’s resignation was preceded by the arrest of the prominent ‘rear man’ Ivanov), but the General Staff and the officer corps have not yet been explicitly touched. While Gerasimov is in place, I don’t expect any significant changes at the front. [At most] It’s possible there will be an expansion or a shift in emphasis in certain operations. In the worst case, a conflict between ‘uniforms’ and ‘suits’ is possible, but it is to be hoped this will be avoided.

🔴 Alexander Khazaridi, political scientist, deputy head of the department of external communications of the Polylog Group:

The President's proposal to approve Andrei Beloüsov as Defence Minister came as a surprise to most experts and observers. Someone even called this move a strategic ace in the hole, since Beloüsov at the head of the military department at the current moment looks very promising. Regarding Beloüsov himself, he is, of course, one of the most prominent federal officials of recent years. Primarily, his activities are related to economics. He is described as a statist: both in ideological and in economic terms. But it is worth understanding that Beloüsov is a civilian minister, so the presidential press secretary immediately emphasised that the appointment of the ex-deputy prime minister is associated with an increase in military spending. Decoding Dmitry Peskov, the growth of the military-industrial complex in the Russian economy requires audit and competent management. This is where we need one of the main specialists in the country with the necessary competencies in order to correctly integrate the growing economy of the security bloc into the economy of the state.

https://t.me/polylog_expertise/1826

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Полилог. Экспертиза

⚡️ Новый министр обороны Смена главы оборонного ведомства — знаковое для современной России событие, способное означать начало системных изменений в армии. Мы решили узнать у экспертов, какие задачи предстоит решить Андрею Белоусову на новой должности и изменится ли ход СВО под его руководством? 🔴 Сергей Полетаев, сооснователь проекта «Ватфор | Автострадный think tank»: Песков вчера сказал исчерпывающе: контроль и эффективное использование огромного финансового потока (6,7% ВВП). Без такого контроля нашей экономике грозят проблемы, аналогичные поздним восьмидесятым. То есть, это подготовка к длительному противостоянию на нынешнем уровне расходов, которое должно стать системным, если угодно, фоновым и уживаться с полноценным развитием государства и общества. Все коллеги, участвующие в СВО на добровольных началах, ждут, что теперь им спустят KPI и заставят писать отчеты и презентации. Если серьезно, то я ожидаю глубокой реформы тыла (все-таки отставке Шойгу предшествовал арест видного тыловика Иванова), а…

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I read what Belarus writes:

Dear friends! Today Belarus celebrates the Day of the National Flag, Emblem and Anthem. Our state symbols are direct successors to the symbols of the BSSR. And rightly so. After all, it was during the Soviet era that modern Belarusian statehood was formed. Most of our flag is red. The scarlet cloth is directly related to the revolutionary era when the Soviet republic arose. To spite the Polish occupiers, red flags were hung on factory chimneys and rooftops by underground members of Western Belarus. Our State Flag incorporates the banners of partisan brigades and units of the Red Army of the Great Patriotic War, and it also reflects the Victory Banner. The ornament on the flag is also associated with revolutionary times. It was woven in 1917 by a simple peasant woman Matryona Markevich. It is based on the “Rising Sun” pattern, which is also very symbolic. The color green is strongly associated with national wealth—woods and forests. The glorious achievements of the post-war era are associated with Soviet symbols: the restoration of the country, great construction projects, our first cosmonauts, the flourishing of culture, science and art, membership in the UN. The majority of Belarusians have never thrown dirt or stones at the Soviet past. The history of the BSSR is dear to us. Without her, there would be no modern Republic of Belarus. Therefore, as a sign of continuity as the basis for confident movement forward, in 1995, at the proposal of the President, our people chose the current flag and coat of arms. In 2020, when Belarus was challenged, we rallied around our President and around state symbols. We have such a beautiful country! And the same beautiful, proud symbols: the flag, coat of arms and anthem. Happy holiday!

Happy holiday, brothers. You're so great. Look at the pattern: Ukraine abandoned everything Soviet and became an enclave of Russophobia. But Belarus has preserved the Soviet legacy and is the most Russophile country in the post-Soviet space. https://t.me/germansadulaev/2402

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Герман Садулаев

Читаю, что пишет Беларусь: «Дорогие друзья! Сегодня в Беларуси отмечается День Государственного флага, герба и гимна. Наши государственные символы являются прямыми преемниками символики БССР. И это справедливо. Ведь именно в советскую эпоху сформировалась современная белорусская государственность. Большая часть нашего знамени красного цвета. Алое полотнище напрямую связано с революционной эпохой, когда возникла советская республика. Красные флаги назло польским оккупантам вывешивали на заводских трубах и крышах домов подпольщики Западной Беларуси. Наш Государственный флаг вобрал в себя знамёна партизанских бригад и частей Красной Армии Великой Отечественной войны, в нем и отражение Знамени Победы. Орнамент на флаге тоже связан с революционным временем. Он был выткан в 1917 году простой крестьянкой Матрёной Маркевич. В основе - узор "Восходящее солнце", что тоже весьма символично. Зелёный цвет прочно ассоциируется с национальным богатством - лесами и пущами. С советскими символами связаны славные достижения послевоенной эпохи: восстановление страны, великие стройки, наши первые космонавты, расцвет культуры, науки и искусства, членство в ООН. Белорусы в своём большинстве никогда не бросали ни грязь, ни камни в советское прошлое. Нам дорога история БССР. Без неё не было бы и современной Республики Беларусь. Потому в знак преемственности как основы уверенного движения вперёд в 1995 году, по предложению Президента, наш народ и избрал нынешние флаг и герб. В 2020 году, когда Беларуси был брошен вызов, мы сплотились вокруг нашего Президента и вокруг государственных символов. У нас такая красивая страна! И такие же красивые, гордые символы: флаг, герб и гимн. С праздником!» С праздником, братья. Вы такие молодцы. Смотрите, какая закономерность. Украина отказалась от всего советского - и стала анклавом русофобии. А Белорусия сохранила советское наследство - и является самой русофильской страной на постсоветском пространстве.

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About the lessons of May 2 Yesterday I was on the road all day, so I didn’t have time to write about Odessa. I was directly involved in the May 2 case when in 2019 I went to the trials of Kulikovo Field activists Sergei Dolzhenkov and Evgeniy Mefedov.[...] In the fall of 2017, after over three years of imprisonment, Dolzhenkov and Mefedov were acquitted of “riots” on Greek Square [“Hretska Ploshcha” in Ukrainian –ed.]. Unexpectedly, it turned out that the Kulikovo residents were not to blame for the tragedy, yet no suspicion was ever brought against the Maidan representatives. Nonetheless, the guys were not even allowed to leave the courtroom but were again handcuffed on suspicion of committing crimes under Art. 109 (actions aimed at violent change or overthrow of the constitutional order) and 110 (encroachment on the territorial integrity of Ukraine) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. They again faced up to 15 years in prison. Activists of the “Odessa squad” allegedly tried to overthrow the constitutional order on March 28, 2014, by laying flowers at the monument to the Olshansky Heroes in Nikolaev [Monument to the 68 Paratroopers, commonly known by the name of their commander, senior Lt. K. F. Olshansky –ed.] on the anniversary of the city’s liberation from the fascist invaders. As evidence of the crime, the prosecutor's office attached a video to the case where the activists lay flowers at the memorial and shouted: “Glory to Rus'!”, “Forward, Slavs, Russians, forward!”, “One for all and all for one!”—to which, it was claimed, there were as many as 49 witnesses. I especially liked the one witness who stated that he did not see Dolzhenkov and Mefedov 8specifically, but was convinced that the participants in the rally “supported the annexation of Crimea and separatism, and opposed the current government and the president.” True, it later turned out that he was at a distance of 20–30 metres from them and could not hear who was speaking for what. “Which president were we up against then?” Mefedov asked reasonably. “At the end of April 2014, when the event occurred, formally the president of Ukraine was Viktor Yanukovych, who left the country. No other president had been elected at that point.” To this the witness, hesitatingly, replied that he did not know. In principle, this is all you need to know about the essence of this criminal case. Also in 2019, Mefedov and Dolzhenkov were exchanged as part of the Minsk process, but at the next court hearing they were put on the wanted list—they disappeared, you know, and no one knew where. That’s how things are done in Ukraine. But in general, Odessa became the first act of an open terrorist dictatorship, the regime that came to power on the Maidan. Before that, in April, it miraculously failed in Zaporozhye, then on May 9 it would succeed in Mariupol. After that there was no turning back. Neither for us nor for them. Having opened Pandora's box once and without punishing the perpetrators (even the grassroots ones, let alone the organisers), the Kiev authorities went astray and naturally arrived at February 24, 2022. But this is not the only lesson to be learned from the Odessa events. They also have a lesson for modern Russia. A law-governed state cannot use illegal methods in the fight against its enemies. Cutting off ears should be prohibited, whatever the circumstances. And those responsible for the death of Russell Bentley also need to be punished, even if they are “our own.” Especially if they are “our own”. Otherwise, Ukraine will have won, by turning Russia into Ukraine. https://t.me/red_wolf_says/1155

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RedWolf

Об уроках 2 мая Вчера весь день был в дороге, поэтому не успел написать об Одессе. К делу 2 мая я прикоснулся непосредственно, когда в 2019 году ездил на суды активистов Куликова поля Сергея Долженкова и Евгения Мефедова. Результатом поездок стал текст для «Русского репортёра», который сейчас лежит здесь. Осенью 2017 года, после трех с лишним лет заключения, Долженков и Мефедов за «беспорядки» на Греческой площади были оправданы. Неожиданно оказалось, что куликовцы не виноваты в трагедии, но представителям Майдана подозрение так и не предъявили. Однако парням даже не дали выйти из зала суда и снова надели на них наручники по подозрению в совершении преступлений по ст. 109 (действия, направленные на насильственное изменение или свержение конституционного строя) и 110 (посягательство на территориальную целостность Украины) УК Украины. Это снова до 15 лет лишения свободы. Свергать конституционный строй активисты «Одесской дружины» якобы пытались 28 марта 2014 года путем возложения цветов к памятнику героям…

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