CloudSec Wine

🔐 Passkeys are Your New Best Friend A lightweight intro to passkeys from Google. https://bughunters.google.com/blog/passkeys-are-your-new-best-friend #iam

👨‍💻 GitHub Actions Security Pt 1: Attacks & Defenses Part one of a two-part series on GitHub Actions security, covering the core threat model, common misconfigurations, and real-world attack examples. https://www.wiz.io/blog/github-actions-security-threat-model-and-defenses #github

🌩 All Your Claude Are Belong To Us: Reversing Claude Code's Remote Control Protocol Researchers reverse-engineered Claude Code's ("claude.exe") undocumented "--sdk-url" flag, fully mapped its CCRv1 WebSocket remote control protocol (NDJSON over WebSockets), and implemented a Python C2 server. The flag accepts arbitrary URLs with no authentication, enabling post-compromise beaconing. https://www.originhq.com/blog/reversing-remote-control #ClaudeCode

🤖 The “AI Vulnerability Storm”: Building a “Mythos-ready” Security Program AI, as demonstrated by Anthropic's Mythos, has significantly increased the likelihood of attackers discovering new vulnerabilities, creating new exploits, and using them in complex automated attacks at scale. While AI also increases the speed of patch development and reduces defects in new software, defenders still face a heavier relative burden due to the inherent limitations of patching. Attackers gain asymmetric benefits. #AI

🔶 A framework for securely collecting forensic artifacts into S3 buckets Blog presenting an AWS architecture for securely collecting forensic artifacts into S3, using IAM least-privilege session policies, STS time-limited credentials scoped per case prefix, KMS encryption, S3 versioning, and an automated Step Functions/Lambda/SSM workflow deployable via AWS CDK. https://aws.amazon.com/ru/blogs/security/a-framework-for-securely-collecting-forensic-artifacts-into-s3-buckets #aws

🤖 Claude & Control: An Introduction to Agentic C2 with Computer Use Agents This blog explores how computer use agents can be used to build an agentic command-and-control framework. By combining LLM reasoning with desktop interaction tools, attackers could automate endpoint control while blending into normal system behavior. Here, we break down the architecture, abuse scenarios, and detection opportunities. https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/claude-control-agentic-c2-computer-use-agent #AI

🤖 NomShub: Weaponizing Cursor's Remote Tunnel Through Indirect Prompt Injection and Sandbox Breakout NomShub is a critical vulnerability chain in the Cursor AI code editor where a malicious repository can silently hijack a developer's machine, combining indirect prompt injection, a sandbox escape via shell builtins, and Cursor's built-in remote tunnel to give attackers persistent, undetected shell access triggered simply by opening a repo. https://www.straiker.ai/blog/nomshub-cursor-remote-tunneling-sandbox-breakout #AI

🔶 Amazon S3 starts rolling out new security best practice to new and existing buckets by default S3 is now deploying a new default bucket security setting which will automatically disable server-side encryption with customer-provided keys (SSE-C) for all new general purpose buckets. https://aws.amazon.com/ru/about-aws/whats-new/2026/04/s3-default-bucket-security-setting #aws

🔶 Launching S3 Files, making S3 buckets accessible as file system Amazon S3 Files makes S3 buckets accessible as high-performance file systems on AWS compute resources, eliminating the tradeoff between object storage benefits and interactive file capabilities while enabling seamless data sharing with ~1ms latencies. https://aws.amazon.com/ru/blogs/aws/launching-s3-files-making-s3-buckets-accessible-as-file-systems/ #aws

🔶 Unexpected Routing Behaviour in AWS with VPC Peering and NAT Gateway When routing VPC peering traffic through an internal NAT gateway in AWS, response traffic bypasses route tables via connection tracking, making all subnets in the peered VPC reachable even without return routes configured. AWS confirmed this is "expected behaviour.". https://labs.reversec.com/posts/2026/03/unexpected-routing-behaviour-in-aws-with-vpc-peering-and-nat-gateway #aws

🤖 How Command Injection Vulnerability in OpenAI Codex Leads to GitHub Token Compromise BeyondTrust Phantom Labs recently identified a critical command injection vulnerability in OpenAI Codex that allowed for the theft of GitHub User Access Tokens. https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/openai-codex-command-injection-vulnerability-github-token #AI

🔶 AWS Security Agent on-demand penetration testing now generally available AWS Security Agent on-demand penetration testing is now GA, offering autonomous 24/7 multi-cloud pen testing combining SAST, DAST, and context-aware agentic AI. https://aws.amazon.com/ru/blogs/security/aws-security-agent-on-demand-penetration-testing-now-generally-available/ #aws

🔶 aws-preflight Check your AWS CLI commands for security risks before you run them. https://github.com/gabrielPav/aws-preflight #aws

🔶 Enforcing AI Governance Across AWS Organizations Learn how to enforce AI governance across AWS organizations using Bedrock guardrails, MCP server controls, model availability rules, and API restrictions to reduce risk and improve security. https://sonraisecurity.com/enforcing-ai-governance-across-aws-orgs #aws

🔴 Double Agents: Exposing Security Blind Spots in GCP Vertex AI Unit 42 researchers found that GCP Vertex AI Agent Engine's default P4SA service account has excessive permissions, enabling credential theft via the metadata service. This allows privilege escalation to read all consumer GCS buckets, access restricted Google-internal Artifact Registry container images, and expose internal source code. https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/double-agents-vertex-ai #gcp

📤 Threat Actors Abuse Railway.com PaaS as Microsoft 365 Token Attack Infrastructure Railway PaaS is being weaponized as a clean token replay engine in an active AiTM and device code phishing campaign impacting 268+ M365 organizations and 100+ MSPs. https://www.huntress.com/blog/railway-paas-m365-token-replay-campaign #PaaS

👨‍💻 Widespread GitHub Campaign Uses Fake VS Code Security Alerts to Deliver Malware A large-scale phishing campaign is targeting developers directly inside GitHub, using fake Visual Studio Code security alerts posted through Discussions to trick users into installing malicious software. https://socket.dev/blog/widespread-github-campaign-uses-fake-vs-code-security-alerts-to-deliver-malware #github

🔴 Remote Command Execution in Google Cloud with Single Directory Deletion - GMO Flatt Security Research A race condition in Google Cloud Looker's directory deletion API allows deleting the ".git" directory while concurrent Git operations proceed, causing Git to use attacker-controlled worktree configs for RCE. Kubernetes service account misconfigurations further enabled cross-instance privilege escalation. https://flatt.tech/research/posts/remote-command-execution-in-google-cloud-with-single-directory-deletion/ #gcp

🔶 Locking down AWS principal tags with RCPs and SCPs A post explaining how to use SCPs to restrict sensitive IAM actions to tagged principals, RCPs to block unauthorized "scp-*" session tags from external/non-tagger principals, and SCPs to protect the "tagger" role itself via CloudFormation StackSets. https://awsteele.com/blog/2026/02/21/locking-down-aws-principal-tags-with-rcps-and-scps.html #aws