Void Verge
We study, test, and innovate against censorship barriers — building tools, strategies, and communities that keep the open internet alive.
Mostrar más📈 Análisis del canal de Telegram Void Verge
El canal Void Verge (@voidverge) es un actor destacado. Actualmente la comunidad reúne a 16 009 suscriptores, ocupando la posición 8 208 en la categoría Tecnologías y Aplicaciones y el puesto 20 452 en la región Irán.
📊 Métricas de audiencia y dinámica
Desde su creación el невідомо, el proyecto ha mostrado un crecimiento acelerado, reuniendo a 16 009 suscriptores.
Según los últimos datos del 04 junio, 2026, el canal mantiene una actividad estable. En los últimos 30 días la variación de miembros fue de -519, y en las últimas 24 horas de -11, conservando un alto alcance.
- Estado de verificación: No verificado
- Tasa de interacción (ER): El promedio de interacción de la audiencia es 254.45%. Durante las primeras 24 horas tras publicar, el contenido suele obtener 75.21% de reacciones respecto al total de suscriptores.
- Alcance de las publicaciones: Cada publicación recibe en promedio 0 visualizaciones. En el primer día suele acumular 12 046 visualizaciones.
- Reacciones e interacción: La audiencia responde de forma activa: el promedio de reacciones por publicación es 0.
- Intereses temáticos: El contenido se centra en temas clave como iran, این, cloudflare, vwarp, configuration.
📝 Descripción y política de contenido
El autor describe el recurso como un espacio para expresar opiniones subjetivas:
“We study, test, and innovate against censorship barriers — building tools, strategies, and communities that keep the open internet alive.”
Gracias a la alta frecuencia de actualizaciones (últimos datos recibidos el 05 junio, 2026), el canal mantiene la vigencia y un amplio alcance. La analítica demuestra que la audiencia interactúa activamente con el contenido, lo que lo convierte en un punto de referencia dentro de la categoría Tecnologías y Aplicaciones.
Carga de datos en curso...
| Fecha | Crecimiento de Suscriptores | Menciones | Canales | |
| 05 junio | 0 | |||
| 04 junio | 0 | |||
| 03 junio | +3 | |||
| 02 junio | +68 | |||
| 01 junio | 0 |
| 2 | secure.pdf | 0 |
| 3 | As we suspected, the Iranian government has begun rolling out internet whitelisting in a gradual, step-by-step manner. We believe this document will help you uncover the truth behind the operation and identify those responsible.
It reveals exactly how the staged whitelisting allows censors to systematically discover and neutralize the remaining bypass techniques—detailing how they detect them and why they have chosen this precise method. It also contains several other valuable insights worth noting.
Unfortunately ongoing infrastructure changes and continuous mass reloading of firewalls (which you see as 2 to 4 hour connection to outside on these days ) on every ISP are clear signs that a class-based national internet is now being implemented at the country-wide level.
Although this may look like a security upgrade, it is more like moving into a house with a bomb already planted inside. The proof is the massive infrastructure shutdown they adopted from the US. | 0 |
| 4 | 3.png | 0 |
| 5 | Another draft paper we found suggests that Iran is planning to control third-party applications such as X (Twitter), Telegram, and Instagram in order to influence public opinion and conduct what could be described as a cognitive war. Although these projects were initially introduced under positive or protective frameworks—appearing to aim at preventing external manipulation—they ultimately seem to offer more advanced methods of control. Much of this work has reportedly been carried out by universities in Tehran, whose names we are not disclosing. The projects have progressed through the use of AI platforms and teams of researchers, with the apparent goal of preventing people from organizing around ideas that conflict with official positions. | 0 |
| 6 | +1 open dns ranges.txt | 0 |
| 7 | We also discovered concrete evidence in the leaked data that the regime has attempted to block public DNS servers on a large scale.
According to the extracted configurations and Cloudflare Radar data (see attached image), they deployed strict DNS blocking rules. However, the documents clearly show that they failed to fully block DNS requests to the outside world.
Most of their own servers collapsed during the first tests, forcing them to reroute traffic and rely on DNS forwarding instead. Meanwhile, several ISPs were unable to implement the blocking properly.
We have published the relevant files below. You can scan them yourself and discover the servers and configurations. | 0 |
| 8 | 2.2-better-quality.jpg | 0 |
| 9 | +5 2-1.png | 0 |
| 10 | After weeks of continuous internet shutdowns in Iran, we have decided to take action.
We have split our team into two parallel projects to expose the regime’s horrific tactics against the Iranian people:
Team 1 has extracted highly confidential government reports and internal orders. These documents reveal systematic strategies to:
Control and manipulate public opinion
Trick and trap citizens
Hunt down Starlink terminals
Target people selling VPN configurations
Seize control of news channels and proxy groups
Team 2 has focused on the mafia networks behind the “white internet” (filtered internet) business. They sell access to the poor at exorbitant prices while working hand-in-hand with the censorship infrastructure (TIC). They actively help block DNS and develop new filtering methods just to make their illegal business more profitable.
So far, we have extracted over 750 gigabytes of sensitive data, including:
Detailed logs and filtering strategies
User profiling systems
Internal orders to enforce nationwide censorship
And much more...
We are now carefully organizing and analyzing this massive archive. In the coming steps, we will publish key findings and develop effective strategies to bypass this digital oppression. | 0 |
| 11 | +2 3.png | 0 |
| 12 | 1.png | 0 |
| 13 | +1 2-1.png | 0 |
| 14 | After weeks of continuous internet shutdowns in Iran, we have decided to take action.
We have split our team into two parallel projects to expose the regime’s horrific tactics against the Iranian people:
Team 1 has extracted highly confidential government reports and internal orders. These documents reveal systematic strategies to:
Control and manipulate public opinion
Trick and trap citizens
Hunt down Starlink terminals
Target people selling VPN configurations
Seize control of news channels and proxy groups
Team 2 has focused on the mafia networks behind the “white internet” (filtered internet) business. They sell access to the poor at exorbitant prices while working hand-in-hand with the censorship infrastructure (TIC). They actively help block DNS and develop new filtering methods just to make their illegal business more profitable.
So far, we have extracted over 750 gigabytes of sensitive data, including:
Detailed logs and filtering strategies
User profiling systems
Internal orders to enforce nationwide censorship
And much more...
We are now carefully organizing and analyzing this massive archive. In the coming steps, we will publish key findings and develop effective strategies to bypass this digital oppression. | 0 |
| 15 | After a few days of silence...
We're back with something massive.
Some fresh leaks coming... | 0 |
| 16 | +1 dns-TCP-new.txt | 0 |
| 17 | Looks like somone need to pass network+ again...
Below is a list of new dns servers list in TCP(port 53), which hasn't been restricted by firewall yet.
With proper set-up (multiplexing, mtu and dns-size) you can make your dead connections alive again.
We also add new UDP dns servers beside the list we published before that may help. | 0 |
| 18 | Th changes came back on TCi. Dns request to most of the sites get the same ip and
They also started blocking othe dns-server even local ones. | 0 |
| 19 | Based on the traffic we observed in Iran, it appears that TCI has started implementing domain whitelisting on their DNS servers.
This might be a configuration mistake, but according to our logs, since this morning most domains have been resolving to the internal IP 10.10.34.35.
Some of the most frequently used domains were occasionally corrected, but many services such as bale.ai, zarebin.ir, and several others have still not been fixed. | 0 |
| 20 | The change is now completely applied and many ranges are open
Scan and find them out | 0 |
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