Citrus Integrity Trick

Tip. 1. https://t.me/CitraIntegrityTrick/1162 ** PIF Inject by KOW, dont use Pixel 10 or later fingerprint. 2. https://t.me/CitraIntegrityTrick/1157 ** TrickyStoreOSS by beakthoven 3. Get a keys : ** Tricky Addon Modules by KOW OR ** Duck Toolbox for unique device RKP Keys. ( Its Private, so never share generated RKP to Public, else you may be banned forever by GOOGLE ) Did this help ? Let me see your reaction on this post. 🌹

Anyone already using this ? https://github.com/Fronsipswu/qcom-band-menu

Looks like this method wont last long for me ... It does flag generated RKP Keys, with "NOT APPROVED". Some of you might already seen this from the leaked Lenovo RKP. Possibly because it send a "csr.cbor" with : vb_state = orange bootloader_state = unlocked to RKP Server, they do respond your request but also flag it as "NOT APPROVED".

Tmpfs needed, tried LKM SUSFS but not enough.

Switch to KernelSU-Next LKM ( No SUSFS ). Stock fingerprint [ With TSupport ].

Alright, this method tested on Qualcomm device. So do guarantee it will work for MTK, and maybe not all Qualcomm device will work with the module.

Everything works [ STRONG ] for me. RKP CTS RCS GPAY

If its work, never share your RKP.

A new keybox technique is public, and Duck ToolBox already implements it A new route to an attestation keybox has been published, and it differs from both routes people knew before. It does not extract the device's CDI_Leaf seed from the TEE for unlimited offline signing, and it does not rely on any external service. The core idea is to treat the device's KeyMint TA as a signing oracle: the real device runs the certificate request itself, and we only supply the software public key we want it to sign. Concretely: the host generates a P-256 key pair and keeps the private half. The public half goes into the TA's CSR_V2 request (command 0x3122), and the trusted application signs it with the device's genuine DICE chain. That yields a completely legitimate CSR, which is then submitted through the normal fetchEekChain / signCertificates flow to Google in exchange for a certificate chain. Finally the private key and the chain are assembled into a keybox.xml that Tricky Store can load. Nothing is extracted, and the bootloader is never touched. The full walkthrough is at the Kanxue write-up linked below. Duck ToolBox reduces that chain of steps to two commands. Start with rkp-device status, which checks the prerequisites: Android arm64, root, /dev/smcinvoke, the keymaster library, and a Qualcomm SoC. It names exactly what is missing instead of leaving you to guess. When the checks pass, provision --acknowledge-limitations produces keybox.xml, the CSR, the DER certificate chain, and the private key. The tool is strict about what it accepts: the issued leaf certificate must carry the public key it generated, the chain must be one complete leaf-to-root path with no stray certificate, and any failure is rejected before a single file is written. What it does write is checked against Tricky Store's own keybox validator, so the artifact is one the device will actually load. The boundaries matter, so: it depends on Qualcomm's KeyMint vendor ABI and therefore works on some devices only; when the ABI does not match you get an explicit error saying the firmware may be incompatible rather than a silent failure. It issues RKP certificates only, with no test or software attestation keys. Beyond writing the artifacts it changes no device state. The keybox is tied to a key generated on the device, so it is valid there and nowhere else: keep the private key file. The prerequisite check is read-only and side-effect free, so running it first to see whether your phone qualifies is the sensible way to start. And yes, it is completely free: no extra hardware, no account, no server. The underlying method comes from a research write-up on the Kanxue forum: https://bbs.kanxue.com/thread-293244.htm — the implementation is Duck ToolBox's, the credit for the method belongs to its author. If you run it on real hardware, your results are welcome; they help us describe the compatible range accurately.

New Keys Technique just leaked.

Necessary ...

Stock Fingerprint no longer valid for Integrity ( my device fingerprint banned ). Only Pixel Canary/Beta Fingerprint works. Just like the old day. ** New changes, Pixel 10/11 can't use Hardware Attestation key ( Old Keyboxes ). This cause by the fingerprint already Device Initial SDK higher than 35.