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This channel discusses: — Offensive Security — RedTeam — Malware Research — OSINT — etc Disclaimer: t.me/APT_Notes/6 Chat Link: t.me/APT_Notes_PublicChat

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Rusia40 429Tecnologías y Aplicaciones7 782

📈 Análisis del canal de Telegram APT

El canal APT (@apt_notes) en el segmento lingüístico de Inglés es un actor destacado. Actualmente la comunidad reúne a 16 236 suscriptores, ocupando la posición 7 782 en la categoría Tecnologías y Aplicaciones y el puesto 40 429 en la región Rusia.

📊 Métricas de audiencia y dinámica

Desde su creación el невідомо, el proyecto ha mostrado un crecimiento acelerado, reuniendo a 16 236 suscriptores.

Según los últimos datos del 29 agosto, 2026, el canal mantiene una actividad estable. En los últimos 30 días la variación de miembros fue de 560, y en las últimas 24 horas de 13, conservando un alto alcance.

  • Estado de verificación: No verificado
  • Tasa de interacción (ER): El promedio de interacción de la audiencia es 39.15%. Durante las primeras 24 horas tras publicar, el contenido suele obtener 18.08% de reacciones respecto al total de suscriptores.
  • Alcance de las publicaciones: Cada publicación recibe en promedio 6 354 visualizaciones. En el primer día suele acumular 2 934 visualizaciones.
  • Reacciones e interacción: La audiencia responde de forma activa: el promedio de reacciones por publicación es 26.

📝 Descripción y política de contenido

El autor describe el recurso como un espacio para expresar opiniones subjetivas:
“This channel discusses: — Offensive Security — RedTeam — Malware Research — OSINT — etc Disclaimer: t.me/APT_Notes/6 Chat Link: t.me/APT_Notes_PublicChat”

Gracias a la alta frecuencia de actualizaciones (últimos datos recibidos el 30 agosto, 2026), el canal mantiene la vigencia y un amplio alcance. La analítica demuestra que la audiencia interactúa activamente con el contenido, lo que lo convierte en un punto de referencia dentro de la categoría Tecnologías y Aplicaciones.

16 236
Suscriptores
+1324 horas
+1017 días
+56030 días
Archivo de publicaciones
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⚛️ Nuclei AI — Browser Extension Nuclei AI Browser Extension, built on top of cloud.projectdiscovery.io, simplifies the creation of vulnerability templates, by enabling users to extract vulnerability information from any webpages to quickly and efficiently create nuclei templates, saving valuable time and effort. 🚀 Features — Context Menu Option to Generate Template — HackerOne Report to Nuclei Template Generation — ExploitDB exploit to Nuclei Template Generation — BugCrowd / Intigriti / Synack support (Coming soon) 🔗 https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-ai-extension #nuclei #template #generator #chrome #extension

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Всем привет! Сегодня в УрФУ выступил с докладом на тему Kerberos, разобрали некоторые базовые атаки, принцип работы и основные, самые популярные механизмы, которые встречаются при каждом внутреннем пентесте. В докладе старался не погружаться в уж очень страшные дебри, а рассказать все более-менее простым понятным человеческим языком. Видео: https://vk.com/video-210214143_456239047 Презентацию прикрепил во вложениях :) P.S. Само собой, будет продолжение :)

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🔥 Bitrix24 Multiple Vulnerabilities Multiple high-risk vulnerabilities found in Bitrix24 v22.0.300. These include Remote Com
🔥 Bitrix24 Multiple Vulnerabilities Multiple high-risk vulnerabilities found in Bitrix24 v22.0.300. These include Remote Command Execution, Cross-Site Scripting, Prototype Pollution, Insecure File Access, and Denial of Service. 🌐 Details and PoC's: 🔗 CVE-2023-1713 (RCE) 🔗 CVE-2023-1714 (RCE) 🔗 CVE-2023-1715 (XSS) 🔗 CVE-2023-1717 (XSS) 🔗 CVE-2023-1718 (DoS) 🔗 CVE-2023-1719 (IDOR) #bitrix24 #rce #xss #dos #idor

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Repost from Offensive Xwitter
😈 [ Almond OffSec @AlmondOffSec ] Understanding the different types of LDAP authentication methods is fundamental to apprehe
😈 [ Almond OffSec @AlmondOffSec ] Understanding the different types of LDAP authentication methods is fundamental to apprehend subjects such as relay attacks or countermeasures. This post by @lowercase_drm introduces them through the lens of Python libraries. 🔗 https://offsec.almond.consulting/ldap-authentication-in-active-directory-environments.html 🐥 [ tweet ]

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Repost from Ralf Hacker Channel
Если кто-то не совсем разобрался с техникой DLL Hijacking, или может совсем не в курсе, что это такое, советую данный материал. Очень хорошая работа! https://elliotonsecurity.com/perfect-dll-hijacking/ So today, we're doing 100% original research reverse engineering the Windows library loader to not just cleanly workaround Loader Lock but, in the end, disable it outright. Plus, coming up with some stable mitigation & detection mechanisms defenders can use to help guard against DLL hijacking. #maldev #redteam

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Repost from SecuriXy.kz
Для автоматизации загрузки скомпиленных бинарей, к примеру из репозитория #SharpCollection можете добавить альяс в свой .zshr
Для автоматизации загрузки скомпиленных бинарей, к примеру из репозитория #SharpCollection можете добавить альяс в свой .zshrc и использовать его подручно. Удобно, быстро и хорошо... 
SharpCollection() {curl -sSL 'https://api.github.com/repos/Flangvik/SharpCollection/git/trees/master?recursive=1' | jq -r '.tree[] | select(.path | endswith(".exe")) | .path | split("/") | "\(.[0]) - \(.[1])"' | fzf -m --reverse --height=50% --preview-window=down:5% -d" - " --preview 'echo "curl -sSL https://github.com/Flangvik/SharpCollection/raw/master/"{1}"/"{2}" -o "{2}""' | awk -F' - ' '{print $1,$2}' | while read -r arch filename; do echo; wget https://github.com/Flangvik/SharpCollection/raw/master/$arch/$filename -O $filename; done}
Спасибо Паше за подсказку

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⚡PsMapExec A PowerShell tool that takes strong inspiration from CrackMapExec. 🚀 Supported Methods — PsExec — RDP — SMB Signi
⚡PsMapExec A PowerShell tool that takes strong inspiration from CrackMapExec. 🚀 Supported Methods — PsExec — RDP — SMB Signing — WinRM — WMI 🔗 More Detailed 🔗 Github Repository #ad #windows #powershell #cme

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🔐 Crack.sh is dead, Long Live Shuck.sh Recently, many of you might've noticed that Crack.sh is currently unavailable. While
🔐 Crack.sh is dead, Long Live Shuck.sh Recently, many of you might've noticed that Crack.sh is currently unavailable. While it's been an invaluable tool in our arsenal, the landscape is ever-changing, and we need to pivot. Meet Shuck.sh, an emerging service that offers similar capabilities, leveraging the extensive Have I Been Pwned (HIBP) database. 🚀 Key Features: — Shuck It: Instantly shuck NetNTLMv1, PPTP VPN, and WPA-Enterprise MSCHAPv2 challenges against HIBP's NT-hash database. — Tech Insight: Efficient binary search for DES-keys collisions from a subset of the HIBP database. — Fast & Free: Got around 100 NetNTLMv1 challenges? Extract their corresponding NT-Hashes in roughly 10 seconds. One significant advantage of Shuck.sh over other tools is its ability to be deployed locally. For those concerned about security and privacy, you can set up Shuck.sh on your own environment using its script from the GitHub repository. 🔗 Shuck.sh 🔗 GitHub Repository 🔗 Pwned Passwords Version 8 (Torrent) #ntlmv1 #des #mschapv2 #bruteforce

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🥔 Coerced Potato New tool for local privilege escalation on a Windows machine, from a service account to NT SYSTEM. Should w
🥔 Coerced Potato New tool for local privilege escalation on a Windows machine, from a service account to NT SYSTEM. Should work on any recent versions of Windows. ⚙️ Tool: https://github.com/hackvens/CoercedPotato 📝 Research: https://blog.hackvens.fr/articles/CoercedPotato.html #windows #lpe #seimpersonateprivilege #potato

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🍀 MSIFortune - Local Privilege Escalation with MSI Installers MSI installers are still pretty alive today. It is a lesser kn
🍀 MSIFortune - Local Privilege Escalation with MSI Installers MSI installers are still pretty alive today. It is a lesser known feature, that a low privileged user can start the repair function of an installation which will run with SYSTEM privileges. What could go wrong? Quite a lot! The repair function often triggers CustomActions, which can lead to several potential issues: — Visible conhost.exe via a cmd.exe or other console binaries — Visible PowerShell — Directly actions from the installer with SYSTEM privileges — Executing binaries from user writable paths — DLL sideloading / search path abusing — Missing PowerShell parameters, mostly -NoProfile — Execution of other tools in an unsafe manner 🌐 Details: https://badoption.eu/blog/2023/10/03/MSIFortune.html #windows #msi #lpe

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Repost from r0 Crew (Channel)

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Repost from 1N73LL1G3NC3
NetExec This tool is based on CrackMapExec and was originally created by bytebleeder and maintained by mpgn over the years, s
NetExec This tool is based on CrackMapExec and was originally created by bytebleeder and maintained by mpgn over the years, shout out to them! With the retirement of mpgn, we decided to maintain the tool NetExec, formerly known as CrackMapExec, as a completely free open source tool. Today will be our first release of NetExec version 1.0.0 NetExec wiki

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🔒 Protected Users and xfreerdp By default xfreerdp does not support Kerberos authentication. As such you'll have to recompil
🔒 Protected Users and xfreerdp By default xfreerdp does not support Kerberos authentication. As such you'll have to recompile it specifying the WITH_GSSAPI option. Also you'll need the libkrb5-dev package to handle TGT/ST requests :) #ad #kerberos #xfreerdp #redteam

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➡️ Local Admin to Domain Admin Ask a TGS on behalf of another user without password. Scenario: you are Local Administrator an
➡️ Local Admin to Domain Admin Ask a TGS on behalf of another user without password. Scenario: you are Local Administrator and there is a logged User you want to Impersonate! 🌐 Source: https://github.com/foxlox/GIUDA #ad #kerberos #tgs #perl

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⚙️ Windows LPE in driver MSKSSRV.SYS CVE-2023-29360 is a Local Privilege Escalation (LPE) vulnerability found in the mskssrv
⚙️ Windows LPE in driver MSKSSRV.SYS CVE-2023-29360 is a Local Privilege Escalation (LPE) vulnerability found in the mskssrv driver. It allows attackers to gain direct access to kernel memory by exploiting improper validation of a user-supplied value. 🌐 PoC: https://github.com/Nero22k/cve-2023-29360 📝 Research: https://big5-sec.github.io/posts/CVE-2023-29360-analysis/ #windows #lpe #driver #mskssrv

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Repost from Ralf Hacker Channel
CVE-2023-29357: Microsoft SharePoint Server Elevation of Privilege https://github.com/Chocapikk/CVE-2023-29357/tree/main #exploit #pentest #redteam #git

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⚙ WTS API Wasteland — Token Impersonation In Another Level A new research about a technique for lateral movement by stealing
⚙ WTS API Wasteland — Token Impersonation In Another Level A new research about a technique for lateral movement by stealing tokens while abusing the RPC named pipe \\pipe\LSM_API_service 🌐 PoC: https://github.com/OmriBaso/WTSImpersonator 📝 Research: https://medium.com/@omribaso/wts-api-wasteland-remote-token-impersonation-in-another-level-a23965e8227e #ad #windows #token #impersonate

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🔤 Fileless RCE on Juniper Firewalls A recently discovered vulnerability, CVE-2023-36845, affects Juniper SRX firewalls and E
🔤 Fileless RCE on Juniper Firewalls A recently discovered vulnerability, CVE-2023-36845, affects Juniper SRX firewalls and EX switches, allowing for remote code execution without writing to the disk 🔍 Scanner: https://github.com/vulncheck-oss/cve-2023-36845-scanner 🌐 Research: https://vulncheck.com/blog/juniper-cve-2023-36845 #juniper #rce #cve

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😈 POSTDump This is the C# / .NET implementation of the ReactOS minidump function (like nanodump), thus avoiding call to the
😈 POSTDump This is the C# / .NET implementation of the ReactOS minidump function (like nanodump), thus avoiding call to the Windows API MiniDumpWriteDump function. 🚀 Key Features: — Usage of indirect syscall along with halo's gate technic to retrieve syscalls IDs — No memory Allocation/Protection call is performed for indirect syscall, instead, free RWX codecave found in the current process are used — ETW patching — No call to MiniDumpWriteDump 🌐 Source: https://github.com/YOLOP0wn/POSTDump #windows #lsass #dump #syscall #reactos