R.Politik

We are excited to share our latest edition of the R.Politik Bulletin, No. 10 (140). This issue delves into four critical topics that shape current geopolitical dynamics. In this edition: ◽️ Putin in China. We explore the potential for Putin to finalize the Power of Siberia-2 contract and consider alternative solutions being discussed. We also examine financial interactions between Chinese and Russian banks and their impact on bilateral relations. Additionally, we provide insights into Moscow’s perspective on Beijing’s peace efforts in the Ukraine conflict. ◽️ Arrests in the Ministry of Defence. Do recent developments indicate an anti-corruption campaign, or are they a purge aimed at weakening former Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu? We analyze each case and uncover the nature of the current prosecutions. ◽️ Confiscation as a Geopolitical Tool. Putin has introduced a new procedure to compensate for damages caused to Russia by the “unfriendly actions” of the United States. We explain how this mechanism is intended to work and discuss Moscow’s underlying tactics.

Dear Friends, We are eager to present our latest R.Politik Bulletin, No. 9 (139), issued after a short break. It covers all major personnel changes in the Russian government undertaken by Vladimir Putin in the last two weeks. In this EDITION: ◽️ Mishustin And The Cabinet. We explain why and how Mikhail Mishustin was reappointed and what the dynamics of his position are. ◽️ The Presidential Bloc. The most shocking changes concern the Defence Ministry, Security Council, and Presidential Administration. You will find out why Andrey Belousov has taken over Sergey Shoigu’s position, while the latter moves to the post of Security Council’s secretary. We also cover Nikolay Patrushev’s transfer to Putin’s administration among other changes. ◽️ Who's Who In The Cabinet. We outline major shifts in Mishustin’s Cabinet: who has gained influence and who has benefited from redistributed prerogatives; new ministers and the particularities of the reshaped Cabinet. ◽️ New Escalation. Putin's fifth term begins amid heightened international tensions. He has directed the General Staff to conduct military drills for non-strategic nuclear weapons. We are trying to answer the critical question: What will happen if Putin believes he cannot win the war, especially if Western forces enter Ukraine? We also invite you to explore our revamped website, which is now more secure and faster: https://rpolitik.com https://rpolitik.com/bulletin/9-2024/personnel-reshuffle-in-the-cabinet-presidential-administration-and-security-council-new-escalation-with-the-west-tactical-nuclear-weapons-drills

After Putin's recent meeting, three main points concerning his vision on the Crocus terrorist attack can be outlined: 1️⃣ Putin unequivocally believes radical Islamists executed the attack. 2️⃣ Putin does not believe that the attack was undertaken by genuine radical islamists due to its timing - during Ramadan. He is persuaded that there's a "client" orchestrating behind the scenes. 3️⃣ However, his wording is cautious and lack evidence: he mentions a "Kyiv trace" (not very convincing) and suspects the US of attempting to "cover up" Ukraine, but gives no specifics. He also says that the terrorist attack at Crocus "may be" (or may not be?) "a link in a series of attempts by those who have been at war with Russia since 2014 at the hands of the Kyiv regime." This is more of an accusation against the US. Finally, he says that "this terrorist attack fits quite logically into the acts of intimidation that Kyiv is carrying out." That is, it could indeed be Kyiv. In other words, Putin does not have evidence of involvement by either the US or Ukraine, but he is convinced that such a terrorist attack would be advantageous for them, which fuels his suspicions.

Yulia Navalnaya has declared her intention to pursue Alexei's cause, signaling a clear move towards an independent political role. This development raises numerous questions regarding her future prospects and the implications of her decision. It's challenging to assess Navalnaya's potential as a politician since we have yet to familiarize ourselves with her in this new capacity. However, I would like to point out several political challenges she might face: 1️⃣ Navalny's Shadow. The dilemma of being perceived merely as Alexei Navalny's widow, thereby constantly being measured against him, poses a significant question. Can she establish a distinct political identity separate from her husband, and more importantly, is it necessary to do so and to what extent? This issue is complex, with no straightforward answer. 2️⃣ Engaged by the West. For the Russian audience, a pro-Western stance is frequently perceived as synonymous with betrayal or allying with the enemy, particularly in the war context. The Kremlin's indirect accusations of Yulia Navalnaya being involved in her husband's murder add to the complexity of distancing herself from such a stigma, regardless of how insane it may seem. This perception of pro-Westernism is contentious even among Russia's liberal circles, which attribute the West's actions as provoking Putin into the conflict and now suspect the West of aiming to deliver a "strategic defeat" to Russia. 3️⃣ Russian Tikhanovskaya. Drawing parallels with Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, who emerged as a formidable challenger to Lukashenko but struggled to establish herself as a significant opposition figure in exile, illustrates another potential pitfall for Navalnaya. Despite possible recognition and respect from the international community, lacking substantial support within Russia could significantly curtail her effectiveness as a political figure. These hurdles do not mean that Navalnaya won't find success. Much will depend on her ability to present herself not just as the widow of a prominent politician but as a formidable, self-accomplished entity. Her success will hinge on her capacity to develop a unique political style, articulate her vision, and assemble a professional team that does not put off potential supporters. Only time will reveal the extent of her impact on the political landscape.

The Federal Penitentiary Service has announced the death of Alexei. Here are my reflections on the matter: First, politically speaking, it's a difficult truth, but Navalny's decision to return to Russia significantly heightened the risk of a tragic end in prison. Renowned for their austere conditions, Russian penal institutions inflict profound and lasting physical and psychological harm on inmates, effectively maiming their lives and rendering many individuals permanently disabled. Navalny was already vulnerable due to his 2020 poisoning. The harsh detention conditions and cruel treatment he received underscore a deliberate indifference, if not consent, from Putin and the authorities for a dire outcome, employing imprisonment in its most severe form. Second, following Navalny's return and subsequent imprisonment, along with the complete disbandment of the FBK and the non-systemic opposition, especially after the commencement of the war, there ceased to be any advocates for him within the system. This was not about the possibility of commuting his sentence—as it was widely understood that Navalny would remain incarcerated as long as Putin was in power—but rather about preventing his death and the potential political fallout. Demonstrating compassion towards Navalny was perceived as too perilous and out of sync with the prevailing political climate. Consequently, the deterioration of his living conditions and the systematic undermining of his health went unchecked. Today, there is no grounds to believe that anyone within the system would stand up for him. Third, I maintain that Putin did not fear Navalny, despite some opposing views, which I do respect. Putin's disdainful perception of Navalny as a minor criminal unworthy of respect and as an adversary manipulated by the West to undermine national and state interests dictated a merciless systemic response, which “programmed” the tragic end. According to my knowledge, Putin admitted that cruel conditions could be fatal for Navalny and dismissed it as a problem. But Putin will have to deal with the consequences of Navalny’s death. Fourth – and this is one of the main consequences of such – the tragedy has happened against the backdrop of presidential elections. And Putin does fear external interference. He sincerely believes that the West would and will use the moment to undermine the stability and to afflict political damage to his campaign. That will push him to take an even more hawkish, more repressive approach to any hostile manifestation, which he may link to external attempts to interfere. This may specifically create a more restrictive approach to the media and social networks. A lot will depend on whether the regime overreacts, which may become an issue in and of itself. Fifth, Navalny emerged as a seminal and historical figure, embodying an unyielding anti-Putin political stance and representing the most substantial alternative to Putin's regime since 2000. His unmatched recognition, significance to the elites, and involvement in domestic politics distinguished him from any other opposition figure, cementing his status as an outstanding politician. And this creates a significant political problem for the regime –– they will have to deal with Navalny’s legacy. I have no doubt that very soon we’ll witness a significant wave of anti-Navalny repressions, raids after indignations in social networks, criminal cases and arrests.

What can be anticipated from Putin's interview with Tucker Carlson? Understanding the context is crucial. Putin perceives 2024 as a pivotal year, viewing it as a window of opportunity for Russia to potentially shift the dynamics of the war in Ukraine in its favor. He anticipates a temporary gap in Western military support, with ammunition production expected to ramp up only by early 2025. Concurrently, the U.S. election cycle might lead to a less decisive American geopolitical strategy towards supporting Kyiv, and the European Union, facing its own internal disagreements, is unlikely to compensate for this support on its own. Moreover, Ukraine could be grappling with significant internal political challenges, especially with the anticipated resignation of Zaluzhny. In this scenario, Putin's immediate goal is to convince the West, particularly Washington, to dismiss Zelensky and to encourage a new, potentially more pliable Ukrainian government to enter negotiations with Russia (Putin thinks that this is how it works). However, Putin's aim for these negotiations is not to seek a tangible compromise but to halt Kyiv's military resistance, paving the way for what he sees as eventual capitulation (a regime friendly to Russia and all that follows). Against this strategic backdrop, Putin badly needs to reach a Western audience. It is probable that during the interview, he will attempt to position himself as a friend to the American people, arguing that it is in the U.S.'s interest to cease its support for Ukraine. He is likely to brand himself as a peacemaker, contrasting his stance with that of the current U.S. administration, which he accuses of prolonging the conflict at Ukraine's expense. Thus, the interview is a platform for Putin to widen his access to American viewers and garner support for his narrative.

A Quick Q&A on Whether Putin Truly Intends to End the War in Ukraine. Q1. Does Putin Suggest Negotiations with the West? No. Neither Putin nor other senior Russian officials perceive the West as a capable and responsible counterpart for discussing strategic issues, as Russia understands them. Even if Trump wins the November election, the Russian leadership harbours no illusions about the West's incapacity to pragmatically engage with Russia, particularly in terms of seriously considering its strategic interests. Q2. So Why, in this case, are Putin's purported representatives signalling to Washington insiders a willingness to halt the conflict and start negotiations, as reported by The New York Times? First, it's important to clarify that these individuals are not Putin's designated representatives, nor are they explicitly tasked by Putin with this specific objective. They are individuals who interpret Putin's stance in a manner they believe to be most accurate. They genuinely think Putin desires to end the conflict and perhaps hope to play a role as mediators. It suits Putin. Q3. Why Does Putin Continue to Speak About Peace Negotiations? Putin's stance is predicated on the belief that Russia did not initiate the conflict, but rather, it was the West, using Ukraine to strategically and militarily confront Russia, including through the provision of arms. He needs the West to desist: to stop sending arms, supporting Ukraine, assisting its resistance, not to mention to turn off the counter-offensive. To Putin, "peace" implies Ukraine ceasing its resistance and the West withdrawing from all matters Ukraine. And he has a limited timeframe, with a critical window up to 2024 – the period before the West increases ammunition production and formulates a new strategy to support Ukraine effectively. Q4. Is Putin Prepared to Cease Military Engagement Himself? In short, yes, but in fact, not really. If Putin perceives that Ukraine is yielding and considering Russian peace terms (effectively tantamount to capitulation), he may significantly reduce military aggression and strikes. His objective is not necessarily to conquer all of Ukraine but to coerce it into accepting political and geopolitical conditions conducive to a Russia-friendly regime. In this case, to whom Odesa belongs is a secondary question to him. However, if Ukraine continues to resist or counterattack, Putin is prepared to not only maintain aggression but also escalate and seize more territory. There's a strategic calculation at play: the longer Ukraine resists, the more territory it risks losing. Q5. Then, is Ukraine Inevitably Doomed? This is Putin's perspective and what he aims to propagate. My view differs; I don’t believe Ukraine will capitulate after enduring so much. IOver time, it might contemplate certain concessions, such as on Donbas or Crimea, but capitulation on Putin’s terms seems absolutely inconceivable. And this would likely fall short of Putin's aspirations. He envisions the cessation of Ukraine as it currently stands, viewing the conflict not just as a territorial dispute but as a battle against what he perceives as a Western 'anti-Russia' project in Ukraine, but he will not get it. Q6. So, What Course of Action Remains? Realistically, there’s no immediate military solution to halt Russia. The key factor is the duration of Putin's tenure. His potential successors, even the most hardline, are unlikely to adopt the same approach. Among the Russian elite, territorial gains are often deemed sufficient for ending the conflict. Disappointing for Putin, Ukraine will not accept his peace terms, thus, he will not win in a way he thinks he must. Plus, contrary to some views, Putin’s time to manoeuvre is not infinite. Ukraine's strategy must focus on enduring this period with minimal damage until the 'post-Putin' era emerges.

The war is beginning to dictate its own rules to Putin. The president and his inner circle are being forced to submit to the new wartime reality that they themselves created. By choosing war and allowing it to pervade everything else, Putin is becoming caught in a trap, turning into a function and instrument of that war. The upcoming elections are acting as a catalyst for all of those processes. Predictable though it is, the election is also important because against its backdrop, various societal challenges will inevitably appear or worsen. Certainly, Russian society will remain under strict control, but Putin’s behavior ahead of the election reveals his efforts to avoid any kind of social frustration: almost as if he were running for reelection in a democratic country, and not in wartime Russia. A striking example is the protests by the wives and mothers of those drafted into the army in Russia’s partial mobilization back in the fall of 2022, who would now like to see their husbands and sons come home and for someone else to take their turn at the front. The presidential administration has instructed the regions to appease the distraught relatives but without resorting to arrests, which would only cause further outrage. https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/91383

Dear friends, In a unique gesture, we're excited to make our year-end Bulletin accessible to all, free of charge – no subscription necessary. We trust you'll find our in-depth analysis both insightful and engaging! In this special issue, we delve into pivotal topics shaping Russia and the global landscape in 2024: ◽️The War in Ukraine: What to Expect in 2024 ◽️Domestic Trends and Shifting Elites in 2024 ◽️The Russian Economy in 2024: Overheating Challenge The Bulletin not only provides a window into these critical issues but also showcases why R.Politik's analysis is unparalleled in its objectivity, impartiality, and meticulous sourcing. We are proud to deliver essential insights for anyone keenly following Russian affairs. As we bid farewell to 2023, it's also the perfect time to consider subscribing to our Bulletins and Weekly Digests. Act now, and lock in your subscription at the current rate before prices increase on January 1st. To subscribe, simply visit our website or send us an email request. Even if your payment is processed after January 1st, 2024 we will honor the current price. Get the best value for your investment in quality information! Contact us today [email protected] 🎄 Wishing you a joyful holiday season and an insightful new year! See you for our last publication of the 2023 year - our Weekly Digest - on December 26, 2023.

Our New Weekly R.Politik Digest is Out and Now Available – No Subscription Required. Here are the main takeaways. Please sign up here to get access to the Digest. https://rpolitik.com/the-weekly-digest/ Our main focus is on Putin’s first press conference — the ‘direct line’ — after Russia launched the war against Ukraine. While many consider the event senseless and annoying, we have watched it carefully and can reassure you - there are intriguing developments to follow. Putin is using this opportunity to assert what he perceives as Russian tactical and strategic dominance, nearly two years into the war. He addressed the West, urging it to cease supporting Ukraine, arguing that this support only leads to a higher death toll and that all Western military equipment will be destroyed. It’s essentially an invitation to agree to a deal on Russian terms: demilitarization of Ukraine (a significant reduction in its army size), “denazification” (establishing a pro-Russia regime in Kyiv), territorial concessions, and a neutral status. While Putin might undertake a new offensive later, the question of borders heavily depends on whether Kyiv capitulates. However, his particular view of this offensive decreases the likelihood of new mobilization in the near future. Putin's rhetoric towards the West has become unusually calm and pragmatic. This is a calculated move. He is trying to lay the groundwork for tactical interactions, particularly regarding potential prisoner swaps. He also aims to appeal to nationally oriented elites to align with Russia. Traditional values have taken on geopolitical significance for Putin. They are now part of the confrontation with Western liberalism and are seen as a means to expand Russia's network of conservative allies. Essentially, this has become an effective strategy for the Kremlin to influence domestic politics in Western countries at an ideological level. The upcoming presidential election will essentially be a plebiscite on trust in Putin. The minor uncertainties are the potential for a record-breaking result and whether the Communist Party can secure the second place. Additionally, there is growing competition between Sergey Kiriyenko’s team and Andrey Turchak regarding Putin’s campaign and United Russia. The elections in the annexed territories hold personal significance for Putin. He wants these elections to demonstrate the “smooth and enthusiastic integration” of Ukrainian territory into Russia. This vote will be fully engineered process that eliminates any possibility of independent observation, restricts access to those managing the proceedings, and ensures that the FSB will be able to closely watch the event. Ensuring that these "elections" are conducted without scandals, incidents, or tragic events will be a significant challenge for the Kremlin, surpassing merely securing the desired results.