King Jackzebra
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7 049
mirror mirror on the wall who's the brokest of them all
28 ago, 07:31
16 sep, ~02:30
7 049
Repost from N/a
JUST IN USER @swagbosscat7 AKA VL DID JUST DUCK AN MOVE ON BACK THE INFAMOUS JACKZEBRA AS HE FAILED TO MATCH 100K JACKZEBRA SAID IF HE MATCHES HELL GIVE AWAY 2K USD TXID PROVIDED
28 ago, 07:17
7 049
give af if my balls are shrinking they are big enough already
27 ago, 08:02
31 ago, ~13:36
7 049
stuck in the same physique for months now ong im hopping on soon
27 ago, 08:02
31 ago, ~13:36
7 049
I did a little extra and found to trigger options
On join (no interaction)
ActivationEventHook.OnEnabled fires automatically the moment the prefab spawns into the world. 96 prefabs across the map are armed, including ones that spawn at world load (Bomba_0, the 2200x objects, etc.). Player joins → prefabs spawn → OnEnabled fires → calc
n then
Stepping on a pad — the backup/legacy trigger. The CollisionEventHook on the Trap prefab has the call on OnPlayerEnter and OnFirstPlayerEnter. Player walks into the collision zone → fires → calc.
(2nd option is what kira was doing)26 ago, 13:51
26 ago, ~14:22
7 049
Unturned Workshop UnityEvent RCE - Patch Bypass
Root cause:
Unturned workshop maps ship as Unity asset bundles (
.masterbundle) containing prefabs with MonoBehaviour mod-hooks (ActivationEventHook, CollisionEventHook, TimerEventHook, …) that expose serialized UnityEvent fields. A UnityEvent persistent call is just data: {m_Target PPtr, m_TargetAssemblyTypeName, m_MethodName, m_Mode, m_StringArgument, m_CallState}. Unity's runtime resolves and invokes whatever method is named — including static methods — with attacker-controlled string arguments. A malicious workshop bundle therefore achieves client-side RCE on anyone who downloads/joins the map, no interaction required.
The sink
SDG.Unturned.Provider.openURL(string) — a static method on a MonoBehaviour-derived class that reaches System.Diagnostics.Process.Start(url) when the Steam overlay is unavailable/disabled. Payload string: C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe. (Alternatives like UnityEngine.Application.OpenURL / Process.Start aren't usable directly because their declaring types aren't components — see below.)
The patch
StaticUnityEventPrevention.Validate() runs on every bundle prefab at load. For every UnityEvent field on every component it checks each persistent call:
public static bool Validate(GameObject gameObject)
{
// ...
for (int index = 0; index < unityEvent.GetPersistentEventCount(); ++index)
{
Object target = unityEvent.GetPersistentTarget(index);
string method = unityEvent.GetPersistentMethodName(index);
if (target == null && !string.IsNullOrEmpty(method))
{
// ...
unityEvent.SetPersistentListenerState(index, UnityEventCallState.Off);
That's the entire check: null target → disable. No static-vs-instance analysis, no declaring-type validation, no allowlist.
The bypass
Two constraints had to be satisfied simultaneously:
Patch constraint: m_Target must be non-null at validate time.
Unity 2022.3 runtime constraint (discovered empirically): static persistent calls now only invoke when the target object is actually an instance of the method's declaring class — a wrong-type non-null target silently resolves to nothing (confirmed: wrong-type targets never fired, including a guaranteed-observable UnturnedLog.info canary).
So the exploit smuggles a Provider-typed component into the bundle itself:
Script-swap an existing bundle MonoScript: rewrite a low-value one (DeadzoneVolume, exactly 1 instance in the map) into a byte-identical copy of the game's real Provider MonoScript (class/namespace/assembly + m_PropertiesHash from globalgamemanagers.assets).
Fix the type entry: script_id = MD4(ClassName + Namespace + AssemblyName) — recipe brute-forced and verified against a known-good bundle pair — and keep script_type_index → the rewritten MonoScript.
Set the sacrificed component m_Enabled = 0 so its rogue Provider.Update() never runs (avoids double-pumping the network loop).
Inject the call into ActivationEventHook.OnEnabled (fires automatically when the prefab spawns → RCE on join, no interaction) and CollisionEventHook.OnPlayerEnter/OnFirstPlayerEnter (step-on-pad trigger): target = the Provider-typed component, method openURL, mode String, arg = calc path, state RuntimeOnly.
Because the target is a real, bound, Provider-typed object, Validate() sees non-null and leaves the call armed, and Unity's type check passes at invoke time.
Proof of execution
Runtime instrumentation inside the game confirmed the complete chain: the smuggled component binds as SDG.Unturned.Provider, and invoking the hooked event with that target fires Provider.openURL("C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe") → calc pops (on Win11 it surfaces as CalculatorApp). No crash, map loads clean.
Delivery / impact
Publish the forged .masterbundle as a workshop map (or map update). Every client that downloads it executes the payload when the hooked prefab spawns — server operators and players alike, platform-typical for the original CVE-class issue. Payload is arbitrary: any Process.Start-able command line.26 ago, 13:46
26 ago, ~14:22
