Third Eye OSINT & Analysis

⁉️What FATF 🇪🇺 should know ⭐UN desginated Jaish-e-Mohammed 🇵🇰 stronghold in Kohat Division in KPK where 70% terrorists associated with JeM Front Kashmir Tigers were trained. Thereafter, they were mostly eliminated in Jammu Region in last 3 years.

📍All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) is going to organize an event to mark the death anniversary of separatist Syed Ali Geelani on September 1, 2026 at 11:00 AM at Municipal Hall, Kotli, Pakistan-occupied Jammu & Kashmir (PoJK). ✍️On one hand, the Jammu Awami Action Committee (JAAC) is fighting against the repression and brutalities of the Pakistan military. On the other hand, the Hurriyat Conference is holding an event to commemorate the death anniversary of a person widely associated with Pakistan-backed separatism in Jammu & Kashmir. ✍️The irony could hardly be greater. While people in PoJK are protesting against Pakistan’s political and military establishment, so-called Kashmiri sympathisers (Hurriyat Conference) continue to celebrate figures and narratives associated with the same Pakistani establishment. 😈Slowly but surely, the masks of these so-called “Kashmiri sympathisers” are coming off. - Team Third Eye OSINT & Analysis

ISKO RETWEET MAIN KARNA POST

ISKO TWEET KARNE KE BAD

📍ADDITIONAL INSIGHTs:  ✍️The recent PoJK & PoTL elections have been challenged amid a prolonged protest movement and calls for a boycott, raising serious questions about their democratic legitimacy by the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC).  ✍️But the truth is Jammu and Kashmir, including the territories currently under Pakistan & Chinese occupation which is PoJK, PoTL and CoTL is an integral part of India and has remained under illegal Pakistani & Chinese occupation since 1947 & 1962, following Pakistan’s invasion of Jammu and Kashmir under Operation Gulmarg 1947 & Indo-Sino war in 1962.

📍UPDATE ON PoJK:  ✍️Yesterday, the Pakistan military establishment appointed Syed Iftikhar Ali Gillani of the PML-N (close aide of Sharif family) as the new PM of Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK), effectively handing control of the occupied territory to the PML-N. This follows a similar political arrangement in July, when Gilgit-Baltistan (Pakistan-occupied Territories of Ladakh) PoTL, another territory under Pakistan’s occupation was handed to the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), with Amjad Hussain Azar (close aide of Zardari family) sworn in as Chief Minister.  ✍️Syed Asim Munir appears to be balancing power between the PPP and PML-N while Pakistan’s military establishment continues to tighten its grip over the country (Balochistan & KPK) and its occupied territories (PoJK & PoTL).

🚨 #PoJKUprising: UK PROTEST | 30 AUGUST 2026 - 🇬🇧 In solidarity with the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), its overseas supporters in the UK, under the banner of Activist Independent Movement (AIM), will organize a protest march against the brutalities of Pakistani military against people in Pakistan-occupied Jammu & Kashmir (PoJK). 📍 Sparkhill Park → Birmingham City Centre 📅 30th August 2026 📌 Birmingham, UK

#PoJKUprising: ✍️Videos emerging from Pakistan-occupied Jammu & Kashmir (PoJK) show mothers and sisters raising difficult questions about the Pakistani military and government over the denial of their fundamental and rightful rights. ✍️The videos reflect growing anger and desperation among local residents, who allege that the Pakistani military is using violence and intimidation against civilians protesting for their rights. ✍️Latest reports claim that schools and colleges have remained shut for the past three months, while disruptions to food supplies and essential services have reportedly added to the hardships faced by the people of PoJK. ✍️The voices coming from PoJK are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. Mothers, sisters and families are asking a basic question: Why are the legitimate grievances of the people being met with force instead of dialogue and solutions? 🔥The people of PoJK deserve to have their voices heard — not silenced.

🚨 PoJK — GROUND SITUATION: ✍️Pakistan military is digging up roads and creating obstacles to restrict JAAC protesters’ movement. 📍 This is the situation being reported from Pakistan-occupied Jammu Kashmir (PoJK).

✍ Jaish-e-Mohammed 🇵🇰 Terrorist training & recuritment appratus has expanded to other districts apart from their traditional stronghold of Manshera District & Kohat Division due to collapse of law & order of Disputed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

❗Disputed Kyber Pakhtunkhwa Chief Ministee has said that KP Police has revolted against Pakistan 🇵🇰. ⭐Pashtuns wants freedom from Pakistan & its occupier Army. They want new country for their survival and prosperity.

❗Internal Rift of LeT is now out in open. ✍Senior LeT Commander Abdul Rehman Abid who was shunted out from LeT HQ Markaz Taiba in April has launched direct attack on Saifullah Kasuri for attending other sect events. ⭐Many LeT Mid Level Cadres who are close to Talha Saeed have threatened Saifullah Kasuri of severe consequences. Thereafter, Kasuri released audio in their internal whatsapp group.

❗Famous Tiktoker Noor Ul Ain v/s Lashkar-e-Taiba is going on for last 10 days.

❗Today Saudi Foreign Minister met with Bangladesh State Foreign Minister during 23rd OIC Extraorfinary Meeting in Jeddah ✍But his Eyes 👀

❗Ostrich Effect 🇧🇩🇵🇰 ⭐Razakars and their wet dreams of saving their masters. https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/1txlwioy6q

✍JeM Terrorists of disputed KPK and their obsession with long hairs 🏳️‍🌈

⁉️What FATF 🇪🇺 should see. ✍UN Designated Jaish-e-Mohammed Terrorists are being provided arms training in several districts of disputed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Flags of JeM are clearly visible in both videos. ✍ Jaish Commanders & Trainers in KPK are using cover of JUI-F to avoid sanctions regime of FATF. Maulana Fazlur Rehman who is heading JUI-F is also involved in these cover up.

That makes a possible return to HM significant. It is highly plausible that the ISI may again see utility in HM as a vehicle for rebuilding local recruitment and restoring a recognisably Kashmiri face to the militant ecosystem. One recent indicator deserves attention. “Kashmir Conflict”, an account associated with propaganda supporting TRF, PAFF, ULC and KRA, recently circulated an audio message from Syed Salahuddin condemning remarks by US Ambassador to India Sergio Gor. Other chatter regarding attempts to revive HM has also been noticed. None of this by itself confirms an operational revival. But after years of trying to replace HM’s local network with proxy brands that never achieved comparable grassroots traction, bringing Salahuddin and Hizbul Mujahideen back into the information space may not be accidental.

Is Hizbul Mujahideen trying to revive itself in J&K? To understand why that may be happening, one first needs to understand why the ISI sidelined HM. HM was once central to Pakistan’s terror ecosystem because of its grassroots network in Kashmir and its links with Jamaat-e-Islami, which provided an important base for local recruitment. But Syed Salahuddin was never considered as pliable as Hafiz Saeed or Masood Azhar. There was also a perception within the ISI that LeT and JeM cadres were better trained and more disciplined than HM’s locally recruited terrorists. The relationship deteriorated further when the ISI reportedly threatened to choke HM’s finances and weapons supplies after the Salahuddin-led UJC failed to generate widespread protests and terror attacks in Kashmir post abrogation of Article 370. HM was receiving around PKR 3 crore per season from the ISI for operational expenses. Salahuddin had publicly criticised the ISI on at least four occasions since 2012. The rift deepened after the killing of HM commander Riyaz Naikoo in 2020, when Salahuddin again criticised the ISI at gatherings in PoJK and Rawalpindi. The ISI’s Kashmir desk subsequently began prioritising LeT, JeM and other Pakistan-based groups while keeping Salahuddin away from important meetings dealing with the post-Article 370 militancy strategy. In February 2020, ISI officials reportedly met militant commanders at Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi’s residence. Salahuddin was not allowed to participate, while Al Badr chief Bakht Zameen was invited. Al Badr had largely disappeared from Kashmir by the mid-2000s but remained active around the Af-Pak theatre and developed links with the Haqqani network. The meeting reportedly discussed increasing infiltration into J&K and shifting jihadist cadres from Afghanistan towards Kashmir. Indian agencies later reported intercepting Pashto conversations at launch pads in PoJK. The pressure on Salahuddin allegedly went further. On 25 May 2020, Islamabad’s Deputy Commissioner reported a cylinder blast in an abandoned vehicle in G-10/2, an area reportedly linked to Salahuddin’s residence. The incident was alleged to have been an ISI warning to Salahuddin over his public criticism of the agency. But Pakistan was facing a larger problem. Following the killing of Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind chief Zakir Musa, fatigue was increasingly visible among local terrorists while sections of the population were becoming disillusioned with both terrorism and Pakistan. The abrogation of Article 370 was preceded and followed by a massive security deployment, communication restrictions, the suspension of LoC trade, an NIA crackdown on hawala networks and separatist financing, and the MHA ban on Jamaat-e-Islami. Together, these measures significantly disrupted the ecosystem that had supported recruitment, financing and logistics. Pakistan’s attempt to diplomatically isolate India after Article 370, including with support from Turkey and China, also failed to produce the expected outcome. Pakistan itself remained under FATF scrutiny, while local militant recruitment was declining sharply. With HM increasingly marginalised, the ISI was losing an organisation that historically provided it with an indigenous recruitment base inside Kashmir. The response shifted towards new front organisations such as TRF, PAFF, KRA, ULC and Kashmir Tigers, alongside attempts to revive older names such as Al Badr and the Jammu and Kashmir Ghaznavi Force. The objective was seemingly twofold. Sustain terrorism through organisations carrying more local or secular-sounding identities, while creating another layer of deniability at a time when Pakistan was facing FATF pressure. The Jammu theatre was subsequently activated, particularly through PAFF and Kashmir Tigers. But this strategy produced only limited success. Local recruitment continued to decline, terrorism became increasingly dependent on Pakistani terrorists, and these newer organisations failed to develop the kind of grassroots resonance that HM had once possessed.

🚨 #UPDATE | Third Eye OSINT & Analysis: ✍️ Reports indicate that the Pakistan military has constructed a series of bunkers near the Combined Military Hospital (CMH) in Rawalpindi, Punjab (near by GHQ) reportedly stocked with up to 30 days of food, water and other essential provisions. The facilities are intended to protect family members of senior military officers in the event of a conflict with India. ✍️ At the same time, there has been reported heavy military transport activity involving China and Turkiye into Pakistan. ✍️ Taken together with the security challenges facing Pakistan’s establishment in Balochistan and PoJK. ✍️ One possibility is that Pakistan’s military establishment could again amplify the familiar “Indian threat” or false-flag narrative to divert domestic attention from internal political, economic and security pressures, including inflation and the continued detention of former PM Imran Khan. Similar narratives have emerged in the aftermath of the Pulwama (2019) and Pahalgam (2025) attacks. ✍️ If these indicators ultimately connect, India could once again be portrayed to the Pakistani public as the convenient external scapegoat, shifting attention away from mounting domestic challenges facing the military establishment and its political allies. ✍️ Another possibility cannot be ruled out: Pakistan could attempt another misadventure against India, whether through a deliberate provocation via its terror proxies.