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APT

APT

前往频道在 Telegram

This channel discusses: — Offensive Security — RedTeam — Malware Research — OSINT — etc Disclaimer: t.me/APT_Notes/6 Chat Link: t.me/APT_Notes_PublicChat

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📈 Telegram 频道 APT 的分析概览

频道 APT (@apt_notes) 英语 语言赛道中的 是活跃参与者。目前社区聚集了 16 245 名订阅者,在 技术与应用 类别中位列第 7 769,并在 俄罗斯 地区排名第 40 381

📊 受众指标与增长动态

невідомо 创建以来,项目保持高速增长,吸引了 16 245 名订阅者。

根据 30 八月, 2026 的最新数据,频道保持稳定运转。过去 30 天订阅人数变化为 549,过去 24 小时变化为 10,整体触达仍然可观。

  • 认证状态: 未认证
  • 互动率 (ER): 平均受众互动率为 39.89%。内容发布后 24 小时内通常能获得 18.07% 的反应,占订阅者总量。
  • 帖子覆盖: 每篇帖子平均可获得 6 477 次浏览,首日通常累积 2 934 次浏览。
  • 互动与反馈: 受众积极参与,单帖平均反应数为 26

📝 描述与内容策略

作者将该频道定位为表达主观观点的平台:
This channel discusses: — Offensive Security — RedTeam — Malware Research — OSINT — etc Disclaimer: t.me/APT_Notes/6 Chat Link: t.me/APT_Notes_PublicChat

凭借高频更新(最新数据采集于 31 八月, 2026),频道始终保持新鲜度与高覆盖。分析显示受众积极互动,使其成为 技术与应用 类别中的关键影响点。

16 245
订阅者
+1024 小时
+957
+54930
帖子存档
APT
16 245
MSSQL Analysis Services — Coerced Authentication New technique to coerce an SMB authentication on Windows SQL Server as the m
MSSQL Analysis Services — Coerced Authentication New technique to coerce an SMB authentication on Windows SQL Server as the machine account PoC: https://github.com/p0dalirius/MSSQL-Analysis-Coerce #ad #mssql #smb #relay

APT
16 245
📡 NTLMv1 vs NTLMv2: Digging into an NTLM Downgrade Attack This article discusses the NTLM specifications to better understan
📡 NTLMv1 vs NTLMv2: Digging into an NTLM Downgrade Attack This article discusses the NTLM specifications to better understand how various aspects of the NTLM protocol function. As well as bypassing the SMB signature, relaying SMB to LDAP, and relaying NTLMv1 authentication attempts to the ADFS service. https://www.praetorian.com/blog/ntlmv1-vs-ntlmv2/ #ad #ntlm #smb #relay

APT
16 245
⚙️ Hackers No Hashing: Randomizing API Hashes to Evade Cobalt Strike Shellcode Detection If you utilise API hashing in your m
⚙️ Hackers No Hashing: Randomizing API Hashes to Evade Cobalt Strike Shellcode Detection If you utilise API hashing in your malware or offensive security tooling. Try rotating your API hashes. This can have a significant impact on detection rates and improve your chances of remaining undetected by AV/EDR. Blog: https://www.huntress.com/blog/hackers-no-hashing-randomizing-api-hashes-to-evade-cobalt-strike-shellcode-detection Source: https://github.com/matthewB-huntress/APIHashReplace #maldev #evasion #hinvoke #cobaltstrike #redteam

APT
16 245
🎭 Masky This tool does not exploit any new vulnerability and does not work by dumping the LSASS process memory. Indeed, it o
🎭 Masky This tool does not exploit any new vulnerability and does not work by dumping the LSASS process memory. Indeed, it only takes advantage of legitimate Windows and Active Directory features (token impersonation, certificate authentication via kerberos & NT hashes retrieval via PKINIT). Blog: https://z4ksec.github.io/posts/masky-release-v0.0.3/ Source: https://github.com/Z4kSec/Masky #ad #adcs #lsass #redteam

APT
16 245
🤖 BBOT: OSINT automation for hackers This tools is capable of executing the entire OSINT process in a single command, includ
🤖 BBOT: OSINT automation for hackers This tools is capable of executing the entire OSINT process in a single command, including subdomain enumeration, port scanning, web screenshots (with its gowitness module), vulnerability scanning (with nuclei), and much more. BBOT currently has over 50 modules and counting. Features — Recursive; — Graphing; — Modular; — Multi-Target; — Automatic Dependencies; — Smart Dictionary Attacks; — Scope Distance; — Easily Configurable via YAML. Blog: https://blog.blacklanternsecurity.com/p/bbot Source: https://github.com/blacklanternsecurity/bbot #external #recon #osint #redteam #bugbounty

APT
16 245
😈 EDRSandBlast This is a tool written in C that weaponize a vulnerable signed driver to bypass EDR detections and LSASS protections. Multiple userland unhooking techniques are also implemented to evade userland monitoring. — User-mode (API hooking) evasion; — Kernel-mode (callbacks and ETW ThreatIntel events) evasion; — Successively tested on market-leading EDR products. https://github.com/wavestone-cdt/EDRSandblast/tree/DefCon30Release #maldev #edr #lsass #evasion #redteam

APT
16 245
😈 EDRSandBlast This is a tool written in C that weaponize a vulnerable signed driver to bypass EDR detections and LSASS prot
😈 EDRSandBlast This is a tool written in C that weaponize a vulnerable signed driver to bypass EDR detections and LSASS protections. Multiple userland unhooking techniques are also implemented to evade userland monitoring. — User-mode (API hooking) evasion; — Kernel-mode (callbacks and ETW ThreatIntel events) evasion; — Successively tested on market-leading EDR products. https://github.com/wavestone-cdt/EDRSandblast/tree/DefCon30Release #maldev #edr #lsass #evasion #redteam

APT
16 245
😈 EDRSandBlast: Update — User-mode (API hooking) evasion; — Kernel-mode (callbacks and ETW ThreatIntel events) evasion; — Successively tested on market-leading EDR products. https://github.com/wavestone-cdt/EDRSandblast/tree/DefCon30Release #maldev #edr #lsass #evasion #redteam

APT
16 245
#api #params > Ничего не могу найти на сайте, может ещё что-то посмотреть? Иногда встречается сайт, на котором всего лишь несколько конечных точек. Казалось, все параметры были проверены на уязвимости, а в чек-листе отмечены любые возможные проверки на инъекции и логику. Однако, бывают уязвимости, которые не видны с первого взгляда. Например (CAPEC-460) HTTP Parameter Pollution или (CWE-472) External Control of Assumed-Immutable Web Parameter. Данные ошибки возникают из-за неожиданного поведения в функциях обработки параметров. Давайте рассмотрим первую атаку HTTP Parameter Pollution, она состоит из возможности добавления повторяющихся параметров с помощью специальных разделителей запроса. Например, у нас открыт сайт по продаже арбузов в браузере 🌐 example.com/profile.jsp?client_id=1 Для кнопки "Открыть профиль" устанавливается динамически в ответе от сервера html: <a href="profile.jsp?client_id=1&action=view А теперь изменим запрос добавив в него параметр и закодировав разделитель & как %26: 🌐 example.com/profile.jsp?client_id=1%26action%3Ddelete В результате для кнопки "Открыть профиль" задаётся html: <a href="profile.jsp?client_id=1&action=delete&action=view При нажатии на кнопку — профиль пользователя будет удалён. Для того чтобы заставить жертву удалить свой аккаунт, нам нужно отправить ей ссылку и подождать. Это происходит, потому что Apache Tomcat 🐈 при анализе двух одинаковых параметров (action) берёт значение первого: &action=delete&action=view Вот так выглядит код на стороне сервера:
String client_id = request.getParameter("client_id");
GetMethod get = new GetMethod("https://example.com/profile");
get.setQueryString("client_id=" + client_id + "&action=" + action);
href_link=get.URL; Разработчик должен был учесть такое поведение и проверить возможность внедрения параметра action в client_id Вообще, приоритет и процесс обработки параметров можно взять из этой таблицы ниже:
Technology/HTTP backend        | Parsing Result    | Example         |
---------------------------------------------------------------------
ASP.NET/IIS                    | All occurrences   | par1=val1,val2  |
ASP/IIS                        | All occurrences   | par1=val1,val2  |
PHP/Apache                     | Last occurrence   | par1=val2       |
JSP Servlet/Apache Tomcat      | First occurrence  | par1=val1       |
JSP Servlet/Oracle Application | First occurrence  | par1=val1       |
IBM HTTP Server                | First occurrence  | par1=val1       |

Так, для Server: Apache Tomcat будет взято значение из первого совпадения action=delete А для Server: Apache значение уже будет action=view — последний параметр Но не все сервера используют приоритет порядка, так, например, ASP.NET/IIS конкатенирует значения. Поэтому в случаях, когда выполнению XSS мешает санитизация или WAF, можно составить следующий payload: example.com/search?param=<audio/n="&param="src/onerror=alert()> В результате на странице html будет <audio n="," src/onerror=alert()> и XSS успешно сработает 💣 Помимо приоритетов, нужно также вспомнить о разделителях для параметров. Существует не только привычный & (амперсанд) и , (запятая) но и ряд других символов, тут нужно обратиться к стандартам и поискать реализации. Если открыть (rfc6570) URI Template можно найти Path-Style Parameter Обычный URL будет следующим: example.com/users?role=admin&firstName=N А теперь преобразуем его в вид Path-Style: example.com/users;role=admin;firstName=N Использование в качестве разделителя ; (точки с запятой) не повсеместно. Это приводит к различиям обработки во фреймворках и как следствие к уязвимостям, в частности, на микросервисных архитектурах: • CVE-2021-23336 — Python библиотека urllib.parse.parse_qsl не игнорирует точку с запятой. • ParseThru — Go библиотека net/url не игнорирует точку с запятой и выводит предупреждение http: URL query contains semicolon... Следует помнить, что уязвимость HTTP Parameter Pollution может возникать не только в URL, но и в любой части POST/GET запроса, а также в теле JSON. {"client_id":4, "client_id":17, "action":"delete"}

APT
16 245
📌 Save the Environment Many applications appear to rely on Environment Variables such as %SYSTEMROOT% to load DLLs from prot
📌 Save the Environment Many applications appear to rely on Environment Variables such as %SYSTEMROOT% to load DLLs from protected locations. By changing these variables on process level, it is possible to let a legitimate program load arbitrary DLLs. Research: https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/save-the-environment-variables Source Code: https://github.com/wietze/windows-dll-env-hijacking #maldev #dll #hijacking #environment

APT
16 245
⚙️ Determining AD domain name via NTLM Auth If you have nmap (http-ntlm-info) unable to determine the FQND of an Active Direc
⚙️ Determining AD domain name via NTLM Auth If you have nmap (http-ntlm-info) unable to determine the FQND of an Active Directory domain via OWA, for example due to Citrix NetScaler or other SSO solutions, do it manually!
1) curl -I -k -X POST -H 'Authorization: NTLM TlRMTVNTUAABAAAAB4IIogAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAKANc6AAAADw==' -H 'Content-Length: 0' https://autodiscover.exmaple.com/ews

2) echo 'TlRMTVNTUAACAAAADAAMAD...' | python2 ./ntlmdecoder.py

Source: ntlmdecoder.py #ntlm #auth #sso #tricks #pentest

APT
16 245
🔑 Cobalt Strike Token Vault This Beacon Object File (BOF) creates in-memory storage for stolen/duplicated Windows access tok
🔑 Cobalt Strike Token Vault This Beacon Object File (BOF) creates in-memory storage for stolen/duplicated Windows access tokens allow you to: — Hot swap/re-use already stolen tokens without re-duplicating; — Store tokens for later use in case of a person log out. https://github.com/Henkru/cs-token-vault #ad #tokens #c2 #cobalt #redteam

APT
16 245
💉ClipboardInject Abusing the clipboard to inject code into remote processes This PoC uses the clipboard to copy a payload into a remote process, eliminating the need for VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory https://www.x86matthew.com/view_post?id=clipboard_inject #maldev #injection #clipboard #redteam

APT
16 245
🦮 BlueHound It is an open-source tool that helps blue teams pinpoint the security issues that actually matter. By combining
🦮 BlueHound It is an open-source tool that helps blue teams pinpoint the security issues that actually matter. By combining information about user permissions, network access and unpatched vulnerabilities, BlueHound reveals the paths attackers would take if they were inside your network It is a fork of NeoDash, reimagined, to make it suitable for defensive security purposes. Blog: 🔗 https://zeronetworks.com/blog/bluehound-community-driven-resilience/ Tool: 🔗 https://github.com/zeronetworks/BlueHound #ad #sharphound #blueteam

APT
16 245
🔔 TamperingSyscalls This is a 2 part novel project consisting of argument spoofing and syscall retrival which both abuse EH
🔔 TamperingSyscalls This is a 2 part novel project consisting of argument spoofing and syscall retrival which both abuse EH in order to subvert EDRs. This project consists of both of these projects in order to provide an alternative solution to direct syscalls. https://github.com/rad9800/TamperingSyscalls #edr #evasion #maldev #syscall #tampering

APT
16 245
🛡 On Detection: Tactical to Functional The goal of this series is to facilitate a conversation about the more technical aspects of attacks and how a deeper understanding at the more foundational levels helps to provide a batter base to build assumptions from. 🔗 Part 1: Discovering API Function Usage through Source Code Review 🔗 Part 2: Operations #maldev #pinvoke #winapi #detection #blueteam #ttp

APT
16 245
Certipy 4.0: ESC9 & ESC10, BloodHound GUI, New Authentication and Request Methods — and more! https://research.ifcr.dk/certipy-4-0-esc9-esc10-bloodhound-gui-new-authentication-and-request-methods-and-more-7237d88061f7 #ad #adcs #certypy #bloodhound

APT
16 245
🔐 PPLDump RIPPL is a tool that abuses a usermode only exploit to manipulate PPL processes on Windows. https://github.com/last-byte/RIPPL #ad #ppl #lsass #tools

APT
16 245
🐚 PSAsyncShell: Asynchronous Firewall Bypass PSAsyncShell is an Asynchronous TCP Reverse Shell written in pure PowerShell. U
🐚 PSAsyncShell: Asynchronous Firewall Bypass PSAsyncShell is an Asynchronous TCP Reverse Shell written in pure PowerShell. Unlike other reverse shells, all the communication and execution flow is done asynchronously, allowing to bypass some firewalls and some countermeasures against this kind of remote connections. 🔗 Research: https://darkbyte.net/psasyncshell-bypasseando-firewalls-con-una-shell-tcp-asincrona/ 🔗 Source: https://github.com/JoelGMSec/PSAsyncShell #ad #powershell #reverse #shell