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هزینه اشتراک ماهیانه فایل PDF مجله های انگلیسی زبان از مورخ 11 دی ماه 1402 و اول ژانويه 2024 به صورت زیر میباشد
کلی کانال خصوصی مجله انگلیسی شامل تمام عناوین موجود و ارسال به روز هزینه ماهیانه 350 هزار تومان
سه ماهه 1میلیون تومان
شش ماهه 1900
دوازده ماهه 3700 قابل اخذ تا اول جولای
هزینه اشتراک مجلات به صورت انتخابی به ترتیب زیر میباشد
هفته نامه ها ی ویک و نیویورکر و بلومبرگ هر شماره 25 هزار تومان حداقل اشتراک یک ماهه
دو هفته نامه ها مانند تایم و نیوزویک و هفته نامه اکونومیست همراه با فایل صوتی و نیچر هر شماره 30 هزار تومان حداقل اشتراک یک ماهه
ماهنامه ها مانند آتلاتیک و ریدرز دایجست فلایت اینترنشنال ورلد ساکر 442 هر شماره 35 هزار تومان
دو ماهنامه ها مانند فوربس و فارین پالیسی و مجلات فصلی و همچنید مجلات دو جزئی مانند ساینتیفیک امریکن هر شماره 40 هزار تومان
هزینه اشتراک مجلات سایر زبانها هم مشابه انگلیسی میباشد
دوستانی که متقاضی هر دو کانال مجله انگلیسی و روزنامه انگلیسی هستند شامل تخفیف میشه و به جای 600 هزار تومان
500 هزار تومان بابت دو کانال ماهیانه
سه ماهه 1450 هزار تومان
شش ماهه 2800
دوازده ماهه 5500 قابل اخذ تا اول جولای
پرداخت خواهند کرد
این تخفیف ها به اشتراک های جدید و تمدید های سر موعد اول دوره و بدون تاخیر میباشد و به دوستانی که در تمدید تاخیر داشته باشند تعلق نخواهد گرفت
برای رعایت عدالت در پرداختی ها و سهولت پیوستن اعضای جدید فایلهای کانال مجله مدت دو ماه ماندگاری دارند وبعد از دو ماه به صورت اتوماتیک از کانال حذف خواهد شد لذا قبل از یک ماه حتما دانلود کنید
اشتراک مجلات منتخب به تاریخ 2023 از تاریخ قرار گرفتن نرخ در کانال به نرخ سال 2023 محاسبه خواهند شد
کلیه این اشتراک ها برای استفاده شخصی میباشد و فورواد آنها به کانالها و گروهها و افراد دیگر مجاز نیست.
تخفیف های بلند مت به اشتراک های شخصی جدید و تمدید های سر موعد اول دوره و بدون تاخیر میباشد و به دوستانی که در تمدید تاخیر داشته باشند تعلق نخواهد گرفت
نرخ های فوق برای استفاده شخصی ميباشد و برای استفاده بیش از یک نفر حد اقل دوبرابر خواهد شد
| 2 | هزینه اشتراک ماهیانه فایل PDF هر کدام از روزنامه های غیر انگلیسی شامل فرانسه ،آلمانی، اسپانیولی، یا عربی زبان با توجه به تقاضای کمتر از مورخ اول ژانویه 2024 به صورت زیر میباشد، حد اقل حد نساب کانال خصوصی 3 نفر.
کلی کانال خصوصی حداقل روزانه 10 عنوان هزینه ماهیانه 400 هزار تومان
سه ماهه 1150 هزار تومان
شش ماهه 2200 هزار تومان
دوازده ماهه 4300 هزار تومان
این تخفیف ها به اشتراک های جدید و تمدید های سر موعد اول دوره و بدون تاخیر میباشد و به دوستانی که در تمدید تاخیر داشته باشند تعلق نخواهد گرفت
یک روزنامه 130
دوتا 200
سه تا 250
چهار تا 300 هزار تومان | 588 |
| 3 | هزینه اشتراک ماهیانه فایل PDF روزنامه های انگلیسی زبان از مورخ اول ژانویه 2024 برابر با 11 دی 1403 به صورت زیر میباشد
کلی کانال خصوصی روزانه بین 20 تا 40 عنوان ،هزینه ماهیانه 250 هزار تومان
سه ماهه 720 هزار تومان
شش ماهه 1400 هزار تومان
دوازده ماهه 2 میلیون و 700 هزار تومان
این تخفیف ها به اشتراک های جدید و تمدید های سر موعد اول دوره و بدون تاخیر میباشد و به دوستانی که در تمدید تاخیر داشته باشند تعلق نخواهد گرفت
یک روزنامه 80
دوتا 120
سه تا 150
چهار تا 200 هزار تومان
نرخ های فوق برای استفاده شخصی ميباشد و برای استفاده بیش از یک نفر حداقل دوبرابر خواهد شد | 595 |
| 4 |  Bloomberg Businessweek USA - October 2, 2023
English | 68 pages | True PDF | 14.9 MB
Bloomberg Businessweek is a trusted source of essential, comprehensive insight that business leaders depend on to get ahead. Combining the innovation and scale of Bloomberg with the insight and depth of Businessweek, the new Bloomberg Businessweek offers a global perspective to help senior executives profit from smarter, faster, and more informed decisions. | 4 838 |
| 5 | دوستان خارج از ایران که حساب ریالی ندارند و مایل به تهیه اشتراک کانالهای خصوصی مجلات و روزنامه خارجی میباشند امکان پرداخت از طریق پی پال فراهم شده
مبنای تبدیل نرخ تاریخ نرخ گذاری اشتراک ها در اول سال میلادی میباشد
تماس جهت اشتراک
@magsorder | 5 286 |
| 6 | شماره جدید مجله موفقیت رسید
تماس جهت اشتراک
@magsorder | 330 |
| 7 | Success in Academic Writing (Bloomsbury Study Skills), 3rd Edition by Trevor Day
Requirements: .PDF reader, 5 MB
Overview: Writing essays, reports, presentations, papers or dissertations makes up a substantial element of most undergraduate and taught postgraduate degree courses. Anything that makes the process easier and more effective can make a big difference to your success as a student.
Taking the reader through the writing process, from understanding the task, through researching, reading and planning, to drafting and composing, reviewing and finalising their copy, the book contains many self-study exercises that will help to develop confidence, technique and clarity of purpose as a writer, whether a first year social science student or a final year scientist or engineer. The book adopts an empowering approach – encouraging the student to find out what they need to know in order to be a successful writer in their discipline. | 377 |
| 8 | SUCCESS magazine - March/April 2023
Requirements: .PDF reader, 32.4 MB True PDF
Overview: SUCCESS offers advice on best business practices, inspiration from major personalities in business and entertainment, and motivation to improve mind and body so that readers are in the best possible mental and physical shape to compete and reach their goals.
دو ماهنامه موفقیت رسید
تماس جهت خرید اشتراک
@magsorder | 6 069 |
| 9 | دوستانی که مایل به دریافت فایلها در اپلیکیشن ایمو هستند که هنوز در ایران فیلتر نشده
این امکان تا حداکثر 4 عنوان امکان پذیر شده | 425 |
| 10 | +1 مجله تایم شخصیت مهم سال هم اکنون در کانال خصوصی و همچنین اشتراک مجله تایم در دسترس میباشد | 2 |
| 11 | هزینه اشتراک ماهیانه فایل PDF مجله های انگلیسی زبان از مورخ 11 دی ماه 1401 و اول ژانويه 2023 به صورت زیر میباشد
کلی کانال خصوصی مجله انگلیسی شامل تمام عناوین موجود و ارسال به روز هزینه ماهیانه 300 هزار تومان
سه ماهه 850 هزار تومان
شش ماهه 1650 هزار تومان
دوازده ماهه 3200 هزار تومان
هزینه اشتراک مجلات به صورت انتخابی به ترتیب زیر میباشد
هفته نامه ها ی ویک و نیویورکر و بلومبرگ هر شماره 20 هزار تومان حداقل اشتراک یک ماهه
دو هفته نامه ها مانند تایم و نیوزویک و هفته نامه اکونومیست همراه با فایل صوتی و نیچر هر شماره 25 هزار تومان حداقل اشتراک یک ماهه
ماهنامه ها مانند آتلاتیک و ریدرز دایجست فلایت اینترنشنال ورلد ساکر 442 هر شماره 30 هزار تومان
دو ماهنامه ها مانند فوربس و فارین پالیسی و مجلات فصلی و همچنید مجلات دو جزئی مانند ساینتیفیک امریکن هر شماره 35 هزار تومان
هزینه اشتراک مجلات سایر زبانها هم مشابه انگلیسی میباشد
دوستانی که متقاضی هر دو کانال مجله انگلیسی و روزنامه انگلیسی هستند شامل تخفیف میشه و به جای 500 هزار تومان
440 هزار تومان بابت دو کانال ماهیانه
سه ماهه 1280 هزار تومان
شش ماهه 2500 هزار تومان
دوازده ماهه 4750 هزار تومان
پرداخت خواهند کرد
این تخفیف ها به اشتراک های جدید و تمدید های سر موعد اول دوره و بدون تاخیر میباشد و به دوستانی که در تمدید تاخیر داشته باشند تعلق نخواهد گرفت
برای اشتراکهای انتخابی یک یا چند مجله پرداخت در اول دوره این تخفیفات تعلق خواهد گرقت
سه ماه 3%
شش ماهه 5%
یکساله 10%
به اشتراک های ماهیانه بالای 600 هزار تومان 10 درصد تخفیف بیشتر تعلق میگیره
برای رعایت عدالت در پرداختی ها و سهولت پیوستن اعضای جدید فایلهای کانال مجله مدت دو ماه ماندگاری دارند وبعد از دو ماه به صورت اتوماتیک از کانال حذف خواهد شد لذا قبل از یک ماه حتما دانلود کنید
اشتراک مجلات منتخب به تاریخ 2022 از تاریخ قرار گرفتن نرخ در کانال به نرخ سال 2022 محاسبه خواهند شد
کلیه این اشتراک ها برای استفاده شخصی میباشد و فورواد آنها به کانالها و گروهها و افراد دیگر مجاز نیست.
کانال خصوصی کتاب انگلیسی به علت حد نساب نرسیدن در سال 2023 به حالت تعلیق در میاد و متوقف میشه
این تخفیف ها به اشتراک های شخصی جدید و تمدید های سر موعد اول دوره و بدون تاخیر میباشد و به دوستانی که در تمدید تاخیر داشته باشند تعلق نخواهد گرفت | 554 |
| 12 | هزینه اشتراک ماهیانه فایل PDF هر کدام از روزنامه های غیر انگلیسی شامل فرانسه ،آلمانی، اسپانیولی، یا عربی زبان با توجه به تقاضای کمتر از مورخ اول ژانویه 2022 به صورت زیر میباشد
کلی کانال خصوصی حداقل روزانه 10 عنوان هزینه ماهیانه 300 هزار تومان
سه ماهه 870 هزار تومان
شش ماهه 1700 هزار تومان
دوازده ماهه 3250 هزار تومان
این تخفیف ها به اشتراک های جدید و تمدید های سر موعد اول دوره و بدون تاخیر میباشد و به دوستانی که در تمدید تاخیر داشته باشند تعلق نخواهد گرفت
یک روزنامه 100
دوتا 150
سه تا 200
چهار تا 250 هزار تومان
برای اشتراکهای انتخابی پرداخت در اول دوره این تخفیفات تعلق خواهد گرقت
سه ماه 3%
شش ماهه 5%
یکساله 10% | 346 |
| 13 | هزینه اشتراک ماهیانه فایل PDF روزنامه های انگلیسی زبان از مورخ اول ژانویه 2023 برابر با 11 دی 1401 به صورت زیر میباشد
کلی کانال خصوصی روزانه بین 20 تا 40 عنوان ،هزینه ماهیانه 200 هزار تومان
سه ماهه 550 هزار تومان
شش ماهه 1050 هزار تومان
دوازده ماهه 2 میلیون تومان
این تخفیف ها به اشتراک های جدید و تمدید های سر موعد اول دوره و بدون تاخیر میباشد و به دوستانی که در تمدید تاخیر داشته باشند تعلق نخواهد گرفت
یک روزنامه 65
دوتا 100
سه تا 130
چهار تا 160 هزار تومان
برای اشتراکهای انتخابی پرداخت در اول دوره این تخفیفات تعلق خواهد گرقت
سه ماه 3%
شش ماهه 5%
یکساله 10% | 354 |
| 14 | The Economist (Intelligence Unit) - Worldwide Cost of Living 2022, 2022
Requirements: .PDF reader, 10mb True PDF
Overview: We are the research and analysis division of The Economist Group, the sister company to The Economist newspaper.
با دریافت اشتراک مجله اکونومیست یا کانال خصوصی مجلات انگلیسی به ویژه نامه های مرکز تحقیقات اکونومیست دسترسی خواهید داشت
تماس جهت خرید اشتراک
@magsorder | 4 334 |
| 15 | +3 برای دریافت نشریات مرکز تحقیقات اکونومیست
چشم انداز سال 2023
به دو روش زیر در دسترس میباشد
خرید اشتراک ماهیانه مجله اکونومیست
عضویت کانال خصوصی مجلات انگلیسی
تماس جهت خرید اشتراک
@magsorder | 5 408 |
| 16 | مقاله مجله Foreign affairs ⬆️⬆️ | 257 |
| 17 | XI UNBOUND
What then? Xi will no doubt see his victory as a mandate to do whatever he wants to achieve the party’s stated goal of rejuvenating China. His ambitions will rise to new heights. In a futile attempt to invigorate the economy without empowering the private sector, Xi will double down on his statist economic policies. To maintain his grip on power, he will continue to preemptively eliminate any potential rivals and tighten social control, making China look increasingly like North Korea. Xi might even try to stay in power well beyond a third term. An emboldened Xi may well accelerate his militarization of disputed areas of the South China Sea and try to forcibly take over Taiwan. As he continues China’s quest for dominance, he will further its isolation from the rest of the world.
But none of these moves would make discontent within the party magically disappear. The feat of gaining a third term would not mollify those within the CCP who resent his accumulation of power and reject his cult of personality, nor would it solve his growing legitimacy problem among the people. In fact, the moves he would likely make in a third term would raise the odds of war, social unrest, and economic crisis, exacerbating existing grievances. Even in China, it takes more than sheer force and intimidation to stay in power; performance still matters. Mao and Deng earned their authority through accomplishments—Mao by liberating China from the Nationalists, and Deng by opening it up and unleashing an economic boom. But Xi can point to no such concrete triumphs. He has less margin for error.
The only viable way of changing course, so far as I can see, is also the scariest and deadliest: a humiliating defeat in a war. If Xi were to attack Taiwan, his likeliest target, there is a good chance that the war would not go as planned, and Taiwan, with American help, would be able to resist invasion and inflict grave damage on mainland China. In that event, the elites and the masses would abandon Xi, paving the way for not only his personal downfall but perhaps even the collapse of the CCP as we know it. For precedent, one would have to go back to the nineteenth century, when Emperor Qianlong failed in his quest to expand China’s realm to Central Asia, Burma, and Vietnam. Predictably, China suffered a mortifying loss in the First Sino-Japanese War, setting the stage for the downfall of the Qing dynasty and kicking off a long period of political upheaval. Emperors are not always forever.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR:
CAI XIA was a Professor at the Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party from 1998 to 2012. | 76 |
| 18 | But by detaining him and his brother, Xi had issued his strongest warning yet to princelings and the top brass of the People’s Liberation Army that they should get in line.
China's Politburo Standing Committee members lining up at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, November 2012
China’s Politburo Standing Committee members lining up at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, November 2012 – Carlos Barria / Reuters
Xi has also ramped up his ostensible anticorruption drive. In the first half of 2022, the government has punished 21 cadres at or above the provincial ministerial level and 1,237 cadres at the district and departmental level. There has been a distinct focus on the security and intelligence agencies. In January, Chinese state television aired a confession by Sun Lijun, once a high-ranking security official, who had been charged with corruption and now faces the prospect of execution. His sin, according to the party’s top disciplinary body, was that he had “formed a cabal to take control over several key departments,” “harbored hugely inflated political ambitions,” and had “evil political qualities.” In March, Fu Zhenghua, who as deputy minister of public security had been Sun’s boss, was also charged with corruption, removed from office, and expelled from the CCP. The message was clear: obey or risk downfall.
Adding extra layers of insurance to his quest for a third term, Xi has issued a veiled threat to retired party cadres. Party elders have long wielded enormous clout in Chinese politics; it was retired elites who forced out Zhao in 1989, for example. In January, Xi took direct aim at this group, announcing that the government would “clean up systemic corruption and eliminate hidden risks” by retroactively investigating the past 20 years of cadres’ lives. And in May, the party tightened the guidelines for retired cadres, warning them “not to discuss the general policies of the party Central Committee in an open manner, not to spread politically negative remarks, not to participate in the activities of illegal social organizations, and not to use their former authority or position influence to seek benefits for themselves and others, and to resolutely oppose and resist all kinds of wrong thinking.”
Xi has also sought to guarantee the backing of the 2,300 CCP delegates invited to attend the National Congress, two-thirds of whom are high-level officials from across the country and one-third of whom are ordinary members who work at the grassroots level. The delegates have been carefully screened for their loyalty to Xi. And to prevent any surprises at the congress, a ban on “nonorganizational activities” forbids them from mingling outside of formal small-group meetings of their provincial delegations, limiting their ability to organize against a particular policy or leader.
In the months leading up to the congress, the CCP’s stealth infighting will probably intensify. Xi could order more arrests and more trials of high-ranking officials, and his critics could leak more information and spread more rumors. Contrary to the conventional wisdom among Western analysts, he may not have locked up a third term. Xi’s proliferating opponents could succeed in ushering him out of office, provided they either convince enough Standing Committee members that he has lost the support of the CCP’s rank and file or persuade party elders to intervene. And there is always a chance that an economic crisis or widespread social unrest could turn even stalwart allies against him. Despite all this, the most likely outcome this fall is that Xi, having so rigged the process and intimidated his rivals, will get his third presidential term and, with it, the right to continue as head of the party and the military for another term. And just like that, the only meaningful political reform made since Deng’s rule will go up in smoke. | 48 |
| 19 | In May, a group calling itself the “Shanghai Self-Saving Autonomous Committee” released a manifesto online titled, “Don’t be a slave—save yourself.” The document called on the city’s residents to fight the lockdown and form self-governing bodies to help one another. On social media, some Chinese have sarcastically proposed that the most effective plan for fighting the pandemic would be to convene the 20th National Congress as soon as possible to prevent Xi from staying in power.
Meanwhile, despite Xi’s claims of having vanquished poverty, most Chinese continue to struggle to make ends meet. As Li revealed in 2020, 600 million people in China—some 40 percent of its population—barely earned $140 a month. According to data obtained by the South China Morning Post, a Hong Kong newspaper, some 4.4 million small businesses closed between January and November 2021, more than three times the number of newly registered companies in the same period. Facing a financial crisis, local governments have been forced to slash government salaries—sometimes by as much as 50 percent, including pay for teachers. They will likely resort to finding new ways of plundering wealth from the private sector and ordinary citizens, in turn generating even more economic misery. After four decades of opening up, most Chinese don’t want to go back to the days of Mao. Within the CCP elite, many resent Xi’s disruption of the traditional power distribution and think his reckless policies are jeopardizing the future of the party. The result is that for the first time since the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, China’s leader is facing not only internal dissent but also an intense popular backlash and a real risk of social unrest.
FIVE MORE YEARS?
Harboring resentment is one thing, but acting on it is another. Members of the party’s upper echelons know that they can always be charged with corruption, so they have little incentive to maneuver against Xi. High-tech surveillance is presumed to be so pervasive that party elites, including retired national leaders, do not dare communicate with one another outside official events, even about mundane matters. The public, for its part, stays silent, held back by censorship, surveillance, and the fear of arrest. That is why opponents of Xi are focused on the one legal avenue for removing him: denying him a third presidential term at the upcoming National Congress.
Perhaps sensing the growing disappointment, Xi has done everything he can to tilt the playing field in his favor. The most important constituency, of course, is his fellow Standing Committee members, who ultimately have the greatest say over whether he stays in office, in part because of their control over members of China’s legislature. Xi has likely done what he can to ensure the support of Standing Committee members, from promising that they will stay in power to pledging not to investigate their families.
Nearly as important is the military, since denying Xi a third term would likely require the support of the generals. Propagandists routinely remind Chinese that “the party commands the gun,” but China’s leaders realize that in truth the gun is always pointed at the party’s head. Although Xi has steadily replaced China’s generals with his own men over the years, military officials’ rhetoric still wavers between emphasizing personal loyalty to Xi and institutional loyalty to the Central Military Commission, the body, headed by Xi, that oversees them.
In one potential sign of lingering opposition within the ranks, I learned last December from several of my contacts in China that Liu, the military official whom Xi had rebuked for criticizing policy on the Uyghurs—had disappeared along with his younger brother, also a general. Both brothers’ houses were raided. The news sent shock waves through the military, since as the son-in-law of a former president, Liu would normally have been considered untouchable. | 37 |
| 20 | Also in the center is a group descended from two retired top officials, Jiang and Zeng Qinghong (a former vice president), as well as a group called the Youth League Faction, consisting of supporters of former party leader Hu Jintao and the current premier Li.
Last are the subfactions on the right, which in the Chinese context means liberals who advocate a market economy and a softer form of authoritarianism (or even, in some cases, constitutional democracy). This camp, which I belong to, is the least powerful of the three. It includes followers of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, party leaders under Deng. It also arguably includes Wen Jiabao, who was China’s premier from 2003 to 2013 and still wields influence. When asked about his push for political reform in a 2010 interview, Wen responded, “I will not yield until the last day of my life.”
Within the CCP elite, many resent Xi’s disruption
of the traditional power distribution.
Xi faces growing opposition from all three factions. The left, while initially supportive of his policies, now thinks he has not gone far enough in reviving Mao’s policies, with some having become disenchanted after he cracked down on the labor movement. The center resents Xi’s undoing of economic reforms. And the right has been completely silenced by Xi’s elimination of even the slightest political debate.
Glimpses of these divides can be seen in the Standing Committee. One member, Han Zheng, is widely perceived as a member of Jiang’s faction. Li in particular seems to diverge from Xi, and a row between the officials is breaking out into public view. Li has long quietly opposed Xi’s zero-COVID policy, stressing the need to reopen businesses and protect the economy. In May, after Li told 100,000 party cadres at an online conference that the economy was in worse shape than expected, Xi’s allies launched a counterattack. In Xinhua, they defended him by arguing, “China’s economic development prospects will definitely be brighter.” As a symbol of their resistance to Xi’s COVID policy, Li and his entourage refuse to wear masks. In April, during a speech in the city of Nanchang, Li’s aides could be seen asking attendees to remove their masks. So far, Li has taken Xi’s imperiousness sitting down, always acquiescing out of necessity. But he may soon reach a breaking point.
Indignation at the elite level is replicating itself further down the bureaucracy. Early in Xi’s tenure, as he began to shuffle power, many in the bureaucracy grew disgruntled and disillusioned. But their resistance was passive, expressed through inaction. Local cadres took sick leave en masse or came up with excuses to stall Xi’s anticorruption initiatives. At the end of 2021, the CCP’s disciplinary commission announced that in the first ten months of that year, it had found 247,000 cases of “ineffective implementation of Xi Jinping’s and the Central Committee’s important instructions.” During the Shanghai lockdown, however, resistance became more overt. On social media, local officials openly criticized the zero-COVID policy. In April, members of the residents’ committee of Sanlin Town, a neighborhood in Shanghai, collectively resigned, complaining in an open letter that they had been sealed in their offices for 24 days with no access to their families.
China’s leader is facing not only internal dissent but also an intense popular backlash.
Even more troubling for Xi, elite dissatisfaction is now spreading to the general public. In an authoritarian state, it is impossible to accurately measure public opinion, but Xi’s harsh COVID measures may well have lost him the affection of most Chinese. An early note of dissent came in February 2020, when the real estate tycoon Ren Zhiqiang called him a “clown” for bungling the response to the pandemic. (After a one-day trial, Ren was sentenced to 18 years in prison.) Chinese social media platforms are awash in videos in which ordinary people beg Xi to end his zero-COVID policy. | 34 |
