KR

S. Taha. S. Taha’s father the translator of Faza’il, and S. Taha’s great grandfather from Indonesia, buried in Strand, near Cape Town, South Africa.

Just to explain why it is bad practice: A layperson does not typically comprehend that consensus can be speculative (zanni). Consensus for the uninitiated is consensus. As for invoking matters of the unseen (like you get x amount of punishment if you do x action), then likewise, an unsophisticated mind would not be able to reconcile that an a scholar adopting another view. Invoking the unseen in and of itself is not a conclusive argument when there is competing evidence.

When discussing evidence for points of law in front of common people, it is bad practice to invoke ahadith pertaining to the unseen. One could stick to quoting the simple practice of the Prophet صلى الله عليه وسل, or his statements ordering or proscribing something. That is enough.

[ملازمة الإمام أبي حنيفة لشيخه حماد] «لقد لازمت حمّادًا لزومًا ما أعلم أنّ أحدًا لزم أحدًا مثل ما لزمته، وكنت أكثر السّؤال، فربما تبرم مني، ويقول: يا أبا حنيفة قد انتفخ جنبي، وضاق صدري.» اهـ. مناقب الإمام أبي حنيفة للمكي (ت. ٥٦٨ هـ) https://t.me/madrasahanafiyya

Engineer Muhammad Ali Mirza says he is of no particular group, but that he is an "ilmi kitabi" Muslim. It is perhaps worth noting that the term "Kitabi" in the books of the jurists actually refers to a man from the Ahl 'l-Kitab, i.e., Jews and Christians. A Jewish or Christian woman is hence referred to as a Kitabiyyah. It might be better for him to drop the whole "Kitabi" thing and choose another word for his personal sect.

Reflections on a “Rebuttal” to “Guidelines for Gender Interaction in Islam” By Zeeshan Chaudri https://www.academia.edu/125495871/Reflections_on_a_Rebuttal_to_Guidelines_for_Gender_Interaction_in_Islam_

Hamza Yusuf is an amazing scholar. But my God, his blind spot is the mother of blind spots.

The above (and any subsequent posts) are a response to my comments recently on the Hanafi School. Regardless of perspective, it is a necessary counterbalance, making it an important read. Add: continues here: https://t.me/ElCanadiyy/44

Irrespective of all that has been forwarded vis-à-vis the Mu'tazili influence on the Hanafi school, or lack thereof, we still find ourselves in a quagmire if this is thesis is accepted. Unlike the Mu'tazili leanings of these usulis that were (according to the framing of ustadh Ismail) " brushed away under the carpet and were never properly addressed", it is no secret that the two mu'tazili authors mentioned above, Abd al-Jabbar and Abu al-Husain, were hihgly influential on the usul of the non-Hanafi jumhur. In fact, al-Umad of Abd al-Jabbar, and the subsequent al-Mu'tamad of Abu al-Husain, are widely considered as two of the four main early usul works around which later scholarship revolves. It is also no secret that both were mu'tazilah. Unlike al-Jassas, Abd al-Jabbar and Abu al-Husain both have books on mu'tazilite theology. Indeed, Abd al-Jabbar remains the primary resource for any researcher of mu'tazili thought and theology. He is conspicuously more mu'tazili than any of the Hanafi names above, save (perhaps) Abu Abdillah al-Basri. So, as is the case with the first two points, this would not be a Hanafi issue if it was true; it would be a problem any true student or researcher in usul would need to contend with. We'll continue with the other points when Allah grants us tawfiq.

Since the author had mentioned this point in the context of Hadith reports (though I am sure his claim stretches far beyond those parameters) and the modus operandi that Hanafis adopt regarding them. In that vein, I would like to mention two case studies: The first is the case of giving preference to one Hadith over the other because of it having more narrators than its counterpart. It has become famous that Hanafis do not give a Hadith preference over another due to it having a greater amount of narrators. There are various reasonings presented, one of which is to analogize Hadith with court testimonies, where such inequivalence is not consequential. This would, at first glance, appear to be something stemming from an erroneous application of analogy to the field of reports. It is forwarded by al-Jassas, claiming that he did not see his teacher al-Karkhi employing this form of reasoning. However, this opinion is met with some opposition. al-Jassas's student, Abu Abdillah al-Jurjani opines that this form of tarjih is a valid usuli mechanism. The same is mentioned from Abu Abdillah al-Basri, another student of al-Karkhi (arguably a closer student of his than al-Jassas) , who reports it from al-Karkhi himself! This is reported by Abu Talib al-Haruni, a student of al-Basri. Al-Saymari, another student of al-Jassas, reports that al-Jassas discarded this view after seeing other examples from the Hanafi imams that support this form of tarjih. What is interesting to note is that the majority of all of these names are Mu’tazili. This case study shows that these scholars were primarily looking at what seemed to be the operating principle in the school, and the primary means of discerning that principle was precedent. As we see in the case of al-Jassas, they were also willing to reconsider these views in the face of new data. The second case study is that of the mursal. This is not the time to discuss the correct conception of acceptance of the mursal, or the historical context behind this element in Hanafi thought. What I want to underscore is that this element (one decried by ustadh Ismail in this thread) is also something that is shared by the one Hanafi that nobody would dare claim is influenced by the Mu’tazilah: al-Tahawi. A look through al-Tahawi’s Sharh Ma’ani al-Athar shows clearly that he held at one point that connectedness (ittisal) was not a condition in a chain of narration. This is just one issue among others that we will not discuss, for brevity’s sake. The point here is that this issue, as central as it is to Hanafi thought, and as criticised as it is by interlocutors, is also not something held solely by the Mu’tazilah. In light of this, where else does this supposed I'tizali influence manifest itself? We will wait for examples, in the absence of which, it would not be amiss to dismiss this supposed elephant in the Hanafi room as a scapegoat that does not at all assist one in truly ascertaining the inner mechanics of Hanafi legal theory.

Prospective students of Fiqh ought to be aware of the I’tizal influence on the school and its unflattering history with the Ahl ‘l-Hadith.

This warning serves no purpose and holds no weight if it isn't supported with clear evidence of what is portrayed by ustadh Isma'il as an elaborate and pervasive influence of the Mu'tazilah that has hitherto gone unnoticed. To prove this, the author needs to show a set of usul propounded by these usulis that are: 1. Clearly influenced in their formation or defense by principles specific to the mu’tazilah. 2. Not preceded by any non-Mu’tazili precursor. Ideally he would also need to show that these usul are also found in non-Hanafi usulis of I'tizali leaning, like al-Qadi Abd al-Jabbar and Abu al-Husain al-Basri. After all, if the cause of these problems is I’tizal, then it should be found in other instances where that cause is found. In fact, it would need to be found a fortiori, as Abd al-Jabbar and al-Basri are a lot more faithful to the Mu’tazili doctrine than al-Jassas. To prove this claim, mentioning the odd reasoning with a whiff of Mu’tazili flavour, or mentioning a view not held by other Mu’tazilah, or ignoring other factors, would by no means be an acceptable proof.

The third point is one related to the effect of Mu'tazili thought and presence in the Hanafi school. The point begins with an overview of the historical reality of Mu'tazili oppression of the Ahl Al-Hadith and the suffering of great scholars at the hands of the Mu'tazilah and that this drove a wedge between the Hanafis and the Ahl Al-Hadith. This point is largely a non sequitur that, like the previous one, shows no concrete proof. Yes, there may have been tension (indeed there was) between Mu’tazili Hanafis and the Ahl Al-Hadith. That tension may have been intense. However, what proves that this tension led to a concrete shift in usuli attitudes? For example, despite being seen as a Mu'tazili, Al-Karkhi is known to have studied Hadith under scholars from the people of Hadith, like Isma’il ibn Ishaq al-Qadhi. The same is said about others. Even if this was not the case, the question remains: what proof is there that the ijtihad changed because of this Mu'tazilah-Muhaddithun rift?

One only needs to look at how Jassas himself treated Shafi’i and Malik in his al-Fusul

This could be because of some deep and latent Mu'tazili hatred of the Ahl al-Hadith, or it could be what it looks like: tension between opponents in the battleground of ideas. Until there is some clear proof that this tension is because of these two figures being considered scholars of the Ahl al-Hadith (this notwithstanding that this is not a very meticulous description of the facts, as Malik has a considerable amount of ra'y in his fiqh).

as for Ahmad, he rarely ever even mentions him in any of his works unless as a narrator in a chain of hadith when presenting an argument.

This could be some elaborate anti-muhaddithun hatred in al-Jassas, or it could be that this was the case in others too, due to various reasons. Al-Tabari doesn't mention Ahmad's opinion either in his Ikhtilaf al-Fuqaha'. Ahmad's mention is sparse in Jassas's refinement of al-Tahawi's Ikhtilaf al-Ulama' as well (unless this is also an elaborate conspiracy of al-Jassas to remove his name from al-Tahawi’s book). His name does feature in more Ahl al-Hadith oriented works of that time, like those of Muhammad ibn Nasr al-Marwazi and Muhammad ibn al-Mundhir. Reading into this some anti-muhaddith sentiment would need proof, which has not been provided. Even if it was proven, we will again ask: what concrete implication would this have on the usul themselves?

None of this would not have been a significant issue if the later school was open about the profiles of its first Usulis’ origins, but these events and developments were brushed away under the carpet and were never properly addressed in terms of these scholars’ theological impact on the development of the school’s Usul.

This is another allusion to the idea that there was, at best, some ignorance or, at worst, a purposeful cover-up that obfuscated the negative impacts of the I'tizal of these scholars. This assumes that there were significant negative impacts stemming from Mu'tazili beliefs that altered the Hanafi usul. This also remains to be proven, as does the resulting cover-up that the author seems to be positing.

Most of the key Usul discussed in the books of Usul of the Hanafis are highly questionable in their ascription to the Imams.

Let’s unpack this: “Most of the key usul” implies that over 50% of the usul are not usul that the imams would have accepted. This means that from any ten given usul, more than five would be false attributions. I am not concerned with disproving this; my only responsibility is to point out that this is a considerably major claim, with massive ramifications. One would only be reasonable in asking for this to be backed up with a proper study presenting, at least, a reliable sample of these “major usul” that represent a similar ratio, so that it may be extrapolated to the rest of the spectrum of usul. Ideally one would hope for a study of all or most of these usul to be studied in this endeavour, but even a sample would be useful to illustrate whether a massive claim like this holds weight. This sample has to be outside of the easy offhand examples of mafhum, takhsis al-aamm, and mursal.

The reality is almost all of the legwork for Hanafi Usul was done by Jassas. Everything is seen through the lens of Jassas.

Notwithstanding the fact that a far more central authority on Hanafi usul historically is Al-Karkhi, we are none the wiser on the reasoning that underlies Ustadh Ismail's claim that "everything is seen through the lens of Jassas". What it means to see everything through Al-Jassas's lens would need to be clarified. In any case, is al-Bazdawi simply following al-Jassas (if this is what he means)? What is the proof that he was simply following al-Jassas? What demonstrable proof is there in al-Dabusi’s oeuvre that shows that he “saw everything through the lens of al-Jassas? If everything is seen through the lens of al-Jassas, why would the later permissiveness on the mursal have proliferated, divorced from the fetters that al-Jassas had placed on the usage of the mursal? In fact, it is from the same Fusul of al-Jassas that Ibn Abd al-Hadi deduces that the difference of opinion on mursal is one that is largely reducible to semantics. The author then says that a student must be prepared to reconcile between the fiqh of the early imams and the cemented authority of later figures such as al-Jassas, al-Dabusi, and al-Sarkhasi (وهذا الضبط هو الأكثر كما ذكره الحموي في معجم البلدان). Here we will simply repeat what we have already mentioned, which  is that this is something every student of fiqh will need to face. This is not a Hanafi issue.

The first point, which is that the contributions of later scholars is many times equated to, equivocated with, or given preference over the works and positions of the founders of the school. This is definitely the case. However, it is also the case in every single other madhhab. The Shafi’i scholars of Egypt were somewhat opposed, or at the very least, apathetic to the printing of al-Shafi’i’s al-Umm (see El-Shamsy’s “The Hashiya in Islamic Law”). Even before that, the focus of later Shafi’is on post-Nawawi writings at the expense of earlier important works was decried by some scholars. Our teacher, Shaykh Muhammad Taha Karaan RahimahuLlah would complain about the lack of attention given to works between al-Nawawi and Ibn Hajar/al-Ramli. In fact, one of his projects early on was to produce a critical edition of Ibn al-Rif’ah’s Kifayat al-Nabih (the book has since been published). This is not a comment intending to belittle the Shafi’i school (or to claim that these earlier works were completely absent in their engagement); it is just a call to objectivity and fairness in our critique. Some setbacks are found in the tradition. We embrace those setbacks because we accept that our venerable scholars were humans; it is our job to now take their legacy and update it, part of which includes paying attention to these things. In any case, this is  just an example from a school other than the Hanafi madhhab. The exact issue that the author has highlighted here, with no exaggeration, is present in every other legal school. We can discuss the Maliki tradition and the riwayaat of Ahmad as well, but the point is sufficiently illustrated; this is everyone’s problem, not just the Hanafiyyah. Once this has been established, we can discuss possible ways of dealing with this issue at the end of the response.

13 REASONS WHY (NOT) I don’t usually enter these discussions, but after reading Ustadh Ismail's thread arguing why a prospective student of Fiqh would do well to, instead of studying Hanafi fiqh, opt for the study of one of the three adjacent madhahib, I noticed some things that I would argue are oversights or claims that lack substantiation. In light of that, I thought it useful to pen down some thoughts of mine regarding his piece here: The piece is a sort of mise en garde of sorts for the aspiring student of Islamic jurisprudence, presenting reasons that would dissuade one from embarking on a study of the Hanafi school. In this context, I felt it necessary to comment on the points raised with two points in mind: 1. Whether a given objection is reasonably founded. 2. Whether said objection is one solely applicable to the Hanafi madhhab, as opposed to being an inevitable hurdle in studying any madhhab. The former is understandable. The latter is crucial to underscore since the post aims to direct students to other avenues in the other three schools, in which case it would make little sense to point out deficiencies that are also invariably present in those recommended alternatives. Notwithstanding this, any objection that is reasonably founded and and possible solutions or methods to deal with it will be discussed at the end of this response. The response will be sent in parts bi idhniLlah.

The rebuttal goes onto state, 'The requirement of “ḍarūrah” (necessity) is not as vague as the authors make it out to be, though naturally, in practice there may be some unclear or grey areas – which exists in many areas of Islamic law. Some examples of necessity (both natural and religious necessities) were highlighted earlier, e.g. when women must attend the market for essential needs because not doing so would create undue difficulty.' Again, this is a total cop out from taking their extreme view to its logical conclusion, which is that: a) women should stay at home even when shopping because online commerce is now possible, b) attend lectures and spiritual reminders online only, and c) stay put in their hotel rooms even when attending the obligatory Hajj, apart from the offerings of the mandatory rites. The rebuttal then has the temerity of leveraging the principle: “Whoever is ignorant of the people of his time is an ignoramus.” This is all the while the extreme anti-intermingling camp isn't willing to put its money where its mouth is and call out specific scholars for perpetrating the type of intermingling that they are dead against. But whatever tickles their fancy. Let's write off people we disagree with as modernists and deformists, because that is what the religion demands, right? Because they don't conform with - like how the rebuttal describes - as the 'correct fiqh methodology'. Perhaps they can take said 'correct fiqh methodology' and apply to themselves for not delineating the contours of how intermingling can be further mitigated in the modern era of technology, and how they can introduce further restrictions on believing men and women by holding them hostage to their interpretation of fiqh and their anti-ikhtilat extremism. The above is not an academic response to the rebuttal - I'm sure something will be written up by Zeeshan and Muntasir. The objective here rather is to point out that the proponents of the extreme position should own up to the implications of their view by offering a fully fleshed out position that introduces more restrictions to women, in light of modern technology facilitating everything for her at home. But it is obvious they won't own up to those ramifications as that would be reputational suicide for them. Their inflated sense of ego is far greater than their pretences to fatwa and taqwa.

Even if there are violations by women (or men) on the conclusive rules of interaction, the solution is not to ban women, especially in this era. The effect of shunning women can be demonstrated to be absolutely detrimental to many segments of women in society. The job of a proper jurist nowadays is to assess this situation objectively and weigh all the pros and cons for Muslim society - locally, nationally, and globally. This is a key dynamic that minnows of the extreme anti-intermingling camp do not appreciate or are not willing to appreciate: their view travels much quicker than what hundreds of scholars would have said just a hundred years ago. Certainly, examples of malpractice should not be universalised. Education, and not legal diktat, is key. Any attempt at formulating a view on this issue without taking into consideration the pros and cons of women in open spaces - like in the time of the Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم - is a doomed endeavour. Yes legal verdicts became progressively harsh across the centuries, but not many discussed the negative ramifications offered up by these restrictions. And they certainly were not speaking with the 21st century in mind. The type of restrictions offered up by the author of the rebuttal echoes the same short-sighted adversarial response to the far-sighted Ibn Badis al-Maliki in Algeria, who wanted to set up religious educational and nurturing institutes for Muslim women - to much opposition from certain Muslim scholars who saw this as a gateway to the erosion of Muslim values like - in their view - non-intermingling. The camp that stood in opposition to Ibn Badis was clearly shaped and driven by their personal circumstances of the French occupation. Context is always key, and a mufti nowadays should be basing rulings on today’s context, not yesterday’s. If there is any plausible leeway in the Shariah to offer a relaxed ruling, then it is within the right of a mufti to issue that as a verdict. A sample of the decontextualised approach to citing scholarly precedent in this rebuttal are the quotes from Ashhab and Ibn Jama'ah vis-à-vis women in al-Masjid al-Haram. How their citations are relevant to the modern al-Masjid al-Haram is beyond any sane person analysing the situation. This camp should assess the modern al-Masjid al-Haram for what it is, and not for what was said 1200 or 700 years ago. Now, the logical conclusion of this camp's view should be that a Muslim woman should not attend any tawaf in her life - apart from the three that are required of her: Umrah, Ziyarah, and Sadar (if she's not on her cycle). By extension, she should not bother attending any Umrah/Hajj in her lifetime thereafter. By way of further extension, in the view of the extreme gender segregation, men should not attend al-Masjid al-Haram if there is no real need for them to do so, as that automatically entails intermingling in this era. The rebuttal acknowledges: 'A limited degree of ikhtilāṭ may be allowed in certain cases that are deemed as valid necessities in Sharī‘ah – like ṭawāf...' I'm sure nobody thinks that a nafl tawaf or a repeat Umrah/Hajj constitutes necessity. The rebuttal does, on one occasion, leverages the ground reality as is seen in many homes today - it says, 'Even today, some households have a similar arrangement, allowing a visitor to enter while the woman remains behind a curtain or screen, unseen.' So it's not as if that camp is aloof to the ground reality - they are simply just too cowardly to take their view to its logical conclusions in all spheres and situations, by banning women from any unnecessary intermingling and blocking all the means from them falling into such situations. The rebuttal couches itself as the proponent of a more cautious view, yet it fails to understand the dangerous implication of the declaration of the scholars of the Ummah as transgressors (tafsiq) en masse - which that it necessarily entails - as well as the ludicrous implications it binds itself into.

SUMMARY THOUGHTS ON THE REBUTTAL ^ Perhaps these chaps can do us all a big favour and spell out what they really think about everyone else from the Indo-Pak scholarly fraternity who interacts with women and lecture them without barriers. Not only that, but they should also be passing specific edicts warning people from attending their lectures or taking any aspect of the religion from them. The video, photo, and historical documentation of these major scholars speaking directly to women is there for all to see. They should own up to the logical conclusions of their extreme gender segregation position. This post underscores this basic fact. While they're at it, maybe they can offer judgement on all other Muslim societies across the world that don't subscribe to their view on extreme gender segregation (and the issue of women's mosque attendance, or among a whole host of other issues, some of which are highlighted below). Why not just declare them all to be transgressors and sinners over this issue? That is after all the logical conclusion of this extreme position. For example, the rebuttal seems to be happy citing from Mufti Taqi Usmani to prove a point, but that camp is fully aware that Mufti Taqi Usmani is a transgressor for some of the most egregious examples of intermingling (in their view) - they just have not yet spelled it out that he is actually a bona fide open sinner. But not only are they happy to cite from an open sinner, but they can look at themselves in the mirror and ask why they are too cowardly to pass a single fatwa mandating online and phone shopping for women, since they don't need to physically go to a shop or market. This is the logical conclusion from this recently released document that says, "In earlier times, some traders may refuse to transact with a woman without seeing her face (in case of a later dispute and the need to identify her in court). However, this particular need to reveal the face, of course, no longer applies today." They should back the courage of their convictions and officially pass the obligation of online shopping as a fatwa, for anyone who lives in a developed area with decent telecom networks. Historical fatwas have offered some ease on venturing out of the house for necessary items. Now, even that should be overturned in favour of prohibition, due to FTTH and 5G. In an attempt at faux sophistry, the rebuttal offers up a piece that is heavily precedent-dependent. After all, precedent trumps legal reasoning and the objectives of the Shariah in the view of the extreme anti-intermingling camp, which is the modus operandi of conveyor-belt muftis trained to suspend logical thinking. This is why any discussion on reverting back to the original default rulings in the time of the Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم is considered to be an anathema, when in fact the original Sunnah has benefits for women that cannot be denied, compared to locking women up in the house under the pretence of prohibited intermingling. Nobody from the extreme anti-intermingling camp has done a survey or assessment on how their legal position adversely impacts women in terms of their spirituality or religiosity, let alone psychology or self-worth. The world is evolving - and the Shariah has enough to accommodate a fresh approach to these issues. But these people want to everyone adopt a ‘preventative measure’ model that was negotiated centuries ago and want to pretend that it is applicable nowadays as well.

After hosting numerous articles and comments by Muntasir Zaman and Zeeshan Chaudry on their own Ahlussunnah forum, the ikhtilat police has finally come around to relegating them to the level of 'modernists and deformists'. Bravo.