Clément Molin
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Repost from Playfra - Maps & Analyses
I have never had to zoom out so much to show an advancement. I have no words. I will prepare another small update thread about this.
| 2 | The fightings are now occuring in the central part of the country, in the Kordofan region. On one side, the Rapid Support Forces, sponsored by the UAE are trying to consolidate their parralel government in Nyala with key victories.
The RSF occupy western Sudan, especially the Darfour region. They are supported by the UAE, Chad, South Sudan, Libya, CAR and Wagner/AC 🇦🇪🇹🇩🇸🇸🇱🇾🇨🇫🇷🇺. Their leader is Mohammed Hamdan Dagolo 'Hemetti'. They are Bagarra arabs, opposing black communities in the west and the Nile river tribes controlling the government.
They managed to occupy En Nahud, a key road hub in west Kordofan region, they are now trying to take Babanusa, they failed for now to destroy the encircled garrison. RSF forces resist SAF progress in the Kordofan regions, especially around El Obeid, key supply road and supply hub for the army. The main battle is happening in El Fasher, capital of Darfour region. There, SAF and Joint forces troops are encircled since 2 years. The SAF broke the 223rd RSF offensive on the 1.5 million inhabitant city (including at least 500 000 refugees). The city faces famine due to the encirclement.
The SAF coalition is composed of the officially recognized "government" led by general Abdel Fattah al Burhan. They represent Nile Arabs, but are also allied to avrious tribes, including African tribes of North Darfur. They are supported by Egypt, Iran, Turkiye, Russia and Qatar 🇪🇬🇮🇷🇹🇷🇷🇺🇶🇦. The SAF managed to liberate all the southern part of the country (Singa, Wad Madani), the capital city Khartoum and its neighbouring twins of Bahri and Omdourman. Now, they want to destroy the RSF by pushing them out of Kordofan before attacking their base in Darfur region. Massive fightings are ongoing around El Obeid and in the south Darfur region.
The battle for Kordofan is ongoing, it will decide wether the army is able to liberate and reunify the country or if the RSF militia will create a de facto arab state in the west of Sudan... | 1 385 |
| 3 |  +5The war in #Sudan 🇸🇩 is still going on, hundred thousands of soldiers are fighting on each side for the control of the country. | 1 100 |
| 4 |  +5لا يوجد نص... | 946 |
| 5 |  +9لا يوجد نص... | 931 |
| 6 | After few hours of work, I geolocated around 450 new russian 🇷🇺 airstrikes since july 11th, north and north-east of Pokrovsk 🇺🇦.
Those new airstrikes (in blue) are showing that russian forces intend a strong push north of Pokrovsk.
🧵THREAD🧵1/20 ⬇️ | 322 |
| 7 | https://x.com/clement_molin/status/1946883053751804002 | 307 |
| 8 | New english thread to come in the hour ! | 308 |
| 9 | English version 🇬🇧:
Over the past few months, I’ve mapped more than 5,000 Russian 🇷🇺 guided bomb impacts. With the increase in strikes and the acceleration of Russian advances — how can Ukraine hold?
The current Russian offensive in the south of Donetsk Oblast — now spilling into Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk — began in October 2023. Ukrainian forces have been pushed far from Donetsk. Russia has taken Avdiivka, Marinka, Vuhledar, Kurakhove, Selydove, and Ocheretyne. Since January 1, 2025, Moscow has continued its offensive southwest and east of Pokrovsk (population over 100,000). Russian forces are approaching Kostiantynivka (67,000 residents), gateway to the Kramatorsk urban area (~300,000 residents). Most of the territory captured by Russia since October 2023 is in southern Donetsk Oblast. The army is now advancing north and west into Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia.
Since October 2023, Russia has gained a major advantage: fire superiority and CAS (close air support) from its air force. Millions of North Korean shells keep artillery active, backed by drones. But the real game changer is the mass production of guidance kits.
Unguided FAB 500/1,000/1,500/3,000 bombs are now precision-guided, dropped from 40–70 km away by Su-34s — far from danger.
Since fall 2022, the Ukrainian front has been largely static — trench warfare. Russia aims to wear down Ukrainian forces while slowly advancing toward goals (Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Kurakhove, Pokrovsk...). In early 2025, Ukraine briefly managed to disrupt FAB guidance, reducing strike volume. But we’re now back to 100–200 bombs dropped daily across the front.
These strikes are visible in videos and satellite imagery, helping to anticipate Russian movements. I identified 1,000+ airstrikes last month supporting the Pokrovsk–Kostiantynivka offensive. I began mapping hundreds of visible impacts using freely available satellite images. They’re easy to see — classic artillery impacts are rarely visible (except in winter).
The problem? Urban airstrikes are harder to detect. I use geolocated videos to supplement mapping. Here are 3,000+ Russian airstrikes in the past 3 months between Pokrovsk and Huliaipole. They support two main offensives: east/northeast of Pokrovsk, and the “three rivers” junction.
East of Pokrovsk, strikes target hedgerows hiding Ukrainian positions, pushing toward encirclement. In the north, I’ve mapped strikes by date: red (before June 11), orange (June 11–July 11), light blue (since July 11).
One hedgerow with Ukrainian positions was devastated — forcing troops to abandon it. A single accurate airstrike can destroy a small position. That’s the underestimated risk with Ukraine’s new defensive line — made of many small fortified sites.
In Sumy, the same story: Russia razed villages and hedges for minimal gains. I mapped 1,700+ bomb impacts in villages and forests near the border. Around 25% of daily airstrikes now hit this area.
Example: dozens of strikes on a forest zone likely hiding Ukrainian troops.
The aim: overwhelm defenses. This is a core component of Moscow’s attrition warfare:
→ Artillery / Drones / FABs
→ Infantry assaults
Can Ukraine hold?
Ukrainian forces face ~200 daily attacks, often by small, lightly equipped groups. They’re also under constant glide bomb strikes. Russian progress isn’t yet critical, but salients are forming (Pokrovsk, Kostiantynivka, Siversk, Lyman, Borova, Kupiansk...) — requiring more men and logistics.
With this sharp increase in airstrikes — especially east and northeast of Pokrovsk — Moscow clearly hopes to capture the city in the coming months. It’s the current top objective.
To journalists, analysts, and mappers following me: this topic — like the one on fortifications — deserves broader public coverage.
Feel free to reach out. Thanks for reading! | 425 |
| 10 | L’Ukraine peut-elle tenir ? Elle subit près de 200 attaques quotidiennes, souvent menées par des groupes de 3-4 soldats peu équipés. Elle subit aussi les frappes massives, notamment celles des bombes planantes. La progression russe n’est pas encore décisive, mais des saillants apparaissent (Pokrovsk, Kostyantynivka, Siversk, Lyman, Borova, Koupiansk...), ce qui demande toujours plus d’hommes et une logistique de fer.
Avec cette recrudescence des frappes, notamment à l’est et au nord-est de Pokrovsk, Moscou espère prendre Pokrovsk dans les mois à venir. C’est l’objectif principal.
Pour les journalistes, cartographes, analystes qui me suivent : ce sujet des frappes aériennes (comme celui des fortifications) mérite d’être traité pour le grand public.
N’hésitez pas à me contacter. Merci d’avoir lu ! | 276 |
| 11 | French version 🇫🇷:
Sur les derniers mois j'ai cartographié plus de 5 000 impacts de bombes guidées russes 🇷🇺. Face à la multiplication des frappes et l'accélération de la progression, comment tenir ?
L'offensive russe en cours dans le sud de l'oblast de Donetsk, qui déborde désormais vers les oblasts de Zaporizhia et Dnipropetrovsk, a débuté en octobre 2023. Les forces ukrainiennes ont été repoussées loin de Donetsk, l'armée russe a pris Avdiivka, Marinka, Vouhledar, Kourakhove, Selydove ou encore Ocheretyne. Depuis le 1er janvier 2025, Moscou poursuit son offensive au sud-ouest et à l'est de Pokrovsk, dont l'agglomération est de plus de 100 000 habitants. Les forces russes s'approchent de Kostiantynivka, 67 000 habitants, porte vers l'agglomération de Kramatorsk (~300 000 habitants). La majorité du territoire capturé par l'armée russe depuis octobre 2023 se situe dans le sud de l'oblast de Donetsk. L'armée russe progresse maintenant vers le nord de cet oblast et vers l'ouest, dans ceux de Dnipropetrovsk et Zaporizhia.
Depuis octobre 2023, l'armée russe dispose d'un atout considérable : la supériorité des feux et l'engagement de son aviation en CAS (close air support). Grâce aux millions de munitions nord-coréennes, l'artillerie russe est restée largement active, suppléée par les drones. Mais c'est surtout la fabrication de kits de guidage qui est le véritable "game changer". Des bombes non guidées de type FAB 500/1 000/1 500/3 000 sont désormais guidées vers leur cible après avoir été lâchées à 40–70 km par un Su-34 russe, sans que celui-ci ne soit menacé.
Depuis l'automne 2022, le front ukrainien est principalement statique — une guerre de positions. L'armée russe mène une bataille d'attrition tout en progressant lentement vers ses objectifs (Bakhmout, Avdiivka, Kourakhove, Pokrovsk...). Début 2025, l'armée ukrainienne avait trouvé un moyen de dévier la trajectoire des FAB russes, ce qui avait temporairement réduit les frappes. Aujourd'hui, on est de nouveau sur 100 à 200 bombes larguées chaque jour sur le front.
Ces frappes sont visibles en vidéos et sur images satellites, ce qui permet d’anticiper les mouvements russes. J'avais notamment repéré un millier de frappes aériennes soutenant l’offensive entre Pokrovsk et Kostiantynivka le mois dernier. J’ai commencé à cartographier les centaines d’impacts visibles avec des images satellites en accès libre. On peut les repérer facilement, contrairement à l’artillerie classique (sauf en hiver).
Le principal problème : difficile de repérer les frappes dans les zones urbaines. J’utilise donc des vidéos géolocalisées. Voici plus de 3 000 frappes aériennes russes sur les trois derniers mois entre Pokrovsk et Houliaïpole. Elles soutiennent deux offensives principales : à l'est/nord-est de Pokrovsk et à la jonction des trois rivières.
À l'est de Pokrovsk, les frappes se concentrent sur les haies où sont positionnés les Ukrainiens, notamment vers le nord et l’ouest pour encercler la ville. Au nord de Pokrovsk, j’ai classé les impacts en rouge (avant le 11 juin), orange (11 juin–11 juillet), bleu clair (depuis le 11 juillet).
Une ligne de positions ukrainiennes a été totalement détruite sur une haie. Ce genre de frappe précise suffit à faire abandonner une position. C’est un risque sous-estimé pour la nouvelle ligne défensive ukrainienne, faite de multiples petites positions.
À Soumy, même scénario : l’armée russe a rasé des villages et des haies pour une progression minime. J’ai cartographié plus de 1 700 impacts dans les villages et forêts proches de la frontière. Chaque jour, plus d’un quart des frappes ont lieu dans cette zone.
Exemple : des dizaines de frappes sur une forêt où se cachent probablement des soldats ukrainiens.
L’enjeu derrière ces frappes, c’est la protection. C’est l’un des piliers de la guerre d’attrition menée par Moscou :
→ Artillerie / Drones / FAB
→ Assauts d’infanterie | 262 |
| 12 |  +9لا يوجد نص... | 372 |
| 13 |  +6لا يوجد نص... | 375 |
| 14 | NEW TWITTER THREAD :
From Sumy to Pokrovsk, can Ukraine 🇺🇦 withstand an unprecedented storm of fire?
De Soumy à Pokrovsk, l'Ukraine 🇺🇦 peut-elle tenir face à un déluge de feu inédit ? | 287 |
| 15 | Aujourd'hui, j'étais au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères :
Today I was at the French Foreign affairs ministry :
https://www.linkedin.com/posts/cl%C3%A9ment-molin-a11730261_rencontre-au-minist%C3%A8re-des-affaires-%C3%A9trang%C3%A8res-activity-7350948298041532418-4kMF?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_android&rcm=ACoAAEBbnK0BIAx4x63ak9_QL4ncGXtSPtBpEAA | 485 |
| 16 | 26/ As always, this job takes hours and is very important to understand war dynamics. I believe that researchers, mappers, analysts, journalists, and military actively use these types of free, open-access maps.
https://buymeacoffee.com/clement.molin | 791 |
| 17 | 2/ West of Pokrovsk, the reader will notice that anti-tank ditches, obstacles, and trenches are increasingly numerous in the open countryside.
3/ After fortifying the immediate rear of Pokrovsk, the Ukrainian army began its "New Donbass Line."
4/ I already mapped and analysed part of this New Donbass line. It is stretching from Zaporizhia oblast to Kharkiv.
5/ Now, a new ditch is being completed a few kilometers east, especially behind main Donbass cities.
6/ West of Pokrovsk, you can now see two lines of the 3 rows of ditches and multiple positions behind.
7/ This is the first part and the main one of the upgrade of the current line by a second one.
8/ On this map, you can see the new ditches and trenches dug around the mining city of Dobropilla this month.
9/ This small city is strategic, because it is now the main supply hub for ukrainian controlled Donbass.
10/ In blue, I added the possible continuity of new ditches and defensive lines around the city in the next few weeks. This will turn Dobropilla into a fortress.
11/ The two ukrainian lines forming together the "New Donbass Line" are both beyond all Donbass cities, Izioum, Lyman, Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Droujkivka, Kostiantynivka, Dobropilla, Pokrovsk.
12/ The new one, in orange, is not yet very developped, only few positions and 1 to 2 ditches.
13/ In total, there are nine major cities in Donetsk Oblast, all with a dedicated defensive network (in yellow) and defenses connecting these points of interest (in white). The two lines behind are new because they do not defend any cities.
14/ The capture of these nine important cities : Siversk, Lyman and Myrnohrod as frontline cities, Kostiantynivka, Pokrovsk, Sloviansk and Druzhkivka as populated industrial cities, Kramatorsk as the capital of ukrainian Donbass, and Dobropilla as a general stronghold ; will enable the russian victory of Donbass.
15/ As the territory west of Donbass, mainly in Kharkhiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblast is open fields, it requires new tactics and new defensive lines. You cannot defend the same way as the Donbass. It is then crucial to prepare for it, now.
16/ I've already mentioned it several times, the new Ukrainian strategy is as follows:
barbed wire
3 anti-tank ditches with barbed wire inside
1 row of dragon's teeth + barbed wire
small trenches and camouflaged bunkers
17/ 1- Barbed wire, to prevent Russian infantry attacks, is present on several heights and in several rows.
18/ 2- Three anti-tank ditches were built to prevent Russian armored vehicles from crossing. Barbed wire was placed in the middle.
19/ 3- Dragon teeth tied together with an iron cable and topped with barbed wire to prevent any clearing work. Perhaps some mines are also placed there?
20/ 4- Small positions and bunker, between the trees, with good cover against drone strikes, to hide infantry and drone teams.
21/ -> The holes in the defensive lines must be covered. Quite often, lines are stopping when there is a forest, a river or a village. Barbed wire must be placed in remote places where russian infantry can infiltrate.
22/ As you can imagine, ditches cannot cover everything. Roads must be prepared for ukrainian logistic and retreat. In this case, the ditch is stopping, forcing russian vehicle to take the road and being more exposed.
23/ The main defensive line continued as far as Kharkiv. Several small towns, such as Veliky Burluk, Shevchenkove, and Izium, were behind the main line. The objective was to provide a stopping point behind the Oskil in the event of a Russian advance.
24/ Despite being very impressive, both lines still have vulnerabilities, such as the lack of cover for roads or some holes. Additionnaly, there is a big vulnerability in Zaporizhia oblast. Both lines are not enough and there is a hole in the defense betseen Prossiana and Pokrovsk'e
25/ There is online multiple images and videos from this new line. This time, the work is being done correctly. However, its effect will only be decided after the fall of Donbass (+/- the 9 cities I talked about), so it's not for now. | 779 |
| 18 |  لا يوجد نص... | 618 |
| 19 |  +8لا يوجد نص... | 20 398 |
| 20 |  +9لا يوجد نص... | 15 405 |
