EthSecurity
الذهاب إلى القناة على Telegram
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المشتركون
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جارٍ تحميل البيانات
القنوات المماثلة
سحابة العلامات
الإشارات الواردة والصادرة
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| التاريخ | نمو المشتركين | الإشارات | القنوات | |
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| 01 أكتوبر | +7 |
منشورات القناة
| 2 | Tether and Circle have frozen about $2.1B, including $313M USDT on Tron. Nothing has gone to Tornado Cash. About $718M in ETH and about $500M in USDT are still free to move, and 17,270 BTC sits untouched.
https://arkm.com/explorer/entity/21a94755-f604-45e5-9501-6542e23005e8
@EthSecurity1 | 482 |
| 3 | Tether freeze ~ 1 billion
@EthSecurity1 | 1 675 |
| 4 | Binance hacked for $2.7 billions
@EthSecurity1 | 582 |
| 5 | Seems there is fucked up with binance
We wait for official announcement
@EthSecurity1 | 534 |
| 6 | zkLink Nova's Arbitrator hacked for~$780K
Rootcause: The Arbitrator contract had two related flaws that the attacker combined:
Uncleared transient storage of the authentication hash
During a legitimate claim, an authenticated gateway callback stores finalizeMessageHash (in transient storage). The Arbitrator later checks this hash against the expected source gateway, value, and message.
The contract never cleared finalizeMessageHash after use. Transient storage persists for the entire transaction, so a second claim in the same transaction could reuse the first claim’s already-set (and still-valid) hash without triggering a fresh authenticated callback.
Caller-controlled target and calldata in the claim path
The claim function accepted a user-supplied target address and calldata. This let the attacker point the second claim at the Ethereum Gateway and supply sendMessage() calldata that invoked a privileged syncBatchRoot update with an attacker-chosen root.
Resulting attack flow (same transaction):
First claim: legitimate Linea message → sets finalizeMessageHash and forwards normally.
Second claim: reuses the stale hash for verification while forcing the trusted Arbitrator to call the Ethereum Gateway with malicious root-update calldata.
The zkLink contract accepted the attacker-controlled root because it came from the authorized Gateway.
Attacker then submitted matching withdrawal proofs against the forged root and drained funds.
@EthSecurity1 | 1 327 |
| 7 | a Safe multisig which lost $7.45M due to a misconfiguration on Avalanache.
RootCause: A Safe multisig misconfiguration on Avalanche involving unrevoked unlimited token approvals to a predictable, empty address.The 2-of-7 Safe had given unlimited spending approvals (for WAVAX, USDC, WETH.e, and BTC.b) to the address 0x3725bd4d175283108156c3f15f86e1c51266155d.
On other chains (Base, Arbitrum, Ethereum), that same address held the team’s legitimate pool contract. On Avalanche, however, the address was empty. It is the deterministic address produced by Safe’s public CreateCall contract on its 13th deployment, and CreateCall had never been used on Avalanche. The approvals (set in a batch transaction on 2026-03-07) were never revoked.
Because the target address was unoccupied, anyone could deploy their own contract there (via the Safe singleton factory + CreateCall) and then use the existing unlimited allowances to drain the Safe’s tokens. An attacker did exactly that; an MEV bot front-ran the drain in the same block.
@EthSecurity1 | 1 338 |
| 8 | - Device hardening & factory reset guides - link
- Top 5 Crypto & Web3 Hacks That Started With Phishing - link
- Cross-Function Reentrancy: When Functions Betray Each Other
@EThSecurity1 | 1 300 |
| 9 | - Moving from EVM to Move Part 1
- Top 25 MCP Vulnerabilities - link
@EthSecurity1 | 627 |
| 10 | X 100 hacked for $4.75M
Rootcause : Anyone could instantly join the Senate by freezing X tokens (and paying a small candidacy fee, reported as ~100 X). Membership was based on the current frozen stake. There was no snapshot of balances/voting power and no timelock (or other delay) on proposals.
A proposal could be created, voted on (with the newly acquired majority), and executed in the same transaction, including calls that invoked the treasury’s own swap functions (e.g., v3Swap).
This allowed the attacker to:
1. Flash-borrow USDT (via Aave), buy X tokens, and distribute/freeze them across controlled contracts to seize 2 of the 3 Senate seats.
2. Immediately propose + vote + execute a malicious proposal that forced the Freezer to swap a large amount of treasury X tokens into a freshly created, attacker-controlled (and empty/manipulated) PancakeSwap V3 X-USDT pool with min-output set near zero.
3. Withdraw the liquidity from that pool, sell the recovered X on legitimate markets, repay the flash loan, and keep the profit (~$4.75–4.85M USDT range reported across related alerts).
@EthSecurity1 | 1 308 |
| 11 | - The Crypto Threat Landscape: Threats and Exploits Targeting Crypto Users - link
- Blockchain Forensics: A Practical Guide to Tracing Stolen Funds
- Blockchain Forensics: Attribution Techniques and the Role of OSINT
- Blockchain Forensics: Advanced Blockchain Forensics Techniques and Additional Resources
@EthSecurity1 | 1 266 |
| 12 | All versions of self-hosted GitLab from 12 years ago up to now are vulnerable.
@EthSecurity1 | 552 |
| 13 | https://blog.railway.com/p/security-disclosure-wednesday-october-21st
@EthSecurity1 | 540 |
| 14 | Security vulnerabilities reported in a SINGLE day:
PHP — 2 CVEs
Node.js — 10 CVEs
NGINX — 5 CVEs
Go — 1 CVE
GitLab — 12 CVEs
eMudhra — CA certificate compromise
@EthSecurity1 | 524 |
| 15 | - The adoption of Solana OFAs has increased over the past six months.
to learn about how they work, some issues we hear about from the top Solana apps, and brief thoughts on if these arrangements making Solana better for apps and users. - link
- The sandwich attack vector built to be missed. - link
@EthSecurity1 | 1 135 |
| 16 | AlpsCon.ai hacked $152K
Rootcause:
Access-control / operational failure (the entry point)
The Hardhat/Anvil default account #0 (0xf39fd6e51aad88f6f4ce6ab8827279cfffb92266) — whose private key is publicly known — was added to the production KYC whitelist in a bulk import on 2025-08-24 and left there for ~14 months.
Anyone could therefore use EIP-7702 to delegate arbitrary code to that address and execute transactions as a fully verified, whitelisted wallet.
Reward-accounting bug (the actual value extraction)
Newer reward contracts (V7–V9) recursively imported balances from earlier versions. When a fresh stake appeared in an older hub that still accepted deposits, the newer contracts multiplied the newly visible balance by the already-accumulated profitPerShare while the account’s entryProfitPerShare stayed at zero.
This let a brand-new (flash-loan funded) stake claim the entire historical reward history (~$355K USDC), emptying the pool. The attacker then unstaked, sold the ALPS, repaid the flash loan, and kept the net ~$152K.
@EthSecurity1 | 1 149 |
| 17 | Trillion Dollar security - link
Validator sniping: How to harvest IP addresses to redirect MEV - link
The Crypto Threat Landscape: Threats and Exploits Targeting Crypto Users
@EthSecurity1 | 1 471 |
| 18 | osec_io used AI agents (led by Claude Opus) and custom tooling to decompile GoonFi V2, a closed-source Solana propAMM written in Rust, achieving byte-identical recompilation of all 219 functions from on-chain bytecode. - link
@EthSecurity1 | 1 612 |
| 19 | Former Mt. Gox CEO: Ledger Received Hardware Wallet Tampering Reports Since December 2025 but Issued No Public Warning
@EthSecurity1 | 1 491 |
| 20 | It approved Telegram is totally shit and unencrypted
@EthSecurity1 | 775 |
