سفيان ناصرالله

“Structure alone is not enough, however. Even with the right connections to the right people or institutions, making networks work requires a human factor. No form of human organization can escape power and politics; no purpose-built organization can escape the need for some form of leadership. Power in networks is different from power in hierarchies. Leading in networks is different from leading in hierarchies. Understanding and operationalizing those differences is as critical to successful strategies of connection as understanding network architecture - Anne-Marie Slaughter : The Chessboard and the Web.

“Resilience networks come in many different forms: a mesh, a modified star, and a customized hub, among others. Task networks are all versions of a hub network: small groups, pods, or teams connected in various ways. That is not surprising, given that the specificity of a task requires a degree of direction and precision in its execution.” - Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Chessboard and the Web

قال عز وجل: وَلَا تَكُ فِي ضَيْقٍ مِّمَّا يَمْكُرُون

ثلات مقالات طويلة قيد الإعداد ١ـ النصر والهزيمة في الحروب الحديثة ٢ ـ استراتيجيات تشكل مفهوم الإرهاب ٣ ـ في العداوة نسأل الله التوفيق والسداد

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"In the age of networks, victory is not about seizing territory but about controlling connections." - Anne-Marie Slaughter, in The Chessboard and the Web

Thomas Schelling's major contribution to the concept of strategic victory is his focus on the role of communication and cooperation in conflict. He argued that victory is not simply a matter of defeating one's opponent, but also of persuading them to accept one's desired outcome. This can be done through a variety of means, including signaling, bargaining, and threats. One of Schelling's most important insights is that strategic victory can often be achieved without the use of force. He argues that even when two sides have conflicting interests, they may be able to reach a mutually beneficial agreement if they can communicate effectively and cooperate. This is because both sides may have an interest in avoiding the costs and risks of conflict. Schelling's work has had a significant impact on our understanding of strategic victory. His insights have been used by policymakers and strategists in a wide range of fields, including international relations, business, and law. Here are some specific examples of Schelling's contributions to the concept of strategic victory: • He developed the concept of focal points, which are mutually understood strategies that can help parties to coordinate their behavior and avoid conflict. For example, the focal point of driving on the right side of the road is that it allows everyone to predict how others will behave, avoiding accidents. • He emphasized the importance of communication in conflict. He argued that parties can often achieve their desired outcomes by signaling their intentions and bargaining effectively. For example, a country can deter aggression from another country by signaling that it is willing to use force if necessary. • He highlighted the role of threats in conflict. He argued that threats can be effective in persuading others to cooperate, but they must be credible and believable. For example, a country's nuclear deterrent is only effective if other countries believe that it is willing to use nuclear weapons if necessary.

"Traditionally, analysts assumed that victory went to the side with the better army; in an information age it may also be influenced by who has the better story. Competing narratives matter." - Power and interdependence / Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye.

According to John Ikenberry, strategic victory is the achievement of a postwar settlement that is both stable and cooperative. This requires the victor to exercise self-restraint and to build a durable order that is based on shared norms and institutions. Ikenberry argues that there are three key elements of strategic victory: • Self-restraint: The victor must be willing to forgo the opportunity to maximize its own power and short-term gains in order to build a more stable and cooperative order. • Legitimacy: The victor must create a postwar settlement that is perceived as legitimate by other states and by its own citizens. This requires the victor to act in accordance with shared norms and values. • Endurance: The postwar settlement must be durable and able to withstand the test of time. This requires the victor to build a system of institutions that can manage conflict and promote cooperation.

“The effort to make sense out of ambiguous, inconsistent, even contradictory data is a fundamental human impulse. Clarity, certitude, or just escape from the discomfort of not knowing—the urge is to bring order out of chaos, to eliminate uncertainty. The order in things that this effort discovers—or imposes—is taken to be the truth. Certitude has, of course, no necessary connection with truth. Partly responsible for this is what might be called the paradox of belief. That is, the level of emotional attachment to a given interpretation tends to vary inversely with the amount of empirical evidence supporting it. The more a hypothesis rests on a priori argument or circumstantial evidence, the more intensely its proponents defend it. But the less the direct evidence, on an issue of empirical fact, the greater the probability that it is flawed or simply false. Intelligence analysis approaches the truly objective only to the extent that its practitioners recognize and compensate for the subjective factors that so easily corrupt professional judgment. But even the most professional of analysts is vulnerable to the influence of unexamined preconceptions and values.” - Ahern, Thomas L. Jr., Good Questions, Wrong Answers: CIA Estimates of Arms Traffic through Sihanoukville, Cambodia during the Vietnam War, (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, February 2004), vii. Declassified and Approved for Release February 19, 2009, CaseCOS260S26.