Source Byte
الذهاب إلى القناة على Telegram
هشیار کسی باید کز عشق بپرهیزد وین طبع که من دارم با عقل نیامیزد Saadi Shirazi 187
إظهار المزيد8 146
المشتركون
+2124 ساعات
+707 أيام
+31530 أيام
أرشيف المشاركات
8 149
hers is detals :
1. 300 MCI employees
(Name and surname, father's name, gender, date of birth, place of birth, ID card, address, province, address, postal code, mobile, plan, email)
2. 300K client name & emails
(customerBriefInfo_custName,indvBrief_email)
8 149
Repost from Ai000 Cybernetics QLab
In April 2025, the threat actor group named Shadowbits claimed to have breached Hamrahe Avval (MCI), Iran's largest mobile operator, and to have gained access to its database. According to the threat actor, a substantial amount of data belonging to MCI's customers was taken, including full names, father names, place of birth, gender, national ID numbers, addresses, postal codes, birth dates, mobile numbers, and SIM card information.
@aioooir | #hack
8 149
Repost from Ralf Hacker Channel
Decrypting Yandex Browser passwords
https://github.com/Goodies365/YandexDecrypt
@exited3n переписал на python:
https://github.com/akhomlyuk/Ya_Decrypt
#creds #pentest #redteam #ad
8 149
سلام. بعضی از چنلهای تلگرام فعال در حوزه امنیت سایبری و OSINT رو اینجا جمع کردم.
خوشحال میشم اگه دوست داشتید برای افزودن کانالهای بیشتر مشارکت کنید. در گیتهاب، یا PV من.
https://mehrazino.github.io/tg-cybersec
8 149
سلام. بعضی از لیست چنلهای تلگرام فعال در حوزه امنیت سایبری و OSINT رو اینجا جمع کردم.
https://mehrazino.github.io/tg-cybersecخوشحال میشم اگه دوست داشتید برای افزودن کانالهای بیشتر مشارکت کنید، در گیتهاب، یا PV من.
8 149
Repost from Order of Six Angles
Xintra APT Emulation Lab - Husky Corp
https://bri5ee.sh/blue%20team/2025/04/07/xintra-apt-emulation-lab-husky-corp.html
8 149
Repost from Reverse Dungeon
Mandiant Malware Analysis 2025 Course - Manuals and Lab Solutions
(without 40GB flarevm images 🥰)
If need images - t.me/Cobalt_Strike_info/1466
8 149
Event Tracing for Windows detection in the kernel against rootkits
In this post, you’ll see how adversaries (both real threat actors and Red Teams) use ETW tampering, why it’s critical for modern EDR’s to detect these techniques, and how my Sanctum EDR demonstrates robust detection and response capabilities against real-world threats like Remcos and Lazarus.
